Albert

Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

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dc.contributor.author Yakovlev, Evgeny
dc.contributor.author Slinko, Irina
dc.contributor.author Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina
dc.contributor.editor Maskin, Eric S.
dc.date.accessioned 2021-12-16T13:58:20Z
dc.date.available 2021-12-16T13:58:20Z
dc.date.issued 2004
dc.identifier.citation Slinko, Irina, Evgeny Yakovlev, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia.” American Law and Economics Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 284–318. en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12111/7973
dc.description.abstract How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using microlevel data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: (1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; (2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; (3) capture adversely affects small-business growth and the tax capacity of the state; and (4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries American Law and Economics Review;7, no. 1
dc.title Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia en_US
dc.type Journal article en_US


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