Carsten Colpe

Das Mihrgan-Fest

Das Mihrgan-Fest ist kein islamisches, sondern ein altes zoroastrisches Fest. Auch sein Name ist altpersischen Ursprungs; es trägt einen alten Götternamen. Die altpersischen Monats- und auch Tagesnamen wurden nämlich durch Götternamen wiedergegeben, die sich, wenn auch sprachlich umgewandelt, bis heute erhalten haben.

Die Probleme der altpersischen Zeitrechnung und des Kalenders sind im einzelnen genau so verwickelt wie die der Religion. Ich muß mich deshalb auf den eben erwähnten Kalender beschränken. Er ist das Ergebnis einer Kalenderreform, die in den letzten Jahren Dareios' I. des Großen oder in den ersten Jahren Xerxes' I. von den zoroastrischen Theologen, den Magiern, durchgeführt wurde. Auch von ihm gab es noch mehrere Redaktionen, die den Dialekten und örtlichen Überlieferungen der verschiedenen Landschaften angepaßt waren; wir kennen eine awestische Fassung, die, der mittelpersischen und später der neupersischen Sprache angepaßt, seit dem Mittelalter bei den Parsen von Bombay weiterlebt, eine altpersische, die u.a. in Kappadokien eingeführt wurde und deren Monatsnamen bei Johannes Lydus (550 n. Chr.) und in einem spätragischen Ptolemaios-Kommentar erhalten geblieben sind, ferner eine chwarzemische und eine sogdische Fassung; die beiden letzteren teilt Biruni mit.

Dieser Kalender nun beruhte auf einem Sonnenjahr, das mit der Frühjahrstagundnachtgleiche begann und 365 Tage zählte, verteilt auf 12 Monate zu 30 Tagen mit 5 Schalttagen am Jahresende. Es sei nur ganz kurz erwähnt, daß dieses Schaltsystem uns heute ganz außerordentliche chronologische Probleme aufgibt; einmal wurde die 5-Tage-Schaltung nur im sakralen Gebrauch verwendet, während man im bürgerlichen Leben keine Rücksicht auf sie nahm; man hatte also ein bürgerliches Jahr ohne und ein religiöses Jahr mit Schaltung, die man dann auch durch Einfügung beweglicher Schalttage ins bürgerliche Jahr öfters wieder aneinander anzugleichen suchte; ferner hätte, da das Sonnenjahr bekanntlich 365 1/4 Tag lang ist, alle 120 Jahre ein Monat eingeschaltet werden müssen, was wohl meistens unterblieb oder zu falschen Zeitpunkten durchgeführt wurde; schließlich mußte eine Schaltung unter ganz besonderen Feierlichkeiten von einem König veranstaltet werden, war also nur bis zur islamischen Eroberung möglich. Die letzte Schaltung hat nach Biruni der sassanidische König Yazdegird I. vorgenommen, jedoch ist es auch möglich, das dieses eine Kalenderreform gewesen ist.

Ich habe diesen Sachverhalt gestreift, um zu zeigen, wie es infolge Fehlens einer astronomischen Überwachung des Kalenders, das natürlich in islamischer Zeit unverbessert anhielt, mit der Zeit zu beträchtlichen Verschiebungen der Daten und der Feste gegenüber den Jahreszeiten kommen mußte. Daher erklärt es sich, daß wir heute für jedes Jahr der persischen Geschichte aus den Angaben der zeitgenössischen Autoren gesondert berechnen müssen, wann etwa unser Mihrgan-Fest wirklich stattgefunden hat; ferner erklärt sich so, daß die Feste ihren Charakter oft geändert haben. So war z.B das Mihrgan-Fest, das sich ursprünglich auf die Wintersonnenwende bezog, schon bald zum Herbstfest geworden und

Doch damit sind wir schon bei der Stellung des Mihran-Festes innerhalb des altpersischen Kalenders. Von der absoluten Chronologie können wir jetzt abschauen. Jener Kalender ist wahrscheinlich die iranische Nachbildung des ägyptischen Kalenders, den die Perser nach der Eroberung Ägyptens durch Cambyses (529-522 v. Chr.) kennengelernt hatten; denn ägyptisch ist vor allem der Grundsatz, jeden einzelnen Tag des Monats einer bestimmten Gottheit zu weißen und ihn nach dieser zu benennen. Nun hörten wir schon zu Anfang, daß im persischen Kalender auch die Monatsnamen selbst nach Göttern benannt wurden. Der siebente Monat ist hier nach Mithra benannt; in der Reihenfolge der Monate war er wohl ursprünglich der erste Monat des Winterhalbjahres, was seiner Bedeutung als Monat des Sonnengottes nicht widersprechend würde, da ja vom 1. Tage des Winters an das Tageslicht wieder zu wachsen anfängt.


Sabine Schmidtke

Al-\textsuperscript{c}Allāma al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī and Shi\textsuperscript{c}ite Mu\textsuperscript{c}tazilite Theology

1.

\textsuperscript{c}Hasan b. \textsuperscript{c}Yūsuf b. al-Mu\textsuperscript{c}tahhar al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī, who is usually known as al-\textsuperscript{c}Allāma al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī (648/1250-726/1325), is certainly not an unknown figure among western scholars on Islam. His major contribution to the development of Shi\textsuperscript{c}ite law has long been acknowledged and his legal works are considered nowadays among the Shi\textsuperscript{c}ite community as belonging to the most authoritative writings in this field. Moreover, he contributed important writings in the field of methodology of law (\textit{uṣūl al-fiqh}) where especially his \textit{Kitāb Mabādi' al-wuṣūl ilā Ǧilm al-uṣūl} and his more extensive \textit{Kitāb Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā Ǧilm al-uṣūl} should be mentioned.

Especially because of the translation of his creed \textit{Bāb al-ḥādi Ǧashar} together with al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Sūyūrī's (d. 821/1418) commentary on it by W. M. Miller into English which was published in 1928, al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī became further known as an authority in Shi\textsuperscript{c}ite theology. Among Shi\textsuperscript{c}ites, especially his more concise treatises on theology are studied until today as basic texts on theology.

Al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī's views on the Imamate as they appear from his \textit{Kiṭāb Minhāj al-karāma fi l-imāma} which was refuted by Ibn Taymiyya in his \textit{K. Minhāj al-sunna} have been investigated by Henri Laoust in a number of articles.

The present article will attempt to outline the principal characteristics of the theological views of the \textsuperscript{c}Allāma al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī in comparison with other relevant developments in Islamic thought.

Taking into consideration that al-\textsuperscript{c}Allāma al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī belonged to the last innovative Mu\textsuperscript{c}tazilite school in Shi\textsuperscript{c}ism, this article will be subdivided into two parts.

The first part will provide a short outline of the development of Shi\textsuperscript{c}ite theology up to the time of al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī. The second part will mainly be concerned with al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī's theological views and will provide an attempt to show al-\textsuperscript{c}Hillī's place in the development of Shi\textsuperscript{c}ite \textit{kalām} in relation to other theological schools in Islam.
2.1

The earliest Imami theologians engaged in theological discussions already in the second century A.H., i.e. in the time of the sixth Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d.148/765). Their chief representatives were Muhammad b. al-Nu'man, usually called Shaytan al-Taq among his opponents, Zurara b. Acyan (d.150/767), Hisham b. Salim al-Jawaliqi and Hisham b. al-Hasam (d.179/795-6). None of their writings are extant and our knowledge about their theological views is restricted to the titles of their works as they are reported by Ibn al-Nadim and Shaykh al-Tusi and to the reports of the different heresiographers, especially al-Ash'ari.

Their theological doctrines are characterised by their direct disagreement with the commonly accepted views of the Mu'tazilites and as such also with the views of the later Shi'ites.

With respect to some of their positions, parallels can be found between these earlier Imami theologians and the Sunnite traditionalists, for example when they maintained that God is, after having created space, immanent in space, namely His throne, or when they ascribe motion to God. In their teaching about God's attributes, however, the early Imami thinkers disagreed with all parties. They rejected the concept of essential divine attributes which are not subject to change and maintained rather that all divine attributes are subject to constant change. God does not know for instance all things from eternity because this would necessitate the eternity of things. Rather, He knows only existent things.

In regard to the question of man's acts they supported the concept of freedom of choice. On the other hand, however, they did not agree with the Mu'tazilites that man is the only author of his acts but held rather an intermediate position between the adherents of constraint (jabr) and the Mu'tazilite position of empowerment (tafwid). Hisham b. al-Hasam for instance maintained that although man's act is to be defined as his choice since it results from his will, he is nonetheless constrained in his act because he requires an occasion produced by God for his act.

However, the theory of the imamate as it was developed by Hisham b. al-Hasam remained the basis for the later fully developed Imami doctrine. Mankind is in permanent need for a divinely guided Imam as authority in religious matters. He is impeccable (ma'sum) but does not receive divine messages (vahy). Each Imam was installed by his predecessor by an explicit appointment (nass) and whoever rejects the Imam of his age is an infidel (kafir).

After the death of Hisham b. al-Hasam who differed at times from the positions of the other representatives of the school because he was influenced by the dualists, the doctrines of the school were carried on for some time. Because of opposition both from rival Shi'ite theological
schools and the Shiʿite traditionalists who opposed the engagement in *kalām* in general, the school became soon extinct.

The first Imami theological school which, though being independent, maintained positions very similar to the chief Muʿtazilite views was founded by the Banū Nawbakht. Their chief representatives were Abū Ismāʿīl b. Ali b. Abī Sahl b. Nawbakht (d.311/923-4) and his nephew Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbakhti (d. between 300/912 and 316/923).

Since none of their works are extant, their positions can only be deduced from the titles of their works. The main secondary source for the reconstruction of their views is the *Awā'il al-maqašāt* by Shaykh al-Mufid (d.413/1022) where their views are regularly mentioned.

It should be noted here that the *Kitāb al-Yaqūt* which was written by a certain Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Nawbakht and upon which al-Ḥillī wrote a commentary entitled *Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-Yaqūt* does evidently not reflect the views of the Banū Nawbakht. It has been suggested that this work was written at least one or to centuries later than the year 340/941 which has been suggested by CAbbās Iqbal in his study on the Banū Nawbakht. This view can be supported by the fact that Abū Ishāq holds positions which are usually identical with the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-_BUSRī (d.436/1044). Since it is highly unlikely that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-_BUSRī would follow such an obscure writer, as al-Ḥillī suggested concerning one question, one may rather assume that Abū Ishāq belonged to those Shiʿite Muʿtazilites whose theological views were influenced by the views of the school of Abū l-Husayn al-_BUSRī.

The Banū Nawbakht agreed with the Muʿtazilites in their principal theses of God's unity (*tawḥīd*) as they opposed any anthropomorphic conception of God and of His justice as they affirmed human free will and opposed the view that God creates man's acts. Although they held firm to the Imamite doctrine of the Imamate with the result that they disagreed with the Muʿtazilites on some related matters, they were nearer to the Muʿtazilites in regard to some points than later Shiʿite theologians. They denied for instance that the Imams may work miracles, they agreed with the Muʿtazilites that there is an absolute difference between major and minor sins and affirmed likewise mutual cancellation between good and evil deeds. Against the Muʿtazilites, however, they denied the intermediary position of the grave sinner between the believer and the unbeliever, they affirmed the principle of intercession of the prophet and the Imams on the Day of Judgement for the grave sinners of their community and maintained that the Qurʾān had undergone deletions and additions.
The strongest opposition to the kalām practice of the Banū Nawbakht which presumably led also to the extinction of this school came from the Shi'ite traditionalists whose most important representative was Abū Ja'far Muḥ. b. Abū I-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn b. Mūsā b. Babūya al-Qummī, who is known as Shaykh al-Ṣādiq (d. 381/991).

Similar to their Sunnite counterparts, the Imami traditionalists categorically rejected the use of reason in religious discussions. However, in contrast to the Sunnites, Shi'ite traditionalism shared a number of decisive notions with the Mu'tazilites. This circumstance was apparently the reason that Mu'tazilism turned eventually out to be the prevalent religious current in Shi'ism while traditionalism did never achieve such a strong position as it did in Sunnism. This general tendency of Shi'ite traditionalism goes back to as far as the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq some of whose statements supported an intermediate position between Sunnite traditionalism and Mu'tazilite doctrine, e.g. on the question of free will versus predestination. Other traditions most of which are ascribed to the eighth Imam ʿAlī Riḍā (d. 203/818) support a concept of God which is in its abstraction and rationality closer to the Mu'tazilite than to the Sunnite traditionalist view. Ibn Babūya relied in his views usually on those traditions which are closer to the Mu'tazilite position.

A major step towards the adoption of Mu'tazilite theology among Shi'ites was taken by Shaykh Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥ. b. Muḥ. b. Nu'mān al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) who was a student of Ibn Babūya. He is also the first Shi'ite theologian whose works on kalām are extant. The most important of his works are his Sharḥ ʿAqīḍat al-Ṣādiq, or Taṣḥīḥ al-iʿtiqād, in which he criticizes especially Ibn Babūya's traditionalist attitudes, and his Kitāb awāl al-maqālāt.

In contrast to Ibn Babūya, al-Mufīd affirms the use of reason in religious matters. However, he does not go as far as the Mu'tazilites who employed reason to the degree of the exclusion of traditions in order to support their positions. He rejects for instance the possibility to assign names to God which do not have any basis in the Qurʾān and the traditions even if reason points to them.

In his theological views, al-Mufīd usually takes the position of the Mu'tazilite school of Baghdad which he considers as less rationalist than the school of Basra which denied that revelation leads to knowledge about fundamental theological questions.

Al-Sharīf al-Murtada, also called ʿAlām al-Hudā (d. 436/1044) who was a student of al-Mufīd disagreed with his teacher in two respects. Reason is in his view the only authority which leads to the truth in religious matters while knowledge derived from revelation and especially from
traditions which is in conflict with reason must be rejected. This principle also influenced his views in the sphere of legal methodology (usūl al-fiqh) where he outrightly rejected any authority of single traditions (akhbār al-āhād). In his theological views, al-Murtada followed in contrast to al-Mufid usually the position of the school of Basra as it was fully developed by Abū Ḥāshim al-Jubbārī (d. 321/933) whose followers are known as the Bahshamiyya. Al-Murtada became acquainted with the doctrines of this school when he studied in Baghdad with the famous Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the author of the extensive Kitāb al-Mughni fi ābāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ṣadl, and the less known Abū Īsāq al-Naṣibīnī (d. 408/1017).

His theological views can be studied in his numerous less extensive kalām works and treatises which are edited. His two major kalām works, the Kitāb al-Mulakhkhas fi usūl al-dīn and the Kitāb al-Dhakhira fi ġīm al-kalām are partly extant in manuscript. A commentary on his more concise kalām work Kitāb Jamal al-ḡīm wa-l-ḵanāl or Kitāb Jamal al-ḡaḏāʾīd was written by his student Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 459/1067) in his work Kitāb Tamhīd al-usūl fi ġīm al-kalām. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī followed in his theological views usually the position of al-Murtada as it can be seen in his Kitāb al-Iqtiṣād al-hādī ilā ṣariq al-rashīd.

2.2

With al-Murtada, the fusion of Muʿtazilism and Shiʿism was completed. However, Imamism did not compromise with Muʿtazilism concerning those principles of belief which derived from their specific doctrine of the Imamate. Since, according to Imami doctrine, the world cannot exist any moment without an Imam who is the guide of mankind, the Imamate is the very foundation of belief. This belief led them to reject the Muʿtazilite principle about the intermediary position of a grave sinner between a believer and an unbeliever. Consequently, they also denied the Muʿtazilite absolute differentiation between major and minor sins and the principle of mutual cancellation (taḥābuṭ). The Muʿtazilites held that if a person does a good act after having committed a minor sin, the reward he deserves for the good act cancels out the punishment he deserved because of the previous sin. The same mechanism applies vice versa. However, if he committed a major sin, the punishment he deserves for it can impossibly be cancelled out by any good act. Moreover, because of the major sin, all the reward this person deserved previously because of his good acts is likewise automatically cancelled out. The Imamis, in contrast, held that not even a major sin may cancel out any of the eternal reward man deserves for his belief. A true believer can rather be certain of eternal reward in the Hereafter for his belief even if he may be punished
temporarily for his sins. Thus, because of this view and since the Imams believed that the prophet and the Imams will intercede for the believers among their community on the Day of Judgement, they rejected further the Mu'tazilite principle of the unconditional and eternal punishment of the grave sinner.

3.1

The last innovative Mu'tazilite school in Shi'ism was introduced by the philosopher and astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). His positions as they appear from his kalām works, notably his Tairid al-qa'ida, were shared by his contemporary Mitham b. Mitham al-Bahrani (d. 699/1300) and fully developed by his student al-Ḥallām al-Ḥilli in his numerous theological works.

A number of important developments had occurred in Islamic thought during the centuries immediately preceding this last Imamite Mu'tazilite school which had a major impact upon their theology. In the realm of Mu'tazilism, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) who was a student of the Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbar had developed independent theological views which set him apart from the school of Abū Ḥāshim. Despite much criticism by the Bahshamiyya and later heresiographers that he introduced philosophy under the cover of kalām, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's views were very successful to such an extent that his school could establish itself side by side with the Bahshamiyya. Eventually, his views survived longer than the teachings of the Bahshamiyya since they were adopted by some of the Zaydi Mu'tazilites and, as will be seen later, to a much larger extent by the Imamite Mu'tazilites.

The sources for the reconstruction of the theological views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, whose entire kalām works are lost, are the writings of the later follower of his school Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāhimi (d. 536/1141), the shorter Kitāb al-fā'iq fi usūl al-dīn and the more extensive Kitāb al-mu'tamad fi usūl al-dīn which is only partly extant. A further valuable source is the Kitāb al-kāmil fi-l-istiqa' fīmā balaghānā min kalām al-qudamā by Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī (or: al-Bahrānī) al-Ḥajjālī about whom no further biographical data are known. This work which highlights the differences between the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was written between 535/1141 and 675/1276-7.

Another development was the growing fascination among the different theologians with the philosophical thought of Ibn Sinā (d. 428/1037). Although the theologians traditionally opposed all those philosophical principles which disagreed with their theological views, they tended
nevertheless to adopt more and more the philosophical terminology and
even elements of the philosophical teachings as long as they could
possibly be brought into agreement with their theological principles.
Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who seems to have studied with the Christian
Abū ʿAlī b. al-Samḥ philosophy and sciences was considered by later
writers like al-Shahrastānī and Ibn al-Qiftī to have been deeply influenced
by the concept of the philosophers although this view is disputed among
modern scholars and certainly requires further investigation.
The influence of the philosophical tradition can easily be found in the
work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) who is famous for having
fully developed what had been initiated by his predecessor al-Ghazālī (d.
505/1111) and what Ibn Khaldūn called the "method of the moderns"
(jāriq al-mutaḥhkhirīn) in Ashkarite kalām through freely mixing
philosophical and theological concepts and terminology. However, despite
this adoption of elements of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī usually
displays a highly critical attitude towards basic philosophical doctrines
holding on to the traditional Ashkarite views. An exception is his
Kitāb al-mabāḥith al-mašhīrīyya which he wrote in his youth and in
which he usually follows the philosophical views of his teacher Abū
Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 560/1152).
A further peculiarity of the theology of al-Rāzī is that he often adopts the
theological concepts of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī whereby he modifies and
interprets them in such a way that they support the Ashkarite rather than the
Muʿtazilite point of view.
The reason for this was that al-Rāzī at a relatively early stage of his life
had spent some time in Khuwārīzm which was the last remaining center
of Muʿtazilism at his time where he engaged in theological discussions
with Muʿtazilites, apparently with the explicit purpose of "converting"
the Muʿtazilites to Ashkarism. Since it is known that the school of Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī together with the Bahshamiyya was well-represented at
al-Rāzī's time in Khuwārīzm, al-Rāzī became on this occasion thoroughly
acquainted with the doctrines of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

These developments had a major impact upon the theology of the Shiʿite
teologians in the time of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. They almost completely
adopted the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in theological
questions. On the other hand, however, they often substituted philoso-
phical terminology as used by al-Rāzī for the traditional Muʿtazilite
terminology in their theological writings. To a varying extent, they
deviated also from the positions of the earlier Muʿtazilites when they
adopted philosophical positions. The peak of this development was Naṣīr
al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who appeared in his various philosophical works as a
consistent defender of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and who substituted in his
theological work *Tajrid al-†Aqaʾīd* philosophy for the theological views where this did not interfere with theology, i.e. in the realm of physics and what is usually called the "subtleties of kalam" (*laţāf al-kalam*).

Al-Ḥilli's writings are well suited for studying the theological views of the Shiʿite Muʿtazilites in this period since he wrote a large number of theological works the majority of which is extant. This does not apply to Naṣir al-Din al-Ṭūsī whose main importance as a writer lies in his philosophical and Ismaʿili works rather than in his theological works and equally not to al-Bahrānī whose only extant theological work is the concise *Kitāb al-Qawāʾid fi ʿilm al-kalām*.

Among al-Ḥilli's works on theology the most extensive one is the *Kitāb Nihayat al-Marām fi ʿilm al-kalām* of which only very few manuscripts exist and which was apparently not often available to later scholars. Even the famous commentator of al-Ḥilli, al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), apparently had no copy. Other important works of al-Ḥilli which he wrote at a very early stage of his scholarly career are especially his *Kitāb Manāhij al-Yaqīn fi usūl al-dīn* which was completed in 680/1281-2 and his *Maʿārij al-faḥm fi sharḥ muqām al-barāhīn* which was compiled apparently even before the *Manāhij*. At a later stage of his life, he wrote the shorter works *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustashhidin fi usūl al-dīn* which was completed in 699/1299-1300 and the *Kitāb Taslīk al-Nafs ilā ḥaqīrat al-quds* which was completed in 704/1304-5. While al-Ḥilli often refrains in the *Kitāb Taslīk al-Nafs* from indicating his own position restricting himself to the presentation of the views of the different parties, he usually expresses his own view explicitly in his *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustashhidin*. During his stay at the court of the Ilkhan Uljaytu, which lasted roughly from 709/1309-10 until 714/1314-5 or even 716/1316-7, al-Ḥilli wrote upon the request of Uljaytu a number of polemical works especially against the Ashʿarites. The most famous among these are the *Kitāb Nahj al-†Haq wa-Kashf al-Šīd* and the *Kitāb Minhaj al-Karaṣma fi ʿl-Imāma*. These later works are in general not very helpful for the reconstruction of al-Ḥilli's theological views since his main concern in these works is with polemics rather than with the elaboration of his own position.

Al-Ḥilli was fully acquainted with the above mentioned developments in Islamic thought which influenced his theology to a large extent. During his youth which he spent in al-Ḥilla he was introduced to the earlier Shiʿite *kalam* literature by his father Sadīd al-Dīn and the brothers Jamāl al-Dīn b. Ṭawwūs (d. 73/1274) and Raḍī al-Dīn b. al-Ṭawwūs (d. 664/1266). At the latest during his stay at the Maraghā observatory which was founded by Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in 657/1258-9 during the reign of the
Ilkhan Hülakü, al-Ḥillî became acquainted with the positions of the school of Abû l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrî. Al-Ḥillî wrote a commentary after Naṣîr al-Dîn al-Ṭûsî's death on the latter's Taqīd al-Qâlîqâd which is influenced to a large extent by the doctrine of the school of Abû l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrî. Presumably, he met also Mitham b. Mitham al-Baḥrânî at the Maragha observatory who also usually preferred the positions of the school of Abû l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrî in his theological work Kitâb al-Qawâ'id fi ǧîm al-kalâm.

Especially from his kalâm work Manâḥîj al-Yaqîn fi ʿusûl al-dīn it is evident that al-Ḥillî must have had copies of Ibn al-Malâḥîmi's Kitâb al-Fāaqiq and Taqi al-Dîn's Kitâb al-Kâmîl since it is almost certain that he quotes from both works.

Al-Ḥillî was furthermore acquainted with the theological and philosophical works of Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî which he studied with his teacher al-Kâtibi al-Qazwînî (d. 675/1276) whom he likewise met at Maragha.

During his stay at Maragha al-Ḥillî received moreover his philosophical education under the supervision of Naṣîr al-Dîn al-Ṭûsî with whom he studied mainly the Ilahiyyât of the Kitâb al-Shiţâ of Ibn Sinâ and al-Kâtibi al-Qazwînî who introduced him to the works of Athîr al-Dîn Mufaḍḍal b. ʿUmar al-Abhârî (d.663/1264) and Muḥ. b. Nâmâwâr b. Abd al-Malîk al-Khûnî (d.646/1247). On two of al-Kâtibi's works, the Risâla al-shamsiyya and the Ḥikmat al-Qayn, al-Ḥillî wrote commentaries.

He was probably at least to some extent acquainted with the mysticism of Ibn al-ĆArabî (d. 638/1240) through his teacher Shams al-Dîn Muḥ. b. Muḥ. b. Ahmad al-Kîshî (d. 695/1295-6) who was well-acquainted with the works of Ibn al-ĆArabî and who was a Sufi himself and with the doctrine of illumination of al-Suhrawardî (d. 587/1191). Later authors attributed to al-Ḥillî a work entitled Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-İshrâq by which the Ḥikmat al-İshrâq by al-Suhrawardî presumably is meant. However, al-Ḥillî does not mention such a work in his own two lists of his works, one in his rijal work Kitâb Khulâṣat al-Aqwâl, written in 693/1293-4, and the second in an Iḫṣâ which he issued to his student Muḥanna b. Sinân in 702/1302-3. However, there are no indications that he incorporated any of the concepts or terminology of either Ibn al-ĆArabî or al-Suhrawardî in his theological works. This development took place only two centuries later with Ibn Abî al-Jumûhûr al-Ĥsâqi (d. 904/1499) who attempted a synthesis of the different currents.
3.2

Al-Ḥillī follows in his views on theological matters usually the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Exceptions are all those doctrines with regard to which the Shiʿites disagreed traditionally with the Muʿtaṣīlītes and in regard to which al-Ḥillī follows without exception the Shiʿite tradition.

In contrast to the followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, notably Ibn al-Malāḥīmi and also Taqī al-Dīn, al-Ḥillī employs frequently philosophical terminology instead of the traditional kalām terminology which was usually also employed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. However, this usually does not lead to disagreements in content between al-Ḥillī and the earlier followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

In the following some examples will be given which will demonstrate the main theological issues in regard to which al-Ḥillī and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed with the Bahshamiyya. It will further be demonstrated in which way al-Ḥillī incorporated philosophical terminology and concepts into the discussion.

One of the chief points on which al-Ḥillī, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, disagreed with the Bahshamiyya is the rejection of the notion of states (ḥāl, pl. ʿaḥwāl) which was introduced by Abū Ḥāshim in order to conceptualize among other things the nature of the divine attributes. According to Abū Ḥāshim essences (dhāt, pl. dhawāʾil) do not differ from another because of themselves but rather because of the attribute of essence (ṣifa dhāřiyah/ṣifat al-dhāt) which is necessarily attached to the essence. The same applies to God. God is God because of His attribute of essence. The attribute of essence entails necessarily a number of essential attributes (ṣifat muqtaḍāt ʿan al-dhāt) as soon as the essence comes into existence. In the specific case of God, who is eternal, these essential attributes are His being knowing, powerful, existing and living.

Al-Ḥillī, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, disagreed. Essences differ because of themselves and do not require any further attribute of essence. God's essence is thus by itself a distinctive essence (dhāt mutamayyīza) which differs as such from all other essences. His being knowing, powerful, existing and living are consequently defined by al-Ḥillī as qualifications of God's distinctive essence by virtue of which He knows and is powerful etc. but not as states. Accordingly, al-Ḥillī rejected Abu Ḥāshim's definition of God's being living as a state because of which it is possible for Him to know and to be powerful. He rather maintained that to be living means that it is not impossible for the living to be knowing and powerful. As for God's being existent, al-Ḥillī similarly rejected Abu Ḥāshim's position that this is an essential attribute which is
different from God's essence and maintained rather that God's existence is identical with His essence.

Al-Ḥilli, following again the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, adopted, however, Abū Ḥāshim's answer to the question of how one knows God's attributes. Attributes are known by the distinguishing characteristic (*futm, pl. *ahkām) which they bring forth. The capability to perform a well-wrought act, for instance, is the distinguishing characteristic of a knowing agent. However, in al-Ḥilli's view the distinguishing characteristic in regard to God points to a matter additional to His essence which exists only in man's imagination but which is in reality nothing but God's distinctive essence. In Abū Ḥāshim's view, the distinguishing characteristic points to a state (*hāl) of God.

In regard to the attribute of God's being willing al-Ḥilli similarly prefers the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Both theologians rejected the position of the Bahshamiyya according to which God's being willing is a state which is entailed through an entitative determinant (*maqāla) which does not subsist in a substrate. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and al-Ḥilli maintained rather that God can only insofar be said to be willing as He acts for a motive (*dā'i). When God knows that a certain act contains more benefit than harm, this knowledge is the motive which induces Him to act. There cannot be ascribed to God a will (*irāda) in addition to His motive. The question of man's will (*irāda) provides an example of how al-Ḥilli followed in content the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī while he substituted philosophical terminology for the traditional *kalām terminology.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that in the case of man will (*irāda) is not identical with the motive. Rather, when man develops the motive for a certain act, he generates in addition to the motive a longing (*talab/*muṭālabāb) for this act. This longing is his will. Al-Ḥilli expresses the same position whereby he employs the philosophical term of inclination (*mayl) rather than longing (*talab). With this, al-Ḥilli follows clearly the position of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who employed exactly the same terms in order to describe man's will.

Another illustrative example in which al-Ḥilli follows the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī but in regard to which he substitutes philosophical terminology for the *kalām terminology concerns the question of God's knowledge about things prior to their existence. This question which was discussed already among the earliest theologians arose from the problem how God can be said to know a thing (*shay) in the state of its nonexistence while *shay is by definition something which exists.
The position of the school of Abū Ḥāshim was that God's knowledge is always connected with the existence of the things, regardless if they already exist at a specific moment or not. I.e., prior to their existence God knows that they will exist in the future, after their occurrence He knows that they exist now, and after they have passed into nonexistence He knows that they existed in the past. The main purpose of this solution was to avoid any change in God's essential attribute of being knowing. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed. Although he affirmed that God is eternally knowing and that God knows everything perfectly in its reality and how it will be when it will exist, he maintained that once a thing occurs, the relation (taʿalluq) between God's knowledge and the existence of the thing is initiated. Since this initiation was restricted to the relation between the divine knowledge and its object, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī could defend his view against the allegation that he allowed change in God's essential attribute of knowledge. Al-Ḥilli adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's view but substituted the philosophical term idāfa for the term taʿalluq as it was used by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Al-Ḥilli is moreover not only concerned, as it was the case with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, with the initiation of the relation between God's knowledge and its object at the moment of its occurrence, but deals rather with every change which occurs to things. He maintains that every modification of a thing effects a corresponding change in the relation between God's knowledge and its object. The reason for this broader approach in the discussion is that al-Ḥilli's main concern in this question is the rejection of the position of those philosophers who restricted God's knowledge to universal matters to the exclusion of the particulars. With the help of this assumption, al-Ḥilli attempts to refute their position.

In the realm of divine justice, al-Ḥilli followed similarly in most points the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

One of the views for which Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was famous, mainly because of the distortion of his view in the presentation of Fākhru al-Dīn al-Rāzī, was the high importance he ascribed to the motive (dā'i) in the process of the occurrence of an act. Capability without a motive attached to it is insufficient for the occurrence of an act. If a motive exists, however, the act necessarily takes place. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed here with the view of the Bahshamiyya who held that capability as such is sufficient to bring forth an act. To this category of acts which occur without a motive belonged in their view e.g. unconscious acts like the movement or the speech of a sleeper. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that even such acts must have a motive even though the agent may not be fully aware of it.
According to al-Rāzī, the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī is equivalent to determinism (*jabr*). He supported this judgement by two arguments. First, he rejected the terminology used by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers that with the occurrence of a motive the act is more likely to occur (*awlā bi l-wuqūṭ*). Al-Rāzī employs rather the philosophical terminology of contingency and argues that an act is a contingent matter which becomes necessary (*wajib*) when its cause occurs. This is the case, according to al-Rāzī, when capability and motive for the act come together. Al-Rāzī's main argument, however, is that he maintained that the motive for an act is not generated by man but rather created by God. On the basis of these two assumptions he concluded that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's view supported in fact his own view, i.e. that man's acts are subject to determinism (*jabr*).

Al-Ḥillī followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in content, but employed the philosophical terminology as introduced by al-Rāzī in this discussion. Capability alone is insufficient to effect an act. When capability and motive come together, the act must necessarily occur. This definition rests like in the case of al-Rāzī on the assumption that an act is a contingent matter in the philosophical sense. However, al-Ḥillī holds firm to the Muṭṭazīlīte position of man's free choice in his acts when he outrightly rejects al-Rāzī's second argument that the motive for the act is created by God. He rather adheres to the traditional Muṭṭazīlīte position that the motive for an act is generated by man only.

In regard to the question of God's obligation to act in man's best interest al-Ḥillī similarly agrees fully with the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who took a position between the school of Baghdad who maintained that God is obliged to act for man's best interest in worldly and religious matters and between the school of Basra who restricted this obligation to religious matters. The same applies to the question of pain which is inflicted by God and the due compensation which God is obliged to render subsequently in regard to which the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed with the Bahshamiyya concerning a number of minor aspects. Al-Ḥillī follows with regard to these usually the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

Other points with regard to which al-Ḥillī followed the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī are his rejection of the view of the Bahshamiyya that a thing can be asserted to be a thing in the state of its nonexistence. The assumption underlying the position of the Bahshamiyya was that the attribute of essence of a thing is prior to its existence. Since
al-Ḥilli, as already mentioned, rejected the concept of the attribute of essence, he maintained that a thing can be asserted as a thing only when it becomes existent.

Following this view, al-Ḥilli agreed moreover with the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-_portfolio that God does not let the human bodies pass away into nonexistence prior to their restoration (iṣrāda) at the Day of Judgement although He is able to do so. Since nonexistence is equivalent with the vanishing of the essences themselves it would be impossible to restore the individual essences for a second time. This, however, is necessary for all those who are entitled to reward or compensation or who deserve punishment in the Hereafter.

Al-Ḥilli agreed moreover with the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-portfolio when he categorically rejected the view of the Bahshamiyya that certain attributes are entailed by an entitative determinant (maḏnā, pl. maḏānī). While the Bahshamiyya defined for instance kawn as an entitative determinant which necessitates the atom's being in a particular position, al-Ḥilli maintained that kawn is the occurrence of the atom itself in a particular position. The same difference applies to the variants of kawn which are motion, rest, contiguity (ijtimā') and separation (iftirāq). Other examples in regard to which the Bahshamiyya employed the concept of the entitative determinant are the attributes of life and power of a living being which are entailed by a determinant which subsists in some parts of the body and which entails a state of the total composite and of the specific part of the body in which the determinants subsist. Al-Ḥilli, in contrast, defined a being's being living and powerful simply as the distinctive structure (bināya makhsūsa) of the being which is as such living and powerful without any need for a determinant.

In the realm of physics, al-Ḥilli and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-portfolio rejected the view of Abū Ḥashim and his followers that an accident might not subsist in a substrate (la fī maḏrill). The Bahshamiyya who affirmed this possibility enumerated among the accidents which belong to this category God's will (irāda) and hate (karaḥa) and the accident of passing away (fanā') which entails the annihilation of all bodies and which itself is not enduring. Moreover, al-Ḥilli and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-portfolio denied the possibility that an accident may subsist in two substrates. This possibility was asserted by the Bahshamiyya for the accident of composition (ta'alluf) which subsists in two substrates with the result that these two substrates turn out to be like one substrate.
3.3

Having described al-Ḥilli’s theological positions in some detail, some remarks will now follow about the degree to which he was influenced by the philosophical tradition in his theological works which led to disagreement between him and the earlier Muʿtazilites.

Before going into detail, it should be pointed out that al-Ḥilli was not only well-trained in philosophy but he also wrote himself a number of philosophical works. Unfortunately, only four of his philosophical writings are partly extant. His *Kitāb al-āsrār al-khaṣṣiyā* which he wrote among his first works was completed in 690/1291. His *Kitāb ʿidāḥ al-maqāṣid*, completed in 694/1294-5, which belongs likewise to the early period of his activities as an author is a commentary on al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī’s *Kitāb ʿIḥkmat al-ʿAyn*. From among his later philosophical works, only a small portion of his *Kitāb Kashf al-Khaṭā min Kitāb al-Shīfa* is extant which he completed in 717/1317-8. Another philosophical work which is extant is his *Kitāb Marāṣid al-Tadqiq wa-Maqāṣid al-Tahqiq*. In addition to these works, we have the titles of about ten more works which al-Ḥilli wrote on philosophy. As far as the titles indicate, the majority of them is concerned with the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, especially the *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbihāt* about which al-Ḥilli appears to have written a number of commentaries and supercommentaries. He further appears to have written commentaries on the *Kitāb al-Talwiḥat* of al-Suhrawardi and the *Kitāb al-Mulakhkhas* of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. From his extant works, especially his *Kitāb al-Āsrār al-khaṣṣiyā*, one gets the impression that al-Ḥilli’s general attitude towards the positions of the philosophers was very critical whenever their views disagreed with al-Ḥilli’s theological views. However, since so few of his philosophical works are extant, this impression may not be representative for his general attitude during his later life.

As for the question to which extent he adopted philosophical concepts in his theological works, the following selected examples which are not meant to cover all aspects in which al-Ḥilli chose philosophical positions will be based mainly in his early work *Kitāb Manāḥīj al-Yaqīn* and his relatively late work *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn*.

Al-Ḥilli substituted the philosophical subdivision of existent matters into necessary (*wājib*), contingent (*mumkin*) and impossible (*mumtana*) for the theological one which distinguishes between eternal (*qadim*) and created in time (*ḥāḍīthi*). God is for him thus the necessarily existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) who is as such necessary by himself (*wājib li-dhātihi*) while everything other than God is contingent by itself (*mumkin li-dhātihi*) and necessary or impossible because of something else (*wājib
li-ghayrīhi/mumtana\textsuperscript{c} li-ghayrīhi). This leads him to disagree with the earlier Mu\textsuperscript{a}tazilites in regard to a number of points. The school of Basra maintained that a body requires an effector only for its occurrence (\textit{ḥudūd}). Once it has gained existence, this body will continue to exist without requiring any longer its effector. Al-\textit{Ḥ}illi disagreed. Since a body like anything else other than God is by itself contingent and necessary through a cause other than it, the occurrence of the body does not modify the body's basic characteristic of being in itself contingent. Therefore, the continuing existence of the body which is defined as a state of the body being necessary by something other than itself, i.e. its effector, requires an effector in the same way as the initial occurrence did.

Moreover, the theologians usually denied that an agent, including God, may annihilate anything. Power, in their view, is by definition only related to the production (\textit{jād}) of something. The annihilation of something can therefore be achieved only by way of producing the opposite of a thing because of which the thing in question consequently passes away into nonexistence. Al-\textit{Ḥ}illi denies this limitation of power. Since existence and nonexistence are equally related to a contingent matter, a powerful agent may to the same degree either cause the existence or the nonexistence of a thing.

With the adoption of the philosophical differentiation between existence of a matter as a picture in the intellect (\textit{wujiḍ dhihi}) which is not linked to its existence in reality and the actual occurrence of the thing in the external world (\textit{wujiḍ khāriji}), al-\textit{Ḥ}illi was able to avoid the long dispute among the theologians how it is possible to speak about something nonexistent.

Al-\textit{Ḥ}illi adopts further Ibn Sinā's understanding of essence (\textit{māhiyya}) and existence (\textit{wujiḍ}). With regard to God, al-\textit{Ḥ}illi maintains that essence and existence are identical. In regard to anything other than God, al-\textit{Ḥ}illi considers essences as concepts which are neither existent nor nonexistent. When existence is attached to them, samples of essences occur in the external world.

In contrast to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-\textit{T}ūsī's usage in his \textit{Tajrid al-\textsuperscript{c}Aqā\textsuperscript{d}}, al-\textit{Ḥ}ilik does not adopt the philosophical concept of \textit{jawhar} as substance which exists in no subject (\textit{mavjiḍ la'ī fi mavdi\textsuperscript{d}}) and accidents (\textit{\textsuperscript{c}ara\textsuperscript{d}}, pl. \textit{\textsuperscript{c}ara\textsuperscript{d}}) which exist in a subject (\textit{mavjiḍ fi mavdi\textsuperscript{d}}). Rather, he defined \textit{jawhar} in the traditional theological way as an atom which occupies space (\textit{mutal\textsuperscript{x}yyiz}) and which cannot be devided and he defined an accident accordingly as that which inheres in something that occupies space (\textit{\textsuperscript{x}all fi-l-mutan\textsuperscript{x}yyiz}). Among the accidents, he enumerates those which where traditionally accepted by the theologians excluding the
passing away (fanāʾ) and composition (taʿrif) for the above mentioned reasons. However, despite this traditional theological approach, there are a number of details in al-Iḥṣāli’s views about atoms and accidents where he was nevertheless influenced by the views of the philosophers. This shall be demonstrated with the help of some examples.

Al-Iḥṣāli allows for instance that an accident may subsist in an accident (qiyaṃ al-ḥarāḍ bi-l-ḥarāḍ) which was unanimously rejected by all theologians with the exception of the early Muʿtazilite Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Sulami (d. 215/830), but which was generally accepted among the philosophers. In order to support this view, al-Iḥṣāli refers to the example which was usually offered by the philosophers. Speed (surʿa) and slowness (baṭṭaʿ) are accidents which subsist in motion which is similarly an accident. Having accepted this principle, al-Iḥṣāli is able to define a letter (ṭārīf) similarly to the philosophers as an accident which subsists in the accident voice (šawār) while the earlier theologians defined a letter usually as a kind (jins) or part (juzʿ) of the voice.

As for the attribute of colour (lawn), al-Iḥṣāli does not follow the view of the Bahshamiyya that there are five simple pure kinds of colours, namely black, white, red, green and yellow, but he follows in his Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn the position of the bulk of the philosophers that the only real pure colours are white and black while all other colours occur because of different mixtures of these two colours. In his Kitāb Manāhīj al-Yaqīn al-Iḥṣāli refrains from taking a position about this question.

4.

It seems, therefore, that al-Iḥṣāli’s main importance in his theological writings lies in the development of the “method of the moderns” which had been introduced into Shiʿite theology by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. For the fusion of the philosophical and the theological system which reached its peak two centuries later with the work of Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥṣāʾi, it seems that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was of far greater importance since he went much further than al-Iḥṣāli in his adoption of the philosophical system in his theological works. It is moreover evident that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s philosophical works were much more widely read by later scholars than the philosophical writings of al-Iḥṣāli, most of which are lost and only one of which has been edited so far. Al-Iḥṣāli’s theological works were in contrast considered by later scholars as authoritative theological works.
Alphabetical List of al-Ḥilli’s Works

(1) Al-Abhath al-mufida fi taḥṣil al-qāida (theology)
   Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(2) Ithbāt al-rajadi
   A manuscript is known to be extant.

   No manuscript known.

(4) al-Ijaza li-Taqi al-Din Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAli al-Āmulī
   No manuscript known.

(5) al-Ijaza li-Taqi al-Din Ḥasan b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan
    al-Sirābshanawī al-Kāshānī
   No manuscript known.

(6) al-Ijaza li-Taqi al-Din Muḥammad b. al-Mawlā Zayn al-Dīn
    Muḥammad b. al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Rāzī

    Editions: in al-Majlīsī, Biḥār, 107:147-149;
    in Ḥasan b. Yusuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥilli, Ajwibat al-masādī al-muḥammaḍyya,
    Qum: al-Khayyam, 1401H., 155-157

(8) al-Ijaza li-Jamāl al-Dīn Abī al-Futūḥ Aṭmād b. al-Shaykh Abī ʿAbd Allah
    Bālkū b. Abī Taḥū b. ʿAlī al-ʿAwī

(9) al-Ijaza li-Rashīd al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Rashīd al-ʿAwī
    No manuscript known.

     al-Sirābshanawī
    No manuscript known.

(11) al-Ijaza li-Ṣharaf al-Dīn Husayn b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī
     al-Ḥusayny al-Ṭūsī
    Editions: in Muḥammad Muḥsin Ṭābriz al-Tīrānī, Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣanʿan al-shīʿīyya

     Shams al-Dīn ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī
    No manuscript known.

    No manuscript known.

(14) al-Ijaza li-kabīra li-Banī Zuhra
Editions: in al-Majlisi, Bitūr, 107:143-146;
al-Ḥillī, Ajwība, 114-117.

No manuscript known.

(17) al-Ijāza li-Maḥmūd b. Muṭṭammad b. Yār
No manuscript known.

(18) al-Ijāza li-Qūf al-Dīn Muṭṭammad al-Rāzi al-Buwayhī

(19) Ajwība masāʾil Ibn Zuhra
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(20) Ajwība al-masāʾil al-fiqhiyya
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(21) Ajwība al-masāʾil al-muḥanna ḥiyya
(a collection of answers on a variety of topics)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(22) al-Adīya al-fākhira al-maṃqūla ʿan al-ʿAʾīma al-fihira
No manuscript known.

(23) Ārba ʿin maṣūla fī usūl al-dīn (theology)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(24) Irshād al-adhḥān fī al-kām al-īmān (law)
Editions: together with al-Ardabīlī’s Majmūʿat al-fāṣida wa-l-burhān.
Qum, 1403/4H.

(25) Istiqāsā al-iṭḥār fī tafqīq maṭānī al-akḥbār
(also: Istiqāsā al-iṭḥār fī tafqīr maṭānī al-akḥbār) (traditions)
No manuscript known.

(26) Istiqāsā al-nazār fī l-baṭn ʿan al-qādār wa-l-qadār (theology)

(27) al-ʿAsrār al-khafīyya fī l-qulūm al-qādīyya (philosophy)
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(28) al-Iṣḥārāt ilā maṭānī al-ʾishārāt (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(29) al-Alsāfīn al-fāriq bayn al-sīdq wa-l-mayn (theology)

(30) Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūṭ (theology)
Tehrān: Tehran University Press, 1338H.
(31) *Idāh al-ishtibāh fi asmā' al-ruwāt* (biographic work)
Editions: Tehran, 1318H.

(32) *Idāh al-talbīs fi kalām al-ra'is* (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(33) *Idāh mukhālasat al-sunna* (traditions)
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(34) *Idāh al-muqāsāt min sharh al-ishārāt* (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(35) *Idāh al-maqāsid fi sharh ḥikmat gāyn al-qawā'id* (philosophy)

(36) *al-Bāb al-fādi Ḥashar fīmā yajibu Ǧalā ġammat al-mukallafīn min ma'rifat usūl al-dīn* (being the 11th chapter of no.110) (theology)

(37) *Bast al-ishārāt* (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(38) *Bast al-kāfīya* (grammar)
No manuscript known.

(39) *Tabṣirat al-muta'āllimin fi ʿalākām al-dīn* (law)
Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-islāmiyya, 1372H.

(40) *Tābīr al-abā'īsī fī ma’rifat al-Ǧulūm al-thalātha* (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(41) *Tābīr al-ʿalākām al-shari'īyya Ǧalā madhhab al-imāmiyya* (law)
Editions: Tehran, 1314/1896

(42) *Ṭaṭṣīl al-mulakkhaṣ* (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(43) *Tadhkiraṭ al-fuqahā' Ǧalā talkhīṣ fatāwī al-Qulamā'ī* (law)

(44) *Taṣlīk al-adhwān ilā ʿalākām al-imān* (law)
No manuscript known.

(45) *Taṣlīk al-ʿaḥām fī ma’rifat al-ʿalākām* (law)
No manuscript known.

(46) *Taṣlīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds* (theology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(47) al-Tā’līm al-thāni (also: al-Tā’līm al-tāmm) (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.

(48) Talkhīṣ al-marrām fi maqrīfat al-aṣkām (law)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(49) al-Tanāṣub bayn al- Awsārriyya wa-l-fīraq al-sūfīstānīyya (theology)  
No manuscript known.

(50) Tanqīḥ al-abhāh fi l-qālīm al-thalātha (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.

(51) Tanqīḥ qawā'id al-dīn al-maṣhīdha  qan al-A'mma al-fāhirīn  
(also: Tanqīḥ qawā'id al-dīn al-maṣhīdha  qan Al Yāsin and  
Tanqīḥ al-qawā'id al-maṣhīdha  qan kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fi l-aḥādīth al-sīḥāh wa-l-ḥisān) (traditions)  
No manuscript known.

(52) Tahdhib al-nafs fi maqrīfat al-madhāhib al-khamsa (law)  
No manuscript known.

(53) Tahdhib al-wusūl ilā qīm al-usūl (legal methodology)  
Editions: edited by c Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Baqqāl.  

(54) Jawāb al-su'wāl qan ṭikmat al-naskh fī l-aṣkām al-illāhiyya (theology)  
No manuscript known.

(55) Jawāhir al-maṣāliḥ fī faqāḥī Amīr al-mu'mīnin ṭAli b. Abī Ṭalīb  
(on the virtues of the Imam cAlī)  
No manuscript known.

(56) al-Jawhar al-naṣīḥ fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd (logic)  

(57) Ḥāshiyat talkhīṣ al-aṣkām (law)  
No manuscript known.

(58) Ḥall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.

(59) Khulāṣat al-aqwāl fī maqrīfat al-rijāl (biographic work)  

(60) al-Khulāṣa fi usūl al-dīn (theology)  
No manuscript known.

(61) al-Durr al-makhīn fī sharḥ al-qānūn (grammar)  
No manuscript known.
(62) al-Durr al-maknūn fī ālim al-qānūn (logic)
No manuscript known

(63) al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-ahādith al-ṣiḥāḥ wa-l-tāsīn (traditions)
No manuscript known.

(64) al-Risāla al-saḥīfa (theology)
Editions: in Kalimat al-mufaqqiqin (Tehran, 1315/1898), 338-379.

(65) Risāla fī adab al-baṣṭh al-muktaṣar
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(66) Risāla fī buqāl al-jabr (theology)
No manuscript known.

(67) Risāla fī talqīq ma’rūn al-imān (theology)
No manuscript known.

(68) Risāla fī khalq al-a’amāl (theology)
No manuscript known.

(69) Risāla fī su‘ālayn sa‘dīa ǧanhumā al-Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn (theology)

(70) Risāla fī l-mawārith (legal treatise)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(71) Risāla fī waqībāl i-tāqīqād ǧalā jami‘al-qbāl (theology)

(72) Risāla fī waqībāt al-tājī fī a-rkānīhī min dīn dhikr al-adā’īyā wa-l-mustaqbībāt (law)
No manuscript known.

(73) Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ischārāq (mysticism)
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(74) al-Risāla al-ṣinā Españ
No manuscript known.

(75) Ghayat al-iṭkām fī taṣbīḥ talkhīs al-m rarān (law)
No manuscript known.

(76) Ghayat al-wusul wa-ṣiḥāl al-sul al-sul al-muktaṣar muntahā al-su’āl wa-l-amal
(legal methodology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(77) Qawā'id al-ahādith ma’rafat al-ḥalāl wa-l-tārām (law)
Editions: Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn.)

(78) al-Qawā'id al-jahlīyya fī sharḥ al-risāla al-shamsīyya (logic)
Editions: Edited by Fāris al-Hassān (forthcoming)
(see Turāthūnū, 17 (1409):243-4).
(79) Qawā'id wa-maqāsid fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ṭabī'ī wa-l-ilāhi (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(80) al-Qawl al-wajiz fī taṣfir al-Qur’ān al-ʿazīz
(also: al-Sirr al-wajiz fī taṣfir al-Qur’ān al-ʿazīz) (exegesis)
No manuscript known.

(81) Kashf al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār
(also: Kashf al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār) (logic)
No manuscript known.

(82) Kashf al-talb is wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs
(also: Kashf al-talb is fī bayān sayr al-ra'īs) (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(83) Kashf al-khāfa' min kitāb al-shifa'(philosophy)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(84) Kashf al-fawā'id Qalā' ʿidāh mā ishtamalat ġalayhi al-risāla al-mawsūma
bi-qawā'id al-qaṣi'īd (theology)
Editions: in Majmū'at rasā'il (Tehran: Maktubat Āyat Allāh al-cuzu'mā
al-Mar'ashi al-Najafi, 1404H.), 2-97

(85) Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ ta'jrid al-Ṣa'iqād (theology)
Editions: Saida: Maḥbūbat al-cīrfān 1353/1934;
Qum: al-Maktab al-Mustawfiyya, n.d.

(86) Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwi'āt (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(87) Kashf al-maqāl fī maqrifat al-rijāl (biographic work)
No manuscript known.

(88) Kashf al-maknūn min kitāb al-qānūn (grammar)
No manuscript known.

(89) Kashf al-yaqīn fī faḫāḍ al-Amīr al-mu'imin
(on the virtues of the Imam ḤAli)
Editions: Najaf n.d.

(90) Lubb al-ḥikma (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(91) al-Mabā'tith: arba'īn mas qala fī usūl al-dīn (theology)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(92) al-Mabā'tith al-sanīyya wa-l-muʿāraḍāt al-nasīriyya (theology)
No manuscript known.

(93) Mabāḍī al-wusūl ilā ʾilm al-usūl (legal methodology)
(94) Muṭākamāt bain shurrāh al-ishing (philosophy)
   No manuscript known.

(95) Mukhtasar sharḥ nahj al-balāgha (also: Mukhtasar nahj al-balāgha)
   A manuscript is known to be extant.

(96) Mukhtalaf al-shi’ā fi al-takām al-sharīʿa (law)
   Editions: Tehran, 1322-24/1905-6

(97) Madārik al-atbākām (law)
   No manuscript known.

(98) Marāṣid al-tadqiq wa-maqāsid al-talqiq (philosophy)
   A manuscript is known to be extant.

(99) Maṣābḥ al-anwār (traditions)
   No manuscript known.

(100) al-Maṭābih al-Qalīyya fi maṣrifat al-ʿarabīyya
   (also: al-Maṭābih al-Qalīyya fi ʿilm al-ʿarabīyya) (grammar)
   No manuscript known.

(101) Maṣāriʿ al-fāhm fi sharḥ al-nuzūm (theology)
   Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(102) al-Maqāsid al-wāfiyya bi-fawāʾid al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiyya (grammar)
   No manuscript known.

(103) al-Muqaddima fi l-kalām (theology)
   Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(104) Maqṣad al-wāṣīlin fi usūl al-din (also Muṣaqad al-wāṣīlin) (theology)
   No manuscript known.

(105) al-Muqāwamāt al-ḥikmiyya (philosophy)
   No manuscript known.

(106) Mukātib bayn al-ʿAllāma al-Hilli wa-l-Qāḍi al-Bayḥawi (law)
   Editions: in Muḥsin al-Amin al-ʿĀmilī, ʿĀyīn al-shiʿa

(107) Manūḥīj al-yaqīn fi usūl al-din (theology)
   Editions: Bombay, 1298H.

(108) Muntahā al-maṣlah fi talqīq al-madhhb (law)
   Editions: Tehran, 1333/1915.

(109) Muntahā al-wusūl ilā ḡilmay al-kalām wa-l-usūl (theology/ legal methodology)
   Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(110) Minhāj al-salāḥ fi ikhtisār al-miṣḥāb (law)
   Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
(111) Minhāj fi manāṣib al-ḥajj (legal work)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(112) Minhāj al-karāma fi maṣraf al-imāma (theology)
Editions: in Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawīyya, by Ibn Taymiyya

(113) Minhāj al-hidāya wa-māraqu al-dirāya fi ʿilm al-kalām
(also: Minhāj al-hidāya wa-māraqu al-hidāya) (theology)
No manuscript known.

(114) Nuẓūm al-barāḥin fi usūl al-dīn (theology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(115) al-Nukat al-badiʿa fi taḥrīr al-dhāriʿa (legal methodology)
No manuscript known.

(116) Niḥāyat al-iṭkām fi maṣraf ṣaḥīḥ (law)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(117) Niḥāyat al-maraʿām fi ʿilm al-kalām (theology)
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(118) Niḥāyat al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-usūl (legal methodology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(119) Nahj al-imān fi tafsīr al-Qurʾān (exegetis)
No manuscript known.

(120) Nahj al-fiqḥ wa-kashf al-sīdqa (theology)
Beirut, 1982.

(121) Nahj al-ṣarfa fi ʿilm al-mizān (logic)
No manuscript known.

(122) Nahj al-mustarshidīn fi ʿusūl al-dīn (theology)
Editions: together with Irshād al-tālibīn ilā nahl al-mustarshidīn by
al-Miqdād al-Suyūtī;

(123) Nahj al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-usūl (legal methodology)
No manuscript known.

(124) Nahj al-waddāḥi fi l-ḥadīth al-ṣiḥāḥ (traditions)
No manuscript known.

(125) al-Nūr al-mushriq fi ʿilm al-maṣṭiq (logic)
No manuscript known.

(126) Wājib wuḍūʿ wa-l-salāt (also: Wājibat al-wuḍūʿ) (law)
No manuscript known.
Further Readings:


