Proceedings
of the
Seminar
on
MUSLIM-JEWISH
RELATIONS
IN NORTH AFRICA


WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
New York
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PREFACE

The seminar on Muslim-Jewish Relations in North Africa, which the American Section's Academic Committee, whose Chairman is Rabbi Wolfe Kelman, co-sponsored with the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., was one of a series of meetings planned by us in an effort to reach out to the intellectual community at large.

The success of this particular seminar exceeded our most optimistic expectations. We found it particularly gratifying that we were brought into contact with many scholars of whose interest and expertise in this field we had been unaware.

Our thanks go to Professor Abraham L. Udovitch, Chairman of the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, and Drs. Carl Kaysen and Clifford Geertz of the Institute for Advanced Study.

We are of course deeply indebted to the speakers who gave so freely of their time and effort, particularly Professor S. D. Goitein of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study.

The seminar would not have been possible without the unceasing labors of Professor Israel Singer, Consultant to the Academic Committee, and Miss Joy S. Abrahamsen who coordinated the Conference, put together the program, and saw this publication through the press.

Max Melamet
Executive Director, American Section of the World Jewish Congress
PROGRAM

10:30 A.M. Registration and Coffee

11:00 A.M. MORNING SESSION

Chairman: Professor Abraham L. Udovitch, Princeton University
“The Origins and Historical Significance of North African Jewry”—
Professor S. D. Goitein, The Institute for Advanced Study
“Muslims and Jews in North Africa: Perceptions, Images, Stereotypes”—
Professor Norman Stillman, State University of New York at Binghamton

DISCUSSION

1:00 P.M. LUNCHEON

2:00 P.M. AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman: Professor Clifford Geertz, The Institute for Advanced Study
“The Pact of ‘Umar in North Africa: A Reappraisal of Muslim-Jewish Relations”—
Professor Jane Gerber, Lehman College, City University of New York
“The Jewish Community of Marrakesh: A Paradigm for Majority-Minority Relations”—
Dr. Richard Press, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

DISCUSSION
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Joy S. Abrahamsen
Prof. Samuel Abrahamsen
Prof. Gil Carl AlRoy
Prof. Joseph Badi
Prof. Mórroe Berger
Prof. Nehama Rezler Bersohn
Dr. Baruch Bokser

Mark R. Cohen
Raphael Danziger
Prof. Richard Ettinghausen
Morris Faierstein
Jeffrey C. Feldman

Mark Friedman
Prof. Clifford Geertz
Prof. Jane S. Gerber

Prof. S. D. Goitein
Dr. Ginette Habousha

Nadine Habousha

Racheline Habousha
Pearl Hochman
Phyllis Holman
Marie Jones
Richard Jones
Ruth Kaplan
Prof. Walter Kaufmann
Susan Keller
David Kotowitz

World Jewish Congress, Queens College (CUNY)
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Hunter College (CUNY)
Medgar Evers College (CUNY)
Princeton University
Princeton University
University of California, Berkeley
Princeton University
Princeton University
New York University
Jewish Theological Seminary
North American Jewish Youth Council
Columbia University
Institute for Advanced Study
Herbert H. Lehman College (CUNY)
Institute for Advanced Study
Herbert H. Lehman College (CUNY)
American Friends of the Hebrew University
American Sephardi Federation
University of Toronto
Boston University
Princeton University
Princeton University
Brandeis University
Princeton University
Princeton University
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Dr. George Lasry
Jeffrey Maas
Shulamit Magnus
Prof. Fouad Masriech
Max Melamet

Prof. Alexander Melamid
Prof. Moise Ohana
Dr. Maurice L. Perlzweig
Dr. Richard Press

Prof. Paul M. Raccan
Sara Reguer

Prof. Helen Anne B. Rivlin
Ira Robinson
Morris Robinson
Mati Ronen
Mona Rosenholtz
William Royce
Irving Ruderman

Prof. Stuart Schaar
Prof. Gary S. Schiff

Mitch Schindler
Ellen J. Seidman
Steven Shaw

Boaz Shoshan
Prof. Israel Singer

Prof. Norman Stillman

Prof. Yedida K. Stillman

Prof. Henry Toledano

Jay Ticker
Prof. Abraham L. Udovitch

World Institute for Sephardic Studies
World Jewish Congress
Columbia University
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Executive Director, World Jewish Congress (American Section)
New York University
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
World Jewish Congress
Northwestern University, now at Swarthmore College
Yeshiva University
Columbia University and Brooklyn College (CUNY)
State University of N.Y. at Binghamton
Columbia University
Columbia University
American Sephardic Federation
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Princeton University
Columbia University, Random House
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
City College of New York (CUNY)
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Princeton University
City College of New York (CUNY)
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Seminar
on
MUSLIM-JEWISH
RELATIONS
IN NORTH AFRICA
Morning Session

CHAIRMAN—PROFESSOR ABRAHAM L. UDOWITCH, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: This seminar is part of a series of meetings sponsored by the Academic Committee of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress in association with various academic institutions in the United States. Although the themes of these meetings have varied, they have combined elements of Jewish interest together with problems of general significance to members of the academic community at large—particularly those in the Humanities and Social Sciences. There is no doubt that the theme of our seminar today fits very well into this category.

As today's newspaper headlines make patently clear, the current focus of Muslim-Jewish relations is not in North Africa. However, since most of us in this room have happily chosen professions which are not directly influenced by newspaper headlines, we need not feel any regrets or remorse about concerning ourselves with Muslim-Jewish relations in the geographical context of North Africa.

There are several good reasons for choosing North Africa as a geographical context and Princeton as the place to discuss Muslim-Jewish relations in that particular area. The countries of North Africa have experienced a continuity of relationship and interaction between Muslims and Jews since the Islamic conquests of the seventh century. Unlike other parts of the Muslim World, in North Africa it was the Jews rather than Christians or Zoroastrians who have constituted the primary non-Muslim minority group ever since the advent of Islam in that part of the world. Muslim and Jewish sources are replete with a good deal of information about Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa. The circumstances prevailing in North Africa have afforded greater possibilities to study this problem, especially in recent times. North Africa has been much more open, especially to social scientists, for the study of its society generally, including the problem which we are going to focus on today. Last but not
least, there is the comparatively large number of scholars who have interested themselves in this problem from a variety of perspectives, and some of the most prominent of these are located here in Princeton.

Our first presentation will be by Professor S. D. Goitein, a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Professor Emeritus of Islamic Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and Professor Emeritus of the Hebrew University where he served as Director for many years at the School of Oriental and African Studies. I need not introduce Professor Goitein any further except to say that in the annals of modern scholarship I don't think that there is any other scholar as distinguished who has devoted his attention to the question of Muslim-Jewish relations in a variety of contexts.—Professor Goitein.

THE ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH AFRICAN JEWRY

S. D. GOITEIN
The Institute for Advanced Study

I understand you expect me to make some general introductory remarks about North Africa and the origin and historical role of its Jewry.

In a nutshell, the main characteristic of this sector of Jewish history was this, that a layer of economically stronger and educationally more advanced immigrants, superimposed itself on an existing local nucleus, partly mingled with it, became Maghrebi, and then radiated out into other Jewish regions fertilizing them. This happened in the eleventh century, the century of Rabbenu Hananel, R. Nissim, and R. Isaac Alfasi (the RIF), when North Africa partly became the physical and spiritual heir of Babylonia and excelled in Jewish learning, which was then transmitted to Muslim Spain and Christian Europe. It happened again in the fifteenth century when immigrants from Spain, and later from Italy, settled in North Africa, putting new life into the existing Jewish community, while their descendants moved eastwards populating Ottoman Turkey, and, in particular, Eretz-Israel. When I took up residence in Haifa in 1923, I found that the original stock of the Jewish population there was Maghrebi. This trend of North African Jewish history reflects the general character of the area.
It is a commonplace to say that North Africa, that is the modern states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, was an area of expansion. Again and again that region was conquered by expanding nations, which, after having established themselves there, used it as their base for further expansion. Tyre on the Lebanese coast was a great and proud maritime city, as is so strikingly described in Isaiah, ch. 23, and Ezekiel, ch. 27. But the Phoenicians never attained power in the eastern part of the Mediterranean comparable to that secured by their colony Carthage in the western half. The reason for the difference was that the hinterland of Carthage was far more spacious and far richer than that of Tyre. Tyre was a middleman—as Ezekiel in his dirge so impressively describes, whereas Carthage was a queen. By challenging land-bound and agricultural Rome and forcing it to transform itself into a seapower, Carthage and its North African empire set into motion a historical process which ultimately led to the unification of the Western world.

The Romans, unlike the Phoenicians, had no reason to settle in North Africa, at least not in considerable numbers. North Africa served Rome as a granary, which provided their city with wheat and oil. Roman manors, or latifundia, were found all over the eight provinces or so into which North Africa was finally divided, with the result that this agricultural economy also sustained a flourishing urban civilization whose remarkable remnants still evoke the admiration of the visitor. I need only mention Lebda on the Libyan coast, the birthplace of the Roman emperor Septimius Severus; el-Djem (Thysdus) in the ancient province of Africa, where an amphitheater seating 60,000 spectators still rises out of the desert; or Volubilis, Oulili, Morocco, where Caracalla’s arch of triumph recalls Roman grandeur and the graceful bronze figure of the laurel-clad ephebus shows Hellenistic art at its very best. By supplying Rome during half a millenium of imperial rule, North Africa contributed much to the maintenance of the pax Romana, the peace guaranteed by Rome’s power, whatever that was worth.

When the Arabs occupied North Africa, they immediately used it as a base for further expansion. From there they conquered Spain and Sicily and attacked southern Italy and other European countries. The great majority of the Muslim invaders of Spain at the beginning of the eighth century were Berbers, but the high command was Arab. And all the Muslim principalities arising in North Africa in the eighth through the tenth centuries were founded by foreigners: Arabs and Persians.
Morocco, the Idrisids, (descendants of 'Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad), around the year 800 founded the city of Fez (Fās), so prominent in Jewish history; then, in the central Maghreb, the sectarian Kharidjite principality of Ibn Rustem, a Persian, founder of the city of Tāhert, also harbored a Jewish community (around 780); thirdly, and most important for Jewish history, in Qayrawān, then the capital of what is today approximately Tunisia, there ruled during the entire ninth century the Aghlabids, originally Arabs from Khorasan (Iran), a glorious dynasty of amirs, that is, governors who were practically independent, and excelled, in addition to military prowess, in the works of peace and in their dedication to Islamic religion and Arabic literature. In that region, Tunisia, and in that period, the ninth century, North African Islamic civilization was formed and developed that character which it has retained with minor changes up to the present day, or, rather, the threshold of modern times.

Let me immediately add that the culture of North African Jewry, as it remained alive up to the very end and still is glimmering in Israel and probably elsewhere, was molded in that region, Tunisia, but somewhat later, in the eleventh century, as I shall presently explain. At that time a foreign dynasty, more powerful than those preceding it, had taken root on North African soil, the Fatimids. The Fatimids claimed to be descendants of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, and aspired to the caliphate. North Africa was for them only a springboard for the conquest of the rest of the Muslim world. For sixty years they tried in vain to take Egypt. Finally, in 969, and with the aid of the Berber people of the Ketāma, they succeeded. Egypt and the adjacent countries, including Palestine, were occupied by Fatimid troops. Subsequently the Fatimids abandoned North Africa and moved to their newly founded residence of Cairo.

With the departure of the Fatimids a new period in North African history began: that of the Berber kingdoms. But before considering this, we must pause for a moment and ask ourselves: did the North African epic of conquest and subsequent expansion based on the human and other resources of the country apply also to spiritual history? It did. Christianity was of course imported into North Africa; how far this occurred in the wake of the Jewish settlements there, we shall probably never know, for the Semitic names found in the Christian catacombs might have been of Punic (Phoenician) rather than Jewish origin. Anyhow, North African soil produced an expounder of Christian
faith and thought who was second only to Saint Paul. I am referring, of course, to Saint Augustine (354–430), the author of the Confessions and the City of God, whose work is a living force in the Church all over the world up till the present day.

As to Islam, I have already made mention of its efflorescence under the Aghlabids of Tunisia in the ninth century. The principality of the Aghlabids was swallowed up by the Shi'ite Fatimids. But that particular brand of Islam, that combination of rigid orthodox practice, religious learning, and mystical pietism often paired with occultism, which was developed during that Aghlabid century, became standard not only in North Africa, where it was paramount, but far beyond the confines of that area.

Finally, when the Christian reconquest of Spain drove many Muslims out of the Iberian peninsula, North Africa profited from the losses of Muslim Spain. In 1377, Ibn Khaldun, scion of such an emigrant family, which had settled in the city of Tunis, wrote his famous Muqaddima, or Prolegomena to his history of the Arabs and Berbers, in which he tried to find the laws governing the history of peoples, as far as he knew it. This very comprehensive book of socio-economic and political theory is one of the most original works written by an Islamic author. The reader receives indeed the impression that the Muqaddima belongs to its period, the Renaissance, rather than its culture, Islam. Anyhow, we see that it is North Africa which produced by the hand of a scion of immigrants one of the great books of all times.

To revert to the Berber kingdoms, the Berbers are a strong and fierce race, but, like the Kurds in the Muslim East, seem to lack the faculty of forming a national state. What happened after the disappearance of the Fatimids was this: Berber peoples, inspired by a religious idea and led by gifted military leaders, conquered North Africa and from there expanded into Spain. I am referring to the Almoravids, al-Murābiḥūn, of the eleventh, and to the Almohads, al-Muwaḥḥidūn, of the twelfth century. The religious policies of the former were detrimental to the Jewish communities, those of the latter were bent on their destruction. We shall come back to these grave developments later.

After the dissolution of the Almohad empire in the thirteenth century, Berber successor states sprang up all over North Africa. In 1377 Ibn Khaldun wrote: “The realm of the Arabs has come to an end, now the North is ruled by the Franks (the
Europeans), the West by the Berbers, and the East by the Turks." The great philosopher of history could not foresee the future. The Berbers were unable to create anything of endurance. The Ottoman Turks took most of North Africa, albeit in a very loose fashion. Only Morocco remained an independent kingdom. But the rulers of Morocco commanded allegiance only of a limited part of their country. Most of the inland belonged to independent tribes, led by sheikhs who were also heads of pietist fraternities or were connected with such religious heads, while the port cities either were dominated by a European power or by Barbary pirates. This unruly state of the area finally led to direct annexation or to a state of protectorate by France (Algeria 1830; Tunisia 1881; Morocco 1912—Spain occupied a small part, the coastal area north of the Rif) and Italy (Libya 1911). The European occupation, especially in Algeria and Tunisia was of great significance for the Jewish population. In our own time, after World War II, all these countries have become independent states with the consequence that the history of North African Jewry is coming practically to its end.

This was a remarkable and influential part of Jewish history, which has attracted growing interest of late, probably also owing to the influx into Israel and France of so many immigrants from that region. I assume you are familiar with André Chouraqui's Les Juifs de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris, 1952), which appeared also in an English translation. I am happy to inform you that the English version of A History of the Jews of North Africa by H. Z. Hirschberg, vol. I, should be on the market soon. The Hebrew version of this book, which promises to become the standard work on the subject, appeared in two volumes in 1965, but the third volume, which was planned to contain the rich cultural history of the last four centuries, has never appeared. Meanwhile, Professor Ḥaim Zafrani of Paris has published the first part of a book La vie intellectuelle juive au Maroc de la fin du 15e au début du 20e siècle, Paris, 1972. Dr. Hirschberg's English version is not only updated, but more conveniently organized than the Hebrew one, and it is only to be hoped that the subsequent volumes will follow in the not too distant future.

We have already stressed the fact that Jewish history in North Africa followed the general pattern of North African history of immigration, settlement, and subsequent expansion. But that pattern was crisscrossed and blurred by another trait, cruel persecutions and repeated attempts at outright anihilations.
tion. Many religions and shades of religions followed and fought each other with utmost ferocity on the soil of North Africa. Let me give you one example. The saintly Saḥnūn, author of the Mālikī code of law al-Mudawwana, which is for the western Muslim world what the Mishne Torah of Maimonides is for Judaism, had his predecessor slowly beaten to death because he did not accept the dogma that the Koran was eternal, that means, coexistent with God, but believed that it was created, that is, came into being under the circumstances evident in the book itself. If a scholar and pious man could act in such a way against a coreligionist and colleague because of theological differences—and similar instances could be adduced from the entire stretch of North African history—what treatment could be expected by a religious minority whose tenets and practices always were at variance with those of the environment. The article “Morocco” in the new Encyclopaedia Judaica reveals indeed an interminable history of cruel sufferings.

Persecutions are the reason why we are unable to say anything substantial about the character and cultural achievements of the Jewish settlements in North Africa during the Roman and Christian periods. As late a writer as Jerome (Hieronymus, d. 420) mentions in one of his letters that an uninterrupted chain of Jewish settlements stretched from Mauritania, approximately Morocco today, through “Africa” (as Tunisia was called in those days), Egypt, and Eretz Israel to far away India. As far as North Africa is concerned, this statement is confirmed by archaeological findings and literary references. From Sala near Rabat on the Atlantic coast and Volubilis in Morocco, throughout Algeria, Tunisia and Libya up to Cyrenaica, that is, eastern Libya, such evidence exists, and not only for larger cities, such as Carthage and Berenike, today Benghazi, but also smaller places such as Naro, today Hammam Lif, in Tunisia, whose lovely synagogue mosaic has been known for over 90 years.

Our sources show that in Roman, as in later Islamic times, the North African Jews were in close contact with their coreligionists in Italy, inasmuch as many of them were engaged in the export, or, rather, in the transport of grain to Rome, where Jews were active on the receiving end. It seems also that Jews had an important share in the production of grain. The delightfully told story of bishop Synesius about the Jewish skipper who during a terrible storm on a Friday night was prepared to take action only when he was convinced that the life of his passengers was really in danger, shows us, on the one hand, that
they were meticulously observant, and even learned, for that skipper, as Synesius humorously describes, sat down during the storm and studied the Torah. The Talmud mentions indeed a number of scholars who lived in, or came from Carthage.

All this, however, does not add up to very much. Judaism could not flourish in North Africa in Roman times, because its base, Cyrenaica, that is, eastern Libya, was liquidated in the war of annihilation which was waged against it in the last year of the emperor Trajan and the first of Hadrian (116–117). We do not know exactly the circumstances which brought about that terrible war, but its consequences are evident enough. With no strong base in Cyrenaica, no populous Jewish settlement of the rest of North Africa was possible at that early time. Still, in the course of the centuries the Jews took part in the general prosperity, although we are not able to put our finger anywhere on specific, noteworthy achievements, material or spiritual. There might have been such achievements, but if there were any, they were obliterated by subsequent persecutions. In 533, Belisarius, the great general of Justinian, wrested North Africa from the Germanic kingdom of the Vandals. This was not only a war of conquest, the fulfillment of the dream of restoring the imperium Romanum, but for Justinian this was also a religious war. North Africa was replete with heresies, the ruling Vandals and many others held beliefs and tenets other than those approved by the Byzantine emperor. The novella 37 of the year 535 outlawed all religions other than the Catholic faith, including the Jewish religion, and ordered the closing of their houses of worship or, rather, their conversion into churches. This novella referred specifically to North Africa, as if this area was singled out for religious intolerance. As we learn from the historian Procopius, who accompanied Belisarius on his campaign, this decree was carried out even with regard to an old and venerable synagogue allegedly built in the time of King Solomon. But Judaism did not entirely disappear from North Africa, for several emperors succeeding Justinian had the opportunity to issue edicts with regard to Jews.

With the termination of Byzantine rule and the advent of the Arabs, a blackout of about 150 years occurred in the West as it did in the East. It was a frightful and bloody period. The fanciful stories about the Kāhina, the allegedly Jewish Berber queen who successfully fought the Arabs, are later fiction; the sooner we discard them the better. As to Jewish Berbers in general, there is no reason to distrust the reports about judaizing
Berber tribes, but in the course of time the Berbers bowed to the dominating religion of their area. The North African Jews are Jews, not Berbers.

The origin of these Jews, or rather that of their upper and more articulate layer, becomes discernible, as soon as the veil covering Jewish history begins to lift in the ninth, tenth, and in particular, the eleventh centuries. All over North Africa we find the Jewish communities, and not only individual scholars or public figures, in closest contact with the yeshivot, or Jewish high councils, of Babylonia-Iraq. This holds true not only of Fez, the central city of Morocco, but also of Sijilmāsa, the desert port deep in the south, on the fringes of the Sahara. It holds true of Tāḥert and Tlemçen in the middle part of North Africa, and not only of Qayrawān, then the metropolis of the Jewish Maghreb, but of a comparatively minor Tunisian town, such as Gabor. The letters of the Gaons, or heads of the yeshivot, to these communities often betray a strong personal concern and frequently refer to relationships between themselves, or their predecessors or ancestors, and the addressees or their forefathers. North Africa was a colonial area opened up and settled by Arabs and Persians. I have already stated that all the principalities created in the Maghreb during the eighth through the tenth centuries were founded by foreigners coming from the East. Naturally, together with the rulers came their retainers and supporters, and, in the wake of these, the merchants and artisans, and among them the Jews. I have described this process briefly in my book A Mediterranean Society, vol. I, and recently the westward movements of Iranians and Iraqis, to differentiate from modern Iraqis, have been studied by Claude Cahen and Eliyahu Ashtor. Many Persian personal and family names are found in the Cairo Geniza. The most important scholarly family of Qayrawān, that of Rabbenu Nissim b. Jacob b. Nissim b. Shāhūn (or Shāhīn) had a Persian family name. (Shāhīn means “falcon” in Persian, shāhūn would be shāh “king,” with the Maghrebi ending of endearment ūn resulting in a word meaning approximately “dear little king”.) Recently, I was astounded to find a letter in Judaeo-Persian addressed to the Ibn ‘Awkal family which evidently had re-emigrated from the Maghreb to Egypt and served as a clearing house for the correspondence of the North African Jewish communities and the Babylonian yeshivot. This re-emigration of the Ibn ‘Awkal family at the end of the tenth century, which clearly followed the transfer of the Fatimid court from Qayrawān to Cairo,
was a portent of a larger movement. North African Jewry, having become economically stronger, but menaced after the departure of the Fatimids by a steadily deteriorating situation, sought expansion to the East, to Egypt and farther afield.

These inner-Jewish migrations were of greatest importance for Jewish history in general, and led also to specific developments in North Africa. First, they go a long way to explain the miraculous fact that the Jewish people could preserve its spiritual unity despite extreme geographical dispersion. The communities in Sijilmása, Tâhert, and Qayrawân were populated or at least dominated by Jews coming from Babylonia and Iran, who impressed their religious tradition and learning on their environment.

Secondly, during the late tenth and the eleventh centuries North Africa was the greatest center of Jewish religious scholarship, which from there was transmitted to Europe. What was the cause of this prominence? Naturally, several factors were at work, such as a certain measure of economic prosperity. But in spiritual matters, manpower is the decisive element. Here I am reminded of a comparative study of American and English national character, which stated that emigrants and their progeny normally show more initiative and thrust than people who stay home. By the middle of the eleventh century Babylonia seems to have been rather exhausted, while North Africa was in bloom.

Rabbênu Hananel's commentary on the Talmud, which was written in that century, accompanies any better edition of the Talmud and is still used second only to Rashi. As is well-known, Rabbênu Hananel cites not only the Babylonian Talmud, but the Palestinian as well, and this is somewhat in line with the contemporary Islamic scholarship of Qayrawân; despite its Mâlîki orthodoxy, it was rather eclectic with regard to its use of the sources. While I have found in the Cairo Geniza several references to Rabbênu Nissîm b. Jacob, I have not come upon a single one related to R. Hananel. From this I conclude that he had contacts with Muslim Spain and Christian Europe, but none, or only a few, with the Muslim East. If he was indeed the son of R. Hûshiel, who came to Qayrawân from southern Italy, as reported by Abraham Ibn Da'ud in his "Book of Tradition", this would perhaps explain the European direction of his influence.

Nissîm b. Jacob was described by his compatriots as "the revivifier of Jewish religion, under whose shadow we live among the nations," and his writings were much studied by European
Jewish scholars. His father Jacob b. Nissim became famous in Hebrew letters as the receiver in 987 of the Iggeret R. Sherira Gaon, which in form is an answer to a question sent to Sherira from Qayrawan, but in substance a unique book describing the history of the Babylonian schools. Sherira took the trouble to address this extensive description to Qayrawan because he knew that in that city there was a galaxy of scholars who would care for its preservation and circulation. He was not mistaken.

The third North African Jewish scholar of ecumenical stature living in the eleventh century was the Rif, R. Isaac al-Fasi. As his byname indicates, he spent the major part of his life in Fez, although he was a native of Qal’at (Bani) Hamada, Algeria, and ended his life in Lucena, Spain. His Halakhot, a rearrangement of the major part of the Babylonian Talmud according to certain principles, its discussion and decisions of moot points, accompanies any serious study of the Talmud.

The presidency of the yeshivot of Baghdad and Jerusalem was reserved for the members of a few Gaonic families; but there were some exceptions. It is noteworthy that we have cases of North Africans heading the academies of Babylonia and Eretz Israel, in the latter especially in the eleventh century, when the most colorful Rosh Yeshiva of Jerusalem was R. Solomon b. Judah (d. 1051), bynamed al-Fasi, the man from Fez, and his rival for the dignity of Gaon Nathan b. Abraham, either was a native of Qayrawan or had studied there.

There is one specific trait in the spirituality of North African Jewry which needs careful consideration. As early as the beginning of the tenth century we find in Qayrawan Isaac Israeli, a native of Egypt, as court physician to the last Aghlabid and to the first Fatimid rulers. He was a renowned medical author, whose books were soon after his death translated from Arabic into Latin and served medical instruction throughout the Middle Ages and later. He was also a philosopher and prolific propounder of interesting Neoplatonic doctrines (comprehensively explained in a monograph by Alexander Altmann and S. M. Stern, 1958). He never married, but reached an age of over a hundred years, claiming that his books were apt to perpetuate his name better than children could ever do. His student Dunash b. Tamim also was a physician and a philosopher, and engaged also in the study of mathematics and astronomy. Dunash achieved fame by his philosophical commentary on the Book of Creation, Sefer Yesira, in which he criticized also a similar commentary by his older contemporary Saadya Gaon, the friend and corre-
spondent of his teacher Isaac Israeli. There were other prominent Jewish doctors in Qayrawān, for instance, Abraham b. 'Āṭā (Nathan), the Nagid, who at the beginning of the eleventh century was the court physician of the Fatimid viceroy of Tunisia. But philosophy and the secular sciences did not further develop in Jewish North Africa, at least no remarkable creations are to be noted in these fields as from the eleventh century (with the possible exception of Judah b. Nissim Ibn Malka, whose work is on the borderline between philosophy and cabbala).

This deficiency is even more astonishing in the field of secular literature. For here in North Africa it was Yehuda Ibn Quraysh of Tāhert, who, in his famous Risāla, or epistle, to the people of Fez, explained the propinquity of the three languages Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramaic, and how the knowledge of one of these languages was able to further the understanding of the others. Here, in the schools of Fez, for the first time Hebrew medieval poetry using Arabic meter, was written. Here Hebrew grammar and lexicography were developed. But the authors dispersed all over the world, and the culture of the Jews of North Africa, like that of the Jews of Poland and Lithuania a few hundred years later, became exclusively Talmudic. It was a rich spiritual life, but it was one-sided.

This narrowing of the intellectual horizon is noteworthy especially since the developments in Spain were so different. Partly the influence of the Muslim environment in North Africa has to account for this, partly also that of the almost permanent state of oppression and vexations, if not outright persecutions.

Under such circumstances it was necessary to stick to the essentials, to "the four cubits of the Torah," to the halachah. North African Jewry created a rich halachic and cabballistic literature and succeeded in preserving an atmosphere of study and learning, which enabled its modern progeny to adapt itself quickly and easily to western civilization.

Let me conclude on a personal note: when in 1951 and 1952 my wife and I gave summer courses in France to young Hebrew teachers, mostly from North Africa, we were impressed by the freshness of their minds and by their zeal for learning. Our impression proved to be correct, for I was able to follow up the history of some of these young men and women some of whom have made quite remarkable contributions to Jewish learning. I was also able to observe in Israel young Maghrebis from non-academic walks of life and found that they had made good use of the opportunities offered to them in the new country. Nat-
urally, no generalizations are permissible. But I am confident that that much-suffering, but sturdy tribe of Israel will make its significant contributions in the future as it has done in the past.

PROFESSOR UDOVITCH: I will ask Professor Norman Stillman, Associate Professor of History and Arabic at the State University of New York, Binghamton, to honor us with his presentation on "Muslims and Jews in North Africa—Perceptions, Images, Stereotypes."—Professor Stillman.

MUSLIMS AND JEWS IN MOROCCO: PERCEPTIONS, IMAGES, STEREOTYPES

NORMAN A. STILLMAN
State University of New York
at Binghamton

Lâ ṭeq b-lihūdi ida slem alu yeqwa arba'ìn ʿām
(Don’t trust a Jew if he becomes a Muslim, even though he remains so for forty years)

Lū emūnā bag-goy afīlū ba-qever arba'īm shānā
(Don’t trust a Muslim, even though he has been in the grave for forty years)

These are both common proverbs in Morocco. The first is said by Muslims about Jews, the second by Jews about Muslims. They are mirror images of one another. Like most saws they are generalizations, half truths, and without much difficulty proverbs—or some other form of popular wisdom—may be found which expresses quite opposite sentiments. It is the familiar case of "You can’t teach an old dog new tricks," as opposed to "You’re


2 Louis Brunot and Elie Malka, *Textes judéo-arabes de Fès* (Rabat, 1939), p. 192, No. 88. One of my Seffrīwi informants recited this proverb to me with the slight change in word order: ... afīlū arba'īm shānā ba-qever.
never too old to learn.” Nevertheless, the two Moroccan proverbs are fair reflections of a deep-seated—although at times sublimated, and even entirely overcome—wariness that has existed in the relations between the Muslim majority and the Jewish minority in the Maghreb. Of course, I have to add that there is a deep wariness or caution that characterizes all human relations in Morocco, even in intercourse with one’s own kith and kin. Lawrence Rosen, for example, has made the observation for Morocco that “all relationships—with the possible exception of emotionally bound friends—imply an element of competition, of struggle for dominance and dependence.” A pervasive wariness is, therefore, a natural corollary. Another oft-quoted Moroccan proverb sums it up succinctly:

_Thebbû w-thisbû_  
(Love him, but make accounts with him)

On the sole basis of the original pair of contrasting proverbs, we cannot come to any particularly judicious conclusions about Muslim-Jewish relations. Reading into them somewhat, we might be led to conclude because of their emphatic formulations that they are colored with a strong feeling of antipathy. There are instances where this holds true. However, interfaith relations in Morocco have been far too variegated to admit such neat characterizations. Because the question is multifaceted, Muslim-Jewish relations may be approached in many ways. One attempt is Rosen’s analysis of the dynamics of interfaith relations in the Moroccan town of Sefrou in the foothills of the Middle Atlas, thirty kilometers south of Fez. Sefrou was the site of extensive anthropological study by Clifford and Hildred Geertz and their students in the 1960’s. During part of the summer of 1971 and all of the following summer, my wife and I carried out a study of the dialect of the once important Jewish community which is now no more than a vestigial remnant. The case of Muslim-Jewish relations in Sefrou is not entirely typical for Morocco. The Vicomte de Foucauld, usually a keen observer, remarked nearly a century ago that Sefrou and Demnate were the two places in Morocco where Jews were happiest. They were notable exceptions to the rule. Generalizations drawn

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from either of these communities regarding Muslim-Jewish relations as a whole, are therefore, to be approached with this caveat in mind.

The social and historical experience of the Jewish communities of Fez and Marrakesh, Sefrou and Demnate’s imperial neighbors, offers instructive contrasts. Jane Gerber and Richard Press in their research on Fez and Marrakesh, respectively, paint a far less rosy picture of interconfessional relations than does Rosen. One important fact that is frequently forgotten in recent studies due to the complete discrediting of colonialism is that the coming of the French profoundly changed (among many other things) the status of Jews in the Sharifan Empire and, as a result, at least in the major cities, Muslim-Jewish relations.

What I would like to attempt here in this paper, however, is not an analysis of Muslim-Jewish relations in a particular community, or in Morocco, generally, but rather to survey some of the images and stereotypes which Moroccan Muslims and Jews have held concerning both each other and themselves. Men in any society have a stock of such images and preconceptions vis-à-vis themselves and their fellow men as part of their cultural baggage. These images—prejudgments, if you will—do not necessarily govern totally, or even predominate in, the Moroccans’ individual perceptions of one another. This is not to say that they are without force or validity. They do indeed reflect fundamental truths about intergroup relations, but have somewhat less validity on the all-important interpersonal level, where individuals may discover their essential kinship as fellow men. It is precisely this level which is often ignored by the historians and travelers and emphasized by anthropologists.

On the formal level, it is Islam that is the single most important factor affecting the Moroccan Muslim’s perception of Jews. Because there have been no native Maghrebi Christians since at least the time of the Almohads (1147–1269), the Jew has been the dhimmī par excellence. The word dhimmī is used almost exclusively in Sa’adian documents referring to Jews. Moroccan historians such as al-Zayyānī, al-Nāṣirī, and Ibn Zaydān employ the terms dhimmī and yahūdī interchangeably (as in the modern colloquial Moroccan, nasrīnī equals European). The nineteenth-century Egyptian historian al-Jabarti,  

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by way of contrast, never uses the term dhimmi, but always designates Jews, Christians (Copts, Greeks, etc.). The fact that Jews were consistently referred to as dhimmis in the Moroccan sources was not mere façon de parler. It very much reflected the actual status of Jews in Sa‘adian (1550–1650) and ‘Alawi (1666–1822) Morocco. The term is pregnant with connotations and says a great deal of how Jews were perceived.

The legal and actual status of dhimmis in Islamic law is well-known from the studies of Tritton, Fattal, Goitein, and others, and needs no lengthy recapitulation here. Although a dhimmi is a protected person, he is first and foremost a tribute bearer. The long litany of exactions found in the Jewish chronicles, such as the Divrē ha-Yâmim of the Ibn Danân family or the Yahas Fâs of Avner Ṣarfâtî refers for the most part to non-canonical levies above and beyond the poll tax required by the Koran. They were viewed by the authorities of the makhzen as fully consonant with the Jews’ tributary status.

The Koran clearly states that non-Muslims are to be humbled (Sura 9:29). In the imperial cities and orthodox religious centers of Morocco this injunction was understood in the most literal sense. The sumptuary laws were generally enforced. In addition to distinguishing garments and restrictions on mounts, Jews had to walk barefoot in some towns (in others only when passing the mosque) and were forced to do the most odious tasks in corvée labor.

Akhbâr Ḥâdirat Mihhâs (Rabat, 1929–1933), 5 vols. É. Lévi-Provençal has written a very informative introduction to native Moroccan historiography Les historiens des chorfa (Paris, 1922), however, he does not discuss attitudes and perceptions vis à vis non-Muslims.

7 Cf. al-Jabarti, ‘Ajâ‘ib al-Âthâr fi ‘l-Tarâjim wa ‘l-Akhbâr (Cairo, 1958–1966), II, p. 7 where even though the jizya (poll tax) is discussed, Jews and Christians are mentioned individually and not lumped together under the rubric of ahl al-dhimma; also ibid. III, p. 348; ibid., IV, pp. 110 and 194–on the latter page, Jabarti differentiates between Europeans, Syrian Christians, Copts, and Greek Orthodox in addition to Jews. (I wish to thank Professor Helen Anne B. Rivlin for first bringing these passages to my attention.)


9 Excerpts from both of these works are given in H. Z. Hirschberg, A History of the Jews in North Africa II (Jerusalem, 1965) [in Hebrew]; excerpts in French translation are given in Georges Vajda, Un recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocains (Paris, 1951).
Leo Africanus in the 16th century, Germain Mouëtte in the 17th, Georg Höst and Louis de Chénier in the 18th, and Charles de Foucauld in the 19th century all bear ample witness to the contempt in which Jews of the cities were generally held. Of course, we should not conclude that Jews suffered much more than the rest of the population. Most town and city dwellers were the frequent victims of pillage and rapine. Even the Jewish chroniclers of the Divrè ha-Yamim or the Yahas Fâs point out that the Jews frequently shared in a general suffering. Nonetheless, it was abundantly clear to all—Jews, Muslims, and European observers—that the Jews were at the very bottom of the ladder (or as they are frequently designated in the literary sources: asfal al-sâfilin). Theirs was without question the most vulnerable position. The mellâh was usually looted before any other quarter of a city. When the historian of the 'Alawi dynasty, Abu 'l-Qâsim al-Zayyânî, (1784–1833), wishes to describe the security and stability of Morocco under Mûlây Ismâ'il (1672–1727), he writes that even a woman or dhimmî could travel from Oujda to Wâdi Nûl unmolested. Obviously, these were the two most unprotected classes of individuals he could conceive of. The saint and scholar al-Hasan al-Yûsî, commonly known in Morocco as Laḥsen Lyûsî (1681–1691), in a moral epistle to Mûlây Ismâ'il on the need for justice in government cites as one of his examples the fact that the Caliph 'Ali had shown justice and kindness even to an elderly Jew. For emphasis, al-Yûsî has chosen an extreme example to affirm his point. Both of these references are what Bernard Lewis has referred to as the Arabic


11 Rosen's observation that "Such attacks were, however, invariably directed against the property of the Jews rather than against their persons" is to some extent a sophisticated distinction. The Jewish sources make it quite clear that there was frequent loss of life in addition to the standard pillage and rape.

12 In Lévi-Provençal, Extraits, p. 118.

13 Professor Clifford Geertz made the astute observation that in another sense Jews and women are the two most protected categories.

14 In al-Nâṣirî, Kitâb al-Istiqâ' VII, p. 86 (the text of the letter runs from pp. 82–86); French translation by Eugène Fumey in Archives Marocaines IX (1907), p. 117 (pp. 110–119).
rhetorical device of *trajectio ad absurdum*.\(^{15}\) A modern proverb from Tangier that could be placed in the same category states:

\begin{quote}
‘Amel l-khayr, ālu j-lhiyūd, iḥāfdek ahlāh mel-lādā ūl-ḥṣūd\(^{16}\)
(Do good even to Jews, God will save you from enemies
and envious people.)
\end{quote}

The general view in pre-Protectorate Morocco of the Jews
as humbled, weak, and highly vulnerable was a rather accurate
reflection of their actual legal and social position. It was neither
an idealized nor a derogatory stereotype, but simply a percep-
tion of social reality. Men, however, frequently entertain images
of others outside their own social grouping which are on an
entirely different level and into which they may project their
fears and anxieties. There are a number of such negative images
of the Jews which appear in both Moroccan literary and popular
sources.\(^{17}\)

One stereotype of Jews common in Morocco is that they
are untrustworthy individuals and that they bear ill-will toward
Islam and toward Muslims. This image goes back to koranic
passages and to early Muslim literature such as the *Sīra* or
Biography of the Prophet.\(^{18}\) Professor Goitein has pointed out
the specific historical circumstances which influenced this at-
titude.\(^{19}\) Ibn Khaldūn explains in the *Muqaddima* that Jewish
insincerity and trickery are not innate characteristics, but are
acquired traits, conditioned by generations of subjection and
tyrranny. He states that these negative traits can be observed in

\(^{16}\) Westermarck, *Wit and Wisdom*, p. 131, No. 475.
\(^{17}\) A stimulating general treatment of inter-group perceptions may be found
in Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories
of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior* (New York, 1972), in
175. A question might be raised with some justification as to just how
representative are the literary and popular sources which are used
throughout this paper. The images found in Moroccan literary sources
are, I believe, a fair representation of views commonly held by the urban
educated classes. The validity of the imagery in proverbs and folktales
is a more difficult question due to the polarity that I mentioned at the
beginning of this paper. Nonetheless, there are certain diffuse and repeti-
tive motifs which—other factors considered—seem to indicate some of the
generally held images and stereotypes. J. L. Fischer points the way—
though only in the most general way—to what can be elicited from folk-
lore in his article “The Sociopsychological Analysis of Folktales,” *Cur-
al-Nabawiyya* II (Cairo, 1955), pp. 190, 234, and elsewhere.
\(^{19}\) Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 64.
any person not in control of his own affairs and who has no authority on his side to guarantee his safety. Ibn Khaldûn accepts the stereotype, but tries to offer a sociological explanation. In this respect he is unique.

The motif of the untrustworthy or malevolent Jew can be found in both the written and oral literature. The sixteenth century writer, 'Ali al-Tamgrûû, in an anecdote about the Imâm al-Mâzarî (d. 1190), relates that he took up the study of medicine after a Jewish doctor admitted to him that the thing which would bring a Jewish physician closest to his God, according to his religion, was to cause patients such as the Imâm to disappear and thus cheat the Muslims. The portrait of the malevolent dhîmmî physician is found in the Middle Eastern literature as well, but was very rare and had little to do with reality since many Muslims from the Caliphs on down entrusted themselves to the care of dhîmmî doctors who, anyway, had a virtual monopoly on the medical profession during the first two centuries of Islam. Such stereotypes did not seem to inhibit Moroccan Muslims from seeking medical attention in the mellâh.

There are numerous Moroccan folktales which portray Jews as untrustworthy or malevolent. These fall into two general categories: 1) those in which Jews are perceived as real evildoers who seek to inflict harm upon true Believers and the Muslim faith, and 2) those of a humorous or light nature in which Jews try to get the better of a Muslim—to "put one over on him." In the former, the wicked Jew is thwarted and/or punished by the pious Muslim. It is a clear case of the triumph of good over evil, of the Believer over the Infidel. In the latter group, the Jew is simply outwitted by his Muslim fellow. There does not seem to be much of a difference between them, with the exception that the Muslim is slightly more clever.

A very well-known example of the first group—the malevolent Jew who seeks to harm believers and the faith—is the Ibn Mêsh'al legend, which in its most embroidered version tells of

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a Jewish tyrant in Taza who annually received a tribute of beautiful Muslim maidens from Fez for his harem, until Mûlây Rashid (1666–1672) came disguised as a woman and killed him. This tale has been studied at some length in a monograph by Pierre de Cenival and needs no further comment here. Another example is a folktale in which a Muslim widow falls in love with a Jewish friend of her deceased husband. He will only have her on the condition that she kill her son and become a Jewess. Her son meanwhile is studying in the mosque. With the *fqiḥ's* (in Morocco, “schoolmaster”, not necessarily a scholar in Islamic law) help, it is the Jew who is killed by the boy, and the mother is tricked into eating his liver. The sexual fantasy common to both of these tales is certainly a familiar motif of racial or religious prejudice. The combined images of the wicked woman and the evil Jew is of particular interest since these were commonplaces in medieval European literature, particularly in Spain. (Of course, they are both to be found in the Arabian Nights as well.)

The image of the Jew as a cheat and ill-wisher to Muslims is also common in proverbs, for example:

*L-iḥūdī ʿida ʾgāshsh l-meslem ka-iḥūn ferḥān f-dak l-yūm*

(When a Jew cheats a Muslim, he is happy that day)

or

*L-iḥūdī ʿida tḥak nel-meslem, ʿarfū nel-ʾgāshsh yēṭḥāzzem*

(If a Jew laughs at a Muslim, know that he is girding himself for cheating).


24 The Arabic text of the story is to be found in Colin, *Chrestomathie marocaine*, pp. 30f, No. LI.


The image of the Jew as a cheat was fairly widespread, more particularly in urban trading centers such as Fez and the coastal cities of Tangier, Rabat-Salé, Safi, and Essaouira. Perhaps this is due to the fact that in these places Jews were seen more as a competitive threat. A notable counterpoint to this image can be found in a number of Jewish folktales in which Jews who cheat Muslims are severely punished.28

Having gone through this catalogue of Muslim images and stereotypes toward Jews, I should for the sake of perspective point out that, over all, these form only a very small part of the written and oral literature. There is no obsession with the Jews comparable to that found in medieval European literature. Most of the Moroccan stereotypes of Jews may be negative, but they are also peripheral. First and foremost they are perceived of as dhimmis, humbled, but protected, subjects. As long as the Jew conforms to this perceived role there is little interest taken in him. The image of insincerity and even malevolence is probably projection. It is also a result of an attitude of caution. One should be wary of others until proven differently. Moroccan writers frequently take note of the Jew when he does not conform to the dhimmī image—when he becomes arrogant. When al-Nāṣirī records the visit of Sir Moses Montefiore to Marrakesh in 1864, he states that the Moroccan Jews had complained of their condition to Rothschild and sought to obtain freedom like that of their brethren in Egypt. He goes on to say that after Mūlāy Muḥammed issued his famous dahir (Cl. Ar. ṭahīr “decree”) guaranteeing Jewish rights in accordance with the dhimma contract, “the Jews became arrogant and frivolous . . . and not only the Jews of the port cities . . . but then God foiled their plot and their endeavor was frustrated.”29

If Jews—or to be more precise, images of Jews—appear only peripherally in Muslim oral and written sources, the same is by no means true with regards to Muslims in Jewish sources.

28 Cf., e.g., Joseph Ben Naim, Maikhd Rabbānān (Jerusalem, 1931), pp. 47b and 125a. Such stories were obviously meant as stern warnings for the community’s own good.
29 al-Nāṣirī, Kitāb al-Isīlqāṭ IX, pp. 115f. It would appear that “arrogant and frivolous” (tālāwh wal-taysh) simply meant not conforming to what was perceived as the dhimmī’s humbled status. In part, it was a matter of projection. Those Jews who served at court and rose to high positions were often indeed as arrogant as anyone else in authority. Cf. Samuel Romanelli’s observation in Massā’ bū-‘Arāq, edited by Jefim Schirmann in Ketāvīm Nivhārīm (Selected Writings of Samuel Romanelli) (Jerusalem, 1968), p. 110.
For although the Jew may have his own communal microcosm, he lives within the Muslim's world: He is more conscious of Muslims, more directly concerned. Thus Muslims appear far more frequently, in Moroccan Jewish literature, oral and written.

As we observed at the outset, stereotypes and stock images held by Moroccan Jews and Muslims are sometimes mirror images of one another. Jews, however, do not generally perceive of Muslims as one lump totality, but differentiate between townspeople, who are called msiim or goy, Berbers, who are called sloh or pilsiti (Philistine—which goes back to médiéval'Andalusian usage), and bedouin, who are simply called 'arobi, which is the standard word in Moroccan Arabic for nomad.

Goy may refer to all three of these groups, but is never used for Christians, who are called našrānī or 'ārel (Hebrew for “uncircumcised”).

There is no lack of stories and proverbs expressing the idea that one cannot trust a non-Jew. Many of those directed specifically against Berbers or bedouin reflect urban prejudices shared by most townspeople and could be heard just as easily from Muslims, as for example:

Sallem 'al-l-'arbi 'ghsar khebzā
(Greet a bedouin and you will lose a loaf of bread)

By the same token, Jews of the south, like their Berber neighbors, had a general distrust of Arabs of the urban-north and shared a number of anti-Arab proverbs with the Bedouin; such as:

Doing a favor to an Arab is like sprinkling water onto sand

With the exception of the proverbs with which we opened

30 Cf., e.g., the poem by Judah Halevi which begins: Pléšitím nes’tíshí va-qódöšim shōsim in J. Schirmann, Ha-Shira, ha-nivrít bish'arad 'as-Provence II (Jerusalem, 1961), p. 479 and no. 1.

31 The same usage of goy for Muslim and 'nāšrānī or 'ārel for Christian is found in the Geniza documents for medieval Egypt. Cf. S. D. Goitein, Med. Soc. II, p. 278.


this paper, one ought not to make too much out of these mildly xenophobic expressions. They belong to a widespread, regional, chauvinistic genre. Thus Fäsis have a host of deprecating remarks about Miknäśis, Miknäśis about Fäsis, and both about Marrâkshîs.

As in 'the Muslim community,' there are numerous light tales of the "one-upmanship" genre, only here the Jew outwits an Arab or a Berber. Once again, many of these are merely the converse of Muslim tales, where one of the two protagonists finally pulls off a slightly better trick, or where a holy man simply works some wonder and thereby defeats, punishes, or makes sport of his opponent. Frequently, however, there is an element which is more particularly Jewish in outlook. The Muslim in these stories is defeated or outwitted not by legerdemain or some irrational power, but by superior intellect, by learning. These stories are more important for the Jew's self-image than for perceptions of Muslims. They are vindications of fundamental Jewish values.34

In some of these stories the Muslim opponent is depicted as an evil antagonist. The image of the malevolent Muslim is less diffuse, more specific, than the parallel of the malevolent Jew found among Muslims. It is less of an irrational stereotype. In the Jewish literature the villain is usually a government official, a fanatical qâdi (Muslim judge) or 'sharîf (descendant of the Prophet)—although he may be someone of no particular consequence. In each case, however, he is a real soneqâristâlî, a hater of Jews. He is frequently a person of overweening pride and is a hypocrite who only pretends to be a good Muslim (e.g., he drinks wine in secret or is disloyal to the sultan).35 The clear implication is that not all Muslims are ill-wishers. In fact, there is usually a virtuous sultan, qâ'id, or pasha in the same story, who like Ahasuerus in the Bible eventually sees Haman exposed. In the Jewish hagiographic literature good Muslims respect the baraka of a saddîq (Jewish saint). Rulers seek his counsel. Muslims in disputes with Jews come to him for judg-

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34 Such tales may be found in Dov Noy, Jewish Folktales from Morocco, Hebrew edition (Jerusalem, 1964), English edition (Jerusalem, 1965). Cf., e.g., Nos. 23 and 47. Cf. Lawrence Rosen's review essay "North African Jewish Studies," Judaism XVII, No. 4 (Fall 1968), pp. 428f. Many stories of this type may be found in Ben Naim, Mâkhê Rabbânân, and in Abraham Ben 'Aṭâr, Sêfer Shenôt Hayyîm (Casablanca, 1958).

ment or invoke his name. In times of drought the authorities seek his intercession with God. This theme which is so common in the Jewish *vitae sanctorum* is clearly apologetic in nature. It is a sort of wishful thinking and an attempt at vindicating the Jews' status as a humbled minority. The intent is to show that even the Muslim majority come to recognize the power of the ṣaddiq, that he is as charismatic, if not more so than the Muslim saint. The whole genre is very similar to the Muslim *manāqib al-sādāt* literature, and the personalities of the saints are very similar. Both can mete out awesome punishments to those who offend them even slightly. A fundamental difference in perception is that Jews view their saints as coming to have their powers solely through their own individual scholarly attainments. The emphasis is on rational faculties. There are no examples, to the best of my knowledge, in Moroccan Jewish hagiography of the spiritual transferal of baraka from one saint to another by mechanistic means such as Sīdī ‘Alī Ben Ḥamdūsh’s drinking Bū ‘Abid Sharqī’s vomit or Sīdī Lahṣen Lyūsī’s drinking the water in which he had washed the garment of his diseased master Aḥmad Ben Nāṣir.36

Muslim holy men—understandably—almost never appear in Jewish pietistic literature. (Although Jews and Muslims do share some pilgrimage shrines and saint’s tombs in common.)37 Jews accept the fact that there are marabouts with genuine powers, but they perceive of them as essentially different from the ṣaddiqīm’s and belong to the realm of magic. In one story Rabbi Khīfa Ben Malka of Agadir asks a Muslim seer to reveal the future to him and knows that what he is told is true.38 The Muslim is referred to as a *mekhāshshēf*, a biblical word meaning sorcerer, one of the abominations of other nations forbidden to Israel in Deuteronomy 18:10. One should not perhaps lay too much emphasis on the term used here to designate the Muslim seer which may be due to no more than the literary style of the pious editor of the collection. The important point here is that the Rabbi knows that the Muslim is gifted with clairvoyance.


and has respect for his powers. Indeed, it would seem that the two men were on friendly terms. There is a practicality here which is typically Maghrebi. In the final analysis, it is the merits of the Muslim seer and the Rabbi's personal relationship with him that count.

Despite the fact that Muslim holy men rarely appear in Jewish oral or written sources, many Jews showed great respect for the sharif or marabout who possessed the qualities expected of a man of noble descent or spiritual powers. Some Jews considered the shorfa (Cl. Ar. shurafâ’) to be like the descendants of Aaron, that is, like kohanîm. The eighteenth-century Italian Jew, Samuel Romanelli, who lived in Morocco from 1787–1790, and has left us a charming and informative account in Hebrew which deserves an English translation, was horrified to see the veneration by Jews of a Berber sharif in Tetouan. He reports that when the sharif came into their presence, they rose and kissed his shoulders.39 The possibility of this type of scene is only alluded to rather obliquely in Jewish oral and written sources, but the image of the Muslim with whom one can have cordial and even intimate relations is quite ubiquitous. There are many stories in the oral and written sources of Muslims who come to the aid of their Jewish friends. In one story in Malkhê Rabbânân (an extensive biographical dictionary of Moroccan saints and scholars), a Berber in the time of Rabbi Judah El-Bâz kills the pasha of Sefrou because he would not let the Berber's Jewish friend out of prison so that he could perform the mîşvâ (religious duty) of circumcising his newborn son.40 The story is not too farfetched or devoid of reality. The Jew may well have been a protected client of the Berber, bound by an ‘âr sacrifice to mutual obligations.41 The story pointedly relates that they were friends.

39 Romanelli, Massâ’ ba-‘Arâv, p. 70.
40 Ben Naim, Malkhê Rabbânân, p. 44b.
41 Concerning the various aspects of the custom of ‘âr, cf. Edward Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in Morocco 1 (New Hyde Park, 1968), pp. 518–569. The establishing of an ‘âr relationship with a Berber tribesman was imperative for Jews who traveled about or traded in the countryside around Sefrou, for example. The relationship established can last for generations, as Lawrence Rosen points out in “A Moroccan Jewish Community During the Middle Eastern Crisis,” The American Scholar XXXVII (Summer 1968), pp. 438f. Having such a protector was also important to the Jews of Yemen. Cf. S. D. Goitein, “Portrait of a Yemenite Weavers’ Village,” Jewish Social Studies XVII, No. 1 (1955), pp. 15f, and idem., The Land of Sheba (New York, 1947), pp. 34–37.
In surveying the images Moroccan Jews have held vis-à-vis Muslims, it is difficult to pinpoint any consistent and pervasive stereotypes as in the case of Muslims on Jews. Jews tended to hold more differentiated images—Muslims may be persecutors or protectors, imposters or genuine thaumaturges. For the Muslims Jews were classified, until the coming of the French when the Protectorate radically changed their general status (a fact that is often forgotten now that colonialism has been discredited), as a single group—dimmis, with all its legal, social, and religio-historical implications.

Although both Muslims and Jews felt a certain a priori wariness toward each other, it would appear that Muslims maintained more consistently negative images of Jews as a whole. This was to some extent—perhaps to a not inconsiderable extent—mitigated on the individual, interpersonal level, especially in economic dealings, where assessments are made face to face.

The exigencies of minority existence in Morocco, which was, at best precarious, forced the Jews to maintain generalized conceptions of Muslims which conformed somewhat more closely to reality, although they did at times indulge in a sort of wishful thinking in an attempt to justify to themselves their own existence. This model does have somewhat of a parallel in the contrasting degrees of reality in mutual White-Black perceptions in the ante-bellum South, where the White majority could allow itself to indulge in fantasies vis-à-vis Blacks much more than could Blacks vis-à-vis Whites. I certainly do not wish this parallel to be taken too far, and I do not by any means seek to suggest that there is much that is comparable between the two societies beyond the fact that in both cases the minority found it necessary to perceive the majority in a more realistic fashion than vice versa.

Of course, in the final analysis the images which Jews and Muslims held concerning each other as a group have their greatest validity from a distance. There was a great deal about each that was foreign to each other. It is rather difficult, if not im-


possible, to understand—much less trust; respect; or like—some- 
one you do not really know. This fact was appreciated by 
Moroccans. If I may be permitted to end as I began with a very 
common proverb which is found in many variant forms in 
Morocco:

\textit{di mā 'arfek ih'ark}\textsuperscript{43} 
(He who does not know you has contempt for you)

**DISCUSSION**

**Professor Uдовичи:** The floor is now open for discussion, questions and comments.

**Professor Alexander Melamid, Department of Economics, NYU:** I'm interested in the Jews of the central Sahara, the Ghardaia, who were never influenced by Spanish immigration as the other Jews of North Africa were. How do they fit into the pattern of the discussions?

**Professor Norman Stillman:** The Ghardaia is in the Mzab in Algeria while my lecture was addressed to Morocco. But, of course, the Mzab in Algeria is a special situation. The Mzab was a stronghold of the Ibādite Khārijite sect and, therefore, it, of course, was not Mālikī. These people themselves were outcasts. That's why they moved out into the Mzab from the North. There are one or two books that deal with the Ghardaia community. One came out fairly recently.

The situation of the Jews there would also be different because, of course, they were in a community which itself was an outcast community, and which had very strict laws of purity. So they formed a completely separate world there themselves. How they relate exactly to my own lecture? I don't think they really do.


**Professor Stillman:** Yes, that's the book.
Dr. Press: It's an eyewitness account of the Jewish inhabitants of the Ghadaïa being loaded on buses and being resettled to Israel.

Professor Paul Raccah, Department of Physics, Yeshiva University: I have no scholarly competence in the field of North African Jewish communities except for the fact that I'm a North African Jew and I was born and raised in Tunisia. Therefore, if I speak to you at all today on this subject, it is from the point of view of my own experience.

While Tunisia has been more influenced by the French Protectorate than Morocco, simply because the Protectorate existed in Tunisia for a longer period of time, from 1881, there was one situation which occurred in Tunisia which did not occur in Morocco or Algeria. German troops did come into Tunisia although they did not invade Morocco or Algeria. The Germans were seeking the friendship of the Arabs because they needed it. The Germans did not like the Jews very much and the Arabs really had a unique opportunity to settle accounts, if there were any accounts to settle.

My own experience, and that of every Jew from Tunisia, was that the nature of the relationship between Muslims and Jews was put to the test: The Muslims did not collaborate with the Germans and in fact they largely protected the Jews.

At that time the Bey of Tunisia was the Bey Moncef (Muhammad al-Munsif). He was a very unique case due to the law of succession in the Tunisian dynasty. Succession does not pass from father to son, but to the eldest in the whole family. Normally Tunisian monarchs are very old when they come to the throne. But he was only 41 years old when he came to the throne. He was a definite nationalist and one would have expected from him as little as one could get. One would have expected him to try to arrange with the Germans for independence of his country.

Yet he did not at all compromise the fate of the Jews. On the contrary, he felt that any attempts made at persecuting his children, he called them "ouladī," "my children," should be met with as much opposition as possible.

Professor Moïse Ohana, Department of Modern Languages and Literature, Brooklyn College: I am from Morocco. The Germans were there too. Muhammad al-Khâmís (Muhammad V) protected the Jews and no harm was done to them. To judge by what happened since the creation of the
State of Israel, I would say that the fate of Moroccan Jews was not in any way comparable to that of the Ifaqi, Syrian or Egyptian Jews. And up to the present day, Jews are living in Morocco and are very much trusted by the Arabs. As a matter of fact, when a Muslim looks for a partner in business, he will go to much trouble to have a Jew with him, not only because he knows that a Jew is very competent but because he knows a Jew is very honest. So, I don't know whether these stereotypes that we find in literature are truly reflective of the relationship between Muslims and Jews in Morocco.

Professor Stillman: To partially answer both, again I point out that stereotypes and images have their best validity of course from the distance. Especially on the inter-personal level and especially on matters of economic relations, one cannot very well deal on the basis of stereotypes; one has to make individual personal assessments. There were in the 1930's in the French colonial journal for Africa, Afrique Française, articles about the penetration of anti-Semitism into North Africa and most pointed out that German anti-Semitism was not very exportable. When German tourists came to Morocco in the thirties, they were not well received. There is the example of Jewish shopkeepers in the bazaar in Casablanca who were asked to put on a tarbush by their Muslim friends so that they would not be picked out by the Germans as Jews. That is very true.

Again, if you take a look at Moroccan history in the pre-Protectorate period, obviously there have been two tendencies that you see in modern scholarship. One, is on the basis of work of anthropologists such as Rosen, who see how very effective personal relationships can be, the so-called symbiotic relationship that one has with another man in which very strong friendships and ties of friendship can develop. On the other hand, you have all of these writers coming from the outside who saw the actual condition of the Jews, not that, of course, the condition of most people in Morocco was that much better during the pre-Protectorate period. And, of course, they emphasize the other side. There is a tendency now to idealize—which is equally wrong. One has to look at it as it really was.

Professor Stuart Schaar, Brooklyn College: One of the most interesting aspects of relations between Jews and Muslims was that the Sultan of Morocco protected the Jewish community. Usually army barracks were close to the Jewish
mellāh or ghetto in various cities. In having barracks located there, troops were supposed to come out in case of trouble arising between the Jewish population and Muslims, to surround the mellāh and prevent the Muslims from causing any trouble. If hypothetically, a Jew passed a mosque, was drunk and spat; that might be a pretext for communal conflict. If the governor was alerted in time, the troops would be called out immediately and they did their job as buffers. Once in a while, and we get this from the chroniclers, things got completely out of hand, when angry Muslims would invade the Jewish quarters. These "invasions," though, were very similar to the rural pillages of Mōroccan mountaineers who would raid in some sedentary zones of the plains. They would move through a village, take whatever was standing unattached such as cows, sheep, horses, miles, simple home furnishings (where they existed), etc. An intermediary, in the rural society, whose role was to "sell" that merchandise back to the person victimized, received a small percentage for services rendered. It was so institutional, that a victim could buy back his own cow at a low cost and not suffer total loss.

In terms of the Jewish community, especially in urban centers, when Muslims entered the mellāh to pillage, they rarely killed people. Now, certainly it is terrible, to be pillaged, but everyone in that society, as Professor Stillman pointed out, I think very accurately, was subject to enormous pressures, whether they were Jewish or Muslim, especially if they were not part of the ruling elite. Jewish people were pillaged, after a conflicting situation arose which shocked the Muslim onlookers, if royal troops did not arrive in time, but victims rarely lost their lives. In the early and mid-nineteenth century, the deaths as a result of such raids were extraordinarily infrequent.

From the 1860's on, we have very incisive records of this generalization from the Alliance Israélite in Paris. The rule of the Alliance from the 1870's on was that Moroccan Jews should be encouraged to remain in Morocco. For that reason, the Alliance built schools there for the Jewish population. Conversely, from the 1880's and 90's on, the policy was to get Algerian Jews out of Algeria. The Dreyfuss affair and anti-Semitism that had developed in the European community of Algeria had caused a great deal of havoc among the Algerian Jewish community. The Alliance Israélite did not want the Jewish community of Morocco to migrate because they really felt that their situation was far better off than it would be in
France or in other places that they might have to go to. What
Professor Goitein calls the “interminable history of cruel suffer-
ing,” in reference to the Jewish population of Morocco is gross-
ly exaggerated and would apply to most people in the society
—especially during periods of social breakdown—who did not
have the means to achieve power or influence the powerful.

Professor Urońitch: If I may intervene for a moment;
and exploit my prerogative as chairman, I am very grateful for
the comments that have been made in the discussion so far in
response to the papers because disavowal of generalizations will
very likely lead us more slowly but more accurately to the truth
about the situation. We are witnessing here a dialectic in
terms of historical interpretation and understanding of the
general situation of minorities in the Islamic-Arabic context
as well as its specifically North African manifestation. Let me
preface what I am about to say by quoting a bon mot of an
economist friend of mine, who claims you can identify an
economist by the following: When you ask how his wife is, he
will answer “As compared to what?” And I have a feeling that
much of our discussion about minority-majority relationships
in the Muslim world can be understood, only if we ask that
same question, “As compared to what?” I refer not to the rela-
tionships themselves, but the views about the relationships,
the historiography, the scholarship concerning these relation-
ships. To put it very simply and maybe over-simplily, it has been
the received wisdom that Islam, while it viewed minorities as
second-class citizens (and when we speak about minorities, we
speak about Christians as well as Jews although, in North Africa
we speak primarily, or almost entirely of Jews) — there was a
tradition of tolerance, which involved at the very minimum,
protection of life and limb of the minority members of the
society. I think that this received wisdom has, in recent times
and for whatever reason, begun to if not provoke, at least elicit,
kind of revisionist scholarly reaction, some of which I think
is underlying some of the remarks that were made here earlier
today. This revisionist view not only maintains that it wasn’t
so good; but asserts that it was pretty bad. And I have a feeling
that there is some truth in both positions and I don’t think
there is much profit in posing the problem with this kind of
juxtaposition in mind.

It would be much more profitable first of all to try to
establish the reality of historical events in their context. In
this connection I would just like to ask Dr. Stillman: You alluded to the fact that Muslims were much more important to Jews than Jews were to Muslims, and it would, therefore, seem to me, as you yourself indicated, that some of the generalizations you implied existed in the proverbs and other examples that you gave, may not have been very characteristic. It would be interesting were you to elaborate somewhat on the place of these views, in what context they existed, how prevalent and how meaningful they were. Generally, I think the discussion should go in this direction.

Professor Clifford Geertz, The Institute for Advanced Study: I want to make a remark along the same lines. The only way you are going to be able to understand these proverbs is to understand the way in which they are used. There is an African example, apposite here, of a man who said to the ethnographer: "I know the proverbs but I don't know how to use them." To understand the way in which these folktales operate is to understand exactly the sort of thing that both Rosen and you and I are trying to understand—that is, the actual pattern of relationships in North Africa.

The point is neither to idealize the symbiotic relationship nor to deny oppression, but to try to see the forms that they took and the kind of society in which they existed. And I would be more radical in this position and say that I think a majority-minority kind of model for the relationship is wrong; that the whole ethnic group notion, which is actually an American notion, does not fit the Moroccan situation, one which is highly individualistic. The central thesis of the talk (which incidentally, despite these caveats, I liked very much) that Muslims' views of Jews were not as differentiated as Jews' views of Muslims raises very great skepticism in me because of the complexity of the relationships in the market, in the governmental situation, and so on between Muslims and Jews, which were very variegated and very individualized. When you say that Jews and women were the most unprotected people in the society, I would say that they were the most protected in the society, being "protected" in a very institutionalized sense. I think it's rather too easy to arrange symbolic materials in such a way as to present a model—a rather traditional sort of American model—of a dominant oppressive majority, and a subdominant, oppressed minority. This does not fit the situation, which is not to say that there is not oppression but that is not
the form it takes and that is not a proper model to understand what is going on. That is why people from North Africa when they hear this respond with a sense that it isn't intuitively true, not because they think there was no oppression. The forms and the structures of Muslim-Jewish relationships need to be conceptualized, sociologically and historically, in a much more explicit way.

DR. MAURICE PERLZWEIG, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS: I would just like to say something very briefly along the same lines. I heard a proverb in Tunisia which I visited before '40 which ran like this: Tunisia is a woman, Algeria is a man, Morocco is a warrior. It is my view that these countries cannot be treated, I am not speaking now of the 10th or 11th centuries, but of the last 50 or 60 years, in the same way.

I would like to confirm exactly what the gentleman from Tunisia said, because I talked to the last Bey. I don't say that is very important, but I talked to his ministers, and it is quite clear that they were determined to defend the Jews. The situation in Algeria which I also visited was quite different. The Jews took a part, many of them, in the revolutionary movement. They were very close to the Arabs in some respect, but it didn't turn out in the end in the way they thought. Now Morocco was again quite different. I was in Morocco under the French Protectorate, I was there during the exile of the King, Muhammad the Fifth, I was in Morocco when he came back. I found in Morocco at least four different trends. I don't know whether the word ethnic is the right word, but four different cultural traditions. First of all, I came across those that were called locally Berber Jews. Professor Goitein didn't think very much of some of the local tradition that these were converted Berbers. I visited a village not very far from Marrakesh, which was extremely primitive, where the peoples' life style was exactly the life style of Berber peasants. They were quite different from those whom I call, perhaps ignorantly, indigenous Moroccan Jews, for example, in Marrakesh in the madina. The latter were people well off and had houses built in exactly the same way as the Arab middle class, except that they had a mikvah attached to the house. Then I came across what I call French Jews, who sometimes turned out to be Polish Jews. Finally I came across genuine Sephardic Jews, who had maintained unimpaired their Sephardic tradition. I found them in the north where some of them talked of having the "key of the old house
in Andalusia," but I found them most of all in Tetuan where they seemed to live exactly like Spanish Jews many centuries ago, very highly cultivated, professional men very deeply attached to Judaism, but living in an atmosphere, at the time when I saw them, which was Spanish. They had a Scroll in the Ark, a Sefer Torah, which came from Barcelona in the 13th or 14th century, which they carried across the Strait of Gibraltar; they had preserved that tradition.

When you talk about Moroccan Jews and their relations with Muslims, I must say I am very doubtful about it because I found that these various groups which I've described, perhaps wrongly, had different kinds of relations. I believe that when we talk about North Africa that we should not treat it as a single unit in any fundamental sense.

PROFESSOR GOTTEIN: It is certain, there is no doubt, that not only North African Jews but even Moroccan Jews and Tunisian Jews can not be treated as one unit. What I said about the Berber Jews has nothing to do with their social character. What I meant to say is that this talk about North African Jews being Berber by race is not true.

DR. BARUCH BOKSER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY: In assessing the value of the proverbs, I was wondering, do we have proverbs today that are expressed by one group of Jews towards another Jew and what is the relationship of the stereotypes of these proverbs to the Arabs?

PROFESSOR STILLMAN: Well of course, as I said, the urban Jews share attitudes toward non-urban peoples that you will find amongst any other members of the same community. That includes everyone. What Fāsīs have to say about Mīknāsīs, Mīknāsīs about Fāsīs ... This, of course, is very well known.

How does that fit into what we have been talking about?

First of all, I think I should mention two things. I agree with Professor Geertz, the Islamic world does not look upon groups as ethnic; these are religious groups. The interesting thing in Morocco, going back to the Middle Ages, is that there is some idea there of a Jewish identity that goes beyond a religious identity. Perhaps this has something to do with Islamic Spain where the idea of purity of language, race and religious tradition seems to be a leitmotif that runs through it.

If you read the biographer of the Mahdi Ibn Tūmart, al-Baydhaq, there's a story there that's rather interesting of
the Mahdi, when he was in Bougie in Algeria. There was a discussion going on in the mosque about whether to say the salât al-jinâza (the funeral prayers) over a Jew who had died. Apparently he had been coming to the mosque and praying regularly for the past twenty years. Now under Islamic law he was not a Jew; he was a Muslim, one hundred percent since all one needs to do to become a Muslim is to say to a witness "là ilâha illa'llâh".

Professor U dovitch: You left out one part.

Professor Stillman: Now this is something interesting for Professor Melamed, about the Jews who were in a place like Ghârdâía. The Kharîjites permit Jews to say the shahâda, to say "là ilâha illa'llâh, wà-Muhammadun rasûlu'llâh" and to add: "but not to us", "Muhammad is the Apostle of God—but not to us." That makes him acceptable in Kharîjite terms, whereas the Kharîjites, of course, look upon other Muslims as being outside the pale.

Another thing that I think was a very good point brought up by a number of people is that there is a great difference between Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria.

Tunisía, for example, was under the Ottoman aegis for a long time. Now the position of Jews in the Ottoman Empire was very different than it was, let's say, in Morocco or in Yemen. Of course, Yemen later came under the Ottomans too, but it was a Zaydi Shi'a country so that there it would again be different.

It's true, as Professor Schaar mentioned, that the mellâh was usually next to the Dâr al-Makhzan. Thé idea of the mellâh, the idea of segregating Jews, was not to put them in a ghetto, this was not part of the humiliation (there were always Jews, by the way, who lived outside the mellâh, that's another thing that's usually not mentioned) but to protect them. I think that Dr. Schaar did indicate that as a general rule people were not killed. Sometimes, of course, they were. But then again people got killed in the other quarters as well. You have all of this in the sources. Unfortunately, most of the Jewish sources are from Fez, which might mean that we have a picture from which we cannot generalize for the rest of Morocco.

One last thing, on the role of the Sultan as a protector, going back to al-Yûsûf’s epistle to `Mûlây Ismâ‘îl, in al-Nâṣirî, he says the Sultan is the Commander of the Faithful and, therefore, he has a responsibility to protect the dhîimmîs. They are
a people who have a contract of protection and he tells Mūlāy ʿIṣmāʿīl that you must live up to that contract of protection. And this is something that Muslim jurists in the Islamic East are also continually telling rulers. On the one hand, you shouldn’t permit Jews to wax proud; on the other hand, you have a certain responsibility to them. And the rulers accepted this responsibility.

**Professor Ohana:** I think we should not overemphasize differences between the different segments of North African Jewry. Of course, they lived under different political situations, but basically, if you look at traditions, they are authentic Sephardic traditions. We could basically speak of one society.

**Professor Gerber:** On the question of differences: The sources themselves, rabbinic sources, rabbinic responsa, seem to be much more instructive. Someone like Yacob Ibn Tzur, for example, in his many responsa often invokes nuances, and not just nuances, but actual differences in customs, such is the custom in Fes, yet this is the way it's done in Sefrou. This is natural in a very fragmented society.

**Professor Udovitch:** We could probably quickly achieve some consensus about what was common and what was distinct about various North African Jewish communities, but I would like to see the discussion focus on the topic of the Seminar, namely, Muslim-Jewish Relations.

**Professor Stillmán:** (In reply to a question) As far as the urban context is concerned—from what I gather from Professor Gerber’s paper, she’s going to be talking to some extent about guild regulations.

'Jews performed certain services. We have Jews as artisans. In the South, we have many Jewish artisans. There are Jewish artisans in the cities as well. Jews were involved in mercantile professions in the Middle Ages—the whole Geniza society. We see so many of these people come out of North Africa from Qayrawān. Of course, we have less in the Geniza from Morocco and Spain. But from what we have there, we still see many Maghrebi Jews.

Up to the year 1000 there was a great population movement within the Islamic World, from East to West. Then from the year 1000, for the next two centuries, the movement goes West to East. We see the thrust of the Maghrebi merchants who
appear so commonly in the Geniza. Jews continue to be the classical entrepreneurs.

Later on in the eighteenth century, you had Jews (and also Muslims) going to Manchester. But many Jews were entrepreneurs both in the South and the North. Many of these people worked in the consular service for the European countries. Romanelli, whom I mentioned, served as the Secretary, as the Hapsburg consul in Tangier. We have the correspondence of this consul.

As for the relations of Jews as clients of tribes, we have a situation in many places which Professor Goitein has described for the Jews of Yemen. This is a relation we find in the Middle East—where people are the ĵirān, the ĵār, which doesn’t mean neighbor here, but the gēr in the Bible. These are protected clients, one who owes you certain obligations and whom as a matter of duty and honor you have to protect.

Now, of course, not every Jew who lived in a city like Fez, Marrakesh, Essaouira (Mogador), Safl, Tangier could have a client relationship with someone. From a place like Sefrou, which was an intermediary zone between the Middle Atlas Berbers and between the Arabs of the plain, many Jews went out. I know both personally and from my studies of many people who were merchants who would go into the country. Now the back country was a dangerous place to go for anyone, Jew or non-Jew. But a Jew, especially, did not have the protection of his own kith and kin. Therefore, he would make an ĵār sacrifice with someone and this would be his way of being able to travel around unprotected. Because an attack on him would be an attack on his patron. And the same thing would happen in Yemen. So you have a wide variety obviously, of economic positions.

Many Jews, however, as I said, although nothing like the position in Europe, were in agriculture, in the South, or in agricultural speculation, although again as entrepreneurs.

Jews also acted as moneylenders. One of the reasons that Jews were very important to the economy was that they would take the risk of being moneylenders. Now, of course, it was a very considerable risk, because of the fact that they were to some extent unprotected persons. The risk, for example, to a Muslim who was not a good credit risk could be anywhere from 60% interest on up. To a fellow Jew who was a good credit risk, it might only be 12% interest. To a Muslim who was a good credit risk, 33% interest.
So what I'm really saying is you find them running quite the gamut, although, if you were to look at it overall, they tend to be, again, this is one of those generalizations that one has to be careful of; craftsmen or entrepreneurs.

Steven Shaw, City College—now at National Jewish Conference Center: Regarding the patterns between Arabs and Jews in Morocco, what's the transferability in terms of the relationships of transplanted Moroccan or North African Jewish communities and their Arab neighbors in Israel?

Professor Uddovitch: I don't know if anybody would care to answer that. But if I may just make a general remark: If we are to take the gist of this discussion seriously, that the relationships were very much conditioned by the context, one would have good grounds for questioning whether there is that kind of transferability since the contexts are radically different.

Raphael Danziger, Princeton: I would like to react to a few things that were said by Professor Geertz.

On the basis of reading sources on the history of Jews in Algeria before the French came in, rather than Morocco, I think that it is true there was a great variegation in the relations between Jews and Arabs. If you take the Jews in Algeria, most of them became millionaires; some practically controlled the Algerian economy.

What Professor Stillman said about the status of dhimmis was very much the underlying basis of it all. While Jews could indeed go out in the world and get this kind of wealth, I think this, dhimmis basis was there. And there were certain bounds which a Jewish merchant could never transgress.

I think the best source for this period is the account by Shaler, who was the American consul in Algiers. He wrote a book in 1826 called Sketches of Algiers. In this, he shows that, for instance, if violence was committed by a Muslim to a Jew, the Jew simply could not respond to it. And he brings in all kinds of other examples to show that there was this underlying basis; the Jew as a dhimmi. While the dhimmis was protected he was always considered to be the one who was under practical subjugation; he could not transgress those boundaries.

Professor Uddovitch: I don't want to respond for Professor Geertz or for anybody else. But I think it would be fair to say that nobody denies the existence of this concept of dhimmis and all sorts of practical consequences that may have
flowed from that status. What some people here are trying to say, is that clinging too closely to the notion of dhimmi may not be the most profitable way to understand the reality of Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa. While that may have been a very important ingredient in the whole mix, that is not the only way to view this problem.

Professor Melamid: There's another group of modern Muslim-Jewish relations which shouldn't be forgotten. And that's the Jews employed by international organizations such as oil companies. I'm amazed at the number you find who are employed in the Sahara and also in Iran. Generally their relations with local Jews are not that good. But with Muslims they are good. It's a significant form of contact and I'm impressed by the number of Jews in these international organizations as having very close contact with Muslims.

Professor Gerber: One of the most startling facts that I found, in terms of documents, pinkasim or account records of the communities, was that despite what Europeans would lead one to believe, the flamboyant Jewish Sephardic trader they met in the town where they were, was atypical of his community. The Moroccan urban Jewish community by and large was an artisan community, heavily weighted in favor of goldsmithery which was outlawed to Muslims. Goldsmithery was the only area where Moroccan Jews had real specialization. The courtier and diplomat, while evoking the comments of Europeans, was generally an isolated or unique personality in a mellah.

Professor Udovitch: I'd like to thank both speakers and all those who participated in the discussion and all those who listened to the discussion. We will reconvene at 2:00 P.M.
Afternoon Session

CHAIRMAN—PROFESSOR GEERTZ: In the name of the Institute for Advanced Study, I would like to welcome you all here. I'm very pleased to be able to be host to this discussion which has already been and promises to be even more productive. I have my own interests in the subject as you perhaps guessed this morning by my own remarks and by the fact that I have studied the town of Sefrou that Mr. Stillman also is working on. I look forward to this afternoon's discussion with interest.

Because time is so short I will make no further remarks, but merely introduce the first speaker who will be Professor Jane Gerber of Lehman College of the City University of New York who will speak on “The Pact of ‘Umar in North Africa: A Reappraisal of Muslim-Jewish Relations”—Professor Gerber.

THE PACT OF ‘UMAR IN MOROCCO: A REAPPRAISAL OF MUSLIM-JEWISH RELATIONS

JANE S. GERBER
Herbert Lehman College of the City University of New York

An analysis of the history of the Jewish community of Fez prior to the advent of the French illustrates the extent to which the Pact of ‘Umar was operative in a major center of Muslim and Jewish life in Morocco. As the imperial seat of Morocco under the Marinids, the Banu Wattas and the first Sa'adian Sherifs (thirteenth through sixteenth centuries), Fez could provide its Jews with a protective shield unavailable in many other Moroccan cities. Hence, even if conditions were atypical in Fez for the Jews, they frequently displayed the optimal conditions which Jews could hope for in Morocco. Analysis of Muslim-Jewish relations in Fez in the late medieval period is particularly illuminating because of the variety of extant primary
sources (in Hebrew, Arabic and a number of European languages). In addition, the emergence of numerous court Jews in precisely the same period, usually interpreted as a symptom of Jewish integration, raises many fundamental questions about the legal status of the Jews in Morocco.

The pact of 'Umar is a theoretical formulation, or variant formulations, compiled in the early centuries of Islam concerning the limitations under which dhimmis (non-Muslims) were to be permitted to live in the world of Islam. Although no single text has survived concerning Jewish disabilities, scholars have tended to accept the limitations placed upon the Christians as the model for Muslim-Jewish relations. Discriminatory regulations in the Pact included the wearing of distinctive clothing to set off Muslim from dhimmis, e.g. special headwear, footwear and color of garments, the prohibition against adopting Muslim surnames, riding on horses or bearing arms, the interdiction against erecting new synagogues or repairing old ones, as well as the stipulation that dhimmis not sell wine. In addition, the Pact declared that non-Muslim religious symbols and festivals be as unobtrusive as possible. Although the Pact emphasized the social and religious inferiority of the non-Muslim it did not mention any special discriminatory taxation. In Morocco, it should be noted, the economic and psychological effects of fiscal exploitation played a major role in shaping the Jewish community into a beleaguered enclave in the Muslim medina.\(^2\)

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2 The constant fiscal oppression of the community is ubiquitous in the chronicles of Fez. The most important Hebrew chronicle is *Dibre ha-Yamim shel Fes*, Anonymous Collection, Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. The text which will be cited is the French translation by Georges S. Vajda, "Un recueil de textes historiques judéo-
In order to ascertain what parts of this theoretical framework were operative, the historian must divest himself of such sweeping categories as “the Jews under Islam” and examine the history of each community within the context of the dynamics of life in that particular community. In the case of Fez, the first important fact about the Pact which should be noted is that the Jews never refer to it by name. Yet, any stipulation regarding non-Muslims was intended solely for the Jews since they were basically the only non-Muslim group living in the city of Fez.3

In 1438 the Jews of Fez were consigned to a special quarter, the Mellah, which was to become the paradigm for the Moroccan ghetto. While the Sultan at the time, 'Abd el-Haq ben Abu-Said (1421–1465), intended this measure as a means of protecting the Jews of Fez from the growing anti-alien sentiment aroused by popular sheikhs, the Jews did not unanimously regard the move to the Mellah as a favorable turn of events.4 Not only did the move entail economic hardship by removing the Jews from the commercially vibrant Kairouanian (Qayrawanian) Bank of the city, but it also left them in an extremely vulnerable position geographically, astride the ramparts of Fez el-Jedid, the imperial quarter of the city.5 Although these measures were not intend as a form of discriminatory isolation, their net result was to remove the Jews from natural social and economic contacts with Muslims.6

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3 A small group of Christians, housed separately and represented by a Facteur did exist in Fez. Their situation bore no relationship to that of the Jews since they usually enjoyed the protection of some ecclesiastical or European political authority.


5 During this period the Jews frequently found themselves caught in the middle of anti-dynastic and sectional fights. See Dibreh ha-Yamim, 24, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37.

6 Fez el-Jedid was a strongly fortified city containing the palaces of the Sultan, royal gardens, parade grounds and barracks for the troops. Economic institutions such as warehouses, bazaars or ateliers were only minimally developed. The move represented a genuine economic hardship for the Jews. The best description of the composition of the different quarters of Fez can be found in Roger le Tourneau, Fès avant le protectorat (Casablanca, 1949).
In 1465 the Mellah was overwhelmed by an outburst of anti-Jewish as well as anti-dynastic agitation which resulted in the decimation of the Jewish community. Apparently many Jews escaped the full wrath of the populace through flight or conversion to Islam. At this point one hears, for the first time since the Almohads, of discriminatory legislation. Forced converts, always the object of suspicion on the part of Muslims, were the subject of deliberation by merchants and the 'ulema alike. The merchants attempted to isolate the new converts while the chief qadi, Ahmed el-Wancharisi (1475–1490) declared that forced converts could revert to Judaism provided that they adhered to the strictures of the 'Umarī. Single statements of this sort, particularly when viewed in the context of an extreme situation of heightened religiosity and intolerance, cannot be regarded as indicative of a continuous state of affairs. Fortunately, many sources are available to test whether or not al-Wancharisi's views reflected the actual state of Muslim-Jewish relations.

During the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries a number of European travelers visited Fez and remarked upon the situation of the Jews. Leo Africanus, a native of Fez who was captured by pirates, baptized in Rome, and returned to Fez in the 1540s, noted that the Jews 'are despised everywhere in Morocco' and were forced to wear sandals of straw in Fez. According to Marmol, another visitor to Fez in the same decade, 'the Jews of Fez aren't permitted to wear shoes, except for the few who have entree to the king and his officers. The rest wear sandals of straw.' An anonymous Portuguese traveler in Fez in the 1590s observed, 'outside the Juiverie (the Mellah) the Jews don't wear their shoes but rather sandals of straw.' When the Jews had attempted to have this disability removed in the middle of the sixteenth century, the same informant relates, the

7 See discussion below on the episode of Haroun.
king cynically forced them to pay a tribute for the "privilege" of wearing sandals outside the Mellah and shoes inside it. Le Père Mouëtte, a French missionary who proselytized in Fez at the end of the seventeenth century observed the same phenomenon.  

Hebrew sources frequently provide important data on Muslim-Jewish relations inter alia. Jewish business contracts frequently made special provisions to meet the Jewish disability of distinctive clothing. For example, in a work contract from 1701, an employer agreed to provide a regular salary to his employee plus taban (straw shoes).  

In another agreement an employer promised his worker two pairs of these straw shoes. The documents aren't explicit enough to ascertain whether the work involved was outside the Mellah except in one instance where this was clearly the case. Apparently those Jews who worked outside the Mellah would as a matter of course accept the clothing distinctions demanded by the Muslims and expect their employers to furnish the necessary garb. A special branch of the Muslim cobbler's guild was devoted exclusively to the production of Jewish sandals until modern times.  

These comments span a period of over 150 years and are unrelated to any particularly noteworthy outbreaks of popular religious fanaticism.  

The prohibition against using a horse, an animal of aristocratic and martial qualities in Arab tradition, was also applied during the period. One argument ex silencio in this regard is the absence of any reference to horses in the Pinkas (account book) of Fez although the document explicitly describes other animals used in service occupations. More positive proof of the application of the stricture can be found in a fascinating Arabic account of the 1465 pogrom. In Muslim eyes, one of the most infuriating actions precipitating the pogrom of 1465 was the fact that the Jewish vizir, Haroun ben Battas, was wont to ride through the streets of Fez on a horse while carrying a sword containing a Quranic inscription.  

12 Père Mouëtte, Sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc: archives et bibliothèques de la France, ed. Henri de Castries (Paris, 1918- ), II.  
13 Pinkas Maskoret Beth ha-Din. Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Enelow Memorial Collection, # 880, 22a. The word for straw in Arabic is tbn.  
14 Pinkas, 55a.  
16 'Abd el-Basit, 113-14.
The stipulation of the Pact of 'Umar that the Jews refrain from wine production has left an echo in numerous Jewish sources. According to one garbled account of the foundation of the ghetto, the Mellah was founded after the Muslims discovered wine in a mosque, allegedly placed there by the Jews.\textsuperscript{17} Although no other evidence supports this version, it serves to reveal Jewish fears and inhibitions projected upon a traumatic event in the life of the community. Given the xenophobic atmosphere in Fez from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, Jewish leaders repeatedly promulgated ordinances (\textit{Takkanot}) against the production and sale of wine. One such ordinance from 1602 prohibited the sale of wine by Jews to any Muslim, Berber, Christian (whether merchant or captive) or another Jew.\textsuperscript{18} Only the Nagid (head of the Jewish community) or his deputies were exempted from this ordinance in order to pursue their diplomatic activities on the community's behalf.\textsuperscript{19} The ban on wine production does not seem to have been successful despite its dangers. Jewish wine was noted by observers to be "absolutely perfect"\textsuperscript{20} and wine and mahia (liquor) were conspicuously consumed at religious and social gatherings.\textsuperscript{21} Generally the reiteration of \textit{Takkanot} proves the pressing nature of the issue in question as well as the inability of the community to abide by its letter.

It is a well known fact that the Muslim authorities generally ignored the provisions of the Pact of 'Umar relating to the construction and maintenance of synagogues. The degree of enforcement varied widely within the world of Islam as vividly illustrated by the proliferation of synagogues in new centers of urban life which followed the consolidation of the Arab conquests. Even within Fez, no rigid rule concerning synagogue construction can be formulated. While it appears that synagogues multiplied rapidly in the sixteenth century following the advent of the exiles from Spain to Fez, increasing in number from about 5 in 1497 to at least one dozen by the 1550's, these structures

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Kisseh ha-Melakhim}, 22; \textit{Yahas Fes}, 9b.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Kerem Hemer}, II, \# 32, 7b; \# 93, 17b.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Dibre ha-Yamim}, 73. In this account a tax collector arrived at the gate of the Mellah and demanded payment of an exorbitant levy by nightfall. The Jews finally obtained a reprieve through bribes and the expeditious use of wine.
\textsuperscript{20} Leò Africanus, 303.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Kerem Hemer}, II, \# 92, 17b; \# 94, 18a.
were generally modest and might have gone unnoticed by the Muslims. 22

The presence of these new synagogues was a clear violation of the stipulations of the Pact of 'Umar. In general, legal guidelines of a discriminatory nature are more strictly adhered to in periods of political and economic instability. Given the chronic instability in Morocco, however, one cannot point to specific political catalysts which caused the destruction of almost all the synagogues in the Mellaḥ. This destruction, recounted by the chroniclers of Fez in Dibret ha-Yamim, alludes to the fact that religious concepts of inferiority-and superiority, built into the fabric of Islam, were the causal factors for the application of the Pact of 'Umar. As Saul Serero relates: 23

On the fifteenth of Elul 5406 (August 1646) he (Muḥammad el Hājj), sent men to destroy the synagogues of the Mellaḥ. On the eighteenth of Elul, because of our iniquities, the Great Synagogue of the Toshavim was destroyed; on the 23rd, it was the turn of the synagogue of the Megorashim and the community tried in vain to bribe them. All the sacred objects of the synagogue were destroyed except for the Torah scrolls which were saved through bribes... Because of our iniquities... all the synagogues were closed by order of the head of the zawiya Muḥammad el-Hājj. On Sunday, the fifteenth of Elul, the enemies penetrated our Temple, despoiled our sanctuary, demolished our synagogue... On that day they left the ark and the women's gallery intact, but the following Thursday they destroyed these too... The following week the Gentiles came to destroy the synagogue of the Tažans and caused enormous damage there: On the day of the Fast of Gedaliah, the enemies attacked the synagogue of the Talmud Torah and destroyed it. On the morrow, the synagogue of R. Isaac Abzardāl met the same fate... On the eve of Yom Kippur, they destroyed the old and the new houses of study. The synagogues of Saadiyah Rabuah and Jacob Ṭoti were spared by offering bribes. Between Yom Kippur and Succot, the synagogue of R. Chaim Uzzziel was destroyed.

22 The figure of five synagogues appears in the Tikkunot of the Sephardim in Kerem Hemer, II, #2. By the 1540’s; the remarkable traveler and missionar, Nicholás Clenardus noted 8-9 Sephardic synagogues. In addition, the indigenous Jews had their own communal institutions. Nicholás Clenardus, Correspondance, trans. Alphonse Roersch (3 vols., Brussels, 1941), III, 104-55.
23 Dibret ha-Yamim, 46-47.
Thus, the destruction of the synagogues of Fez was not an isolated case of vandalism perpetrated by an unruful mob but rather a concerted destructive effort initiated by a leading religious personality resident in the city. It is noteworthy that the destruction included the desecration of Jewish ritual objects.

For the Jews of Fez, the display of religious symbols and processions weighed heavily on their security considerations. Some of the sumptuary legislation dating from this period reflects the Jewish realization that religious fanaticism, as embodied in the details of the Pact, was prominent in Muslim-Jewish relations. For example, the Rabbis of Fez attempted, by decree to alter Jewish burial rites, hallowed by custom for fear that a public procession to the cemetery, accompanied by holding the shofar (ram's horn), would incite the Muslims of Fez. It is probably not accidental that Jewish attention focused on precisely those customs which echoed the prohibitions of the Pact of 'Umar.

Therefore the lack of reference to a particular document by Jew, Muslim or Christian is not of major significance. In whatever fashion the discriminatory regulations were identified and promulgated, they nonetheless conformed to many of the essential clauses of what is known as the Pact of 'Umar.

One of the fascinating questions about Jewish life in Fez during this period is that of interpreting the role of Jewish courtiers in the political life of the city. If the strictures of the Pact were indeed in effect, how could Haroun ben Battas, a Jewish vizir in 1465, or Jacob Roti, the chief architect of diplomatic relations between Portugal and the Kingdom of Fez, exercise their powers? It has been a popular notion in Jewish historiography to interpret the careers of court Jews as symptomatic of Jewish integration in general society or as an indicator of Gentile tolerance towards Jews. A brief examination of the career of one of these courtiers in his political milieu, however, demonstrates that the dazzling political career of the courtier was also defined by the Pact of 'Umar and the realities of Moroccan political conditions.

Morocco is a profoundly divided country whose history has reflected her deep geographic and ethnic divisions. For most of her history she was not a political unit but rather a conglomera-

24 Cemeteries played an important part in the religious life of the community in North Africa. For specific burial customs in Morocco, see Joseph Ben Naim, Nohag be-Hokmah, Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Xerox from anonymous collection. pp. 8ff.
tion of independent principalities with only limited areas contiguous to her few capital cities subject to any central control. Thus, one cannot accurately speak of a history of Morocco or her Jewish community: frequently in towns in such close proximity as Fez and Meknes conditions could be simultaneously favorable for the Jews in one city and dolorous in the other.  

Despite its progressive Arabization in the course of the Middle Ages, the Moroccan Berbers held tenaciously to their traditions of individualism and tribal loyalties. The dynamics of Moroccan history derive from her division into three main tribal groupings: the Masmouda, the Sanhaja and the Zenata. Morocco's seemingly anarchic history cannot be viewed simply as a succession of hostile and rapacious dynasties but rather as an acting out on the stage of the Maghreb of deep-seated Berber antagonisms. The Almoravids (1062–1147) represent the domination of the Sanhaja, the Almohads (1147–1269) signalize the hegemony of the Masmouda, and the Marinids (1269–1450) symbolize the triumph of the Zenata. Those dynasties which lacked a strong tribal base, such as the Banu Wattas (1450–1550) and the Sa'dian Sherifs (1550–1650) were forced to seek alternate and far less reliable bases of support.

While all the main population groups of Morocco had the assurance of some protection through their legendary or biological links with some large tribal grouping, the Jews alone lacked support in the population. The comment of the chroniclers of the Jewish community of Fez that "the Sultan is our salvation" indeed reflected the Jewish dependency on the ruling dynasty.

One group to which precarious dynasties would turn to form a Makhzen (a government) was the Jewish community. Observers noted and sources reveal the emergence of Jews in extremely crucial and delicate political positions. This apparent power bore no relation to their real power, as the Jews were often allied with dynasts who had no control over anyone but the

25 This was the case in 1549 and again in 1701 when the Jews of Fez were forced to take refuge in Meknes. See Les Sources inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc : archives et bibliothèques de l'Espagne, ed. Robert Ricard, I, 139–59.


27 This dependency is apparent until modern times. The dichotomy in attitudes between ruler and ruled vis-à-vis the Jew is, of course, one fundamental characteristic of medieval Jewish history.

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Jews. In the period under discussion, the groups who represented popular feelings (such as the Marabouts or the qadis) harbored strong feelings of hostility towards all "infidels." Thus we are dealing with a complex and paradoxical situation: Muslim-Jewish relations were not determined by ephemeral rulers in Fez, the "protectors" of the Jews, who could, at best, simply hold anti-Jewish passions in check and utilize the Jews out of considerations of expediency. The clearest example of such exploitation of Jewish skills as a result of the dynasty's estrangement from his subjects can be seen in the career of Haroun.

In 1465 the last ruler of the tottering Marinid dynasty, 'Abd el-Haq ben Abou Said, decided to wrest control from his Wattasid regents and rule alone with the aid of his Jewish confidant Haroun ben Battas. According to the most fulsome account of Haroun's career, that of 'Abd el-Basit ibn Khalil (1440–1514), Haroun rose to the position of vizir since "he was no threat to the Sultan." Moreover, the Sultan "rejoiced in the insult he could thus render to the Banu Wattas" through the appointment of a Jew to this powerful office. This was not an insignificant achievement since, as 'Abd el-Basit reminds the reader, "'Abd el-Haq was on the throne of Fez for thirty years during which he was dominated by the Wattasid vizirs . . . such was the custom in the Maghreb . . . that the supreme authority was exercised by the vizirs who were the true masters of the people and the country." Despite this, according to 'Abd el-Basit, Haroun used his position with an arrogance unacceptable for a Jew. When the preacher of the Kairouanian (Qayrawanian) mosque heard of the hubris of Haroun, he roused the populace with cries of "Jihad". The excited crowd sought religious support from one of the leading Sherifs of Fez. The latter refused to countenance rebellion, since the Sultan was directly implicated, without receiving a Fatwa from the 'Ulema. The 'Ulema finally consented and declared it licit to rise up against the Jews and the Sultan. The crowd thereupon rushed to the Mellah and slaughtered countless Jews. Haroun and the

28 An important Sheikh of the period, al-Maghili, exemplified this attitude. His biography provides much data on how the popular religious orders and charismatic leaders regarded Jews. Al-Maghili went so far as to declare that the Jews no longer deserved protection under Muslim law. See Ibn 'Askar, The Sheikhs of Morocco, tr. T. H. Weir (Edinburgh, 1904).
29 'Abd el-Basit, 118–14.
30 Ibid.
Sultan were caught in the carnage as were smaller Jewish communities within the jurisdiction of Fez.

The events of 1465 are instructive from a number of points of view. On the one hand, they reveal that the religious party in Fez was not unanimous but, rather, was divided between advocates of restraint and provocateurs. The conflict was enmeshed in political considerations. The Jewish position of identification with a floundering dynasty, while sparing the beleaguered Jews in 1438, could not help but overwhelm them when the dynasty was overthrown in 1465. On the other hand, a close reading of the career of Haroun also reveals that the assumptions of the Pact of Umar, i.e. the subordination of Jews to Muslims, were deeply imbedded in the political life of Fez.

One important conclusion that should be drawn from an analysis of the dramatic career of Haroun is that the rise to political prominence of a Jew should not be construed as evidence of Jewish security or acceptance in a given historical period. As Haroun's demise so graphically illustrates, the rise of a Jew to an important governmental post was symptomatic of the complete alienation of the dynasty from its subjects. The episode, furthermore, implies a consensus among wide sections of the Muslim population that Jews were expected to assume a low profile in the political life of the city.81

While the reconstruction of the life of the Jews in Morocco is still in its infancy, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the history of Jews in Muslim lands, for all its internal parallels, was not of one cloth. A close reading of the primary sources, particularly those in Hebrew, emphasizes the constant state of anxiety and vulnerability in which the Jews lived. Much of this precariousness stemmed directly from the acceptance and implementation by the Muslims of the letter as well as the spirit of the Pact of Umar. European records of diplomats, grain traders or sugar merchants notwithstanding, the Jews trod a very cautious path, constantly aware that their role in the Dar ul-Islam was carefully circumscribed by centuries of juridical precedents and attitudes of Muslim superiority vis-à-vis the Jews which have collectively become known as the Pact of Umar.

81 When Jacob Roti guided and to a great extent formed the alliance between Fez and Portugal in the 1530's and 1540's his mission was presented to the Ulema of Fez in the most innocuous guise. Roti was merely serving as a translator in the company of Muslim diplomats. By assuming this low profile, he was able to pursue an effective political role without arousing the sensitivities of the religious party in Fez.
THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF MARRAKESH IN THE 20th CENTURY: A PARADIGM FOR MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS

Richard L. Press
Swarthmore College

I would like to approach the subject of this conference, Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa, through the prism, theme or organizing principle which I have labeled the majority-minority relationship or syndrome. It is a very complex model, not infallible particularly when applied to a wide historical approach. However, this theme seems particularly useful when applied to Muslim-Jewish relations in Arab-Muslim countries in the 20th century.

Why should we be concerned with Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa? I suspect it is because this relationship is almost a social phenomenon of the past. Is North Africa, Morocco or Marrakesh an exception to the pattern of Muslim-Jewish relations in the 20th century? A major idea worth pursuing is that Muslim-Jewish relationships in Morocco or Marrakesh can no longer be explained by a marginal geographic position in the Arab-Muslim world. A major contention is that Muslim-Jewish relations are much more dependent upon recent historical events and the concept of the nation-state than upon geography, demographic considerations or the classical mode of identity and behavior of Muslims and Jews in the traditional Islamic environment.

I will seek to trace the various manifestations of Muslim-Jewish relationships in the 20th century by examining the conditions which enhanced Muslim-Jewish co-existence and those conditions which obviated this relationship. A mere checklist of the comings and goings of these two communities in Marrakesh will not provide us with a reasonable explanation for the demise of the Jewish community of Marrakesh. Rather,
the rules of the game have changed not only because of new internal pressures but also because the appearance of new external forces caused the fate of the Jewish community of Marrakesh to be similar to the fate of Jewish communities in other Arab-Muslim states. The timetable has been somewhat slower due to Morocco’s brand of decolonization which is similar to that of the Ivory Coast i.e. the old elites have managed to stay on creating a facade of business as usual.

My presentation is divided into: 1) Introductory remarks concerning methodology; 2) Marrakesh—the physical, demographic and social setting; 3) The Mellah of Marrakesh—what was it and what is it? 4) The French and American presence and the impact of modernity; 5) Commerce and its role in Muslim-Jewish relations in Marrakesh; 6) Response of the Jewish community of Marrakesh to new internal pressures and external forces; 7) The dynamics of migration; 8) A Muslim intellectual’s analysis of the reasons for the demise of the Jewish community of Marrakesh; 9) Conclusion.

The majority-minority theme has proven useful in explaining European-Jewish history and it should prove to be equally useful for an historical understanding of Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa. Historical reconstructions in this context require a knowledge of both the histories of the majority and minority groups. For minority history—be it Jewish, Armenian, Greek, Turkish, Kurd—in the Middle East, or in America—Indians, Blacks, Japanese ad infinitum—has both an internal and external aspect. The history of the Jewish community of Marrakesh cannot be written without reference to Muslim Marrakesh and Morocco. Likewise, the history of Marrakesh cannot be written without reference to the Jewish community of Marrakesh. This does not mean that minorities are only mirror images of their respective majorities. It does mean that historical reconstructions must take into consideration the majority-minority dynamic to understand the behavior of both groups. This awareness has particular value in helping to minimize assigning unique behavior and roles to either the majority or minority group. For there is usually an explanation which eschews uniqueness.

Reading in general history and in Jewish history not related to North Africa, provides ample examples of Jews and non-Jews relating to each other as distinct individuals and personalities and not as abstractions as long as the majority is
not experiencing great socio-economic and political crises. Even when there is an idyllic state of affairs there is an irreducible difference between majority and minority. In times of stress, majorities manipulate this irreducible difference in order to solve their minority problems. The solution is sometimes forced migrations or various modes of destruction of minorities. Generally speaking, when the majority catches a cold, the corresponding minority contracts pneumonia. What the feelings of the majority of the majority culture, i.e. the poor, are at any given time is almost unknown. History from the bottom up is only now coming into its own, particularly history relating to the European Industrial Revolution, but not as it relates to the poor and their feelings concerning minorities. Perhaps this is impossible.

My remarks concerning Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa are more or less confined to fieldwork experience in Marrakesh during 1964–65, and to the fact that my wife, her family and a network of relatives and friends are originally from Marrakesh. I have not returned to Marrakesh since then so my observations have to be adjusted for the passage of a decade.

It is important to note in a discussion of Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco that these relations varied from city to city, from village to village, according to ruler and locale, according to the relationship between the central administration and the local administration, between city and country, between Bled el-Makhzen (Official Morocco) and Bled el-Siba (Independent Morocco, remained outside of sultan's authority). There have been almost no studies on local Jewish communities using unpublished archives of communities and municipal and national archives for reconstructing Muslim-Jewish relations over time. Until this is done much of our historical perspective will come primarily from fieldwork and recently gathered impressions. In 1964–65 I used very selectively the extensive collection of the minute books of the Jewish community of Marrakesh. I assume this archive is still intact and available for scholarship. No such detailed studies exist for the Moroccan Muslim population either. What I am thinking about is the kind of analysis of economic data recently published by Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman in their two-volume study: Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery. C. Vann Woodward had a lengthy review of this work and points up many problems, but he also writes, “They mark the start
of a new period of slavery scholarship and some searching re-
visions of a national tradition."1 Similar data on Muslim-
Jewish relations if available has not to my knowledge been 
published.

*Marrakesh—the Physical, Demographic and Social Setting*

Marrakesh, or "big red", is the second most populous city
in Morocco, the pre- eminent southern city, the gateway to the
High Atlas and the Southern Interior. It has been for centuries
the entrepôt for Southern Morocco and plays the role for that
vast hinterland that Casablanca plays for the rest of Morocco.
Historically there has been constant migration of both Muslims
and Jews to Marrakesh from the villages and small towns of the
hinterland. Marrakesh is more rustic in mood and temperament
than is Casablanca, Rabat or Fez. Its ethnic mix of peoples
includes a large black population, a reminder of the important
role that Marrakesh played in the trans-Saharan trade. Simply
stated, this city is the crossroads in which the North and South
meet and where modernity and tradition make their impress
with minimal dislocation.

The city itself is divided into three distinct quarters: 1) the
ville nouvelle or Gueliz, a splendid example of the garden city;
2) the Medina which is surrounded by 12 miles of ramparts;
3) the Mellah is physically located in the Medina but it is a
self-enclosed enclave located on an extremity next to the royal
complex for reasons of security. The Mellah always had an
exit out of the Medina, and in times of trouble this geographic
escape valve was a vital element in the security system of the
Mellah. In addition there are four major gates connecting the
Medina and Mellah. In time of trouble they could be closed
as well, but this practice was almost non-existent in the 20th
century. There were also three private gates that gave access
to the Mellah from the extremity near the royal buildings.
These gates were really the doors of private homes, and in cases
of emergency such as illness, people used them as shortcuts.
They were closed and barred on two occasions in the last 35
years due to perceived strained Muslim-Jewish relations.

1 C. Vann Woodward, Review of *Time on the Cross: The Economics of
American Negro Slavery*, by Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, *The
The Mellah of Marrakesh—What Was It and What Is It?

We know that in the 20th century Morocco had the largest Jewish community in the Maghreb and Middle East and even though greatly reduced in size to about a tenth of what it once was, it is today still the largest Jewish community in the Arab-Muslim world. Similarly, the Jewish community of Marrakesh was the largest in Morocco until 1936 when it was supplanted by Casablanca.

The Jewish community of Marrakesh more than doubled in size between 1920 and 1936, going from 11,000 people to 26,000. For the same period, the total population of Marrakesh increased by 40% from 140,000 to 190,000. The great increase in the Jewish population is substantially attributable to the French presence. The French presence brought however grudgingly a door to modernity, health, mobility and education for the Jewish community of Marrakesh. To be sure, none of the above was available for the asking, but it was there nevertheless. The French manipulated the Jewish community as they did other ethnic groups. This same presence had a regulatory influence on Muslim-Jewish relations as it did with the peoples living in the Sahara and between Arabs and Berbers. Gone or going forever, in the first decades of the 20th century, was what seems to us today to be bizarre treatment of Jews by Muslims in terms of special dress, modes of travel and, on occasion, harsh physical treatment and arbitrary dispossession of property and livelihood. To digress for a moment, Jewish dress which at one time was prescribed as a badge of identity, continued to be observed after the prescription was done away with. Also gone are the benefits of special status.

Leaving the French presence aside, how does one explain the unusually large Jewish community of Morocco and Marrakesh, given the literature of 19th and 20th century travelers who describe the Jews of Morocco as being debased and maltreated? Does size of population tell us anything about Muslim-Jewish relations? I don’t know.

In 1875, a member of the Alliance Israélite visited the Mellah of Marrakesh and left a tragic description of the inhumane treatment of Jews. In 1900, another member of the Alliance visited the Mellah but no longer spoke about ill treatment. Rather, he recorded the appalling physiological, moral and intellectual misery and he noticed that the consumption of alcohol was very high. From descriptions of non-Jewish life in
Marrakesh and Morocco, it is easy to conclude that the majority of Muslims were no better off.

The Mellah of Marrakesh was a ghetto in the true American sense. The Jew is usually portrayed as being more depraved than a Muslim, and the Mellah much less fit for human habitation than the Medina. One has only to recall George Orwell's visit to the Mellah in 1939 where he describes the streets as being rivers of urine. Leaving prejudice aside, the problem of understanding Muslim-Jewish relations historically is compounded by at least two major considerations. For foreigners, the Mellah was wide open compared to the Medina and, on occasion, the dignitaries of the Mellah would expose even the seamier side of life in hopes of securing relief to intolerable conditions. More important is the simple fact of population density. In 1949, the European quarter (ville nouvelle-Gueliz) had a ratio of 35 persons per hectare, the Medina had a ratio of 150 persons per hectare and in the Mellah density reached 1300 persons per hectare. In 1949, the Jewish population of Marrakesh was 18,310 whereas the total population was approximately 205,000. Visualize that most of the dwellings were two stories.

Density itself, as we know, has a direct influence on levels of sickness, filth, promiscuity, and living in the street. As late as 1940 there was a major typhoid epidemic in the Mellah. The overcrowding in the Mellah was a concern of the French since their official arrival in 1912. A proposed solution was an extension outside the walls of the Medina, however, no immediate solution was forthcoming. The major relief to the overcrowding was the use of an adjacent sector known as Arset al-Maach and much later the European quarter absorbed some Jews as did the first housing development in Marrakesh, the Habitat, in Jnân al-Áafia. The latter was built in the early 1950's expressly for the Jewish population. In 1964 the Habitat was mainly inhabited by Muslims. All of these solutions were small scale and geared to the middle class so that not too much pressure was taken off the Mellah.

There is some oral history that indicates that as early as 1918 the Jews themselves sought solutions to overcrowding. Monsieur Judah Abitbol, President of the Jewish Community of Marrakesh in 1964-65, and reputedly the wealthiest Jew in Marrakesh, had visited Fez after World War I and seen that the Jews there were building a whole new quarter outside the Mellah. Marrakesh at that time was doing nothing along these lines, partially because the Jewish community of Marrakesh was poorer,
less educated, and more conservative. When Judah Abitbol returned to Marrakesh, he tried to persuade his co-religionists to leave the Mellah and invest and build in an undeveloped sector of the ville nouvelle called L'Hivernage. No one would follow his lead as it involved both personal and financial risk. So this effort to reorient the Jewish community of Marrakesh and relieve the overcrowding in the Mellah came to naught. However, the Abitbol family invested in the L'Hivernage and these properties are the reputed basis of his wealth and position. By 1964-65 the problems brought about by density no longer existed as most of the inhabitants had internally migrated to the ville nouvelle, to Casablanca, Israel, or Canada.

The establishment of the state of Israel (1948) and the independence of Morocco (1956) were the major events that changed the Mellah to the degree that functionally it was no longer the Jewish quarter of Marrakesh. Particularly striking was the rapid physical transformation, an example being one room synagogues converted into living space for the new Muslim dwellers. The artifacts of the synagogues wound up in the Souks. On two occasions that I knew about, elderly Jews were found in abandoned buildings by Muslims and brought to the 'Jewish Old People's Home. Today the Mellah is totally Muslim and the Jewish population of Marrakesh is about what it was in 1804 (2000 people).

In 1964-65, the construction of the first Muslim Hammam (bath-house) and mosque in the ville nouvelle signaled the equally dramatic transformation of the European quarter of Marrakesh. Thus, fundamental change began to occur in the ville nouvelle as well, reflecting the growing mobility and affluence of the Muslim community and a corresponding diminution of the European community.

The French and American Presence and the Impact of Modernity

Both the French official presence (1912-1956) and the unofficial American presence (1953-1963) had a great impact on the Jewish community of Marrakesh. The French, particularly through the Alliance schools, provided access to modernity and in turn some Jews were a sort of modernity brokers for the Muslim middle and upper classes, including even El-Glaoui (Thami al-Glawi). When El-Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh, was expelled from Morocco upon the return of Mohammed V from exile, there were several prominent Jewish families of Marrakesh in his entourage. This is also an example of an oral tradition
which indicates that Berber-Jewish relations were more cordial than Arab-Jewish relations and, in a sense, more symbiotic, particularly in the mountains and the South. The relations between Arabs and Jews in Marrakesh or in the plains surrounding Marrakesh were reputed to be different, basically more hesitant, and less trustful. It should be stated that in Southern Morocco the majority of Jews historically lived with Berber-Muslims rather than Arab-Muslims. One could argue that this line of reasoning is just another manifestation of the dualism between Arab and Berber so continuously exploited under the French presence. However, many personal interviews with Jews and Berbers seem to suggest that the Berbers were in a real sense protectors of their Jews and the Jews in turn provided Berbers with goods, services, and an outlook which was both beneficial and necessary.

With the establishment of the SAC Air Force Base at Ben Guerir in 1953, 60 kilometers north of Marrakesh, there is a dramatic impact of the American presence on Muslim and Jew alike. The availability of money and jobs provided by the base caused an incredible upsurge in the economy of Marrakesh and the surrounding villages and towns. The American presence brought skills to Muslims and Jews which were in short supply. The average diet of both Muslim and Jew was far richer than it had ever been. With the demise of the base in 1968, there was a concomitant shrinking of the economy which was quite frustrating for both Muslim and Jew. The majority of the civilian supervisory, secretarial, and clerical positions at the base were held by Jews primarily due to their modern orientation under the French presence with the result that the first Jewish students to have studied English in the Alliance schools found ready employment. The American presence reached down to an even larger group of Jews from Marrakesh so that it was not only a small upper and upper-middle class who influenced and were subsequent carriers of the ideas and material trappings of modern affluence. Some small Jewish businesses were started with the money earned and saved through the decade of employment at Ben Guerir (1953-63). There were also many marriages between GI's and Jewish women from Marrakesh. One of the more common operations at the base was the circumcision to meet the requirements of the parents of the prospective bride. Jews were likewise one of the filters or facilitators of the American presence for a growing percentage of the Muslim population. Every fad that was current at the base and by extension in the world, could be seen in Marrakesh. Change occurred at a blinding pace for ever-increas-
ing numbers of Muslims and Jews. Other factors accelerating change were the general post-World War II economic boom and attendant geographic mobility. The role of the Jew as intermediary in the mountain fastnesses of Southern Morocco, and in Marrakesh under the French and American presence is not peculiar to Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco, but rather it is an ingredient in the majority-minority relationship. I am reminded that Armenians, Greeks, Lebanese, and Parsees, for example, have played similar roles at widely varying times and places.

**Commerce and its Role in Muslim-Jewish Relations in Marrakesh**

Commerce, being an all pervasive, tangible, and important activity in society, is a good vehicle for exploring Muslim-Jewish relations. Within the context of Muslim-Jewish relations in Marrakesh, business acts as a great leveler of abstractions. Until the 1940's, both the Muslim and Jewish communities were pretty much self-contained, each acting out roles circumscribed by custom and tradition. Exceptions usually relate to business transactions and earning a living, e.g. Muslim women working in Jewish households. As long as the Mellah was a viable Jewish community, many of these households employed Muslim women, and in many instances they were members of the Jewish household. This state of affairs is still true of some Jewish households in the ville nouvelle. To my knowledge there were no Jewish domestics in Muslim households. Why did Muslim women work in Jewish households and not vice-versa? Basically, the answer relates to working conditions. The pay, treatment, and added dividends such as food and clothing were better in Jewish households than in Muslim households. In the 1940's there was a short period of time when Muslim women were barred from working in Jewish households and Jewish Hammams. This regulation dramatically illustrated how inter-dependent these two groups were. The Jewish household couldn't function without its Muslim member and likewise the Muslim women needed the material sustenance, but equally important both needed each other in a total sense. It is well-known that when Jewish households left Marrakesh there were many heart-rending exchanges. Another explanation of the above relates to the majority-minority relation whereby the minority is always more proper and generous in dealing with the majority than is the majority dealing with one of its own members.

Jews and Muslims conduct business with each other because
it makes good business sense to do so. All the rest is commentary. Muslims and Jews are not going to engage in business if the transaction in question is not good business. Role-playing and the relations of Arabs to Berbers and vice-versa and the social neutrality of Jews are most important during a crisis, but are a minor consideration during normal times when one is deciding what to pay for apricots or from whom should one buy a piece of farm machinery. In the latter case, there often wasn’t a choice.

I would like to digress and describe two Jewish families engaged in business in Marrakesh. One of these families started some 40 years ago with a small food processing plant, and today it is one of the largest in Southern Morocco. As with other food processing plants owned or managed by Jews, the employees were Muslims, and in several instances almost exclusively women. Relations for the most part were cordial and proper. Along with the obvious prosperity of this firm is the fact that two of the children are doctors and another is an immensely successful real estate broker in Paris.

In the recent past Jews were and to a limited extent are even today the classical entrepreneurs, i.e. the wholesalers who facilitate the distribution of local products and imports. Given the position of being a minority there was both a necessity and a propensity for taking risks, especially in agricultural commodities, somewhat like buying futures. Risk-taking is quite important, and I would add it to my inventory of minority traits in the majority-minority relationship. In some sectors, such as the spice trade, Jews dominated both the import and internal markets.

My other Jewish family had as head of household one of the largest spice merchants in Marrakesh. At the age of 11, he lost his father and was the main support of his mother and three sisters. He never learned to read or write, and for 45 years he never had a default on a business transaction with his Muslim customers. He was a wholesaler and purchased spices and teas from all over the world, and either sold or bartered his goods throughout Southern Morocco going as far as Colomb-Bechar and Ifni. He did a great deal of business as well with the Blue Men of the Sahara (Tuareg herdsman). He had two categories of customers, those who bought in quantities allowing a wholesale price, and those who bought lesser quantities in which there was a semi-wholesale price. Our spice merchant left Marrakesh for Israel in 1965; his children were scattered to the four winds. One son in particular provides an interesting insight into the mobility and resiliency of the human spirit. Initially, he went to
Paris and operated a business which he left in order to represent a company in Burundi. It was a good living, but there were no schools for his children, so he left Burundi and came to New York to work with some relatives. He wanted to be independent so he left New York and established a business in Laredo, Texas. Within a year he was fluent in Spanish in addition to French, Shiha, Moroccan Arabic, Hebrew, and English. Laredo’s population is 90 per cent Mexican, the language is exclusively Spanish, the currency is the Mexican peso, and unemployment is currently 17 per cent. In addition to his business, he is the Hebrew teacher for the 105 Jewish families.

I was fortunate to have interviewed our spice merchant and his son before their departure from Marrakesh. The spice merchant stated that Muslims did business with him because he had quality goods at reasonable prices, and he extended credit. If there were special considerations for doing business they relate to the majority-minority relationship. For example, Jews believed that Muslims did business with them not only because it made good sense, but also because there was a two-way hedge. The Jewish businessman knew that his business dealings had to be as straightforward as possible if he wanted to avoid the wrath of his customers because of poor business practice compounded by being a member of a minority. As for the Muslim customer, he knew there were more safeguards in his dealings with a Jewish businessman than with a Muslim businessman. In the Jewish businessman’s outlook there was always the possibility that his Muslim customer would not honor his obligation because of the majority-minority relationship. This rarely happened, for there were some legal safeguards, but more fundamentally, it would have been foolish to destroy Jewish business contacts.

Response of the Jewish Community of Marrakesh to New Internal Pressures and External Forces

Since Moroccan independence, there have been established new ways of doing business which have been a factor influencing Jewish businessmen to leave. The government has played an increasingly larger role in the regulation of business both as to licensing and taxation. The classical entrepreneur has for the most part given way to government cooperatives and the proliferation of very small operators. To be sure, there are still large thriving Jewish business concerns, but the general feeling is that it is only a question of time before they cease to exist. Pressure of external circumstances, particularly as it relates
to the nation-state, dictates a shift from face-to-face behavior to responding to abstractions. Part of the working definition of a minority is that it is subject to the winds of external and internal change to a far greater degree than is the majority. How does one account then for the different destinies of the Moroccan Jewish community and those Jewish communities of other Arab-Muslim societies? The basic difference seems to be the timetable, but the results will be the same, i.e. for all practical purposes there will be an all but complete demise of the Jewish community of Morocco.

The Dynamics of Migration

At this point, I would like to explore some of the dynamics of the dissolution of the Jewish community of Marrakesh in order to try and add something more to our understanding of Muslim-Jewish relations.

One may say that when there is a possibility to immigrate to another country for what seem to be prospects for a better future, it is the poor who generally seize this opportunity, as the middle class and wealthy have no economic reason to leave. In times of impending disaster, and I am really speaking about the Nazi reign in Europe, the dynamics of emigration are reversed. Here emigration from is more important than immigration to. It is the wealthy and the middle class who somehow manage to leave at the last minute while the majority of the population remains behind because of lack of mobility. In an impending disaster it is necessary to emigrate to a country which affords, primarily, physical security. Since 1948, there have been opportunities and mild pressures for Moroccan Jews to immigrate to Israel. These pressures have increased since Moroccan independence as a result of greater difficulty to engage in business, shifting of priorities for government employment, and general uneasiness about the impact of the existence of Israel on Moroccan public opinion.

The Jewish community of Marrakesh exhibited behavior that I would classify as both immigrant oriented and emigrant oriented, sometimes in the same person. The majority of the Jews who left Marrakesh and its hinterland were the poor, the religious, the elderly, the adventurous, and the idealists. Those who remained were primarily the middle class and the wealthy. While in Marrakesh I conducted a survey of the Jewish community to see who was left after 80 per cent of the community had left. For example, the officers and members of the remaining
Jewish community of Marrakesh included owners and managers of food processing plants, businessmen, financiers, teachers, accountants, and jewelers. In all, there were 221 heads of household representing two-thirds of the Jewish male working population of Marrakesh. There were 88 merchants, 25 managers, 20 manufacturers, 18 jewelers, 9 financiers, 8 doctors.

There are psychological and political factors to migration as well. Muslims and Jews in Marrakesh could be characterized by a basic respect each had for the other to a far greater degree than was operative in Algeria, for example, which makes it both easier and more difficult to understand the dissolution of the Jewish community of Marrakesh as a consequence of the majority-minority syndrome. Once the Jewish community of Marrakesh began to break up through migration, with no possibility of replenishment, it is certain that migration will not stop until the community has disappeared. This state of affairs is particularly true given the close-knit Jewish community of Marrakesh where it seemed that somehow everyone was related to everyone else, resulting in an incredibly complex, large, extended family. As members of families immigrated to Israel and later to Canada, the split within families and the desire to be reunited further accelerated emigration. Every person who migrated not only left a hole in the family, but also an irreparable hole for neighbors, and consequently this hole grew larger and larger.

Those who remained worried about nationalization of their holdings, how to make a living, how to have a communal life without family, friends, or communal institutions, and finally what was to become of their children. For example, the Moroccan government announced between October 9th and October 12th, 1964, that drastic austerity measures were to be put into effect to counteract a near-bankrupt treasury. These measures included strict limitations on imports and on sending money out of the country. Families didn't know how to send money to their children studying abroad. These new regulations caused a panic among the Jews and Europeans of Marrakesh. The end result was a further acceleration of emigration. Israel also played a role in encouraging immigration, particularly through her activities with Jewish youth in Marrakesh.

A Muslim Intellectual's Analysis of the Reasons for the Demise of the Jewish Community of Marrakesh

The following observations come from an extensive interview with one of the leading Muslim intellectuals of Marrakesh
who, throughout his life, was very close to a group of Jewish intellectuals in that city. He explained that the Moroccan Jews have difficulty in adjusting to Israel because these Jews are unlike other Jews and hence can't be understood. The life they had in Marrakesh was simple, frugal, and full of tranquility. For him, the main reasons the Jews emigrated were: 1) Israel needed the manpower of the Moroccan Jews, especially the poor from the country who were good workers. It was no one's fault. Rather it was simply a matter of arithmetic. The cost of the journey, Marrakesh-Casablanca-Marseille-Haifa and of absorption in Israel, was repaid almost immediately through their contribution to the labor force. 2) Israel organized centers for youth which pleased Jewish parents as their children were taught modern Jewish history. 3) Scout groups and summer camps flourished, and the Jewish children, on their own, began to identify with Israel and put pressure on their families to leave. 4) After independence, the Jews in Morocco felt very insecure, especially once the French presence was ended. To ease this situation, the Moroccan government appointed Dr. Ben Zaken, a Jew, as Minister of Posts, and shortly thereafter, the post office was flooded with Jewish employees. Jealousies were aroused, and this was no longer a solution. 5) After independence, there were a number of small incidents between Muslims and Jews provoked, so he alleged, by the Jewish Agency to scare the Moroccan Jewish population. 6) The pressure of the Arab world against Israel created feelings of insecurity for the Jews of Marrakesh and Morocco.

In summary, the major reasons for emigration from Marrakesh are: the establishment of the state of Israel which changed to a greater or lesser degree the life in Arab-Muslim countries; the ending of the French presence; the independence of Morocco, and the attendant Moroccanization of the economy; the missionary activity of Israel and finally, the dynamics of migration, which once started constantly feeds on itself. The Jewish communities of Morocco had no choice but to emigrate, given the new set of internal and external pressures.

Here I would like to quote from Dr. Larry Rosen's article, "Muslim-Jewish Relations in a Moroccan City". "And many of the political decisions taken with reference to the avenues of access to various resources have necessarily granted highest priority to different segments of the Muslim community."^2

is the key word. To quote further, "The attachment that had developed to French cultural life, the birth of the state of Israel, and the recognition that they did have a real alternative to continued residence in Morocco, the sudden death of the Sultan Mohammed V in 1961—these and other economic, political, and (for the Jews) attitudinal changes have all contributed to the departure of the Jews from this North African country."8

Why should the Jews seek a real alternative to residence in Morocco as a matter of course? I might add that attitudinal changes are a function of the activities of both the majority and the minority. However, as one Jewish informant of Marrakesh stated, all these reasons are sufficient but they don't capture the deep attachments to Morocco and the fundamental emotional change that destroyed this deep attachment. No one thought of permanently leaving Morocco. Once Israel was established and Morocco achieved independence, life was no longer the same, and an irrevocable rupture occurred affecting all age groups for different reasons. Rising expectations and corresponding frustrations on the part of Muslims and Jews turned acceptable, permissible, and tolerated behavior into something quite different.

Modern nation-states have great difficulty in dealing with their minorities so they tend to neutralize their role and to encourage their disappearance. In the case of Morocco, where particularly in the 20th century, Muslim-Jewish relations were quite enduring, in some cases touching, and positive, this only underscores the majority-minority syndrome which eventually tears apart even special cases deriving from geography and from special status in a theocratic society.

Insofar as our concern has been to assess majority-minority relations, perhaps a brief conclusion concerning the various general components of this relationship are in order. The majority-minority relation may be based upon demographic, economic, or political factors, or any combination thereof. In some instances, it may be based upon special status within a theocratic society. Thus, a group can be a demographic majority, but an economic and political minority, e.g. Moroccan Muslims during the colonial era. A group can be the economic majority, but a demographic and political minority, e.g. Europeans in parts of South America. A minority can be indigenous or foreign, e.g. Catholic Irish in Ulster versus Pakistanis in Uganda. A minority can be indigenous and the majority foreign in all three categories, e.g.

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8 Ibid.
American Indians as opposed to all the subsequent settlers to these shores.

How have we characterized the past and present, with regard to the Jewish community of Marrakesh? Before 1912, Jews were members of a demographic, political, and economic minority with special status in a theocratic society. The declining isolation and the abolition of special status brought about by the French presence quickened the emancipation of Jews, but this emancipation was two-edged because it left no intermediary body between the individual and the state. The rebirth of the Jewish state was the major external change and elimination of special status the major internal change—both dictating the formulation of strategies on the part of majority and minority leading to the disappearance of the Jewish community of Marrakesh. Is this the inevitable pattern of this form of majority-minority relations in the 20th century?

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR GEERTZ: May I remind you that there will be questions on both papers. Does anyone have a question on either of the two papers?

PROFESSOR GERBER (addressed to Dr. Press): You quoted an interview with a Muslim who alluded to certain incidents involving the Jewish Agency in Marrakesh. Who was this person you were interviewing? I’m just curious.

DR. PRESS: It was a Muslim. He’s an important official in the government of Marrakesh and for a while he was detailed to the central government in Rabat. But he didn’t say this derogatorily. He said it as a matter of course because he had many Jewish friends.

DR. PERLZWEIG: I would just like to ask a question about an important or interesting element in Muslim-Jewish relations: The employment of Jews in quasi-diplomatic positions. You mentioned el-Glaoui; he was a-feudal overlord of a district around Marrakesh. When I was there, his secretary came to see me on his behalf. When he told-me how pleased el-Glaoui was about what the World Jewish-Congress was doing, I asked him how el-Glaoui knew. He said, “I am a member of the World Jewish Congress. The committee is waiting for you in Marra-
kesh." He was employed as a court Jew, very much as Jews were employed as court Jews in Europe in the Middle Ages. Now my question is, was that at all a widespread practice?

DR. PRESS: I think Dr. Gerber's fascinating account about the court Jews and their relationship to the court had a lot to do with the power of the court. El-Glaoui was a man who had a very limited power in a sense, and the Jews played a very important role for him. We know the names of the major families in Marrakesh who were deported with him because of their involvement to an incredible degree with his affairs.

DR. PERLZWEIG: Well, that is a very important element in Muslim-Jewish relations in Marrakesh.

DR. PRESS: Oh yes, oh sure. Because el-Glaoui was kind of a sub-set of the whole thing.

PROFESSOR SCHAAR: I have a question for Professor Gerber. What the thrust of your paper emphasized is that the rules of the game were literally written out in the Pact of 'Umar for both communities. What I seem to get from your conclusions and from the very vivid details is that every time the community overstepped the bounds of that Pact, there was bound to be trouble, at least there were examples in your sources where this happened.

Now, the question which is posed by this is: Did those rules of the game help the community also to survive under normal conditions? In other words, as long as they stayed within the bounds, were they treated in a way which was different from that at the time when they overstepped? The reason I bring this up is primarily that the two examples you give of extreme antagonistic behavior towards the community came at periods of intense social and political disintegration. They therefore fit into the whole pattern of difficulties that everybody experienced on the Moroccan scene during those periods when the central government just wasn't in control. So what I am really getting at is, do you have any information about what happened in normal situations when the rules of the game were spelled out?

PROFESSOR GERBER: One beautiful thing about the information from Fez, from Jewish sources, is that it does not indicate extraordinary situations. Once the capital disappears
from Fez, and is reestablished in Meknès or Marrakesh, then you do get everyday incidents in the chronicle of Fez. For example, a Muslim insulting a Jew, or a Jew insulting a Muslim, with minor kinds of outbreaks. By and large, the Pact provided guidelines and they were followed. The whole question which you ask, which is a much more philosophical one, whether it was to the detriment or to the benefit of the Jews to have lived by these guidelines is one that I think would require a great deal of examination. Obviously it was a protection which rebounded to the favor of the community. Yet a more tolerant status would have rebounded to their favor even more.

Most of the rabbinic sources do not deal with these extraordinary situations and problems, but of normal situations, of the problems of trying to live by halakha and of other intrusive elements coming into their lives. You can't generalize from this.

Professor Uдовitch (to Professor Gerber): I really want to question your major conclusion, because I think it needs some qualification and indeed you may have intended it to be so qualified. I really question whether we can state, as you have stated, that the general rules of the Pact of ‘Umar were followed.

First of all, as far as I know there is no one document which is considered to be the Pact of ‘Umar. Now there may have been a document in Mālikī Fez or in ‘Alawī Fez which was considered to be the Pact of ‘Umar, but the versions of the Pact of ‘Umar differ significantly one from the other. Interestingly enough, in the earlier period, (I don’t know about the sixteenth century), we frequently encounter references to the renewal of the Pact or to its renewed enforcement. If the Pact of ‘Umar had periodically to be renewed, it would seem that its provisions were not being carefully or consistently observed in the intervening periods. You brought the example of straw sandals. Straw sandals are not mentioned in earlier versions of the Pact of ‘Umar. They may be in Fāṣi versions, I don’t know. What is mentioned is that women have to wear sandals of different colors, just as an identifying mark.

Secondly, one of the most important requirements in the Pact of ‘Umar is that no new synagogues were to be built. Since Fez was a city established by the Muslim Arab conquerors, no synagogues could theoretically exist there at all if this provision of the Pact were adhered to. Yet synagogues did exist. I found very significant the fact that the incidents to which you referred were accompanied by accusations of arrogance and os-
tentatious behavior on the part of members of the non-Muslim communities, because in Egyptian Arabic sources of the earlier period, I was struck by the fact that every time there was an outburst, the immediate cause was some incident involving alleged ostentatious behavior on the part of a member of a religious minority, usually a Christian in Egypt and not a Jew. So it seems to me, and I'd like to tie it in here with what Dr. Schaar said, that maybe at certain times where there were certain pressures on the society (politically, militarily, or economically), these weakened its fiber, and, therefore, were the fundamental cause of this outbreak.

I don't think that it could be accurately stated that the Pact of 'Umar was the rule by which Muslim-Jewish relations were governed. Rather, I think it might be more accurate to say that certain aspects of these relations of it were affected and that its authority was more frequently invoked in later centuries than it had been in earlier periods.

PROFESSOR GERBER: I agree with you that it is unclear what the Moroccan understanding of the Pact was, whether it was actually the same understanding or the same text as in Egypt or Iraq. With respect to the question that you pose about the rules of the game and how they were understood, I actually didn't take the most extreme situations. There were ones that were even more extreme. There were certain marabouts like al-Maghili who wanted to completely overthrow the traditional position of the Jews in Fez. And it was the Sultan who ousted these marabouts from Fez. The religious climate was probably even more fanatical than I described throughout these few centuries and threatened to sunder the traditional relationship. I don't think there is any law that could not be undermined by other pacts and other qualifications. I agree my statement should be qualified. But we can find concrete things to prove that the Jews were supposed to be living not theoretically, but actually, in a second class position and that Muslims had certain ideas of what was a second class position. More than that I shouldn't state dogmatically.

MRS. LILIANE WINN, AMERICAN SEPHARDI FEDERATION: Mr. Chairman, I am surprised that our speakers have left out the virtual internal autonomy of Jews in Morocco and some other countries of North Africa. For example, in the judicial process Jews had their own rabbinical tribunals for disputes between Jew and Jew.
DR. PRESS: I alluded to that by saying there were also benefits to having a special status.

MRS. WINN: It was very important for a Jew to be judged by Jews since we could be subject to three different courts, French, Muslim and Jewish courts, depending on the circumstances.

PROFESSOR RACCAH: You alluded to emigration out of Marrakesh, and presumably mostly to Israel, do you have any information?

DR. PRESS: No, it was to Casablanca. I mentioned there was internal migration as well.

PROFESSOR RACCAH: From there they moved on to Israel or to France?

DR. PRESS: Most did not go to France, because unlike Tunisians and Algerians, the Moroccans had a status that was quite different. They did not have automatic or semi-automatic rights to emigrate to France, except for a few who had worked out a special relationship.

PROFESSOR RACCAH: What was the distribution of qualifications and of skills as well as abilities, between the people who stayed as opposed to the people who left?

DR. PRESS: Well I mentioned who stayed. It was the upper middle class and the wealthy.

PROFESSOR RACCAH: Only the poor, destitute, and the uneducated left?

DR. PRESS: The religious, the adventurous, the elderly, the idealists. I'm not saying that all of the middle class stayed. One group that suffered greatly were the schoolteachers from Marrakesh who went to Israel and couldn't find work. The ones who really suffered in Israel in those first years were the middle class. I did a study in 1967 on occupational mobility. I found a little village outside of Marrakesh and I tried to find out what happened to all the people from there who went to Israel. I found the poor people were much more capable of adaptation to Israel than the middle class, because the middle class was competing with the bureaucracy, etc. for all kinds of jobs. They were the most miserable. You would have somebody who was a painter in Marrakesh and opened up a little butcher shop in
Beersheba and he was doing very well. You had those kinds of trade-offs all the time. Also many of the poor Jews in Marrakesh worked as salaried employees, as gardeners, at that level of activity in Israel, and they were very happy to do that.

**Professor Raccah:** Would you say that the community of Marrakesh, that part of the community which went to Israel, left without its traditional leadership, were, therefore, leaderless? Would that be an accurate evaluation?

**Dr. Press:** If you say that traditional leadership has something to do with economic status, to some degree I would say yes. I have to remind you that the Moroccan Jewish community in Montreal is larger now than the Jewish community in Marrakesh. So, they did not all go to Israel. Maybe some of the leadership went to Canada, but I can't give your question a precise answer. I don't know.

**Question (unidentified participant):** I'd like to address this to Professor Gerber: One of the peculiarities of the Sephardic communities, although not in New Amsterdam or in the New World, with regard to the hashamot, the laws, was to consider themselves as a nation of Jews in exile. My question to you is, in Morocco or in Fez, is the Pact of 'Umar, or the relationship with the Muslims, partly volitional because of the Jewish insistence upon this status as a nation? Do you see what I am trying to say? Is it just that the Jews were second-class citizens in Morocco or were they a nation and, as a nation, subject to certain restrictions that the Muslims imposed upon them?

**Professor Gerber:** The question raised doesn't apply exactly in that sense to this area. In Fez, the question of the Sephardic element was one of how and in what fashion were they going to take over the indigenous Jewish community of Morocco.

The feeling of a Sephardic consciousness as something distinct—yes. As to whether they articulated this feeling of distinctiveness while living in a Muslim environment, well, takkanot were laws by which Jews could renovate or innovate in order to live under new circumstances. Sephardim in Morocco promulgated takkanot based on Judeo-Spanish customs in order to preserve these customs, meet new circumstances and live in the fashion their forefathers had.

**An Unidentified Participant:** But did they address themselves to the Muslim authorities as a Jewish nation?
Professor Gerber: They addressed themselves to the Muslims as if they, the Sephardim, were the only Jewish community there. They had many internal problems. To begin with there were Jews from Taza, there were Jews from Tlemcen, and other native Moroccan Jews who resented this usurpation. While all the Jews in one locale were regarded by the Muslims as a unit, the Sephardim attempted to impose their heritage on this unit. Muslims conceived of them in religious and not geographic terms.

Professor Gottleib: I want to say one word in defense of the word "nation". Until 1880, approximately, the word nation is used in Spanish and in French by Jews simply with the meaning of "group"—nothing more. It had nothing to do with modern nationalism, so it has no other connotation as a special group.

Professor Gerber: Just in answer to the lady's question about autonomy. I did not bring it up, not because it was not important, because actually I spent most of my time on the autonomous institutions of the Jews, but this was something that really had very little to do with Muslim-Jewish relations. Given the fact that the Jews were considered internally autonomous, and this was not questioned by Muslims for centuries, there were only isolated instances of interference in Jewish affairs and Jewish customs.

An unidentified participant: You were discussing Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco, and I lived Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco. When you have corporate law you could spend a whole life without coming into contact with Muslims. You have an Alliance Israelite school system that is partly subsidized by the Moroccan Government. That is very important.

Dr. Press: The Ittihad schools (the name given to Alliance schools not integrated by the Moroccan government into its own school system in 1960—ed.), in Marrakesh today, if they still exist, are, I guess, totally Muslim. At the time that the name came into being there was not a meaningful coexistence between Muslim and Jewish students.

An unidentified participant: Alliance schools today, sir, in Morocco, are still exempt from the forced teaching of Arabic, and are partly subsidized by the Moroccan Government.

Dr. Press: I think there were two Alliance schools left in Marrakesh in 1964-65; and there was only a handful of students. In fact, many of the people were not sending their children to
Alliance schools any more, but to what was left of the French system of schools in Marrakesh which previously were not open to them. As long as the French schools were not open, they went to the Alliance schools. Once the French schools opened, they went to the French schools.

PROFESSOR STILLMAN: There is nothing special about the Jews in Morocco having internal personal legal autonomy. That is part of the Muslim system. That holds for the rest of North Africa and the Middle East as well.

Prof. Udovitch has talked about the fact that in the Middle East, in Fāṭimid Egypt, for example, when we consider the sumptuary laws, most of the restrictions were not enforced under most circumstances. My wife has done a study on the costumes of the period that shows that none of the things Suyūṭī writes about—for example, the difference between the colors of costumes to be worn by Samaritans, Jews, Christians, etc.—none of these held true.

But of course, when you get to the later Middle Ages, this does begin to change somewhat. After the Fāṭimid and under the Mamlūks, of course Suyūṭī is writing from a later period, these sumptuary laws do indeed get enforced. Most of us have been talking about Morocco in the later Middle Ages and pre-modern period, which is not to be classed with the classical Middle East. This is a period basically of retrenchment. So that these were very much enforced.

The other thing is that in the Muslim texts I have read, they never really call it a Pact of ‘Umar as such, but always refer to it simply as a dhimma, a contract. The contract they are talking about is not a specific contract, at least not in the Moroccan legal sense of specific laws. For example, at one period they might be wearing straw sandals and at another period they might go barefoot entirely. The main thing was that they were supposed to be under a condition of humility and subjugation. And this was interpreted in various ways. This goes back to early Islam. You find this in early legal sources even if it is not stated quite as such. The tendency to think of the Covenant of ‘Umar as a single document is unfortunate.

AN UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I wonder if Dr. Press would elaborate a bit on the role of the Jewish Agency in Marrakesh?

DR. PRESS: As I said, that was an interview. The Joint Dis-
tribution Committee was very active in 1964 and 1965 with what was left of the Jewish community.

AN UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Was there any opposition on the part of the indigenous leadership in Marrakesh to the role of the Agency?

DR. PRESS: It was similar to the opposition to the Alliance schools in Marrakesh, because Marrakesh was much more reactionary and conservative than the other cities. The Alliance schools came last to Marrakesh of all of the big cities and they were fought bitterly.

AN UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: What about shlichim? What was their orientation? What was the nature of their expectations in Israel?

DR. PRESS: For instance, in one archive I know about, someone called Yehuda Grinker carries on a correspondence with Moshe Sharett, I think it was he, in which it was debated very bitterly: what do you do with elderly Jews who are in the mountains, who have no visible means of support, who do not have someone who can sponsor them in Israel? Do you leave them up in the mountains? There were all those kinds of problems.

The shlichim had a tremendous problem influencing people to leave. People do not naturally leave their homes. So there was a tremendous debate about that. It was very difficult. People were going into the unknown. Why should they leave? Especially the Jews in the mountains. As I say, there is a whole archive about this that someone should work on.

PROFESSOR GEERTZ: I will make one passing remark which is to underscore something Dr. Press said earlier, namely, that this study, as all of North African studies, is very much in its infancy. We are all adventurous pioneers. There is not much solid data yet, aside from some quantitative material. In particular, there is a great deal of ethnographic description still to be done.

I would certainly think of a number of conclusions one could draw from today's discussion, but the main one is that it is both important to keep this discussion, now that it is started, sustained, even though the Jewish communities have disappeared, or are in the process of disappearing from North Africa, and at the same time, to keep from getting premature closure under the pressure of certain kinds of contemporary concerns.
Obviously there is a great deal more to be said about the variations, variability, and complexity of the situation than anyone could possibly say in one session. I hope this is the beginning of what will be a sustained kind of historical, demographic, sociological, economic investigation into North African society generally, and the Jewish part of it particularly.

Mr. Max Melamet: On behalf of the Academic Committee of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress, I would like first of all to thank the Institute for Advanced Study, Dr. Kaysen and Professor Geertz for paying us the compliment of co-hosting this Seminar with us and giving us the wonderful cooperation we have received. I would like to thank Professor Udovitch for his valuable advice, guidance and active help. I would like to thank the four scholars who presented papers. Professor Goitein did more than come and give us a paper. He also helped us put this program together so I would like to give him our special thanks. I want to express our great appreciation to Professor Stillman, Professor Gerber, and Dr. Press, and not least of all, I would like to thank all of you for coming here. You heard Professor Udovitch say that this is one of a series of such seminars, and I would like to invite you, if you have any ideas on suitable topics for seminars to write to us. Once again, I thank you all for coming.