THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Historical Studies - Social Science Library

ITEMS REMOVED : GOERGE KENNAN - PUBLICATIONS

1) Invitation to The Elihu Root Lectures, 1963-64: "A Critical Evaluation of the Evolving Soviet Challenge and the Adequacy of Western Response," by George F, Kennan. Sponsored by the Council of Foreign Affairs.

2) Invitation: To Meet Hon. George F. Kennan. Private dinner sponsored by the Council on Foreign Affairs.

3) "Publicity wider Willen: Kennan, ein Mann, der mit seinen Gedanken die Welt bewegte," Die Zeit, den 27. Februar 1959.

4) "Briefe an Die Zeit: Amerikanische Deutschland-Experten nehmen in diesem Schreiben Stellung gegen Goerge F. Kennans Russland-Vortrage," Die Zeit, date not specified.

5) George F. Kennan, "Where Do You Stand on Communism," The New York Times Magazine, May 27, 1951.

6) "Kennan Is Slated for Post of Ambassador to Moscow," New York Times, November 20, 1951.

7) Photo of George Kennan, newly appointed American ambassador to Russia, in front of gangway just before sailing hour, New York Herald Tribune, April 24, 1952.

8) "east Europe Fund Elects Kennan," New York Herald Tribune, September 24, 1953.

9) "John P. Davies Upheld," new York Times, December 19, 1953.

10) "Four Public Lectures to be Given by Kennan, former Ambassador to Russia," The Princeton Packet, February 11, 1954.

11) "Kennan Criticizes Handling of Moral Cases as 'Risks,'" New York Herald Tribune, February 23, 1954.

12) "kennan Discourages Diplomatic Career in Advice to Princeton Undergraduates," New York Times, February 23, 1954.

13) "Kennan Will Deliver Princeton Lectures," New York Times, Feb. 14, 1954.

Princeton, New Jersey 08540 Telephone 609-734-8375

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ITEMS REMOVED : GEORGE KENNAN - PUBLICATIONS (CONT.)

14) "Kennan will Seek Seat In House as Democrat," New York Herald Tribune, March 14, 1854.

15) "Kennan Will Run for House Seat; Ex-Envoy Sees 'Real Ecil' in U.S." New York Times, March 14, 1954.

16) "U.S. Held Unreal in Foreign Policy," New York Times, March 24, 1954.

17) "Kennan Says Hope for Peace Is Less," Princeton Herald, June 19, 1954.

18) "Atomic War Trend Denied By Kennan," New York Times, June 17, 1954.

19) "Our Future," Trenton Sunday Times Advertisor, October 3, 1954.

Summer 1982

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

PROFESSOR GEORGE F. KENNAN

George F. Kennan is now Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study,* in Princeton, New Jersey, where he served as Professor from 1956 to 1974. Prior to that he was a career diplomat in the Foreign Service, ending his career with service as Ambassador to Russia and to Yugoslavia.

In the course of his academic career, Professor Kennan has written some fifteen books, in addition to a large number of articles, most of them dealing with Russian and the Soviet Union. Two of these books have been honored with the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. He has received a number of other honors, including honorary degrees from Oxford, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, the Albert Einstein Peace Prize (1981) and the Grenville Clark Prize (1981). In October of this year, Professor Kennan is to be awarded the peace prize of the West German book trade (Friendenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels). He has been, for many years, a member of the American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters, and served as President of that Academy from 1968 to 1972.

One of Professor Kennan's major concerns has been the improvement of Russian studies throughout this country with a view to providing the American public and American policymakers with a better background of information about the Soviet Union. In this connection, he helped to establish, in Washington, D. C., the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

Recently, Professor Kennan's writings on the nuclear arms race have received wide attention, both in this country and abroad. Many people consider them to be the philosophical foundation of the rapidly-growing anti-nuclear movement. (See enclosed publications of the American Committee on East-West Accord).

*Please note that there is no connection with Princeton University.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

George Frost Kennan

BORN: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; February 16, 1904.

PARENTS: Kossuth Kent and Florence James Kennan

SCHOOLS and DEGREES: St. John's Military Academy, Delafield, Wisconsin.
A.B., Princeton University, 1925.
Diploma, Berlin Seminary for Oriental Languages, 1930.

Honorary LL.D.: Yale University, Dartmouth College, 1950; Colgate University, 1951; University of Notre Dame, 1953; Kenyon College, 1954; The New School for Social Research, 1955; Princeton University, 1956; University of Michigan, Northwestern University, 1957; Brandeis University, 1958; University of Wisconsin, Harvard University, 1963; Denison University, Rutgers the State University, 1966; Marquette University, 1972; Catholic University of America, 1976; Duke University, 1977; Ripon College, 1978.
Honorary D.C.L., Oxford University, 1969

FAMILY: Married Annelise Sørensen, 1931.
Children: Grace (Mrs. John C. Warnecke);
Joan Elisabeth (Mrs. Walter Pozen);
Christopher James Kennan;
Wendy Antonia (Mrs. Claude Pfaeffli)

CAREER: Appointed Foreign Service Officer, September 1, 1926.
Vice Consul, Geneva, 1927; Hamburg, 1927; Berlin, 1928; Tallinn, 1928.
Third Secretary, Riga (Kovno and Tallinn), 1929.
Language Officer, Berlin, 1929.
Third Secretary, Riga, 1931.
Accompanied Ambassador William C. Bullitt to Moscow, to reopen American Embassy, 1933.
Consul, Vienna, 1935.
Second Secretary, Prague, 1938.
Consul, Prague, 1939.
Second Secretary, Berlin, 1939; First Secretary, 1940 (interned at Bad Nauheim ; repatriated in June, 1942).
Department of State, Washington, 1942.
Counselor, Lisbon, 1942.
Counselor, American Delegation to the European Advisory Commission, London, 1943.
Minister-Counselor, Moscow, 1944.

CAREER:
Deputy for Foreign Affairs, National War College, Washington, 1946.
Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Washington, 1947.
Counselor, Department of State, 1949.
Leave-of-absence, at The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, 1950-1952. (Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lecturer at the University of Chicago, 1951).
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., 1952.
Retired from the Foreign Service, July 29, 1953.
Member, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1953. (Stafford Little Lecturer, Princeton University, 1954).
Permanent Professor, School of Historical Studies, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, since January, 1956.
George Eastman Visiting Professor, Balliol College, Oxford University, 1957-1958.
BBC Reith Lecturer, 1957.
Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1961-1963 (leave of absence from The Institute for Advanced Study).
Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford University, January-June, 1969 (Chichele Lecturer).
Professor Emeritus, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, effective July 1, 1974.

Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 1, 1974-December 31, 1975

CURRENT AFFILIATIONS:
American Philosophical Society (member since 1952).
National Institute of Arts and Letters (since 1962; President, 1965-1967).
American Academy of Arts and Letters (since 1964; President, 1968-1972). Order of the "Pour le Merite" for Arts & Sciences (since 1976).

BOOKS:
American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. (Freedom House Award, 1951).
Realities of American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954.
Das Amerikanisch Russische Verhältnis. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954.
Russia Leaves the War. Vol. I of Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. (National Book Award; Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and Pulitzer Prizes).
Russia, The Atom, and The West. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958.
The Decision to Intervene, Vol. II of Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

BOOKS:

Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1960.

Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961.

On Dealing with the Communist World. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

Memoirs 1925-1950. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1967. (National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize for Biography, 1968).

From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.

Democracy and the Student Left. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1968.

The Marquis de Custine and His "Russia in 1839." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Memoirs 1950-1963. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown and Company, 1972.

The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy. Atlantic-Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

*

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RECENT HONORS AND AWARDS:

Awarded Director General's Cup of the American Foreign Service Association, for "distinction in the Foreign Service," November 16, 1973.

Recipient of the Emory Buckner Medal for Distinguished Public Service of the Federal Bar Council of New York, November 21, 1973.

Recipient of the Knight Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, December 13, 1973.

Recipient of the John F. Lewis Prize of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, for an important paper presented to and published by the Society. April 19, 1974.

Recipient of the Woodrow Wilson Award, for "distinguished achievement in the nation's service," Princeton University, February 28, 1976.

Recipient of the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, May 19, 1981

Recipient of the Grenville Clark Prize, November 16, 1981

Recipient of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, October 10, 1982.

Recipient of the Union Medal of the Union Theological Seminary, October 25, 1982

* The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

** The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982.

for Harvey —

1982

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

George F. Kennan was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on February 16, 1904, and educated at St. John's Military Academy and Princeton University. Entering the American Foreign Service in 1926, he was soon chosen for training as an expert on Soviet affairs. In addition to serving for some years in the Baltic region, he studied for two years(1929-1931) at the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen, the Hochschule für Politik, and the University of Berlin. In the course of the ensuing years of the 1930's and 1940's,he served several times in Moscow and again, during the early years of the War, was stationed in Berlin. In 1953, after some 26 years of duty in the Foreign Service, he left that service and embarked on a career as a scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton*, where he became a Permanent Professor in 1956. He has remained at that Institue ever since, becoming Professor Emeritus in 1974.

In the course of his academic career, Mr. Kennan has written some fifteen books, in addition to a large number of articles, most of them dealing with Russia and the Soviet Union. Two of these books have been honored with the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. He has received a number of other honors, including honorary degrees from Oxford, Harvard, Yale and Princeton, the Verdienstkreuz der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands(1973), and the Albert Einstein Peace Prize (1981). Since 1976 he has been a member of the Orden Pour le Merite für Wissenschaften und Künste. He has been, for many years, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, and served as President of that Academy from 1968 to 1972.

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* Please note that there is no connection with Princeton University.

George Kennan

"Reflections: Two Views of the Soviet Problem," The New Yorker, November 2, 1981.

"On Nuclear War," The New York Review of Books, January 21, 1982.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF
PUBLISHED WRITINGS
AND
UNPUBLISHED ADDRESSES AND LECTURES
OF

GEORGE FROST KENNAN

May, 1974

BOOKS

1. American Diplomacy 1900-1950.*
   [Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures, University of Chicago, April 9-20, 1951.]
   Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. 146 pp.

   Foreign Editions:
   - Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1952. (German).
   - London: Martin Secker and Warburg, Ltd., 1952.
   - Paris: Calmann-Lévy, Éditeurs, 1952. La Diplomatie Américaine 1900-1950.
   - Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952.
   - Milan: Oficine Grafiche Aldo Garzanti, Editore, 1952. Diplomazia Americana 1900-1950.
   - Stockholm: Tidens Varldspolitiska Bibliotek, 1953. Amerikansk utrikespolitik.

   Later Editions:
   - Mentor Book. New York: New American Library, 1952.
   - Collector's Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
   - Phoenix Book. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

2. Realities of American Foreign Policy.
   [Stafford Little Lectures, Princeton University, March, 1954.]
   Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. 120 pp.

   Foreign Edition:
   - London: Oxford University Press, 1955.

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* Freedom House Award, 1951.

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2. Realities of American Foreign Policy.

Later Editions: New York: Chekhov Publishing House of the East European Fund, Inc., 1956. Problemy vneshnei politiki SShA. [Translated from the English by E. Neledinsky.]

Norton Library Edition. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1966. [With new Preface written by the author in 1965.]

3. Das Amerikanisch Russische Verhältnis.
[Lectures at the University of Frankfurt, July, 1954.]
Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1954. 96 pp.

4. Russia Leaves the War.* [Volume I of Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920.]
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. 544 pp.

Foreign Editions: London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1956.
Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag. Amerika und die Sowjetmacht - Der Sieg der Revolution.

Later Edition: New York: Atheneum Press, 1967.

5. The Decision to Intervene.** [Volume II of Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920.]
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 513 pp.

Foreign Editions: London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1958.
Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag. Amerika und die Sowjetmacht. Die Entscheidung zur Intervention.

Later Edition: New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1967.

6, Russia, The Atom and The West.
[BBC Reith Lectures, London, November 10-December 15, 1957.]
London: Oxford University Press, 1958. 398 pp.
New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1957, 1958. 116 pp.

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* - National Book Award; Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and Pulitzer Prizes, 1957.

** - History Book Club selection.

BOOKS

6. Russia, The Atom and The West.

Foreign Editions:
Turin: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1958. La Russia, l'atomo e l'Occidente.
Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Bezige Bij, 1958. Rusland, het Atoom en het Westen.
Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1958. Ryssland, atomvapnen och västmakterna.
Frankfurt: Ullstein Taschenbucher-Verlag, 1958. Russland, der Westen und die Atomwaffe.
Tokyo: Kinseido, Ltd. To be reissued in 1970 by Jiji Tsushin Sha, Ltd.
Copenhagen: Det Danske Forlag, 1958. Rusland, Atomet og Vesten.
Lisbon: Editora Ulisseia, Limitada, 1958. A Russia, o Atomo e o Ocidente.
Madrid: Ediciones Europa, 1959. Rusia, el Atomo y el Occidente.

7. Soviet Foreign Policy. 1917-1941.
Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960. An Anvil Original. No. 47. 191 pp.

8. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.
[Oxford University Lectures, 1957-1958; Harvard University Lectures, 1960.]
Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown and Company, 1960, 1961. 411 pp.

Foreign Editions:
London: Hutchinson and Company, 1960, 1961.
Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag, 1961. Sowjetische Aussenpolitik unter Lenin und Stalin.
Amsterdam: H. J. W. Becht's Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 1960, 1961. Rusland en het Westen onden Lenin en Stalin.
Buenos Aires: Editorial de Ediciones Selectas, S.R.L., 1962. Rusia y Occidente bajo Lenin y Stalin.

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8. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.

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Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Forense, 1966. A Russia e o Ocidente.
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New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1964. 55 pp.

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A Harper Colophon Book. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1964.

10. Memoirs 1925-1950.* **
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* National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize for Biography, 1968.

** Book of the Month Club Selection for December, 1967 and Book Find Club Selection, February, 1969.

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10. Memoirs 1925-1950.

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London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd., 1968.
Rijeka: Otokar Kersovani, 1969. Memoari 1925-1950.
Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, G.m.b.H. and Co., K.G., 1971. 2 vols. (paperback).
Barcelona: Luis de Caralt, Editor, 1972. Memorias de un Diplomático.
Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, Inc., 1972.

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Frankfurt am Main: Goverts Krüger Stahlberg Verlag, 1973. Memoiren 1950-1963.

12. From Prague after Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940. **
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 266 pp.

Foreign Editions:
London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Frankfurt am Main: Goverts Krüger Stahlberg Verlag G.m.b.H., 1972. Diplomat in Prag. 1938-1940. Berichte Briefe Aufzeichnungen.

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* Book of the Month Club Alternate Selection, February, 1973.

** History Book Club Selection, 1968.

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13. Democracy and the Student Left.
[From address, "The Library and the Student Radical," Swarthmore College, December 9, 1967.]
Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown and Company, 1968. 239 pp.

Foreign Editions:
London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd., 1968. [Also in paperback edition.]
Stuttgart: Henry Goverts Verlag G.m.b.H., 1968. Rebellen ohne Programm.
Milan: Rizzoli editora, 1968. Ribelli senza programma.
Stockholm: Bokförlaget Pan/Norstedts, 1969. Demokratin och de radikala studenterna.
Provoo and Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1972. Demokratia ja ylioppilasvassemmisto.

Later Edition: New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968.

14. The Marquis de Custine and His "Russia in 1839."
[Chichele Lectures, Oxford University, May, 1969.]
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 145 pp.

Foreign Edition: London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd., 1972.

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1. From American Diplomacy 1900-1950.

----------"The Challenge of Soviet Power," The Boston Globe. I, December 30, 1951; II, December 31, 1951; III, January 1, 1952.
----------Excerpts, Foreign Service Journal (January, 1952).
----------"World War II," Readings in American Foreign Policy. Robert A. Goldwin, ed. Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1952. Vol. II. pp. 186-193.

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1. From American Diplomacy 1900-1950.

----------"Diplomacy in the Modern World," Readings in American Foreign Policy. Vol. II. pp. 209-223.
----------"World War I," Wilson at Versailles: Problems in American Civilization. Theodore Green, ed. Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1957. pp. 87-99.
----------"The Price of Indifference," The Causes of War: The American Revolution, The Civil War, and World War I, by Kenyon C. Cramer. Scott Foresman Problems in American History Series. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965. pp. 145-151.
----------"World War I," Avenues to America's Past. John S. Bowes, ed. Morristown, N.J.: Silver Burdett Company, 1965. pp. 373-386.
----------"What Were the Possibilities for Peace?," The U.S. War with Spain, 1898. Was Expansion Justifiable? Jack R. Fraenkel, ed. The Scholastic Great Issues Series. New York: Scholastic Book Services, 1968. pp. 10-16.
----------Excerpts, in Recent American Foreign Policy: Conflicting Interpretations. Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed. The Dorsey Series in American History. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968. pp. 349-352.
----------"Limited Victory: The Burden of the Past," Sources of the American Republic. A Documentary History of Politics, Society, and Thought. Marvin Meyers, John G. Cawelti, and Alexander Kern, eds. Rev. ed. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969. II, pp. 451-455.
----------"The War with Spain," The American Past in Perspective. Trevor Colbourn and James T. Patterson, eds. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970. II, pp. 148-160.
----------Excerpts, in From Roosevelt to Roosevelt. American Politics and Diplomacy 1901-1941. Otis L. Graham, ed. The Literature of History Series. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Educational Division, 1971. pp. 250-255.
----------Excerpts, in Nationalist, Realist, and Radical: Three Views of American Diplomacy, by Jerald A. Combs. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972. pp. 232-246.
----------"The Policy of Containment," Arms and Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age. Milton L. Rakove, ed. American Foundation for Continuing Education. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
----------Excerpts, in Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference. N. Gordon Levin, Jr., ed. Problems in American Civilization Series. Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972. pp. 210-214.

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1. From American Diplomacy 1900-1950.

----------Excerpts, in The Search for Meaning. Viewpoints in American History. Richard E. Marshall and John Edward Wiltz, eds. The Lippincott Social Studies Program. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1973. pp. 406-408.

----------"The Spanish-American War," A Sense of the Past. Readings in American History. Dorothy S. Arnof, ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973. pp. 338-340.

2. From Realities of American Foreign Policy.

----------"Two Planes of International Reality," Issues in American Diplomacy. Armin Rappoport, ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965. I (The Formative Years to 1895), pp. 3-15.

----------"Two Planes of International Reality," The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy. David L. Larson, ed. New Perspectives in Political Science Series. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966. pp. 25-42.

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3. From Russia, The Atom and The West.

----------Condensed version of Chapter II, in Svědectví (Chicago), I, 1958. pp. 23-28.

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----------"The Soviet Mind and World Realities," Contemporary Communism: Theory and Practice. Howard R. Swearer and Richard P. Longaker, eds. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1963. pp. 238-242.

----------"The Soviet Mind and World Realities," The European Past. Reappraisals in History since Waterloo. Shepard B. Clough, Peter Gay, Charles K. Warner, eds. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964. II, pp. 512-519.

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----------"Doubts About Economic Aid," Contemporary America: Issues and Problems. Maurice Boyd and Donald Worcester, eds. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968. pp. 457-459.

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4. From Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.

----------"Russia and the Versailles Conference," (Chapters 9 and 10), The American Scholar, 30, No. 1 (Winter, 1960-1961), pp. 13-42.

----------"Stalin and China," The Atlantic Monthly, 207, No. 5 (May, 1961), pp. 35-42.

----------"Keeping a World Intact," The Observer (London), Weekend Review. September 17, 1961.

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----------Excerpts, in Chicago's American, October 29, 1961; November 5, 1961; November 12, 1961.

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----------Excerpts, in An Age of Controversy: Discussion Problems in 20th Century European History. Gordon Wright and Arthur Mejia, Jr., eds. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963. pp. 330-331.

----------Excerpt, in The U.S.S.R. and Communism. Alfred J. Rieber and Robert C. Nelson, eds. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1964. p. 252.

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4. From Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.

----------"Criminality Enthroned," Stalin. T. H. Rigby, ed. Great Lives Observed Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966. pp. 165-176. A Spectrum Book.

----------Excerpts, in World Politics in an Age of Revolution, by John W. Spanier. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. pp. 98-100.

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OF

GEORGE FROST KENNAN

SUPPLEMENT

January, 1975

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 58 EAST 68TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK
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To meet

Honorable George F. Kennan

Philip E. Mosely

Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

requests the pleasure of your presence

at an off-the-record meeting at

The Harold Pratt House
58 East Sixty-eighth Street

Wednesday afternoon, November 4, 1964

Tea : 4:45

Meeting : 5:00 to 6:15

Marshall Shulman
Presiding

Subject of Discussion:

THE CHANGE IN THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Please mail the enclosed
card if you plan to attend

George F. Kennan
Dinner speech, May 3, 1956,
Pittsburgh Foreign Policy Association
World Affairs Forum, "Can we do better than co-exist?"

One of our wisest and most experienced fellow citizens, Mr. Walter Lippmann, in discussing speeches recently made in Washington by President Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, pointed out that this was not so much a debate as it was a great common inquiry into what America's foreign policy ought to be in the light of the change that has come over the world situation in the past three years. "We are all," he said, "in a new and strange country, for which we have no acceptable maps -- neither Truman maps nor Eisenhower maps -- and we are reconnoitering strange ground."

The subject of this present conference was announced as: "Can we do better than co-exist?" -- and it would be possible for me, this evening, to discuss that title in the literal and narrow sense. I could argue, for example, about semantics -- about the meaning of the term "co-existence." I could question whether it is possible for a country such as ours to do more than to "co-exist" with any nation.

But I suspect that what the organizers of this conference had in mind was something much wider than a literal discussion of the meaning of co-existence — something more akin to the broad inquiry Mr. Lippmann was speaking about. And I am going to take this evening as an occasion for making my own modest contribution to this inquiry.

There is one rather important point that I should like to clarify, if possible, at the very beginning. It is often suggested that great changes are due in American foreign policy as a result of, and by way of adjustment to,

changes that have recently occurred in the attitudes and policies of the Soviet government. The President appeared to be endorsing this same thought when he recently said that policies that were good six months ago were not necessarily now of any validity.

This suggestion seems to me to reflect in large part a misunderstanding of the true situation. There have indeed been important changes in the attitude and policies of the Soviet government. But their relationship to the problem of our own foreign policy is, in my own opinion, somewhat different than is generally supposed.

In the first place, there is an impression that Stalin was a man of war, aiming to launch a military onslaught against the non-communist world, whereas his successors are men of peace. Therefore, it is argued, we no longer need to orient our policies exclusively to the danger of war. This is a great oversimplification. Stalin was not what you would call a nice man, and his intentions toward ourselves were strictly dishonorable. But the image of a Stalinist Russia poised and yearning to attack the west, and deterred only by our possession of atomic weapons, was largely a creation of our own imagination, against which some of us who were familiar with Russian matters tried in vain, over the course of years, to make our voices heard. In this respect the change that has come about has been more a change in the American attitude than in any external reality.

Secondly, while the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union do indeed suggest and emphasize the need for certain alterations in American policies, these alterations are ones the need for which ought to have been visible to us years ago and the implementation of which is decidedly overdue.

It should not have required the effectiveness of recent Soviet appeals to the neutral bloc to bring us to realize that the extreme bipolarity of world power which marked the immediate postwar period was bound to break down at a relatively early date and that this breakdown would give increased importance on the world scene to the attitudes and reactions of the neutral powers. It should not have required the evidence that the Russians were actually testing atomic explosives to make us recognize that weapons of such vast destructiveness were bound to become, sooner or later, suicidal and prohibitive for mankind at large. It should not have required things like the Geneva meeting to bring home to us that it was foolish for America to take a stance in world affairs that appeared to be oriented exclusively to the winning of a future war, and that would plainly leave us empty handed and devoid of suggestion in case, as so many hundreds of millions of people desperately continued to hope, a new world war would not materialize and tensions should be reduced rather than increased.

As one who has pleaded for these recognitions on many earlier occasions -- rather futilely and often with a great sense of loneliness -- I find it hard to share, today, the view that things have quite recently occurred in the Soviet Union that change drastically the assumptions underlying American policy.

I do not mean to belittle what has occurred. No one is more pleased and encouraged than I am about these recent changes in Russia. They have unquestionably helped to reduce world tension. They represent, I think, the beginning of that mellowing process which overtakes sooner or later all militant movements and which has been the source of hope for many of us who refused, in the darker moments, to take a despairing view of the Soviet problem. These changes point

the way to a lifting, in considerable degree, of the iron curtain -- to the restoration of a more normal and more hopeful relationship of the Russian people to their world environment, and to us in particular. I think all this has important and even, in some respects, exciting possibilities.

But we should not exaggerate them. We would be ill advised to ignore the very real differences of historical experience and tradition and outlook that still divide us from the Russian people and would continue to divide us even under the most liberal conceivable Russian regime. We Americans have a tendency to hazy and exalted dreams of intimacy with other peoples; and the farther away those peoples are from us both in physical distance and in historical tradition the more we like to picture ourselves as associated with them in some sort of rosy nirvana of intimacy and comradeship. This has applied particularly, over the past hundred years, to our feelings about the Russians and the Chinese. Woodrow Wilson pictured the Russian people as a great mass of appealing, downtrodden liberals, cherishing in their hearts the same ideals that animated the people of this country, waiting only for liberation from the strictures of political oppression to add what he conceived to be their "thrilling voice" to the aspirations of American democracy. The number of Americans who have entertained similar illusions and daydreams with respect to the Chinese is legion.

I sometimes wonder whether these dreams of intimacy with what we regard as the humble and oppressed peoples of the earth do not represent a form of rebellion against the older European peoples who were, in a sense, the parents of this country. Perhaps we Americans, having once been the child of older nations, have a subconscious yearning, now, to play the father to someone else, in order to prove to ourselves the reality of our maturity and the finality of

our liberation from the apron strings of old Europe. However this may be, our dreams of possible association with the Russian and Chinese peoples have been unrealistic and a little silly: unjust to those peoples, because we attributed to them by implication a helplessness and weakness and dependence -- an inferiority, really -- that did not exist; unworthy of ourselves, since most of us are intelligent enough to be aware, on reflection, of the unreality of such visions. Perhaps we may regard the profoundly anti-American spirit of the political revolutions that have swept both these great countries during the past half century as in part a just reproof to ourselves for this childishness and wishfulness in our approach to them.

Great damage can be done in international life, as in personal life, by the attempt to push intimacy beyond the point warranted by the real prerequisites of taste and outlook and experience. There are ways of looking at things and reacting to things among the Russian people which will always be strange to Americans and will always tend to arouse our resentment if we become too closely involved in their affairs. The same is no less true conversely. If, on the other hand, we keep our distance and concede to them the privilege of their privacy and their differentness, as we would like to have it conceded to us, being prepared to reserve judgment on that which we cannot understand and which need not concern us, I can see no reason why a satisfactory and hopeful relationship should not be established between the United States and Russia, even though the respective social systems and political philosophies remain theoretically in conflict. But then we must both take care to be modest in the demands we place on each other. And we Americans, in particular, must learn to act more normally toward Russian people, to remember that they are human beings like ourselves, to

get over the charged and excited quality we have contrived to insert into every sort of relationship with them, and to cease behaving as though every sort of personal contact between themselves and ourselves were some sort of extraordinary and miraculous phenomenon, to be attended and gaped at by our entire public. When we reach the point where a Soviet agricultural delegation can visit this country and see something of our life without busloads of photographers and reporters at their heels every minute of the day, we shall have come a long way. Here is a point where our press and mass media, by helping to restore a climate of normalcy to the environment of Soviet-American relations, could render a real service to everyone.

If we can move in this direction, I am of good heart about the possibilities for the future in our relations with Russia.

I am sorry that I cannot say the same thing with regard to Communist China. I think we must draw a sharp distinction here. I cannot pretend to have followed Chinese affairs with the qualifications or intensity of a specialist. But I am familiar with the ideology by which the Chinese communist leaders claim to be motivated, and by the example -- namely, that of the Soviet Union -- by which they profess to be guided. I must say that up to this time I have been able to observe in the conduct and outlook of the Chinese communist leaders nothing that could give justification for any immediate hope of better relations between ourselves and them -- nothing, in fact, but the most profound arrogance, inhumanity, and obstinate error in the understanding of the western world.

Now let me make a caveat. I have never shared and cannot now share in the savage enthusiasm many Americans have worked up over the cause of keeping the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations. I fail to see the logic of this

position or to understand the overriding importance people attach to the question. It is not my understanding that we ever objected on principle to the inclusion of communist states in the United Nations. And to scratch around now among communist regimes to establish relative degrees of iniquity, entitling some to membership and others not, is an undertaking for which I personally have no stomach. I have never understood, in fact, why membership in the United Nations should be regarded as a privilege and a reward for good conduct at all -- I think it should be regarded rather as a responsibility to which any regime claiming the allegiance of a sizeable portion of the world's population should be held, and held strictly. I don't see that acquiescence in the acceptance of any particular country into the United Nations commits us to any form of sponsorship or approval of the system of government of that country. I wonder, therefore, whether it is really wise or necessary for us to stand in the way of the admission of the Chinese communist government to the United Nations if the majority of the other participating governments favor it. I have no enthusiasm for it. I would not recommend that we vote for it. But I would think it reasonable to suggest that we might, if only to clear ourselves of the unjust suspicions of ulterior motive that rest upon us, abstain from voting on this particular question. This is, at the very least, a suggestion which I think one ought to be able to put forward without incurring the charge of being subversive; and my plea, at the minimum, would be that we drop the uninhibited emotionalism with which we have contrived to surround this subject, and begin to discuss it calmly and maturely, as we should any other serious issue of world affairs.

In our own bilateral relations to Communist China, on the other hand, I would hope for nothing at all at this juncture. I feel that the present Chinese

leaders have given to this country the deepest and most unjustified sort of offense, which they should not be permitted to forget at any early date. I see nothing to be gained by entry into any direct diplomatic relations with them. Let us rather keep our distance, defend our own interests with determination and with whatever ruthlessness the situation requires, and not permit the Chinese communist leaders to forget for a moment that so far as relations between our two countries are concerned the explanations and amends for what has transpired are theirs to make.

So much for the main figures in the communist camp. Now for the satellites. There can be no argument here about the hideous injustices committed some years ago in the forcing of communist regimes upon these people and in the cynical exploitation of them by Stalin for his particular purposes. But if American foreign policy were to be addressed exclusively to righting the wrongs of the past rather than to developing the possibilities of the present, it would have a long way to go. Much of world history is little more than a recital of the injustices and brutalities committed by minorities of willful power-thirsty men on the more docile majority of mankind and most of these wrongs will never be righted. What we must recognize today, in the case of the satellites, is that evil, like good, produces its own vested interests. Where regimes of this nature have been in power for more than a decade, there can be no question of putting humpty-dumpty together again and restoring the status quo ante. No one in this country has deeper sympathy than myself with those moderate and democratically minded people -- many of them my good friends -- who have been driven into exile by the sickening intolerance of these communist regimes. But there is a finality, for better or for worse, about what has now occurred in eastern

Europe; and it is no service to these people to encourage them to believe that they could return and pick up again where they left off ten or twenty years ago. Whether we like it or not, the gradual evolution of these communist regimes to a position of greater independence and greater responsiveness to domestic opinion is the best we can hope for as the next phase of development in that area. It is through this process that the respective peoples will best be able to return to something resembling a normal and independent participation in world affairs. But this transition will be effected most easily and most rapidly if it does not come as a military or an ideological issue -- if the satellite countries, in other words, are not asked to challenge in any way Russia's military interests or to embrace abruptly, in deference to any external pressure, ideologies conflicting with that which is dominant in that region today. The Soviet leaders have recently shown a greater liberality in their attitude toward these regimes; and this makes it all the more important that we should not allow ourselves to appear as the barrier to tendencies that are actually in everyone's interests.

This has an important bearing on our policies toward the countries that border on the communist orbit. I have always felt that the release of eastern Europe from the abnormal sort of bondage in which it has been held in these recent years will be best facilitated if the line that divides American and Russian military power in central Europe is not too strongly accentuated and if there can be an increase, rather than a reduction, in the neutral zone that stands between. I think it, in other words, a good thing rather than a bad thing that Sweden has never joined the Atlantic Pact, that Switzerland has preserved in every respect her traditional neutrality, that Austria has been

effectively neutralized, and that Yugoslavia is not wholly committed either to west or to east. I would wish that this neutral zone might be widened, rather than narrowed. While I realize that the concept of neutrality can be, and has been, exploited for communist purposes, I don't think that should deter us from recognizing the real advantages it may hold. I, in any case, am a protagonist of neutralism in general, and feel that what we should wish from many other countries is not that they should make promises to defend us in case of war but should hold an enlightened view of their own self-interest and then firmly resist improper pressures from any quarter, in war or in peace.

For this reason, I have always doubted the wisdom of the decision to re-arm western Germany and to bring her into the Atlantic Pact. It seems to me that American policy should be aimed at the reunification of Germany and the earliest possible re-establishment of that country as a neutral factor that can blunt the sharp edge of military bipolarity in Europe and help, eventually, to mitigate the intensity of conflict between east and west. I am aware of the memories and inhibitions that cause the French and many other Europeans to contemplate such a prospect with unmitigated horror, and to fear that a Germany so re-established would eventually rework itself into the attitudes and aspirations of Hitlerism. But I think these fears ignore the real changes that have taken place in the mentality and aspirations of the German people in the past fifteen years. If our European allies insist that we must try to solve the European problem of today on the basis of the conditions that prevailed twenty years ago, then I am bound to say I see no solution of that problem at all, and no very good reason why the United States should continue to commit resources to the vain hope of its solution. This, as I do not need

to stress, is a very serious conclusion.

It is frequently observed to me by friends here and in Europe that the Russians don't want German unification, and that therefore there is no point in pressing it more seriously as an objective of United States policy. About the soundness of this assertion, I just don't know; I suspect it to be something of an oversimplification. But I see no reason, in any case, why Russia's attitude of the moment should be the binding determinant of western policy. I recognize that it may be too late to undo a portion of what we have done in our German policy; and I am not arguing for any abrupt or dramatic changes of policy. But I believe that before we can hope to make much further headway in the European situation, the three western powers will have to show a more genuine interest in German unification than they have shown to date and a readiness to take greater chances, and to contemplate more realistic concessions, to achieve it.

The same principle applies, in my mind, to Japan. Again, I thought it regrettable, at the time, that it should have been necessary for us to conclude with the Japanese this particular sort of peace treaty, which settled nothing with respect to the adjacent areas and provided for an indefinite stationing of American forces on Japanese territory. I suspect that this may have had more to do than we suppose with the outbreak of the Korean war -- by which observation I do not mean to condone in any way the cynicism and irresponsibility that led to the unleashing of that conflict. What troubles me particularly about the present arrangement is the maintenance of our bases in Japan. I have no illusion about the motives behind the Soviet agitation against our bases abroad; but again I see no reason why this should prevent us from recognizing that the prolonged stationing of American forces on the territory of any foreign country

is always going to represent to some extent an unnatural situation and a burden on our relations with the people of that country. I can think of nothing more important for the peace and stability for the entire Pacific area than the relations between the Japanese people and ourselves. It seems to me a pity that these relations should be encumbered by any unnecessary burden. I fear that the prolonged presence of our forces in Japan, with all the minor inconveniences and irritations for the Japanese that this inevitably involves, will, even with the best of intentions on both sides, constitute just such a burden. I think American policy ought to be pointed toward a solution in which the Japanese archipelago, like central Europe, could eventually come to constitute a bridge, and an area of reconciliation, rather than a bone of contention, between the two great world systems. I have confidence in the maturity and enlightened self-interest of the Japanese people to assure that Japan would remain, under such an arrangement, no less constructive and dependable a partner in world affairs than she is today.

I can see that the conclusion of the existing peace treaty with Japan may have been unavoidable at the time; and obviously we could have done nothing other than to continue this line of policy during the period of the Korean war and its immediate aftermath. But it does seem to me that the time has come when we might begin to direct our thoughts to the possibility of replacing the current arrangements by ones that would embrace a wider international agreement, would assure stability not just to Japan but -- let us hope -- to the surrounding areas as well, and would make it unnecessary for us to retain forces there indefinitely. I should be the last to suggest that anything of this sort be contemplated that did not make reasonable provision both for our own security

interests and for an acceptable and worthy future for the Korean people. The fact that such a solution may seem far off today is no reason why we Americans should not set our sights for it and work patiently and realistically for its achievement. That, it seems to me, we have not done.

Let us now turn to the problem of the great "in-between" areas -- particularly the underdeveloped ones -- which are still formally or virtually uncommitted in the great world struggle. This is of course not one problem but forty or fifty problems. We cannot discuss them all this evening. But there are two main aspects common to many of these situations on which I would like to say a word. One of these is the problem of colonialism. The other is the problem of the assistance that America can give and would like to give for the development of countries that have lagged behind in the march of economic and technological progress.

You are all aware of the conflicting demands that are made on this country in the colonial problem, and of the resentment and bitterness we reap from both sides. We face, on the one hand, the violent demand of a whole segment of the world's population that we should join in denouncing colonialism in every form and should assist enthusiastically at the dismantling of the colonial empires of our closest and most respected friends. The metropolitan owners, on the other hand, place precisely the opposite demand upon us. They insist that our attachment to them implies an attachment to their empires, and regard any expression of concern on our part for the instability caused by colonial unrest as an act of antagonism toward themselves.

Two things strike me about this great wave of anti-colonialism the world is now witnessing. First of all, this is an emotional rather than a rational

cause; and I think its leading protagonists would be the first to admit it. Emotionalism and inconsistency are evident in many aspects of it: in the absurd distinctions drawn between overseas relationships and other relationships (colonialism being sinful if a body of water divides mother-country and colony but otherwise quite in order); in the close association of all these feelings with the color problem; and in the extent to which the achievement of national independence is regarded by many of these peoples as an absolute. Few of the protagonists of this movement would argue seriously, I think, that the termination of the colonial bond would automatically mean, everywhere, better administration, greater justice, increased tolerance, greater prosperity to the peoples in question. It is the principle, not the substance, that interests them. It is the status of independence, rather than any real advantages, that they want.

Now I have no disrespect for emotional feelings as factors in world affairs. I should be the first to concede that mankind is governed by symbols and emotions rather than by reason, and that feelings deserve to be taken seriously. It is reasonable that we should be asked to recognize, as important realities, the intensity of the feelings of millions of colonial or recently colonial peoples about national independence, and the futility that is generally involved in the effort of a metropolitan power to retain indefinitely the colonial bond to a people who have once set their hearts on the goal of independence. Wherever our government honestly concludes, on the basis of its own careful observations, that a colonial relationship is really exhausted and that the effort to preserve it can lead only to violence and instability, I see no reason why we should not say so, in all frankness and sadness, if circumstances require us to take a position at all.

But I fail to see why we should be maneuvered into professing an enthusiasm we ought not to feel for what is in reality a painful, tragic, and unavoidable process of history. Colonialism arose from historical factors largely beyond the control of contemporaries on both sides of the relationship. It is dying out, in many parts of the world, from similar causes. It has never been a moral act; it is rather a great human predicament. In many recent instances, it has not been by any means the onerous burden some would have us believe; and its abolition, instead of leading to the immediate establishment of paradise on earth for the respective peoples, will be only the beginning of the long, hard road of independent responsibility.

Let us, then, as Americans, have the courage and frankness to lend our friendly assistance to the dissolution of the colonial bond where it has clearly outworn its real justification and where our interests are affected. But let us do this without pretense and without illusion, with sympathy both for those who have set their hearts on an independent national future, and with sympathy for the mother-countries, to whose feelings and pride of achievement this process often involves, as I see it, the most grievous and tragic sort of injustice.

Above all, let us be specific and not general in what we say on this subject. Let us not be led into anything so sweeping and vague as a sponsorship of anti-colonialism per se. We must not forget that there are numerous small branches of the human family that could not conceivably meet the responsibilities of national independence, and have no desire to acquire them. Some degree of human dependence must always remain. We must not commit ourselves to a position which implies that every primitive tribe or tiny insular community should have sovereignty thrust upon it, even when that sovereignty would be unwanted and inevitably fictitious.

And now a few words about economic aid. Again, you are all familiar with the demands constantly being made upon us in this respect. The peoples of the underdeveloped areas of the world are resolved, we are often told, to tolerate no longer their inferior economic condition; the barriers that formerly divided them from the rest of mankind have now been swept away; they are now going to insist that within a very short time -- one or two decades, or a generation at the most -- such things as poverty and hunger and poor public health must be eliminated from their lives. It is natural and right that these demands should be raised. It is true that the disparity -- or rather the awareness of the disparity -- is an unhealthy and in the long run -- perhaps -- intolerable situation. It is right that we in this country should give serious heed to these voices and examine very carefully what part we can wisely and legitimately take in helping to overcome this disparity.

But precisely in this respect I would like to voice some questions and misgivings about some of our American attitudes.

As you all know, in the face of such demands, if not always in response to them, we Americans have gotten ourselves into the habit -- since this recent war -- of giving extensive economic and military aid each year in a great many forms and to a great many people. These donations have come to amount, habitually, to a sum running into several billions of dollars each year. Yet only in very few instances does this appear to have been sufficient. We find ourselves constantly confronted with the assertion, coming to us in many instances not only from outsiders but also from thoughtful and well-informed Americans as well, that our donations must in fact be greatly increased if we expect to prevent further deterioration of our influence and popularity in wide areas of the world. And yet we also find ourselves,

after more than a decade of this effort of benevolence, more hated, more maligned, and more disdained than at any previous period in our history, and precisely in those areas to which a good portion of our aid has been directed.

Obviously, there is something wrong here. There must, it seems to me, be some enormous misunderstandings underlying this entire question, else there could not be so tremendous a gap between effort and result. What are these misunderstandings? I suspect that they are to be found in some of the attitudes adopted by many of our own people. And I would like to speak of two or three of them before I close.

First, I think there is a misunderstanding here about how things work in the relations between peoples and particularly in such matters as any sort of one-sided assistance from one people to another. Many Americans seem to think that economic aid ought to be followed by an automatic reaction of gratitude and happy collaboration in all American purposes. People of my generation should not have to remind their contemporaries that there is no such thing as gratitude in international affairs. Alexander Hamilton pointed this out a long time ago, and we have no reason not to respect his words. We should remember -- and I have had occasion to say this before -- that any form of one-sided favor unduly prolonged soon comes to be viewed by the recipient as a right, to be taken for granted so long as it continues but promptly resented if it is withdrawn. I would submit, therefore, that any prolonged series of direct donations by one nation to another not only will <u>not</u> produce feelings of obligation and gratitude on the part of the recipient but may very easily, in the long run, become a source of confusion, resentment, and discord.

Secondly, I think that there is a misplaced desire and hope on the part of

many Americans to see our country become "popular" abroad -- to see us understood and loved by others. It seems to me that this, again, is a misunderstanding both of what is possible and of what is desirable in world affairs.

We are today, whether we like it or not, in the traditional position of the rich man. Let us remember that it is only the poor who can demand, with reasonable hope of satisfaction, to be understood. No one ever tries to understand the rich.

A country in the position of our country today, regardless of how it got there, cannot expect not to attract to itself, like a magnet, all the jealousies, the malice, the derogation, and the ridicule of which a discontented humanity is capable. This is a cross we Americans must learn to bear cheerfully and with dignity.

I would like to emphasize the word "cheerfully." Because the fact that popularity is a will-o'-the-wisp and not worth pursuing does not mean that there is nothing worth seeking and cultivating in the minds of other peoples. There is still something else to be had in international relationships that is far more durable and valuable than popularity, and that is respect. When people ask what we could do today to improve our public posture in the world, I sometimes think the best move we could make would be to sweep from our minds, from our information programs, and from the statements of our multitudinous spokesmen abroad, every trace of a claim or insinuation that we are "nice people" or "generous" or "virtuous" and restrict ourselves to giving the impression that we are serious people, who know what they are about, who have their own reasons for acting as they do, and whose confidence rests in their belief in themselves, not in the appreciation of others. I am content that the world should remain ignorant of

our virtues, or should be left to stumble upon them in its own way, if it can only be brought to believe that we are not fools and that our purposes are not unreasonable.

Finally, there is the fact that we have been thrust so deplorably onto the defensive in many of these aid relationships, so that we appear to be doing what we are doing today not of our own volition but in a panicky effort to forestall some sort of threatened disaster. I must say that wherever the element of threat or pressure enters into any question of foreign aid, I would consider the possibilities of the given relationship to be, for the moment, exhausted. Wherever people come to us and say: "Give us this -- or that -- or else we will take it from the communists or we will go communist ourselves" -- I think there is only one possible answer, and that answer should be given unhesitatingly and categorically, with a readiness to accept whatever the consequences may be. I simply have no confidence in the reality or solidity of any results to be obtained by yielding to such pressures. I would rather see us accept at once the worst possible consequences of a polite refusal than to see us whipsawed and blackmailed in this manner. And frankly, I think in most instances we would find that the consequences of such a refusal would not be as disastrous to us, or as easy for the people concerned, as they would have us believe.

I do not mean to make light of this problem. I do not doubt that there is a place for assistance by this country to the underdeveloped areas of the world. Like every other American, I like to feel that we have things to offer to the outside world out of our experience, just as the outside world has things to offer to us. I am sure there are ways all this can be arranged without detriment to the independence or the dignity of either party. In many instances, it <u>has</u>

been arranged this way. But I suspect that a large part of our foreign aid effort is already corrupted, to one degree or another, by the assumptions I have spoken about; and to the extent that is true, I also suspect that we could give fifty billion a year instead of five and the result would not be much better.

I think, therefore, that we require a general clarification of the terms and backgrounds of our aid programs; and I would plead for a new approach to this problem, marked by much more thoughtfulness and dignity of concept and by more flexibility of execution than we have had in these recent years. I would like to see us first look the rest of the world in the face and say to it that we will accept from no one the assertion of any a priori moral claim on America's energies and resources. To those who reply that in this case they will go communist, I would like to see us respond with a single word: "Go." When we have made all this clear, and not until then, I would like to have us say that we are nevertheless prepared to devote a generous portion of our national product and technical assistance to economic development in other lands; that we are prepared to do this as a duty to ourselves and to our own ideals and not as a moral obligation to others; that we expect, accordingly, no gratitude for it from anyone else but also wish to hear from those who accept it no maligning of our motives; and that, finally, we would prefer, as a general rule, in order to avoid all resentments and misunderstandings, to channel this aid through some international agency, in order that there may be no question of selfish or ulterior motives on our part, and in order that others may be required to bear a share of the responsibility for seeing that our contribution is used effectively and constructively. Then, having said all this, I should like to see us do it, generously and handsomely

and on a proper long-term basis. I can well imagine that this may involve an effort greater in scale than what we have done to date. And I would like to see us accompany this effort with trade policies no less liberal, no less courageous, no less characteristic of the scale of action that ought to characterize all the approaches of a great country.

Now I see that I have spoken to you about our adversaries, our ex-enemies, and those who are in large part neutrals in the great political conflict of recent years. I have not said anything about that group of states whose importance is greatest for the future of our international relationships: namely, our close friends and allies. Here there is only one thing that needs to be said. It cannot be reiterated too often. It is simply that we must be careful not to take our friends for granted, not to neglect them merely because they make less trouble for us than other people, and never to assume their support without consulting their opinion. Let it never be said that America does more for those who threaten to be her enemies than for those who have proven themselves her friends.

To sum up, I should like to see us more relaxed and more normal in our dealings with our Russian adversaries -- bolder, more imaginative, and more far-seeing in our approach to the strategic areas that lie to the east and west of Russia -- more appreciative and more attentive toward those countries whose adoption as friends has been tried and proven. And with regard to those other great areas of the world, where people today are trying to fight their way through all the accumulated handicaps of past experience, to a more comfortable and hopeful life, I should like to see this country recover the dignity and balance of its position, abandon the effort to cultivate an illusory popularity, and set out to earn the respect to which it is entitled by its instincts, its temper, and its achievements to date.

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Copy for Dr Oppenheimer

BBC SYMPOSIUM
December 29, 1958, 22:15-23:00 GMT
RUSSIA, THE ATOM, AND THE WEST

[BBC Announcer: Owing to the great interest aroused by the Reith Lectures, our next program has been extended and will continue until eleven o'clock. ...]

CBS Announcer: CBS Radio brings you a round table discussion based on highlights of the six Reith Lectures on Russia, The Atom, and The West which were broadcast by CBS Radio during the past six weeks. Participating are 1957 Reith Lecturer, George F. Kennan, a leading American authority on Soviet Russia, a former United States Ambassador to Russia, and now Professor of History at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton; Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor; and Donald Tyerman, editor of The Economist; with Robert McKenzie, reader in sociology at the London School of Economics, in the chair. Mr. McKenzie.

McKENZIE: It is no exaggeration at all to say that this year's Reith Lectures have echoed around the world. They have been reported as news in all the world's capitals. Mr. Khrushchev has mentioned them in the course of one of his speeches. [When I was talking to Lester Pearson, who recently was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, his first question was: "Where can I get a full text of the Reith Lectures?" And this week in Paris, at the Palais de Chaillot, where the NATO conference was being held, it was literally true that the nineteen hundred journalists present seemed to be spending more time discussing the arguments advanced in this year's Reith Lectures, than in discussing any of the public speeches, at least, of the leading state men present.

[Now the gentleman responsible for stimulating all this argument is with us tonight, Mr. George Kenna, the American scholar, diplomat. He's spent most of his years in the service of his country, in the Foreign Service, and served for a time as Ambassador in Moscow. Now, he's professor of history at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.]

Now we don't intend, tonight, a typical press conference situation. Our purpose is, with Mr. Kennan's permission, to explore his mind, as it were; and those taking part in this act of exploration, in turn, will be Marshal of the Air Force, Sir John Slessor, himself a distinguished commentator on military and political problems; and Mr. Donald Tyerman, the editor of The Economist. Tyerman, will you lead off?

TYERMAN: A lot of things that you said, Kennan, in your lectures have been labeled as dangerous thoughts. I think perhaps the one basic assumption that has troubled a lot of people, perplexed some of them, vexed not a few, and gladdened quite a lot, has been the assumption that there is not, and there hasn't

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N.B.: The bracketed portion was deleted from the CBS re-broadcast; the original symposium was forty-five minutes long. The New York Times furnished the text of the complete discussion.

been, any threat of an all-out Soviet military attack; that you said in your lectures you've never thought that Russia at any time since 1945 has intended to go into a general war; and that you don't believe, as Sir Winston Churchill does, that it was the western possession of the bomb which stopped Russia from overrunning Europe in those years. And yet at the same time in your lectures, Kennan, you described a society in Russia implaccably hostile to us and everything we stand for, invincibly ignorant of our motives, and possessed of these vast military forces in all elements -- on the sea as well as on land and in the air. What makes you so sure?

KENNAN: Well, you know, I think that we perhaps don't take quite seriously enough the ideology in the Soviet Union. It's true that the ideology is rather rubbery and it is infinitely flexible when it needs to be for certain purposes, but yet it does have an influence on their behavior. And the ideology has never said that the triumph of communism throughout the world would come by virtue of an all-out onslaught of the Red Army against other countries as a whole. The role of the Red Army was always supposed to be a subsidiary one and in theory revolution was supposed to come as a result of impulses within the respective country. And actually, if one goes back through the history of the Soviet Union, is has rather been this way -- with the exception of the attack on Finland in 1939, for which I think special circumstances accounted. I don't recall any direct onslaught by the Red Army on any other country.

Now since the recent war there have been special reasons: Russia was much more deeply destroyed and damaged by the last war than many people here in the west realize, and especially in those early years, in 1948 -- '47, '48, '49 -- when there was a war scare here in the west, the Russians had absolutely no idea of wanting to start again [the sort of destruction which they'd known.

[TYERMAN: It's then, on these grounds of ideology on the one hand and precedent and experience on the other, you do describe these vast forces as destined only to play a subsidiary role in the demise of western capitalism, as I think you've called it?

[KENNAN: One must realize that they also have a certain internal role -- that this is, after all, a dictatorial government. It has, in its relation to the Russian people -- it has, in a sense, a bear by the tail, and it can't let go, and it cultivates great armed forces partly as a form of reassurance for itself.

[TYERMAN: Wouldn't it be reasonable, though, Kennan, to assume that in Russia, as indeed in any other country, the armed forces are an instrument of national policy. In the achievement of that policy -- I mean, if it were possible to achieve that policy by direct attack of one sort or another and to get away with it, it might seek to achieve it in that way. On the other hand, policy could secure its ends by political intimidation, by what I think you called, in one of your pieces, "the psychological shadow" of these forces. And it does mean

that the task of the west in looking at this thing -- I mean, it is a task of making it impossible for them to get away with either of these methods if they chose to adopt them.

KENNAN: [Well, that's quite true, and I've always felt that we needed a strong defense posture in the west as a counterbalance to this. But, you see,] I think that they want a maximum of power with the minimum of responsibility. I don't suspect that they want to extend their occupational commitments nor the borders of their country.

May I just make this distinction? In the old days, imperialism often involved the advancing of the actual, formal borders of your sovereignty in order to exercise power over further areas. In the case of the Soviet Union, it doesn't. What they want to do is get puppet communist regimes in power in other areas, not to expand the borders of the Soviet Union as of today.

McKENZIE: But doesn't it amount to much the same sort of thing? I'm wondering, for example; you say you can't think of instances where they've used force to extend their power. But surely Hungary proves exactly this: that when they couldn't get it by political means they moved in the Red Army.

KENNAN: But the Red Army'd been there since 1945.

McKENZIE: But it came back in force to achieve a political purpose.

KENNAN: Well, it hadn't really gotten out. I mean, it was reinforced because they were faced with a rebellion in an area which was part of their military responsibility.

TYERMAN: I think a very fundamental point, Kennan, is this: that in our British experience, at any rate, big wars don't come by direct attack in that kind. Both in the First World War and in the Second World War, it was we who declared war upon the Germans, and we declared war because a situation arose when we were politically intimidated -- we were dared -- into a position when we felt we must stand.

KENNAN: There I would fully agree with you, and I think that the great danger today is that we will be put in a position where we would have to take the overt act. But I have never seen the evidence that they intended really to launch this with Soviet forces. With puppet forces, yes; that's an entirely different thing. And this was the great distinction in Korea which is often lost sight of: it was not the Soviet armed forces which were used for that, it was a puppet force.

SIESSOR: Could I just ask a question here? What importance do you attach to the defensive complex in this? I mean, fantastic as it may seem to us, surely it is the case that their holy books tell them that they are going to be attacked by the wicked capitalist world. Is that an important factor?

KENNAN: I am so glad you asked that, because I think it is a tremendously important factor. You know, if you go back to the American diplomatic despatches from the years of 1845 to 1850 you find them full of the same complaints: that the Russians are maintaining the most tremendous armed forces in the world, what possible purpose could there be for such armed forces? In the 1920's, when none of us were very worried about this, they were also maintaining the greatest armed forces in Europe. I think this is partly a complex on their part. And I also really sincerely believe that they have seen that they do not understand the whole NATO operation and that many of the things which we've done with defensive motives in mind have appeared to them to involve possible offensive motives.

TYERMAN: There is some abysmal ignorance --

[SLESSOR: Yes, but there's some justification, you know, if you look back into Russian history, isn't there? I mean they've been invaded over the centuries by Poles and Swedes and Frenchmen and all sort of chaps --

[KENNAN: Well, they have, and of course they always saw their defense partly in secrecy, partly in the ability to control space, so that they could trade space for time, and for that reason they wanted to reach out, and they -- also in having a sort of puppet zone, what the French call a "glacis" zone, which you control but for which you don't take responsibility, which could act as a buffer between their enemies and themselves.]

McKENZIE: Just finally, on this question of Russian motives, Mr. Kennan. Are you absolutely sure in your own mind that there is no possibility of, as it were, a Russian Pearl Harbor against western defenses?

KENNAN: No, sir, I'm not sure of that, because I think that the atomic weapons race has created a premium on surprise for purely military reasons, which wouldn't have existed for political reasons. Now may I draw this distinction? For its political purposes, I do not think Moscow would be inclined simply to go launching the Red Army in an invasion of other countries, outright. But, for its military purposes, I wouldn't make any assurances. The atom can produce situations in which people will do -- goodness knows what.

McKENZIE: Now, arising out of this, I'd like to move you on, if you would permit me, to really the most explosive idea you've expounded in your lectures and the one that cuts right across western policy. This is the suggestion that there ought to be disengagement, throughout the center of Europe, between the great nuclear powers. You've suggested, as I understand it, that we ought to approach Russia with the proposition that she ought to withdraw from East Germany and the satellites to her own frontiers, and that similarly, in exchange, the West, and notably the United States and Britain, ought to withdraw from Germany and I don't know how far west you see them moving. In other words, we'd aim at an area of disengagement throughout central Europe. And central to that, it seems to me you argued, we must achieve a united and neutralized Germany, a Germany that stands outside the great power blocs of East and West. Now, is this a fair statement of your central argument?

KENNAN: Not quite; because I tried to make it clear in that lecture that I did not feel that any outsider like myself could propose a specific plan of disengagement.

McKENZIE: You're not all that much of an outsider.

KENNAN: No, no; but this is quite true. There are military considerations involved here -- things I don't know about. And having once been the director of a planning staff, I know my limitations as a chap who just reads the newspapers, in trying to tell government what it ought to do. In this lecture I was trying to tell governments what they ought to think about, not what they ought to do. And I didn't mean to propose a plan. I merely asked that two features of thinking in the western governments be re-examined, and one is our insistence that Germany be free to determine its own military obligations in the event that it is reunified, and the other was our assumption that a disengagement would automatically work to our military disadvantage. I'm just not sure that that's true.

McKENZIE: Now you make it sound much less explosive than it really is, because this suggestion has been denounced, notably by Anthony Nutting, the Foreign Minister of State in this country, as a very serious threat to the whole western position.

KENNAN: Well, it seemed to me that it really was much less sensational than it has been made to be abroad. I will say this, that I can see no solution to this present jam we're getting ourselves in, namely the weapons race, except by some sort of a disengagement of the forces of the great powers in Europe and perhaps later in the Far East.

SLESSOR: I agree very much with McKenzie; I think it is very explosive and to my mind it is the $64,000 question in the whole of this series, but -- from the military point of view, particularly. And of course, since you gave your last lecture, your fifth lecture anyway, it's been given added point by these Christmas cards we've had from Mr. Bulganin. But I've always felt, and I do still feel, a great deal of sympathy with this withdrawal policy. I've long thought that as an aim, as a policy not as an immediate action, that it was the right answer from a military point of view, as well as the political, on certain conditions. But that we ought to be terribly sure what those conditions are.

But you, if you will forgive my saying so, you did frighten me very much in two points you made, apropos of that. One was this. You said -- in one of your lectures you said that there are people in the west who tremble at the thought that the pledge of American support in Europe could ever be, might ever be withdrawn. You said now this is expecting too much and for too long of the United States, who are not a European power. Well, it struck me -- I mean, does it, in the days when we've got Sputnik whirling overhead, does it really make sense to talk about anybody being a European power or anything else?

But then, allied with that, the other thing which really frightened me

to death was your suggestion that after withdrawal, the forces of the allied -- the European allies should, as far as I understood it, should consist of sort of what we would call Home Guard resistance groups, the implication being that the country was already overrun by the Red Army. Now I wonder if you would comment on that?

McKENZIE: The first one, on American withdrawal, which I think causes tremendous concern.

SLESSOR: Yes.

KENNAN: I'll answer the first one first, and then perhaps we can go on to the second. I'm glad to have a chance to explain that, because I'm sure that if I confused you on this, I confused many other people.

It had never been my thought that the obligations of NATO would not continue to stand, in toto. I would assume that if there were any attack on any NATO country, even though we did not have these garrisons in Germany, we would immediately meet it. Even if Germany were to withdraw from NATO, I would consider that the German territory was -- the inviolability of German territory was, for us, all important and that we would also act to meet any attack made against Germany. But I merely questioned whether we were doing any good by keeping our garrisons --

SLESSOR: You mean American?

KENNAN: Yes, American garrisons on the continent --

SLESSOR: Or British?

KENNAN: And British."

McKENZIE: But how are you going to meet a Red Army threat without American and British troops on the continent?

KENNAN: Well, certainly not with these garrisons that we have in Germany today.

TYERMAN: When you say "on the continent" -- I mean, at one point in your lecture you talked about "from the heart of the continent" and at others "from the continent." You do really mean "from the continent"? -- overseas?

KENNAN: Again, I'd like to leave these details to the planners. I can conceive of many variations of a disengagement. You could withdraw to garrison areas in Germany as a first step; or you could clear a zone in Germany. You could remove the troops from Germany, which has been proposed from the Russian side; or you could remove them from Germany and eastern European countries and a certain

number of western countries.. Of these variations, I wouldn't pretend to know which is best. I would personally think that no disengagement would be worthwhile from our standpoint which did not involve the evacuation of Poland and Hungary.

McKENZIE: But you are prepared -- may I be perfectly clear about this -- to see all American forces withdrawn from the continent?

KENNAN: Yes.

McKENZIE: Withdrawn from Britain, too?

KENNAN: I must say that personally I can't see why they couldn't be with the course of time, perhaps, not overnight. But I --

TYERMAN: But you regard the NATO guarantee as still standing?

KENNAN: Yes. And the atomic deterrent as still standing in our hands, and in English hands, and as operable in the case of any attack on these continental countries.

McKENZIE: Now you can see Russia withdrawing her forces from central Europe, to be followed by a series of Hungarys throughout the continent?

KENNAN: Well, all I can say is that within the past two weeks, Mr. Bulganin has formally offered to Chancellor Adenauer to withdraw the Soviet troops from the eastern zone of Germany and from the other Warsaw Pact countries against -- or in return for a withdrawal of American and British forces from the territory of other NATO countries. Now this may or may not be a proposition acceptable to us today, but it indicates that they are prepared to go quite far.

TYERMAN: The really hard, practical question, though, Kennan, is whether we would in fact be better off if this happened than we are now.

KENNAN: That is correct.

TYERMAN: And a great deal in deciding that, quite apartmfrom this question of the American troops and where they are being located -- the American forces -- is Germany itself, in this new situation.

KENNAN: Yes.

TYERMAN: Now, how in this new situation, do you prevent Germany from becoming itself, again, a center of unrest, jealousy, and rivalry? I mean, you are asking Germany to accept limitations on sovereignty, and presumably certain pledges about frontiers; you are asking them to accept a certain situation.

KENNAN: I think the Germans would be rather glad to do it -- it is, after all, we who have pressed them into militarization. The initiative hasn't come from them, nor has any very strong desire come out of Germany.

SLESSOR: Yes, but we're still thinking, as you said, "about the course of time."

KENNAN: Yes. Well, this is the heart of the question and I can only speak to this as a historian. It seems to me that our quarrels with Germany in the early years of this century -- the two World Wars -- have been the events which gave to the Russians -- really made Bolshevism in the first place. They permitted the Bolshevik Revolution to take place; they permitted it to be confirmed in power; and they gave it its great territorial gains after World War II. And if we cannot find a way of working with the Germans which really puts them on our side -- but I think all of Germany -- I don't have much hope for Western Europe. This seems to me to be absolutely essential. And I don't have confidence in a divided Europe as an indefinite solution.

TYERMAN: The point being that Germany will have a German policy. It is the interest of the West, as you see it, that that German policy shall be a policy which matches with western policy.

KENNAN: You know, I think it would today. And I think we are in such great danger of making our judgments on the basis of the past. It is my own belief, based on residence in Germany -- actually, as a little boy, before World War I, but again between the two wars in the Weimar Republic period for years, and during the Nazi period for years -- that National Socialism is deader today in Germany than was Bonapartism in France twelve years after the fall of Napoleon, and that we must contrive to keep these people on our side, which they basically are today. The German people are, I think, ninety-five per cent pro-western insofar as it is a choice between the West and Russia.

McKENZIE: I'm completely confused on this point, Mr. Kennan. You're suggesting that Germany should be neutralized, and in effect expelled from NATO. I mean there would be no question about that: if you neutralize her, she's outside NATO.

KENNAN: Yes.

McKENZIE: And yet you're talking about a Germany on our side.

KENNAN: Mr. McKenzie, I draw a very sharp line between Germany's subjective feelings and Germany's legal obligations. I don't think we need the signature on a piece of paper, as of today, to have Germany as part of the west, and I actually don't believe that these signatures are really the things that keep people there. I think it is a question of how people feel.

SLESSOR: Could I just ask you to elaborate one point which interested me and you mentioned; that -- you said, of course, that Bulganin has offered this

and promised that. Well, he's offered things and promised things before, and it hasn't been worth the paper it's written on. But you assume Germany will be not committed militarily to either side and of course it's quite obvious that if we are going to get a disengagement policy, the only hope of getting the Russians to accept it -- if there is any hope -- is that. But you also said in your lectures you don't like security pacts, and I would like you to, if you could, to elaborate a little bit on two points: A. How are you going to reassure Germany if she does agree to leave NATO that she's not going to be left alone if she's attacked; and secondly, and I think this is just as important although I personally don't believe Germany can be a menace to her neighbors again, not only for the reasons you've said but because it seems to me that if there's one thing that's certain about any future war it's that Germany finishes up as a radioactive desert, and I think the Germans realize that. But you can't expect Frenchmen, and even Poles and Czechs, to take that for granted, and how are you going to reassure them against a revival of German militarism unless you have some form of security pact?

KENNAN: Well, I would consider that the Atlantic Pact remained in existence. It was in existence before the Germans were part of it and I'm not proposing at all that it shouldn't remain as an engagement between ourselves and the French. And I would hope that the French would regard our undertakings under that pact quite seriously, whether we had garrisons in Germany or not. I think they should. I feel quite strongly about this, because the decision in Washington to enter into the Atlantic Pact in 1948 and 1949 was a very solemn one, and meant something. I am quite sure that the American people mean it, whether we have the garrisons there or not.

[McKENZIE: I'm not at all clear yet, Mr. Kennan though, on how you're going to guarantee that Germany remains neutral and remains disarmed. Are you proposing an elaborate system of inspection in Germany? Are you proposing an enforcement jointly by the West and Russia of German neutrality? A step backward, really, from Germany's present status.

[KENNAN: Well, you know I think Sir John Slessor could answer that better than I could, in a sense, from the technical and military standpoint. I don't think it would be so difficult today to make sure that Germany was not in a position to take part in the major atomic weapons -- cultivation of atomic weapons. If she wants to have small conventional forces, that's another thing.

[TYERMAN: What if she wants large conventional forces? You would accept conventional forces? I mean, you're not looking at her completely disarmed?

[KENNAN: No. I think she would need some conventional forces.

[TYERMAN: For what purpose?

[KENNAN: Because she would have -- in the east there would be possibilities of border incidents, and there would also be the internal problems. If she were

not able to handle her own internal situation, any threat that comes up from her own communists, then, of course, the Russians might take advantage of that.

[SLESSOR: Now, I'd like to chip in here, if I may, on that point, because it seems to me to be a very important one, that you cannot, it seems to me, leave a military vacuum there. And if the SHAPE forces -- the British, Americans, French, and Germans -- Allies withdraw, you've got (of) have something to take their place to safeguard the frontiers of Germany against the tactics of erosion, something to stand between that and the major conservation, and that seems to me to bring up this question of timing into this thing. You don't imagine this happening at once. And two factors seem to me in the timing: one is the question of -- it's going to be a pretty big job to convince anybody that this is a practical proposition; and you've got to create a climate of opinion, in which your lectures have had a great value; but secondly you've got to have time, to my way of thinking, for Germany to rearm sufficiently to take the place on the frontiers of freedom of the present SHAPE forces.

[KENNAN: We assume that this would take years to negotiate anything of this sort.

[McKENZIE: And surely, though, if Germany does rearm in Sir John's sense, it becomes again a threat to eastern Europe of exactly the kind the Russians wouldn't tolerate?

[KENNAN: Well, I'm not so sure about that. I don't know why they've made these offers.

[McKENZIE: Pure propaganda, possibly.

[KENNAN: Well, at least we could find out by exploring them.

[TYERMAN: Yes, as Kennan said in one of his lectures, what's the matter with propaganda?

[McKENZIE: Very effective, indeed.

[SLESSOR: But look here, on this question of a security pact, surely if we ever got to this position of this being a practical proposition at all, that it would be a two-way street. It wouldn't only be a guarantee to Germany against being attacked, it would be a guarantee to Germany's neighbors against being attacked.

[KENNAN: Yes, and to Russia, too --

[SLESSOR: And to Russia, too.

[KENNAN: And I could see, for example, an overall European security pact, embracing provisions governing the status of Germany, being signed by both sides, that is by ourselves and the Russians, and yet the Atlantic Pact continuing undiminished and unaffected by it. I don't see why that shouldn't be possible.]

McKENZIE: You bring us to the question of the Atlantic Pact and NATO, and here I'm again perplexed. You first of all envisage the dropping out of the most powerful nation in NATO -- Germany -- certainly the most powerful European one. Secondly, you envisage the withdrawal of American forces from the continent of Europe. Thirdly, you envisage the defense of the European nations being mainly on a territorial home guard basis. And you said also in your lectures that NATO should not be used for the diplomacy of the West, there should be no coalition diplomacy. Now, precisely what's left of NATO if you do that?

KENNAN: Well, just what was there before we took the Germans into it, which I never approved. You must realize that as a part of what I'm talking about, the Red Army would get back behind the borders of Poland. Now that does affect very greatly, as I understand it, the whole strategic situation in Europe. As of today, the Soviet Red Army has an area of deployment in eastern Germany which enables it to overcome this great communications-poor zone of eastern Europe, which has always been the traditional barrier between Russia and the West. Now, if the Red Army were to retire behind Poland, an attack by them -- a land attack on western Europe -- would involve first, the reoccupation of Poland. And believe me there would be time, from the western standpoint, to react to this. Now another thing is --

McKENZIE: How do you react if American forces and British forces are not on the continent?

KENNAN: Look. These forces are not going to stop the Russians from coming in there. The thing that is important today is the atomic deterrent, and that I have said I think we should keep. And I would say that that would become operable, at once, if there were any attempt to re-invade the continent on the part of the Russians. I would assume that that would happen.

SLESSOR: Then you would assume, I hope, in agreement with me, that in a European war, as opposed to some of these peripheral wars elsewhere, that in a European war it is really a fallacy to talk about limiting it? That if it really heppened, if we did get to a point when the 150 divisions started on the road, to think that you can hold that up with 28 divisions with the tactical atomic weapons against 150 divisions of the same, is nonsense and that the ultimate weapon would sooner than later come into it.

KENNAN: Ithink in Europe that's absolutely true. [If it's the Soviet forces themselves that are used.

[SLESSOR: Is that true of Berlin today?

[KENNAN: If it's the Soviet forces themselves that --

[TYERMAN: I mention this particularly because you make a point in one of your lectures of the fact that the western position in Berlin is very far from sound and safe.

[KENNAN: That's just the trouble. Berlin is the one point where this can be "fuzzed" up to such a degree that we don't know whether it's Soviet agression or not. Berlin's a place where they can theoretically force us to take the overt act.

[TYERMAN: And would you say that today the west should react, now, to any such move, as it reacted at the time of the Berlin air lift?

[KENNAN: Yes. I must say that to me the Berlin position seems absolutely vital, and I think we have a real debt there -- the people of Berlin stood by the West in a very stout way in 1947, and they shouldn't be let down.

[SLESSOR: And would this debt be discharged in a neutralized and disarmed Germany?

[KENNAN: Yes, because of course the city would immediately be restored them and would have a chance of life again, and I think Berlin is a very healthy force in Germany, myself.

[TYERMAN: I'm still worried, like McKenzie, about what state NATO would be in after these various changes have taken place, assuming that one needs NATO still to be able to deploy the ultimate deterrent at any rate.

[KENNAN: Well, you see, it doesn't seem to me that the Germans have to promise to defend the United States, for the United States to resolve to defend Germany. Do you see the distinction?

[TYERMAN: Yes, yes.

[McKENZIE: You mean a neutralized Germany might be guaranteed --

[KENNAN: Yes, I think we could extend what amounts to a unilateral guarantee over it and I certainly should because I regard it as absolutely vital. Germany sits at the fulcrum of world power, as between the Russians and the western world, and it does seem to mean that what is your alternative to this? To keep it divided for ever? That means Europe divided for ever, indefinitely. That means the satellites in their present situation indefinitely. And it does seem to me unreasonable to expect the Russians to get out entirely with no counter move on our part whatsoever, and I don't think they are going to do it. And as I said in this lecture, if they get to the point where they should think that they had to, they wouldn't want to make an agreement with us to do it; they'd just do it.]

McKENZIE: Could we press you a little more on this question of how western Europe is going to defend itself after these developments have occurred? You talk about territorial militia being the main basis for defense in the nations of western Europe, apparently a kind of home guard system with policies of scorched earth. Now, are you really serious about this as a means of defense in our modern age?

KENNAN: Yes -- again, if you consider the alternatives. Suppose that there is a withdrawal from any of this area, as there was, say, in Austria. What sort of defense are these countries going to have in future? If they are going to have tactical atomic weapons, then the withdrawal has been no use at all, in my opinion, because then the Russians army -- as a matter of fact, then there will be no mutual withdrawal. The Russians won't withdraw if these people are armed with atomic weapons.

Your next possibility is that they remain armed with conventional forces on the World War II pattern. Those are not going to protect their frontiers against the sort of army that the Russians have got today, if that's what it comes to. That's not where their security lies; their security lies in the atomic deterrent, if it is a question of Russian aggression.

Now, what's the other threat with which they are faced? The other threat is that of internal weakness, internal subversion, large communist groups intimidating in some way the rest of the country, and possibly then forces from some other communist power coming in in a subsidiary way to sort of clinch the thing. And against that, it seems to me that they could have forces better -- in the first place, cheaper to operate, and better suited to --

TYERMAN: I thought, Mr. Kennan, you envisaged these forces in fact dealing with the Russians coming in. I think you definitely said, in one of your lectures, if you had these forces then the Russians wouldn't think it worthwhile coming in and that's what seems to some of us very unrealistic.

KENNAN: Well, I would only say that it would be a factor they would take into account. Switzerland has got by in two world wars not because -- in the second World War not because she couldn't have been overrun, but probably because it wouldn't have been worthwhile. The Russians didn't occupy Finland at the end of World War II, not because they couldn't do it but because I think they felt that there was a very high state of internal morale in Finland and that it would be a rather ugly and difficult task. That's one of the reasons I believe they didn't do it. Now, all I have in mind is this: that these countries cannot be defended at the frontier. Either they are defended in the air by the atomic weapon or they have to make occupation not worthwhile for someone else.

[TYERMAN: By these countries, we are meaning particularly Germany --

[TALK TOGETHER: Including Poland and Hungary in a disengaged Europe?

[KENNAN: I was including them in a disengaged Europe. This is probably all the Russians would want them to have.

[SLESSOR: Could I chip in a moment here. I mean, there seems to me there's something between -- you say they couldn't be defended at the frontier and you rather implied that there's nothing between that and resistance groups to put up internal resistance if the Red Armies overrun them.]

But surely if the threat is what you rather painted yourself, it's what I call "erosion," it's infiltration, it's -- you know -- spontaneous risings by patriots and all that sort of thing. And it seems to me that what you want there is something that can smother that quickly, for which I say you want the conventional soldier, not the atomic weapon. But that's got to be something much more to prevent it becoming into the big conflagration, when I entirely agree with you, you have to use the ultimate weapon. But that's got to something much more than mere resistance groups internally. I think you want, quite possibly, both.

KENNAN: Well, I think I have not made myself clear there. What I had in mind was something very much like the regular conventional forces, except that they would not have the heavier type of armaments, and that their training would be a dual one -- they would be taught to fight as soldiers normally are and to defend, so far as they could defend, but they would also be prepared to go over to another status in case the territory was occupied by the enemy. [Now, I have relatives in Norway -- one of my brothers-in-law there was with the Norwegian armed forces in 1940, when the Germans came in. These chaps were forced up to the end of the valley and after a while -- they had no instructions, nobody had told them what to do in this contingency, and they just didn't know. They had no arms, cash, no communications, no command structure -- anything. And all of that had to be recreated later by the Norwegian underground under the guns of the Germans. It would have been much easier if they'd been prepared to take over such a role, that's all that I had in mind.]

McKENZIE: In linking up with this idea of a territorial militia, you also suggested, Mr. Kennan, that we ought to be able to convince Russia there is no basis for puppet regimes in the West. Now, I found this extraordinary when one Frenchman in every four votes communist, and one Italain in every three votes communist. How can we convince --

KENNAN: I am so glad you say this. That's precisely my point: that the French and Italian communist parties have been greater dangers to the security of western Europe since 1945 than the possibility of an attack by the Red Army.

McKENZIE: But how can we convince them there aren't splendid bases for puppet regimes.

KENNAN: Well, there are, in those two countries. And I don't think you could implement this, and I must say that until people in those countries contrive

to do something to correct this situation -- I think the Italians are, gradually -- I don't think anybody can promise them security. I think all the undertakings of the Atlantic Pact are in some respects illusory so long as they have components --

SLESSOR: It would make a powerful difference, though, if these countries happen to be countries which were contiguous to the Red Army.

KENNAN: That, of course, makes a great difference. The things that save the Italians and the French are the fact that they're not, plus the fact that the Yugoslavs occupy an ambiguous position.

McKENZIE: Very briefly, Mr. Kennan, could we bring you to the question of what happens next? Now NATO is moving in precisely the opposite direction from what you've advocated. They're going to provide missiles for western Europe and so on. What do you feel is the most hopeful step, the next step, in the situation?

KENNAN: You know, that's the hardest question you could have asked me. Because I really do not see any. It seems to me that what has happened in these last days in Paris has served simply to make negotiation more difficult, without adding anything real to the defense of Europe, at least not for the next year or so.

TYERMAN: It's made negotiations more difficult because of decisions about?

KENNAN: Well, you see today we could -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- could not now negotiate with the Russians about atomic weapons in Europe without holding another NATO meeting, because we've come to an agreement in principle with all the other NATO powers which we have to respect.

SLESSOR: Not, I think, to have them in Germany, have we? I think that's been left open till the March examination.

KENNAN: That's correct.

TYERMAN: Where they'll be has been left open --

SLESSOR: Yes, but I mean the Bulganin proposal for the free zone was of a German-Polish-Czech zone free of nuclear weapons, wasn't it? It doesn't seem to me that that's been fatally prejudiced yet.

KENNAN: Well, it hasn't. But it would be hardly possible, it seems to me, now for us to go into negotiations with the Russians without first, now, clearing it with all our NATO allies.

McKENZIE: I am afraid we must leave the matter there. It remains for me only to thank you, Mr. Kennan, not only for tonight's fascinating performance but for the series of six lectures you have given us over the BBC. Thank you very much indeed, and thank you, also, to the questioners.

CBS ANNOUNCER: CBS Radio has brought you a roundtable discussion based on salient points emerging out of the six Reith Lectures on "Russia, The Atom, and The West." Participating were the man who delivered the lectures, George F. Kennan; Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor; and Donald Tyerman, editor of The Economist. Serving as chairman was Robert McKenzie. This program, recorded in London by the BBC, has been brought to you in America by CBS Radio.

* * *

Kennan

WORLD WAR II

Stafford Little Lecture Series

May 1, 1951

Princeton, N. J.

The Cambridge historian, Herbert Butterfield, recently wrote: "Behind the great conflicts of mankind is a terrible human predicament which lies at the heart of the story: ... Contemporaries fail to see the predicament or refuse to recognize its genuineness so that our knowledge of it comes from later analysis -- it is only with the progress of historical science on a particular subject that men come really to recognize that there was a terrible knot almost beyond the ingenuity of man to untie."

I do not suppose that this was any more true of World War II than of any other great physical conflict. But the fact remains that it was a war poorly understood by the peoples who fought it on the democratic side, and particularly ourselves; and I am sure that this lack of understanding of what was involved in the conflict itself has much to do with the great bewilderment and trouble we seem now to be experiencing in adjusting ourselves to the situation it left in its train.

It occurs to me that perhaps the most helpful thing to understand about this recent war is the extent to which it was prejudiced, as a military encounter, before it was begun -- the extent to which, you might say, it was not fully winnable.

Let me explain how this was. Before the war began the overwhelming portion of the world's armed strength in land forces and air

forces had accumulated in the hands of three political entities — Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Imperial Japan. All of these entities were deeply and dangerously hostile to the Western democracies. As things stood in the late thirties, if these three powers were to combine their efforts and stick together in a military enterprise, the remaining Western nations plainly had no hope of defeating them on the land mass of Europe and Asia, with the armaments they had or even those in prospect. In Europe and Asia, Western democracy had become militarily outclassed. The world balance of power had turned decisively against it.

I am not claiming that this was perceived, or would have been easy to perceive, by Western statesmen. But I believe it was a reality. And as such, it plainly limited the actual prospects for the West if war were to occur. Of the three totalitarian powers, Japan was the only one which could conceivably be defeated by the democracies without invoking for this purpose the aid of one of the other totalitarian powers. In the case of Germany and Russia, the situation was bitter. Together, they could not be defeated at all. Individually, either of them could be defeated only if the democracies had the collaboration of the other.

But such collaboration, if permitted to proceed to the point of complete victory, would mean the relative strengthening of the collaborating power and its eventual appearance as a greedy and implacable claimant at the peace table. Not only that: any war in which one of these two powers was fighting on the side of the democracies could hardly be fought to a complete and successful finish without placing the collaborating totalitarian power in occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe simply by virtue of the sweep of military operations.

As things stood in 1939, therefore, the Western democracies were already under the handicap of being militarily the weaker party. They could hardly have expected to avoid paying the price. Theirs were no longer the choices of strength. The cards were so stacked against them that any complete, unsullied democratic victory in a new world war was practically impossible to foresee.

Now it may be asked, from the vantage point of hindsight, whether, if this was the case, Western statesmen would not have been wiser in the years prior to hostilities to have shaped their policies in such a way as to embroil the totalitarian powers with one another in order that they might exhaust each other and leave the security of the Western democracies undiminished. This is, of course, precisely what Soviet propaganda has charged Western statesmen with doing in the thirties, and indeed some of their actions were so ambiguous and ill-advised as to seem to lend substance to the charge. Actually, it would be flattering to the vigor and incisiveness of Western policy in those unhappy years of the late thirties if we could believe that it was capable of such desperate and Machiavellian undertakings. I personally can find no evidence that any substantial body of responsible opinion in any of the Western countries really wished for war at all at that time — even one between Russia and Germany. It was plain that a war between the Nazis and the Russian Communists could take place only over the prostrate bodies of the small states of Eastern Europe. And notwithstanding the tragedy of Munich, the extinction of the independence of these Eastern European states was something no one wished for. If other evidence of this were lacking, you had the bald fact that it was, after all, the issue of the independence of Poland for which the Frencn and Britisn finally went to war in 1939.

The fact is that a policy aimed deliberately at the embroilment of the totalitarian powers against each other was -- for subjective reasons -- never really a practical alternative for democratic statesmen. People who wish well for the democratic idea can find in that fact a source of hope or despair, depending on how they look at it. And as the shades of war closed down over Europe in the summer of 1939, the dilemma of Western statesmen, as we now see it in retrospect, was clear and inescapable. There was no prospect for victory over Germany, unless it were with the help of Russia. But for such help, even if it were forthcoming, the Western democracies would have to pay heavily in the military consequences of the war and in the demands that would be raised at the peace table. Their military purposes, in other words, were mortgaged in advance. They might be achieved, as far as Germany was concerned; but there would be a heavy political charge against them. This was not, incidentally, merely a matter of collaboration with Soviet Russia. The tortured compromises the democracies were destined eventually to make with Vichy and with Franco Spain and elsewhere were all part of this pattern. They were part of the price of Western military weakness.

It is important that these things be recognized; for when we look at the problem of the Western powers in this light, bearing in mind the unpromising nature of the military undertaking on which they were embarking in 1939, we begin to wonder whether the great mistakes of Western statesmen in connection with this world war were really those of the wartime period at all -- whether they were not rather the earlier mistakes -- or perhaps we ought to say earlier <u>circumstances</u> -- which had permitted the development of a situation so grievously and fatefully "loaded" against Western interests. This is of course the problem of the deeper origins

of the war; and I think we have no choice but to face it, for the thought at once suggests itself that the best way to win so inauspicious a war might have been to find some way in which one would not have had to fight it at all. By September, 1939, it was of course too late for this. By that time, the French and British had no choice, any more than we had in the Pacific in the days following Pearl Harbor. But was there a time when it was not too late?

The question as to what Western statesmen might have done to avoid World War II is not an easy one. It is a little disconcerting to find respectable scholars, such as the French historian Bainville, claiming as early as 1920 to see a peculiar logic in the situation flowing from World War I and predicting quite accurately, on the basis of this logic, the general course of events up to and including the outbreak of World War II. It is disconcerting, because it leads you to ask whether World War II was not perhaps implicit in the outcome of World War I; in the fact that England and France had been injured and weakened far more deeply than they knew in that first encounter; in the fact that Austria-Hungary and Russia were both lost for the maintenance of European stability; Austria-Hungary because she had disappeared entirely, Russia because her energies and resources had been captured by people violently hostile to capitalist democracy in general; and in the fact that the Germans -- frustrated, impoverished, stinging with defeat, uncertain in the breakdown of their traditional institutions -- were nevertheless left as the only great united people in Central Europe. Looking at these things, it is easy to conclude that World War II just could not help but develop; that it was nothing more than the inevitable aftermath of World War I. You then start poking back into the origins of the earlier war to discover the real sources

of the instability of our time. And from this standpoint it is only a step to absolving the Western statesmen of the twenties and thirties of all responsibility for the second war, and to regarding them exclusively as the actors in a tragedy beyond their making or repair.

This is of course an extremism. Statesmen, it is true, generally, inherit from their predecessors predicaments and dilemmas to which they can see no complete solutions; their ability to improve situations by action over the short term is often quite genuinely limited; but over the long term (and two decades is a respectable length of time) there are always some choices at their disposal. I think it fair to say that World War I was a genuine tragedy which left the Western world much worse off afterward than it had been before and significantly narrowed the choices of Western statesmen in the postwar period; but it did not eliminate those choices entirely. There were, in other words, still things that "could have been done" and which we may assume would at least have been helpful and have had greater possibilities of preventing further tragedy than the things that were done. Insofar as we are talking about Germany, there are two such things that strike me as of obvious importance, and in both of them we Americans could, had we wished, have taken a considerable part. First, we could have tried to give greater understanding, support and encouragement to the moderate forces in the Weimar Republic. And if that did not succeed in preventing the rise of Nazism, then we could have taken a stiffer and more resolute attitude against Hitler's earlier encroachments and provocations.

It is the last of these two possibilities, that of a stronger stand against Hitler at an earlier date, that has received most prominence

in Western thought and has constituted the source of most reproaches to democratic statesmanship between the wars. Unquestionably, such a policy might have enforced a greater circumspection on the Nazi regime and caused it to proceed more slowly with the realization of its timetable. From this standpoint, firmness at the time of the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 would probably have yielded even better results than firmness at the time of Munich. But I wonder whether we do not tend to exaggerate the relative importance of this question of stopping Hitler once he was in power, as compared with the importance of seeing to it that a person of his ilk should not come into power at all in a great Western country. It was a defeat for the West, of course, that Hitler was able to consolidate his power and be successful in the years 1933-39. But actually the West had suffered an even greater defeat on the day when the German people found itself in such a frame of mind that it could, without great resistance or remonstrance, accept a Hitler as its leader and master.

A stiffer attitude on the part of the Western democracies might, it is true, have resulted in Hitler's overthrow and his replacement by a less obnoxious regime before war could come; in fact, there is evidence that a revolt might well have been attempted had the British and French had the perceptiveness to stand firm at the time of Munich. But great uncertainties lay along this path. The hypnotic charm of Nazism was already strong upon the German people. If anyone had overthrown Hitler, presumably it would have been the generals. Whether they would have been able to control the situation subsequently, to lay the ghost not only of Nazism but of German aggressiveness in general, and to adjust peaceably their relations with the West, is not certain. The great misfortune of the West, I suspect, was

not Hitler but the weakness of German society which made possible his triumph. And it is this which takes us back to this question of the approach of the Western democracies to the Weimar Republic.

Events have moved so fast that we have almost lost sight of this intensely interesting period in German history — the period before 1933, with its amazing cultural and intellectual flowering, so full of hope and yet so close to despair. In the decade of the twenties Berlin was the most alive of the capitals of Europe, and things were taking place there from which the Western democracies might have derived profit and instruction. It is true that the peace treaty we Americans concluded with Weimar Germany was non-punitive. We Americans cannot be justly charged with any political offensiveness toward the new Germany. We even financed it rather lavishly, though foolishly. But what I am thinking of pertained not just to us but to the Western democracies in general, and it was something more than just political or financial: it was a general attitude of distaste and suspicion, intermingled with a sort of social snobbery so grotesque that as late as 1927 a German could still not be admitted to the golf links at Geneva, the seat of the League of Nations. We did nothing to harm Weimar Germany; but we left it very much to its own devices. There are times when that is a good policy toward another country. But I fear that this was not one of those times. Here, in any case, were lost opportunities; and it is significant that they lay as much in the cultural and intellectual as in the political field.

Now a word about Russia -- the second totalitarian party. Was there nothing we could have done, prior to 1939, to keep this great country out of the camp of our adversaries? I am sorry that we cannot devote an

entire lecture to this subject, for it is an interesting one and close to my heart. I do not feel that we in this country always conducted ourselves in the manner best calculated to reduce the dimensions of the Soviet threat. I think we might have done more to win the respect, if not the liking, of the Russian Communists; and the respect of your enemies -- as we are apt sometimes to forget — is nothing to be sneezed at. But I know of little that we could have done to alter basically the political personality of the Bolshevik leadership or to moderate the violent preconceptions against Western democracy on which it was reared and with which it came into power. These things had deep psychological roots, lying in specifically Russian phenomena. Whether the capitalist democracies of the West had done things prior to 1917 to deserve this burning hostility on the part of the political power in Russia, I do not know. But I am sure that, once developed, it was hardly to be altered by anything the West might do directly; and the best reaction to it on our part would have been at all times an attitude of great reserve, consistency, and dignity.

As for Japan, the problem of whether she had also to be ranged against us in war in the early 1940's was of course primarily our problem — not that of the French and British. I would wish that we could skip it entirely for purposes of this discussion; for it is a tremendous subject in itself, relatively remote from the causes of the war in Europe, and not easy to treat in a few words. But the fact of our simultaneous involvement with Japan and Germany was so important an element in the course and outcome of the war, that I think one cannot just pass the question by.

To discuss this problem at all adequately would be to discuss the entire sequence of American-Japanese relations over the half-century

preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific; and that we obviously cannot do tonight. To this we must add the disturbing fact that there can never be any certainty about these post mortems on history. It does seem plain that as the earlier decades and years of this century went by and the hour of Pearl Harbor approached, the choices of American statesmen that held promise of averting a war with Japan became narrower and narrower, so no one can be sure, I suppose, that anything we might have done or failed to do in the final years and months before the Japanese attack could really have forestalled the final outcome. If there were happier possibilities, they were surely more abundant in the more distant past, when our allotment of time was more generous and our area of diplomatic maneuvre greater. But whether such possibilities really existed must remain a matter of opinion. My own feeling, for whatever it is worth, is that a policy carefully and realistically aimed at the avoidance of a war with Japan and less encumbered with other motives would certainly have involved a line of action considerably different from that which we actually pursued, and would presumably have led to quite different results.

But I think it is enough for us to record that here again, as in the European theatre, if there were ways in which this war might have been avoided altogether, they were probably ones that did relate to the more distant past: to a period when people were not thinking about war at all and had no idea that the things they were doing or failing to do were manufacturing for them this tremendous predicament of the future.

So we are back again to our fundamental fact that by the year 1939 things were really quite inauspicious for the Western democracies.

The situation which they had allowed to arise was one for which there were no complete cures. Whether they realized it or not, the war could be for them, in the deeper sense, at best a war of defense: a war that might bring immediate survival but could scarcely bring an improvement in the stability of the world they lived in, and certainly not the advance of any of the more positive and constructive purposes of democracy. When this is borne in mind, the great decisions of the war years themselves appear for the most part in a more charitable light.

The first of these great decisions which deserves mention seems to me to have been our own decision -- if we may call it that -- not to enter the European war until the Germans declared war upon us. This was of course comparable to our behavior in World War I when we refrained from entering until an overt German action, namely the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, brought us in. And what seems to me most interesting about our conduct in each of these cases is the marked change in our emotional attitude toward the struggle itself, once we had become formally involved in it. Theoretically, if the issues involved in the European struggle were really as vital to us as we persuaded ourselves they were in the years 1942-45, they were surely no less important from 1939-1941. Actually, in that earlier period, before the German attack on Russia, the cause of the British and French could really be called the cause of freedom and democracy, for very little else was involved on the Western side; whereas later, when we did discover that our vital stake in the anti-German cause was such as to warrant great military sacrifice on our part, it was at a time when that cause had been rendered ambiguous, as anything more than a defensive undertaking, by the participation of the USSR on the side of the democracies.

Now I mention this, because, making all due allowance for the deliberateness of the opinion-forming process in a democracy, it does look as though the real source of the emotional fervor which we Americans are able to put into a war effort lies less in an objective understanding of the wider issues involved than in a profound sort of irritation over the fact that other people have finally provoked us to the point where we had no alternative but to take up arms. This lends to the democratic war effort a basically punitive note, rather than one of expediency. I mention this because if there is anything in this thought it goes far to explain the difficulty we have in employing force for rational and restricted purposes rather than for ones which are emotional and to which it is hard to find a rational limit.

Once we had come into the European war, and granted the heavy military handicaps with which the Western powers were then confronted in that theatre, the decisions taken throughout the remainder of the war years were those of harried, overworked men, operating in the vortex of a series of tremendous pressures, military and otherwise, which we today find it difficult to remember or to imagine. I think that some injustice is being done both to the men in question and to the cause of historical understanding by the latter-day interpretations which view specific decisions of the wartime years as the source of all our present difficulties. The most vociferous charges of wartime mistakes relate primarily to our dealings with the USSR, and particularly to the wartime conferences of Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta. As one who was very unhappy about these conferences at the time they were taking place and very worried lest they lead to false hopes and misunderstandings, I may, perhaps, be permitted to

say that I think their importance has recently been considerably overrated. If it cannot be said that the Western democracies gained very much from these talks with the Russians, it would also be incorrect to say that they gave very much away. The establishment of Soviet military power in Eastern Europe and the entry of Soviet forces into Manchuria was not the result of these talks; it was the result of the military operations of the concluding phases of the war. There was nothing the Western democracies could have done to prevent the Russians from entering these areas except to get there first, and this they were not in a position to do. The implication that Soviet forces would not have gone into Manchuria if Roosevelt had not arrived at the Yalta understanding with Stalin is surely nonsense. Nothing could have stopped the Russians from participating in the final phases of the Pacific war, in order to be in at the kill and to profit by an opportunity to gain objectives they had been seeking for a half a century.

It is similarly incorrect to portray the Yalta agreement as a terrible betrayal of Nationalist China. The agreement was that we should recommend certain things to the Chinese Government. The leaders of that Government were not averse to these things at the time. They had asked us, long before Yalta, to help them to arrange their affairs with the Soviet Government. They later expressed themselves as well satisfied with what we had done. And in the subsequent negotiations which they themselves conducted independently with the Russians and which actually constituted the controlling arrangements for the future with respect to Manchuria, they went in some respects further in the way of concessions to the Soviet Union than anything that had been agreed upon at Yalta and

recommended to them by us. They did this despite the fact that they were specifically warned by us that in doing so they were acting on their own responsibility and not at our recommendation.

The worst that can fairly be said about the wartime conferences from the practical standpoint, therefore, is that they were somewhat redundant, and led to a certain number of false hopes here and elsewhere. But we must remember, in this connection, that these conferences had a distinct value as practical demonstrations of our readiness and eagerness to establish better relations with the Soviet regime and of the difficulties we encountered in our effort to do so. Like other evidences of patience and good will, they were important for the record. Had we not gone into them, it is my guess that we would still be hearing reproachful voices saying: "You claim that cooperation with Russia is not possible. How do you know? You never even tried."

A more substantial charge against our wartime policy toward Russia, althougn one we hear less about, is that which relates to the continuation of lend-lease during the latter period of the war, and specifically subsequent to midsummer of 1944. By that time, as you will recall, Russia's own territory had been freed of the enemy; our own talking position vis-a-vis the Russians had been considerably improved by the creation of a successful second front; and from there on out whatever the Russian forces did was bound to have important political consequences for European peoples other than the Germans -- consequences which went far beyond the mere defeat of Germany. I think it can be well argued that there was no adequate justification for refusing to give any attention to these developing political problems and for continuing a program of lavish and almost indiscriminate aid to the Soviet Union at a time when there was increasing

reason to doubt whether her purposes in Eastern Europe, aside from the defeat of Germany, would be ones which we Americans could approve and sponsor.

But in all these matters we must bear in mind both the over-riding compulsion of military necessity under which our statesmen were working and also the depth of their conviction that one had no choice but to gamble on the possibility that Soviet suspicions might be broken down and Soviet collaboration won for the postwar period, if there were to be any hope of permanent peace. Many of us who were familiar with Russian matters were impatient with this line of thought at the time, because we knew how poor were the chances of success, and we saw no reason why a Western world which kept its nerves, its good humor and a due measure of military preparedness should not continue indefinitely to live in the same world with the power of the Kremlin without flying to either of the extremes of political intimacy or war. In the light of what has occurred subsequently, I can see that our view, too, was not fully rounded. We were right about the nature of Soviet power; but we were wrong about the ability of American democracy at this stage in its history to bear for long a situation full of instability, inconvenience and military danger. Perhaps Harry Hopkins and FDR had more reason than we then supposed to believe that everything depended on the possibility of changing the attitude of the Soviet regime. But if so, this is then only an indication that the dilemma was crueler than any of us really appreciated, and the crisis of our time one of such profundity that even the vast dislocations of World War II were only a partial symptom of it.

And there is no reason to suppose that had we behaved differently either with respect to lend-lease or with respect to the wartime conferences the outcome of military events in Europe would have been greatly different than it was. We might have wasted less money and material than we did. We might have arrived in the center of Europe slightly sooner and less encumbered with obligations to our Soviet allies. The postwar line of division between East and West might have lain somewhat further east than it does today, and that would certainly be a relief to everyone concerned. But we were still up against the basic dilemma that Hitler was a man with whom a compromise peace was impracticable and unthinkable, and that while "unconditional surrender" was probably not a wise thing to talk a lot about and make into a wartime slogan, in reality there was no promising alternative but to pursue this unhappy struggle to its bitter end, whether you were acting in agreement with your Russian allies or whether you were not; and this meant that sooner or later you would end up on some sort of a line in Central or Eastern Europe, and probably more Central than Eastern, with ourselves on the one side and Soviet forces on the other, and with the understanding between us just about what it has proved to be in these past six years since the termination of hostilities.

Remembering these things, I think we are justified in asking whether the greatest mistakes of World War II were really those tortured and hard-pressed decisions which defined military operations and gave shape to inter-Allied relations in the stress of military operations -- whether they were really, in other words, the errors of decision on the part of a few highly placed individuals -- whether they were not rather the deeper mistakes of understanding and attitude on the part of our society in general with respect to a military venture in which we were engaged.

First of all, there was the failure to remember the essentially and inescapably defensive nature of this particular war, as one in which we in the West were initially the weaker party, capable of achieving only a portion of our purposes and of achieving that portion only in collaboration with a totalitarian adversary and at a price. This failure stemmed from our general ignorance of the historical processes of our age, and particularly from our lack of attention to the power realities involved in given situations.

But beyond that, it seems to me, there lay a deeper failure of understanding -- a failure to appreciate the limitations of war in general -- of any war -- as a vehicle for the achievement of the objectives of the democratic state. This is the question of the proper relationship of such things as force and coercion to the purposes of democracy. That they have a place in the international as well as the domestic functioning of democracy I would be the last to deny. That will continue to be true until the world is an entirely different world than what we have known it to be throughout our national history. But I would submit that we will continue to harm our own interests almost as much as we benefit them if we continue to employ the instruments of coercion in the international field without a better national understanding of their significance and possibilities. It is essential to recognize that the maiming and killing of man and the destruction of human shelters and other installations, however necessary it may be for other reasons, cannot in itself make a positive contribution to any democratic purpose. It can be the regrettable alternative to similar destruction in our own country or killing of our own people. It can conceivably protect values which it is necessary to

protect and which can be protected in no other way. Occasionally, if used with forethought and circumspection and restraint, it may trade the lesser violence for the greater and impel the stream of human events into channels which will be more hopeful ones than it would otherwise have taken. But basically, the democratic purpose does not prosper when a man dies or a building collapses or an enemy force retreats. It may be hard for it to prosper unless these things happen, and in that lies the entire justification for the use of force at all as a weapon of national policy. But the actual prospering occurs only when something happens in a man's mind that increases his enlightenment and the consciousness of his real relation to other people -- something that makes him aware that whenever the dignity of another man is offended, his own dignity, as a man among men, is thereby reduced. And this is why the destructive process of war must always be accompanied by, or made subsidiary to, a different sort of undertaking aimed at the widening of the horizons and the changing of the motives of men, and should never be thought of in itself as a proper vehicle for hopes and enthusiasms and dreams of world improvement. Force, like peace, is not an abstraction, and cannot be understood or dealt with as a concept outside of the given framework of purpose and method. If this were better understood, there could be neither the sweeping moral rejection of international violence which bedevils so many Americans in times of peace nor the helpless abandonment to its compulsions and its inner momentum which characterizes so many of us in times of war.

It is hard for me to say how different would have been our situation today had our public opinion and the mental outlook of our leading personalities been marked by a comprehension of these realities throughout the entire period of the '30s and '40s which we associate with World

War II. It is easy to imagine that the war might never have come upon us in the form that it did, had this been the case. Or perhaps, even if it had come upon us we might have been prepared to enter it sooner and in greater force, and thus have been able to end it in a way more favorable to the interests of moderation and stability in world affairs. But these are only conjectures. The historian can never peove that a better comprehension of realities would have prevented any specific calamity or obviated any of the major human predicaments. He can only say that in the law of averages it should have helped.

At the very worst, we can be sure that had we understood better the elements of our situation during World War II we would be calmer and more united and less irritated with one another today in this country, for we would have been better prepared for the things that have happened since 1945 and less inclined to mistake them for the product of somebody else's individual stupidity or bad faith. But actually it is my belief, which I cannot prove, that the benefits would have gone much farther than this. The possibilities which lie in human understanding, like those that lie in darkness and ignorance, are rarely hypothetically demonstrable; but sometimes, they are surprising.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

Telephone-609-924-4400

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

23 October 1978

Dear Betty:

This is in reply to your request for recent additions to Professor Kennan's bibliography. As I mentioned, there are no books. There is, of course, the usual assortment of interviews, letters to the editor, articles, informal lectures, book reviews, etc., but I gather it is not necessary to list these.

The most significant addition would be the address he gave before the Council on Foreign Relations on November 22, 1977. This address, giving his "Current Assessment of Soviet-American Relations" and calling for a special effort to think freshly about the problems of Soviet-American relations, received wide attention in this country and abroad, and stirred up a great deal of debate. It was subsequently published in The Washington Post (December 11, 1977) and in Encounter (March 1978). As a result of this address, several high-level seminars, sponsored jointly by The Council on Foreign Relations and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, were held last spring to discuss the "USSR and the Sources of Soviet Policy."

Sincerely,

Constance Goodman,
Secretary to Professor Kennan

Miss Elizabeth Horton
The Institute for Advanced Study

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

30 January 1975

Dear Dr. Kaysen:

Professor Kennan has asked me to inform you of the status of his Papers on deposit in Firestone Library, should your office receive any letters about them.

Professor Kennan has asked me to furnish you with a description of the categories of Papers donated to Firestone. The most recent donation, for the years 1950 through 1969, was presented in two installments: September 27 and January 8.

Certain categories are restricted and access to them may be granted only with permission.

In my absence, Miss Horton is handling correspondence about the Papers. A Committee has been appointed to rule on access and she is a member of it. May I ask that any letters about the Papers be sent to her, rather than to Professor Kennan?

Informatively, in case you do not already have it, Professor Kennan's direct telephone number at the Woodrow Wilson Center is: (202) 381-6380.

noted

Very sincerely yours,

Janet Smith

Janet Smith

Dr. Carl Kaysen
Director
The Institute

Enc.: 1

A ROUGH SURVEY OF PROFESSOR KENNAN'S PAPERS

1913-1949
and
1950 through 1969

1/ Writings and Publications

a. Bibliography (at the beginning of Box b)

b. Drafts and reproductions of articles, speeches and lectures published in full or in part

the articles are all labelled

c. Drafts and reproductions of articles, speeches and lectures unpublished

all is labelled

d. Particularly official and semi-official memoranda, reports, notes, despatches, summaries, drafts, remarks, comments, telegrams.

all is labelled

e. Major unused drafts

all is labelled

f. Diaries, personal notes, journey reports, verses

U n d e r s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n

2/ Correspondence

a. Letters to George Kennan's sister Jeannette (Mrs. Eugene Hotchkiss, Sr.)

Under special protection

b. Correspondence with other persons, arranged by years, in alphabetical order of names of correspondents.

Under special protection

3/ Clippings

4/ Photographs

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OF
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BY
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(Please note that this is an incomplete bibliography. It does not list titles of articles, reprints of same, published lectures in magazines, etc. of Mr. Kennan.)

Princeton, New Jersey
November, 1970

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

28 May 1971

MEMORANDUM for: The Director

FROM: George Kennan

Carl:

As a sort of statistical indication of what at least one professor does in this place, I give you the following figures -- from a record we have kept since the first of January.

In these first five months of 1971, there were sent to me, with requests for me to read, 32 books or manuscripts of book length, and 39 articles or shorter monographs. Of these, 17 of the books and 25 of the articles were ones which for various reasons -- because they came from friends or valued colleagues or because the subject matter was close to my own concerns -- I felt obliged to read. In several instances, I had to make extensive written comments.

All of this, of course, was extraneous to my own research and writing.

George K.

P.S. You will note that this runs to about 41 books and 60 articles per annum which I feel I have to read - or at least pretend to read; and this is of course in addition to all the reading for membership applications & other Institute problems.

G. K.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON NEW JERSEY

Office of the Director

March 8, 1957

Dear Dr. Oppenheimer,

I am happy to send you two tickets to the National Book Award Presentation next Tuesday. I hope very much that you and Mrs. Oppenheimer will be able to be there.

I am also looking forward to seeing you both at the dinner afterward in honor of the winners, at seven-thirty at the Pierre.

Sincerely,

H. S. Bailey Jr.

Herbert S. Bailey, Jr.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, N. J.

Kennan

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS · *Publishers*
PRINCETON · NEW JERSEY

February 21, 1957

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

I am writing to give you full information on the ceremonies for presentation of the non-fiction National Book Award to George Kennan on Tuesday, March 12th. Since I spoke to you at the Institute I have learned that March 12th is a day of faculty meetings at the Institute, and I suppose it may be difficult for you to get away in the afternoon. Even if you cannot attend the presentation ceremony, which takes place at 5:00 o'clock at the Commodore Hotel, I hope very much that you and Mrs. Oppenheimer can attend the informal dinner at the Hotel Pierre at 7:30 p.m.

Please let me know whether you can attend the presentation ceremony, and also the dinner.

Sincerely yours,

H. S. Bailey Jr.

Herbert S. Bailey, Jr.

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Harcourt, Brace & Company and Princeton University Press
request the pleasure of your company
at an informal dinner
in honor of
The Winners
of
THE NATIONAL BOOK AWARDS
Tuesday, the twelfth of March at seven-thirty p.m.
Hotel Pierre, The Teakwood Room, 2 East Sixty-First Street

RSVP
National Book Awards Committee
24 West 40th Street, New York 18, N.Y.