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## Das Mihrgan-Fest

Das Mihrgan-Fest ist kein islamisches, sondern ein altes zoroastrisches Fest. Auch sein Name ist altpersischen Ursprungs; es trägt einen alten Götternamen. Die altpersischen Monats- und auch Tagesnamen wurden nämlich durch Götternamen wiedergegeben, die sich, wenn auch sprachlich umgewandelt, bis heute erhalten haben.

Mihr ist die neupersische Form des Namens des altpersischen Gottes Mithra, dessen Bedeutung anzugeben sehr schwer ist; denn im alten Iran gab es nicht eine, sondern mehrere Religionen, zum mindesten sehr verschiedenartige Ausprägungen einer Religion, die sich voneinander unabhängig entwickelten und ab und an synkretistische Verbindungen eingingen. In jeder dieser Religionen hatte Mithra eine etwas andere Stellung. Sein Name bedeutet ursprünglich "Vertrag"; Mithra war in der Zeit der Einwanderung der Arier der Vertragsgott, der den Zusammenhalt in allen den sozialen Gruppen schützte, auf denen der Bestand der Gemeinschaft beruhte. Diese Eigenschaft, also die eines sozialen Gottes, tritt auch im Awesta noch hervor, wenn auch dort in seinem Wesen der Nachthimmel vorherrscht. Aber als Gott des Nachthimmels wacht er bei Nacht über die Menschen, schützt die Seinen und behält seine und ihre Feinde im Auge. Es heißt, daß er dazu tausend Ohren und zehntausend Augen hat und niemals schläft. Steht Mithra so in nächster Verbindung zum Nachthimmel mit seinem Mond, den Sternen und dem dämmernden Morgenrot, so scheint ihm doch auch nicht der Zusammenhang mit dem dämmernden Taghimmel zu fehlen. Jedoch sind die Stellen, die davon reden, nicht sicher zu deuten. Ein prächtiger, von vier himmlischen Rossen gezogener Wagen, auf dem er fährt, scheint als Sonnenwagen gedacht zu sein, und einmal wird der auf dem Wagen fahrende Mithra offenbar direkt als die strahlende Sonne angerufen. Ganz sicher jedoch ist Mithra im westlichen Iran, etwa im Ausgangsgebiet der achämenidischen Dynastie, als Sonnengott verehrt worden; diese Bedeutung hat er auch im offiziellen altpersischen Kalender. Dieser Kalender ist ja eine Urkunde des westlichen Zoroastrismus - die älteste datierbare übrigens zum Unterschied vom Awesta, in dem wir den östlicheren Zoroastrismus finden.

Die Probleme der altpersischen Zeitrechnung und des Kalenders sind im einzelnen genau so verwickelt wie die der Religion. Ich muß mich deshalb auf den eben erwähnten Kalender beschränken. Er ist das Ergebnis einer Kalenderreform, die in den letzten Jahren Dareios' I. des Großen oder in den ersten Jahren Xerxes' I. von den zoroastrischen Theologen, den Magiern, durchgeführt wurde. Auch von ihm gab es noch mehrere Redaktionen, die den Dialekten und örtlichen Überlieferungen der verschiedenen Landschaften angepaßt waren; wir kennen eine awestische Fassung, die, der mittelpersischen und später der neupersischen Sprache angepaßt, seit dem Mittelalter bei den Parsen von Bombay weiterlebt, eine altpersische, die u.a. in Kappadokien eingeführt wurde und deren Monatsnamen bei Johannes Lydus (550 n. Chr.) und in einem spätgriechischen Ptolemaios-Kommentar erhalten geblieben sind, ferner eine chwarizmische und eine sogdische Fassung; die beiden letzteren teilt Biruni mit.

Dieser Kalender nun beruhte auf einem Sonnenjahr, das mit der Frühjahrstagundnachtgleiche begann und 365 Tage zählte, verteilt auf 12 Monate zu 30 Tagen mit 5 Schalttagen am Jahresende. Es sei nur ganz kurz erwähnt, daß dieses Schaltsystem uns heute ganz außerordentliche chronologische Probleme aufgibt; einmal wurde die 5-Tage-Schaltung nur im sakralen Gebrauch verwendet, während man im bürgerlichen Leben keine Rücksicht auf sie nahm; man hatte also ein bürgerliches Jahr ohne und ein religiöses Jahr mit Schaltung, die man dann auch durch Einfügung beweglicher Schalttage ins bürgerliche Jahr öfters wieder aneinander anzugleichen suchte; ferner hätte, da das Sonnenjahr bekanntlich  $365 \frac{1}{4}$  Tag lang ist, alle 120 Jahre ein Monat eingeschaltet werden müssen, was wohl meistens unterblieb oder zu falschen Zeitpunkten durchgeführt wurde; schließlich mußte eine Schaltung unter ganz besonderen Feierlichkeiten von einem König veranstaltet werden, war also nur bis zur islamischen Eroberung möglich. Die letzte Schaltung hat nach Biruni der sassanidische König Yezdegerd I. vorgenommen, jedoch ist es auch möglich, daß dieses eine Kalenderreform gewesen ist.

Ich habe diesen Sachverhalt gestreift, um zu zeigen, wie es infolge Fehlens einer astronomischen Überwachung des Kalenders, das natürlich in islamischer Zeit unverbessert anhielt, mit der Zeit zu beträchtlichen Verschiebungen der Daten und der Feste gegenüber den Jahreszeiten kommen mußte. Daher erklärt es sich, daß wir heute für jedes Jahr der persischen Geschichte aus den Angaben der zeitgenössischen Autoren gesondert berechnen müssen, wann etwa unser Mihrigan-Fest wirklich stattgefunden hat; ferner erklärt sich so, daß die Feste ihren Charakter oft geändert haben. So war z.B. das Mihrigan-Fest, das sich ursprünglich auf die Wintersonnenwende bezog, schon bald zum Herbstfest geworden und

nur dann und wann noch weit in den Spätherbst hinein verschoben worden. Doch konnte es, wie z.B. im Jahre 121/738, auch in den Hochsommer fallen. Nicht einmal der Abstand zum Nauruz, dem mit dem Frühlingsbeginn zusammenfallenden Jahresanfang, blieb sich immer gleich; er schwankt zwischen 169 und 194 Tagen. Unter dem seldschukischen Sultan Dschelaloddin Malekschah jedoch fand im Jahre 472/1079 eine Kalenderreform statt, die den Jahresanfang, Nauruz, fest auf den Tag der Frühjahrstagundnachtgleiche legte, das erste Jahr dieser Ära mit dem ersten Jahr der Regierung des letzten Sassaniden Yezdegerd III. zusammenfallen ließ, die 5 Schalttage stets hinter dem 12. Monat einschaltete und für jedes 4. Jahr einen zusätzlichen Schalttag einsetzte. Ich möchte annehmen, daß dieses die Ära war, die man unter allen anderen in der Folgezeit am liebsten heranzog, wenn man die offizielle islamische Zeitrechnung einmal nicht brauchen wollte; denn sie ist unter den persischen Ären die zuverlässigste. Auch das Datum des derzeitigen persischen Jahresbeginns, eben Nauruz, Frühlingsäquinoktium, wird durch diese Ära garantiert; der Monat Mihr würde danach an unserem 17. September beginnen und bis zum 16. Oktober dauern, und sein 16. Tag, das Mihrgan-Fest, würde in eben die Oktoberwoche fallen, in der es tatsächlich auch - von den Parsen bis heute - gefeiert wird.

Doch damit sind wir schon bei der Stellung des Mihrgan-Festes innerhalb des altpersischen Kalenders. Von der absoluten Chronologie können wir jetzt absehen. Jener Kalender ist wahrscheinlich die iranische Nachbildung des ägyptischen Kalenders, den die Perser nach der Eroberung Ägyptens durch Kambyzes (529-522 v. Chr.) kennengelernt hatten; denn ägyptisch ist vor allem der Grundsatz, jeden einzelnen Tag des Monats einer bestimmten Gottheit zu weihen und ihn nach dieser zu benennen. Nun hörten wir schon zu Anfang, daß im persischen Kalender auch die Monatsnamen selbst nach Göttern benannt wurden. Der siebente Monat ist hier nach Mithra benannt; in der Reihenfolge der Monate war er wohl ursprünglich der erste Monat des Winterhalbjahres, was seiner Bedeutung als Monat des Sonnengottes nicht widersprechen würde, da ja vom 1. Tage des Winters an das Tageslicht wieder zu wachsen anfängt.

Ein solcher Monat war viergeteilt; jeden Teil kann man entfernt mit unseren heutigen Wochen vergleichen. Die beiden ersten Teile des Monats, vom 1.-7. und vom 8.-14. Tag, haben jeder 7, die beiden anderen Teile jeder 8 Tage. Die einzelnen Tage sind nach den Gliedern theologisch durchdachter und geordneter Götterreihen benannt, auf die hier nicht weiter eingegangen werden soll. In diesen Reihen kommen auch einige Namen vor, die schon durch die Benennung der Monatsnamen beansprucht waren. Ein solcher ist auch Mithra, der Name des 16. Tages. Auf diesen Tag im Mithra-Monat fällt nun der Beginn unseres Mihrgan-

Festes. Er liegt also auf dem Tag Mithra des Monats Mithra, d.h. dem 16. Tag des 7. Monats. (In dieser Weise fielen alle 12 großen Monatsfeste immer auf den Tag, der den Namen der Monatsgottheit trug). Das Mihrigan-Fest dauerte ursprünglich 6 Tage, wie das Neujahrsfest, vom 16.-21. Mihr. Biruni berichtet, daß Hormuz, der Sohn des Schapur, diese beiden Tage, die ursprünglich verschiedene Feste waren, vereinigt und die Tage dazwischen zu Festtagen erhoben habe, sodaß ein sechstägiges Fest entstand. Später hätten die Könige von Iran auch die nächsten 30 Tage nach dem Mihrigan-Fest feierlich begehen lassen, wobei nacheinander alle Klassen der Bevölkerung je 5 Tage zur Feier zugewiesen bekamen.

Nach der islamischen Eroberung blieb der persische Kalender weitgehend in Gebrauch, hauptsächlich aus wirtschaftlichen Erwägungen. Denn der offizielle islamische, auf dem Mondjahr basierende Kalender tat diesen nicht Genüge. Darüberhinaus aber blieben die Feste auch deshalb erhalten, weil sie von den kleinen Landedelleuten, den Dehkanen, die weithin Träger der staatlichen Repräsentation blieben, zusammen mit der ganzen nationalen Kultur weiter überliefert wurden. Die Feste wurden also weiterhin gefeiert, ähnlich wie nach der Eroberung Ägyptens die Nilfeste.

Freilich wurden sie nicht immer offiziell geduldet. Der omajjadische Kalif Omar II. (717-20) wollte Nauruz und Mihrigan abschaffen und die zu diesen Tagen üblichen Geschenke an Höhergestellte unterdrücken. Er hatte keinen Erfolg damit, weil diese Sitte im persischen Volk zu fest verwurzelt war. Stattdessen wurde das Fest unter den Abbasiden und Bujiden allgemein üblich und fand sogar im Zweistromland Eingang. Im 9. Jahrhundert bereitete man in Bagdad am Mihrigan-Fest Palmwein, nahm Nüsse, Knoblauch, rohes Fleisch, warme Speisen und Getränke zu sich und beging kultische Abwehrriten. Auch die in Persien lebenden Araber sahen sich, um ihr Ansehen zu wahren, veranlaßt, nach persischer Sitte diese Feste mitzufeiern und die traditionellen Geschenke entgegenzunehmen. Diese Feste boten überhaupt Anlaß zu großen Ausgaben. Man gab sich Ehren- und symbolische Geschenke (738 in Balkh einen Apfel). Man begnadigte auch politische Missetäter, die bisweilen in goldenen Fesseln vorgeführt wurden und dann einen Gnadenbecher (Kāsā-yi amān) leeren durften. Dabei ging die religiöse Bedeutung des Festes nach und nach verloren, und man feierte nur mehr aus Tradition. Die Geschenke wurden die Hauptsache (goldene und silberne Gefäße, Geld, Gebrauchsgegenstände und Kleider). Freilich gab es auch hierin Ausnahmen. So nahm z.B. der Ṭahiride ʿAbdallāh (213/828-229/844) die alte persische Gewohnheit wieder auf, an Nauruz und Mihrigan Recht zu sprechen. - So behauptete sich das Fest durch die ganze Abbasiden- und Samanidenzeit, sogar noch unter den Seldschuken.

Erst nach dem Mongolensturm verschwand es und blieb auch unter den folgenden persischen Dynastien vergessen. Und da es seit Jahrhunderten keine lebendige Tradition mehr bei den muslimischen Völkern Irans hatte, wurde der Versuch seiner Neubelebung durch die Pahlavi-Dynastie auch nicht wiederholt.

*Für Quellen- und Literaturangaben wird auf den Artikel s.v. Mihragān (Jean Calmard) in der Encyclopædia of Islam, New Edition, VII (1993), pp. 15-20 verwiesen.*

Sabine Schmidtke

## Al-<sup>c</sup>Allāma al-Ḥillī and Shi<sup>c</sup>ite Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite Theology

1.

Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, who is usually known as al-<sup>c</sup>Allāma al-Ḥillī (648/1250-726/1325), is certainly not an unknown figure among western scholars on Islam. His major contribution to the development of Shi<sup>c</sup>ite law has long been acknowledged and his legal works are considered nowadays among the Shi<sup>c</sup>ite community as belonging to the most authoritative writings in this field. Moreover, he contributed important writings in the field of methodology of law (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) where especially his *Kitāb Mabādī al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* and his more extensive *Kitāb Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* should be mentioned.

Especially because of the translation of his creed *Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar* together with al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's (d. 821/1418) commentary on it by W. M. Miller into English which was published in 1928, al-Ḥillī became further known as an authority in Shi<sup>c</sup>ite theology. Among Shi<sup>c</sup>ites, especially his more concise treatises on theology are studied until today as basic texts on theology.

Al-Ḥillī's views on the Imamate as they appear from his *Kitāb Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma* which was refuted by Ibn Taymiyya in his *K. Minhāj al-sunna* have been investigated by Henri Laoust in a number of articles.

The present article will attempt to outline the principal characteristics of the theological views of the <sup>c</sup>Allāma al-Ḥillī in comparison with other relevant developments in Islamic thought.

Taking into consideration that al-<sup>c</sup>Allāma al-Ḥillī belonged to the last innovative Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite school in Shi<sup>c</sup>ism, this article will be subdivided into two parts.

The first part will provide a short outline of the development of Shi<sup>c</sup>ite theology up to the time of al-Ḥillī. The second part will mainly be concerned with al-Ḥillī's theological views and will provide an attempt to show al-Ḥillī's place in the development of Shi<sup>c</sup>ite *kalām* in relation to other theological schools in Islam.

## 2.1

The earliest Imami theologians engaged in theological discussions already in the second century A.H., i.e. in the time of the sixth Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d.148/765). Their chief representatives were Muḥammad b. al-Nuʿmān, usually called Shayṭān al-Ṭāq among his opponents, Zurāra b. Aʿyān (d.150/767), Hishām b. Sālīm al-Jawālīqī and Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d.179/795-6). None of their writings are extant and our knowledge about their theological views is restricted to the titles of their works as they are reported by Ibn al-Nadīm and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and to the reports of the different heresiographers, especially al-Ashʿarī.

Their theological doctrines are characterised by their direct disagreement with the commonly accepted views of the Muʿtazilites and as such also with the views of the later Shiʿites.

With respect to some of their positions, parallels can be found between these earlier Imami theologians and the Sunnite traditionalists, for example when they maintained that God is, after having created space, immanent in space, namely His throne, or when they ascribe motion to God. In their teaching about God's attributes, however, the early Imami thinkers disagreed with all parties. They rejected the concept of essential divine attributes which are not subject to change and maintained rather that all divine attributes are subject to constant change. God does not know for instance all things from eternity because this would necessitate the eternity of things. Rather, He knows only existent things.

In regard to the question of man's acts they supported the concept of freedom of choice. On the other hand, however, they did not agree with the Muʿtazilites that man is the only author of his acts but held rather an intermediate position between the adherents of constraint (*jabr*) and the Muʿtazilite position of empowerment (*tafwīḍ*). Hishām b. al-Ḥakam for instance maintained that although man's act is to be defined as his choice since it results from his will, he is nonetheless constrained in his act because he requires an occasion produced by God for his act.

However, the theory of the imamate as it was developed by Hishām b. al-Ḥakam remained the basis for the later fully developed Imami doctrine. Mankind is in permanent need for a divinely guided Imam as authority in religious matters. He is impeccable (*maʿṣūm*) but does not receive divine messages (*waḥy*). Each Imam was installed by his predecessor by an explicit appointment (*naṣṣ*) and whoever rejects the Imam of his age is an infidel (*kāfir*).

After the death of Hishām b. al-Ḥakam who differed at times from the positions of the other representatives of the school because he was influenced by the dualists, the doctrines of the school were carried on for some time. Because of opposition both from rival Shiʿite theological

schools and the Shi'ite traditionalists who opposed the engagement in *kalām* in general, the school became soon extinct.

The first Imami theological school which, though being independent, maintained positions very similar to the chief Mu'tazilite views was founded by the Banū Nawbakht. Their chief representatives were Abū Ismā'īl b. Alī b. Abī Sahl b. Nawbakht (d.311/923-4) and his nephew Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbakhtī (d. between 300/912 and 316/923).

Since none of their works are extant, their positions can only be deduced from the titles of their works. The main secondary source for the reconstruction of their views is the *Awā'il al-maqālāt* by Shaykh al-Mufīd (d.413/1022) where their views are regularly mentioned.

It should be noted here that the *Kitāb al-Yaqūt* which was written by a certain Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Nawbakht and upon which al-Ḥillī wrote a commentary entitled *Amwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-Yaqūt* does evidently not reflect the views of the Banū Nawbakht. It has been suggested that this work was written at least one or to centuries later than the year 340/941 which has been suggested by ʿAbbās Iqbāl in his study on the Banū Nawbakht. This view can be supported by the fact that Abū Ishāq holds positions which are usually identical with the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d.436/1044). Since it is highly unlikely that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī would follow such an obscure writer, as al-Ḥillī suggested concerning one question, one may rather assume that Abū Ishāq belonged to those Shi'ite Mu'tazilites whose theological views were influenced by the views of the school of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī.

The Banū Nawbakht agreed with the Mu'tazilites in their principal theses of God's unity (*tawḥīd*) as they opposed any anthropomorphic conception of God and of His justice as they affirmed human free will and opposed the view that God creates man's acts. Although they held firm to the Imamite doctrine of the Imamate with the result that they disagreed with the Mu'tazilites on some related matters, they were nearer to the Mu'tazilites in regard to some points than later Shi'ite theologians. They denied for instance that the Imams may work miracles, they agreed with the Mu'tazilites that there is an absolute difference between major and minor sins and affirmed likewise mutual cancellation between good and evil deeds. Against the Mu'tazilites, however, they denied the intermediary position of the grave sinner between the believer and the unbeliever, they affirmed the principle of intercession of the prophet and the Imams on the Day of Judgement for the grave sinners of their community and maintained that the Qur'ān had undergone deletions and additions.



The strongest opposition to the *kalām* practice of the Banū Nawbakht which presumably led also to the extinction of this school came from the Shi'ite traditionalists whose most important representative was Abū Ja'far Muḥ. b. Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn b. Mūsā b. Babūya al-Qummi, who is known as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991).

Similar to their Sunnite counterparts, the Imami traditionalists categorically rejected the use of reason in religious discussions. However, in contrast to the Sunnites, Shi'ite traditionalism shared a number of decisive notions with the Mu'tazilites. This circumstance was apparently the reason that Mu'tazilism turned eventually out to be the prevalent religious current in Shi'ism while traditionalism did never achieve such a strong position as it did in Sunnism. This general tendency of Shi'ite traditionalism goes back to as far as the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq some of whose statements supported an intermediate position between Sunnite traditionalism and Mu'tazilite doctrine, e.g. on the question of free will versus predestination. Other traditions most of which are ascribed to the eighth Imam ʿAlī Riḍā (d. 203/818) support a concept of God which is in its abstraction and rationality closer to the Mu'tazilite than to the Sunnite traditionalist view. Ibn Babūya relied in his views usually on those traditions which are closer to the Mu'tazilite position.

A major step towards the adoption of Mu'tazilite theology among Shi'ites was taken by Shaykh Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥ. b. Muḥ. b. Nu'mān al-Mufid (d. 413/1022) who was a student of Ibn Babūya. He is also the first Shi'ite theologian whose works on *kalām* are extant. The most important of his works are his *Sharḥ ʿAqā'id al-Ṣadūq*, or *Taṣḥīḥ al-i'tiqād*, in which he criticizes especially Ibn Babūya's traditionalist attitudes, and his *Kitāb awā'il al-maqālāt*.

In contrast to Ibn Babūya, al-Mufid affirms the use of reason in religious matters. However, he does not go as far as the Mu'tazilites who employed reason to the degree of the exclusion of traditions in order to support their positions. He rejects for instance the possibility to assign names to God which do not have any basis in the Qur'ān and the traditions even if reason points to them.

In his theological views, al-Mufid usually takes the position of the Mu'tazilite school of Baghdad which he considers as less rationalist than the school of Basra which denied that revelation leads to knowledge about fundamental theological questions.

Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, also called ʿAlam al-Hudā (d. 436/1044) who was a student of al-Mufid disagreed with his teacher in two respects. Reason is in his view the only authority which leads to the truth in religious matters while knowledge derived from revelation and especially from

traditions which is in conflict with reason must be rejected. This principle also influenced his views in the sphere of legal methodology (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) where he outrightly rejected any authority of single traditions (*akhbār al-āḥād*). In his theological views, al-Murtaḍā followed in contrast to al-Mufid usually the position of the school of Basra as it was fully developed by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʿī (d. 321/933) whose followers are known as the Bahshamiyya. Al-Murtaḍā became acquainted with the doctrines of this school when he studied in Baghdad with the famous Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the author of the extensive *Kitāb al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl*, and the less known Abū Ishāq al-Naṣībī (d. 408/1017).

His theological views can be studied in his numerous less extensive *kalām* works and treatises which are edited. His two major *kalām* works, the *Kitāb al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī uṣūl al-dīn* and the *Kitāb al-Dhakhīra fī ʿilm al-kalām* are partly extant in manuscript. A commentary on his more concise *kalām* work *Kitāb Jumal al-ʿilm wa-l-ʿamal* or *Kitāb Jumal al-ʿaḳāʾid* was written by his student Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 459/1067) in his work *Kitāb Tamhīd al-uṣūl fī ʿilm al-kalām*. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī followed in his theological views usually the position of al-Murtaḍā as it can be seen in his *Kitāb al-Iqtisād al-hādī ilā tariq al-rashād*.

## 2.2

With al-Murtaḍā, the fusion of Muʿtazilism and Shiʿism was completed. However, Imamism did not compromise with Muʿtazilism concerning those principles of belief which derived from their specific doctrine of the Imamate. Since, according to Imami doctrine, the world cannot exist any moment without an Imam who is the guide of mankind, the Imamate is the very foundation of belief. This belief led them to reject the Muʿtazilite principle about the intermediary position of a grave sinner between a believer and an unbeliever. Consequently, they also denied the Muʿtazilite absolute differentiation between major and minor sins and the principle of mutual cancellation (*taḥābuṭ*). The Muʿtazilites held that if a person does a good act after having committed a minor sin, the reward he deserves for the good act cancels out the punishment he deserved because of the previous sin. The same mechanism applies vice versa. However, if he committed a major sin, the punishment he deserves for it can impossibly be cancelled out by any good act. Moreover, because of the major sin, all the reward this person deserved previously because of his good acts is likewise automatically cancelled out. The Imamis, in contrast, held that not even a major sin may cancel out any of the eternal reward man deserves for his belief. A true believer can rather be certain of eternal reward in the Hereafter for his belief even if he may be punished

temporarily for his sins. Thus, because of this view and since the Imamis believed that the prophet and the Imams will intercede for the believers among their community on the Day of Judgement, they rejected further the Muʿtazilite principle of the unconditional and eternal punishment of the grave sinner.

### 3.1

The last innovative Muʿtazilite school in Shiʿism was introduced by the philosopher and astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). His positions as they appear from his *kalām* works, notably his *Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʿid*, were shared by his contemporary Mitham b. Mitham al-Baḥrānī (d. 699/1300) and fully developed by his student al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī in his numerous theological works.

A number of important developments had occurred in Islamic thought during the centuries immediately preceding this last Imamite Muʿtazilite school which had a major impact upon their theology.

In the realm of Muʿtazilism, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) who was a student of the Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār had developed independent theological views which set him apart from the school of Abū Hāshim. Despite much criticism by the Bahshamiyya and later heresiographers that he introduced philosophy under the cover of *kalām*, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's views were very successful to such an extent that his school could establish itself side by side with the Bahshamiyya. Eventually, his views survived longer than the teachings of the Bahshamiyya since they were adopted by some of the Zaydī Muʿtazilites and, as will be seen later, to a much larger extent by the Imamite Muʿtazilites.

The sources for the reconstruction of the theological views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, whose entire *kalām* works are lost, are the writings of the later follower of his school Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), the shorter *Kitāb al-fāʿiq fī uṣūl al-dīn* and the more extensive *Kitāb al-muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* which is only partly extant. A further valuable source is the *Kitāb al-kāmil fī l-istiḳṣāʾ fīmā balaghānā min kalām al-quḍamā* by Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī (or: al-Baḥrānī) al-ʿAjālī about whom no further biographical data are known. This work which highlights the differences between the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was written between 535/1141 and 675/1276-7.

Another development was the growing fascination among the different theologians with the philosophical thought of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). Although the theologians traditionally opposed all those philosophical principles which disagreed with their theological views, they tended

nevertheless to adopt more and more the philosophical terminology and even elements of the philosophical teachings as long as they could possibly be brought into agreement with their theological principles.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who seems to have studied with the Christian Abū ʿAlī b. al-Samḥ philosophy and sciences was considered by later writers like al-Shahrastānī and Ibn al-Qifṭī to have been deeply influenced by the concept of the philosophers although this view is disputed among modern scholars and certainly requires further investigation.

The influence of the philosophical tradition can easily be found in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) who is famous for having fully developed what had been initiated by his predecessor al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and what Ibn Khaldūn called the "method of the moderns" (*tarīq al-mutaʿakkhkhirīn*) in Ashʿarite *kalām* through freely mixing philosophical and theological concepts and terminology. However, despite this adoption of elements of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī usually displays a highly critical attitude towards basic philosophical doctrines holding on to the traditional Ashʿarite views. An exception is his *Kitāb al-mabāḥiṭh al-mashriqiyya* which he wrote in his youth and in which he usually follows the philosophical views of his teacher Abū Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 560/1152).

A further peculiarity of the theology of al-Rāzī is that he often adopts the theological concepts of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī whereby he modifies and interprets them in such a way that they support the Ashʿarite rather than the Muʿtazilite point of view.

The reason for this was that al-Rāzī at a relatively early stage of his life had spent some time in Khuwārazm which was the last remaining center of Muʿtazilism at his time where he engaged in theological discussions with Muʿtazilites, apparently with the explicit purpose of "converting" the Muʿtazilites to Ashʿarism. Since it is known that the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī together with the Bahshamiyya was well-represented at al-Rāzī's time in Khuwārazm, al-Rāzī became on this occasion thoroughly acquainted with the doctrines of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

These developments had a major impact upon the theology of the Shiʿite theologians in the time of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. They almost completely adopted the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in theological questions. On the other hand, however, they often substituted philosophical terminology as used by al-Rāzī for the traditional Muʿtazilite terminology in their theological writings. To a varying extent, they deviated also from the positions of the earlier Muʿtazilites when they adopted philosophical positions. The peak of this development was Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who appeared in his various philosophical works as a consistent defender of Ibn Sinā's philosophy and who substituted in his

theological work *Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʿid* philosophy for the theological views where this did not interfere with theology, i.e. in the realm of physics and what is usually called the "subtleties of kalām" (*laṭāʿif al-kalām*).

Al-Hillī's writings are well suited for studying the theological views of the Shi'ite Mu'tazilites in this period since he wrote a large number of theological works the majority of which is extant. This does not apply to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī whose main importance as a writer lies in his philosophical and Isma'ili works rather than in his theological works and equally not to al-Baḥrānī whose only extant theological work is the concise *Kitāb al-Qawāʿid fī ʿilm al-kalām*.

Among al-Hillī's works on theology the most extensive one is the *Kitāb Nihāyat al-Marām fī ʿilm al-kalām* of which only very few manuscripts exist and which was apparently not often available to later scholars. Even the famous commentator of al-Hillī, al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), apparently had no copy. Other important works of al-Hillī which he wrote at a very early stage of his scholarly career are especially his *Kitāb Manāḥij al-Yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* which was completed in 680/1281-2 and his *Maʿārij al-fahm fī sharḥ nuzūm al-barāhin* which was compiled apparently even before the *Manāḥij*. At a later stage of his life, he wrote the shorter works *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* which was completed in 699/1299-1300 and the *Kitāb Taslīk al-Nafs ilā ḥaḍirat al-quds* which was completed in 704/1304-5. While al-Hillī often refrains in the *Kitāb Taslīk al-Nafs* from indicating his own position restricting himself to the presentation of the views of the different parties, he usually expresses his own view explicitly in his *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn*. During his stay at the court of the Ilkhan Uljaytu, which lasted roughly from 709/1309-10 until 714/1314-5 or even 716/1316-7, al-Hillī wrote upon the request of Uljaytu a number of polemical works especially against the Ash'arites. The most famous among these are the *Kitāb Nahj al-Ḥaqq wa-Kashf al-Ṣidq* and the *Kitāb Minhāj al-Karāma fī l-Imāma*. These later works are in general not very helpful for the reconstruction of al-Hillī's theological views since his main concern in these works is with polemics rather than with the elaboration of his own position.

Al-Hillī was fully acquainted with the above mentioned developments in Islamic thought which influenced his theology to a large extent. During his youth which he spent in al-Hilla he was introduced to the earlier Shi'ite kalām literature by his father Sadīd al-Dīn and the brothers Jamāl al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs (d. 73/1274) and Raḍī al-Dīn b. al-Ṭāwūs (d. 664/1266). At the latest during his stay at the Maragha observatory which was founded by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in 657/1258-9 during the reign of the

Ilkhan Hūlakū, al-Ḥillī became acquainted with the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Al-Ḥillī wrote a commentary after Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's death on the latter's *Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʿid* which is influenced to a large extent by the doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Presumably, he met also Mitham b. Mitham al-Baḥrānī at the Maragha observatory who also usually preferred the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in his theological work *Kitāb al-Qawāʿid fī ʿilm al-kalām*.

Especially from his *kalām* work *Manāḥij al-Yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* it is evident that al-Ḥillī must have had copies of Ibn al-Malāḥimi's *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq* and Taqī al-Dīn's *Kitāb al-Kāmil* since it is almost certain that he quotes from both works.

Al-Ḥillī was furthermore acquainted with the theological and philosophical works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī which he studied with his teacher al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1276) whom he likewise met at Maragha.

During his stay at Maragha al-Ḥillī received moreover his philosophical education under the supervision of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī with whom he studied mainly the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ* of Ibn Sīnā and al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī who introduced him to the works of Athīr al-Dīn Mufaḍḍal b. ʿUmar al-Abḥārī (d.663/1264) and Muḥ. b. Nāmawār b. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Khūnjī (d.646/1247). On two of al-Kātibī's works, the *Risāla al-shamsiyya* and the *Ḥikmat al-ʿayn*, al-Ḥillī wrote commentaries.

He was probably at least to some extent acquainted with the mysticism of Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) through his teacher Shams al-Dīn Muḥ. b. Muḥ. b. Aḥmad al-Kīshī (d. 695/1295-6) who was well-acquainted with the works of Ibn al-ʿArabī and who was a Sufī himself and with the doctrine of illumination of al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191). Later authors attributed to al-Ḥillī a work entitled *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* by which the *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* by al-Suhrawardī presumably is meant. However, al-Ḥillī does not mention such a work in his own two lists of his works, one in his *rijāl* work *Kitāb Khulāṣat al-Aqwāl*, written in 693/1293-4, and the second in an *Ijāza* which he issued to his student Muhannā b. Sinān in 702/1302-3. However, there are no indications that he incorporated any of the concepts or terminology of either Ibn al-ʿArabī or al-Suhrawardī in his theological works. This development took place only two centuries later with Ibn Abī al-Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 904/1499) who attempted a synthesis of the different currents.

### 3.2

Al-Ḥillī follows in his views on theological matters usually the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Exceptions are all those doctrines with regard to which the Shiʿites disagreed traditionally with the Muʿtazilites and in regard to which al-Ḥillī follows without exception the Shiʿite tradition.

In contrast to the followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, notably Ibn al-Malāḥimī and also Taqī al-Dīn, al-Ḥillī employs frequently philosophical terminology instead of the traditional *kalām* terminology which was usually also employed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. However, this usually does not lead to disagreements in content between al-Ḥillī and the earlier followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

In the following some examples will be given which will demonstrate the main theological issues in regard to which al-Ḥillī and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed with the Bahshamiyya. It will further be demonstrated in which way al-Ḥillī incorporated philosophical terminology and concepts into the discussion.

One of the chief points on which al-Ḥillī, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, disagreed with the Bahshamiyya is the rejection of the notion of states (*ḥāl*, pl. *aḥwāl*) which was introduced by Abū Ḥāshim in order to conceptualize among other things the nature of the divine attributes. According to Abū Ḥāshim essences (*dhāt*, pl. *dhawāt*) do not differ from another because of themselves but rather because of the attribute of essence (*ṣifa dhātiyya/ ṣifat al-dhāt*) which is necessarily attached to the essence. The same applies to God. God is God because of His attribute of essence. The attribute of essence entails necessarily a number of essential attributes (*ṣifāt muqtaḍāt ʿan al-dhāt*) as soon as the essence comes into existence. In the specific case of God, who is eternal, these essential attributes are His being knowing, powerful, existing and living.

Al-Ḥillī, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, disagreed. Essences differ because of themselves and do not require any further attribute of essence. God's essence is thus by itself a distinctive essence (*dhāt mutamayyiza*) which differs as such from all other essences. His being knowing, powerful, existing and living are consequently defined by al-Ḥillī as qualifications of God's distinctive essence by virtue of which He knows and is powerful etc. but not as states. Accordingly, al-Ḥillī rejected Abū Ḥāshim's definition of God's being living as a state because of which it is possible for Him to know and to be powerful. He rather maintained that to be living means that it is not impossible for the living to be knowing and powerful. As for God's being existent, al-Ḥillī similarly rejected Abū Ḥāshim's position that this is an essential attribute which is

different from God's essence and maintained rather that God's existence is identical with His essence.

Al-Ḥillī, following again the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, adopted, however, Abū Hāshim's answer to the question of how one knows God's attributes. Attributes are known by the distinguishing characteristic (*ḥukm*, pl. *aḥkām*) which they bring forth. The capability to perform a well-wrought act, for instance, is the distinguishing characteristic of a knowing agent. However, in al-Ḥillī's view the distinguishing characteristic in regard to God points to a matter additional to His essence which exists only in man's imagination but which is in reality nothing but God's distinctive essence. In Abū Hāshim's view, the distinguishing characteristic points to a state (*ḥāl*) of God.

In regard to the attribute of God's being willing al-Ḥillī similarly prefers the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Both theologians rejected the position of the Bahshamiyya according to which God's being willing is a state which is entailed through an entitative determinant (*maḥnā*) which does not subsist in a substrate. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and al-Ḥillī maintained rather that God can only insofar be said to be willing as He acts for a motive (*dāʿi*). When God knows that a certain act contains more benefit than harm, this knowledge is the motive which induces Him to act. There cannot be ascribed to God a will (*irāda*) in addition to His motive.

The question of man's will (*irāda*) provides an example of how al-Ḥillī followed in content the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī while he substituted philosophical terminology for the traditional *kalām* terminology.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that in the case of man will (*irāda*) is not identical with the motive. Rather, when man develops the motive for a certain act, he generates in addition to the motive a longing (*ṭalab/muṭālaba*) for this act. This longing is his will. Al-Ḥillī expresses the same position whereby he employs the philosophical term of inclination (*mayl*) rather than longing (*ṭalab*). With this, al-Ḥillī follows clearly the position of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who employed exactly the same terms in order to describe man's will.

Another illustrative example in which al-Ḥillī follows the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī but in regard to which he substitutes philosophical terminology for the *kalām* terminology concerns the question of God's knowledge about things prior to their existence. This question which was discussed already among the earliest theologians arose from the problem how God can be said to know a thing (*shay*) in the state of its nonexistence while *shay* is by definition something which exists.



The position of the school of Abū Hāshim was that God's knowledge is always connected with the existence of the things, regardless if they already exist at a specific moment or not. I.e., prior to their existence God knows that they will exist in the future, after their occurrence He knows that they exist now, and after they have passed into nonexistence He knows that they existed in the past. The main purpose of this solution was to avoid any change in God's essential attribute of being knowing.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed. Although he affirmed that God is eternally knowing and that God knows everything perfectly in its reality and how it will be when it will exist, he maintained that once a thing occurs, the relation (*taḥalluq*) between God's knowledge and the existence of the thing is initiated. Since this initiation was restricted to the relation between the divine knowledge and its object, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī could defend his view against the allegation that he allowed change in God's essential attribute of knowledge. Al-Ḥillī adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's view but substituted the philosophical term *iḍāfa* for the term *taḥalluq* as it was used by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Al-Ḥillī is moreover not only concerned, as it was the case with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, with the initiation of the relation between God's knowledge and its object at the moment of its occurrence, but deals rather with every change which occurs to things. He maintains that every modification of a thing effects a corresponding change in the relation between God's knowledge and its object. The reason for this broader approach in the discussion is that al-Ḥillī's main concern in this question is the rejection of the position of those philosophers who restricted God's knowledge to universal matters to the exclusion of the particulars. With the help of this assumption, al-Ḥillī attempts to refute their position.

In the realm of divine justice, al-Ḥillī followed similarly in most points the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

One of the views for which Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was famous, mainly because of the distortion of his view in the presentation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, was the high importance he ascribed to the motive (*dāʿi*) in the process of the occurrence of an act. Capability without a motive attached to it is insufficient for the occurrence of an act. If a motive exists, however, the act necessarily takes place. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed here with the view of the Bahshamiyya who held that capability as such is sufficient to bring forth an act. To this category of acts which occur without a motive belonged in their view e.g. unconscious acts like the movement or the speech of a sleeper. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that even such acts must have a motive even though the agent may not be fully aware of it.

According to al-Rāzī, the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī is equivalent to determinism (*jabr*). He supported this judgement by two arguments. First, he rejected the terminology used by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers that with the occurrence of a motive the act is more likely to occur (*awlā bi l-wuqūʿ*). Al-Rāzī employs rather the philosophical terminology of contingency and argues that an act is a contingent matter which becomes necessary (*wājib*) when its cause occurs. This is the case, according to al-Rāzī, when capability and motive for the act come together. Al-Rāzī's main argument, however, is that he maintained that the motive for an act is not generated by man but rather created by God. On the basis of these two assumptions he concluded that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's view supported in fact his own view, i.e. that man's acts are subject to determinism (*jabr*).

Al-Ḥilli followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in content, but employed the philosophical terminology as introduced by al-Rāzī in this discussion. Capability alone is insufficient to effect an act. When capability and motive come together, the act must necessarily occur. This definition rests like in the case of al-Rāzī on the assumption that an act is a contingent matter in the philosophical sense. However, al-Ḥilli holds firm to the Muʿtazilite position of man's free choice in his acts when he outrightly rejects al-Rāzī's second argument that the motive for the act is created by God. He rather adheres to the traditional Muʿtazilite position that the motive for an act is generated by man only.

In regard to the question of God's obligation to act in man's best interest al-Ḥilli similarly agrees fully with the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who took a position between the school of Baghdad who maintained that God is obliged to act for man's best interest in worldly and religious matters and between the school of Basra who restricted this obligation to religious matters.

The same applies to the question of pain which is inflicted by God and the due compensation which God is obliged to render subsequently in regard to which the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī disagreed with the Bahshamiyya concerning a number of minor aspects. Al-Ḥilli follows with regard to these usually the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

Other points with regard to which al-Ḥilli followed the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī are his rejection of the view of the Bahshamiyya that a thing can be asserted to be a thing in the state of its nonexistence. The assumption underlying the position of the Bahshamiyya was that the attribute of essence of a thing is prior to its existence. Since

al-Ḥillī, as already mentioned, rejected the concept of the attribute of essence, he maintained that a thing can be asserted as a thing only when it becomes existent.

Following this view, al-Ḥillī agreed moreover with the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī that God does not let the human bodies pass away into nonexistence prior to their restoration (*iʿāda*) at the Day of Judgement although He is able to do so. Since nonexistence is equivalent with the vanishing of the essences themselves it would be impossible to restore the individual essences for a second time. This, however, is necessary for all those who are entitled to reward or compensation or who deserve punishment in the Hereafter.

Al-Ḥillī agreed moreover with the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī when he categorically rejected the view of the Bahshamiyya that certain attributes are entailed by an entitative determinant (*maʿnā*, pl. *maʿānī*). While the Bahshamiyya defined for instance *kawn* as an entitative determinant which necessitates the atom's being in a particular position, al-Ḥillī maintained that *kawn* is the occurrence of the atom itself in a particular position. The same difference applies to the variants of *kawn* which are motion, rest, contiguity (*ijtimāʿ*) and separation (*iftirāq*). Other examples in regard to which the Bahshamiyya employed the concept of the entitative determinant are the attributes of life and power of a living being which are entailed by a determinant which subsists in some parts of the body and which entails a state of the total composite and of the specific part of the body in which the determinants subsist. Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, defined a being's being living and powerful simply as the distinctive structure (*binyā makhṣūṣa*) of the being which is as such living and powerful without any need for a determinant.

In the realm of physics, al-Ḥillī and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī rejected the view of Abū Hāshim and his followers that an accident might not subsist in a substrate (*lā fī maḥall*). The Bahshamiyya who affirmed this possibility enumerated among the accidents which belong to this category God's will (*irāda*) and hate (*karāha*) and the accident of passing away (*fanāʾ*) which entails the annihilation of all bodies and which itself is not enduring. Moreover, al-Ḥillī and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī denied the possibility that an accident may subsist in two substrates. This possibility was asserted by the Bahshamiyya for the accident of composition (*taʿrif*) which subsists in two substrates with the result that these two substrates turn out to be like one substrate.

## 3.3

Having described al-Ḥilli's theological positions in some detail, some remarks will now follow about the degree to which he was influenced by the philosophical tradition in his theological works which led to disagreement between him and the earlier Muʿtazilites.

Before going into detail, it should be pointed out that al-Ḥilli was not only well-trained in philosophy but he also wrote himself a number of philosophical works. Unfortunately, only four of his philosophical writings are partly extant. His *Kitāb al-asrār al-khaṣṣiyya* which he wrote among his first works was completed in 690/1291. His *Kitāb idāḥ al-maqāsid*, completed in 694/1294-5, which belongs likewise to the early period of his activities as an author is a commentary on al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī's *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-ʿAyn*. From among his later philosophical works, only a small portion of his *Kitāb Kashf al-Khaṣā min Kitāb al-Shifāʿ* is extant which he completed in 717/1317-8. Another philosophical work which is extant is his *Kitāb Marāsid al-Tadqīq wa-Maqāsid al-Taḥqīq*. In addition to these works, we have the titles of about ten more works which al-Ḥilli wrote on philosophy. As far as the titles indicate, the majority of them is concerned with the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā, especially the *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbihāt* about which al-Ḥilli appears to have written a number of commentaries and supercommentaries. He further appears to have written commentaries on the *Kitāb al-Tahwīḥāt* of al-Suhrawardī and the *Kitāb al-Mulakhkhaṣ* of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. From his extant works, especially his *Kitāb al-Asrār al-khaṣṣiyya*, one gets the impression that al-Ḥilli's general attitude towards the positions of the philosophers was very critical whenever their views disagreed with al-Ḥilli's theological views. However, since so few of his philosophical works are extant, this impression may not be representative for his general attitude during his later life.

As for the question to which extent he adopted philosophical concepts in his theological works, the following selected examples which are not meant to cover all aspects in which al-Ḥilli chose philosophical positions will be based mainly in his early work *Kitāb Manāḥij al-Yaqīn* and his relatively late work *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn*.

Al-Ḥilli substituted the philosophical subdivision of existent matters into necessary (*wājib*), contingent (*mumkin*) and impossible (*mumtanaʿ*) for the theological one which distinguishes between eternal (*qadīm*) and created in time (*ḥādīth*). God is for him thus the necessarily existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) who is as such necessary by himself (*wājib li-dhātihi*) while everything other than God is contingent by itself (*mumkin li-dhātihi*) and necessary or impossible because of something else (*wājib*

*li-ghayrihi/ mumtana<sup>c</sup> li-ghayrihi*). This leads him to disagree with the earlier Mu'tazilites in regard to a number of points. The school of Basra maintained that a body requires an effector only for its occurrence (*hudūth*). Once it has gained existence, this body will continue to exist without requiring any longer its effector. Al-Hillī disagreed. Since a body like anything else other than God is by itself contingent and necessary through a cause other than it, the occurrence of the body does not modify the body's basic characteristic of being in itself contingent. Therefore, the continuing existence of the body which is defined as a state of the body being necessary by something other than itself, i.e. its effector, requires an effector in the same way as the initial occurrence did.

Moreover, the theologians usually denied that an agent, including God, may annihilate anything. Power, in their view, is by definition only related to the production (*ijād*) of something. The annihilation of something can therefore be achieved only by way of producing the opposite of a thing because of which the thing in question consequently passes away into nonexistence. Al-Hillī denies this limitation of power. Since existence and nonexistence are equally related to a contingent matter, a powerful agent may to the same degree either cause the existence or the nonexistence of a thing.

With the adoption of the philosophical differentiation between existence of a matter as a picture in the intellect (*wujūd dhihni*) which is not linked to its existence in reality and the actual occurrence of the thing in the external world (*wujūd khārijī*), al-Hillī was able to avoid the long dispute among the theologians how it is possible to speak about something nonexistent.

Al-Hillī adopts further Ibn Sīnā's understanding of essence (*māhiyya*) and existence (*wujūd*). With regard to God, al-Hillī maintains that essence and existence are identical. In regard to anything other than God, al-Hillī considers essences as concepts which are neither existent nor nonexistent. When existence is attached to them, samples of essences occur in the external world.

In contrast to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's usage in his *Tajrid al-Aqā'id*, al-Hillī does not adopt the philosophical concept of *jawhar* as substance which exists in no subject (*mawjūd lā fī mawḍū<sup>c</sup>*) and accidents (*ʿaraḍ*, pl. *aʿrāḍ*) which exist in a subject (*mawjūd fī mawḍū<sup>c</sup>*). Rather, he defined *jawhar* in the traditional theological way as an atom which occupies space (*mutaḥayyiz*) and which cannot be divided and he defined an accident accordingly as that which inheres in something that occupies space (*ḥall fī-l-mutaḥayyiz*). Among the accidents, he enumerates those which were traditionally accepted by the theologians excluding the

passing away (*fanāʿ*) and composition (*taʿjīf*) for the above mentioned reasons.

However, despite this traditional theological approach, there are a number of details in al-Ḥillī's views about atoms and accidents where he was nevertheless influenced by the views of the philosophers. This shall be demonstrated with the help of some examples.

Al-Ḥillī allows for instance that an accident may subsist in an accident (*qiyām al-ʿaraḍ bi-l-ʿaraḍ*) which was unanimously rejected by all theologians with the exception of the early Muʿtazilite Muḥammad b. ʿAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830), but which was generally accepted among the philosophers. In order to support this view, al-Ḥillī refers to the example which was usually offered by the philosophers. Speed (*surʿa*) and slowness (*buṭūʿ*) are accidents which subsist in motion which is similarly an accident. Having accepted this principle, al-Ḥillī is able to define a letter (*ḥarf*) similarly to the philosophers as an accident which subsists in the accident voice (*ṣawt*) while the earlier theologians defined a letter usually as a kind (*jins*) or part (*juzʿ*) of the voice.

As for the attribute of colour (*lawn*), al-Ḥillī does not follow the view of the Bahshamiyya that there are five simple pure kinds of colours, namely black, white, red, green and yellow, but he follows in his *Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn* the position of the bulk of the philosophers that the only real pure colours are white and black while all other colours occur because of different mixtures of these two colours. In his *Kitāb Manāḥij al-Yaqīn* al-Ḥillī refrains from taking a position about this question.

#### 4.

It seems, therefore, that al-Ḥillī's main importance in his theological writings lies in the development of the "method of the moderns" which had been introduced into Shiʿite theology by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. For the fusion of the philosophical and the theological system which reached its peak two centuries later with the work of Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʿī, it seems that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was of far greater importance since he went much further than al-Ḥillī in his adoption of the philosophical system in his theological works. It is moreover evident that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's philosophical works were much more widely read by later scholars than the philosophical writings of al-Ḥillī, most of which are lost and only one of which has been edited so far. Al-Ḥillī's theological works were in contrast considered by later scholars as authoritative theological works.

## Alphabetical List of al-Ḥillī's Works

(1) *al-Abḥāth al-mufīda fī taḥṣīl al-ʿaqqāda* (theology)

Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(2) *Itḥbāt al-raǧʿa*

A manuscript is known to be extant.

(3) *al-Ijāza li-ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ al-Gharawī*

No manuscript known.

(4) *al-Ijāza li-Taǧī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-ʿAmulī*

No manuscript known.

(5) *al-Ijāza li-Tāǧ al-Dīn Ḥasan b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan*

*al-Sirābshanawī al-Kāshānī*

No manuscript known.

(6) *al-Ijāza li-Tāǧ al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Mawlā Zayn al-Dīn*

*Muḥammad b. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Rāzī*

Editions: Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār*.

Edited by Jawād al-ʿAlawī et al. Tehran: al-Maktaba al-islamiyya, 107:142.

(7) *Ijāza thāniya li-Najm al-Dīn Muhannaʿ b. Sinān b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*

*al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī*

Editions: in al-Majlisī, *Biḥār*, 107:147-149;

in Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Ajwibat al-masāʾil al-muhannaʿiyya*,

Qum: al-Khayyam, 1401H., 155-157

(8) *al-Ijāza li-Jamāl al-Dīn Abī al-Futūḥ Aḥmad b. al-Shaykh Abī ʿAbd Allah*

*Balkū b. Abī Ṭālib b. ʿAlī al-ʿAwī*

Editions: in Ḥ. ʿA. Maḥfūz, "Nafāʾis al-makḥḥūtāt fī Irān", 19-20.

(9) *al-Ijāza li-Rashīd al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Rashīd al-ʿAwī*

No manuscript known.

(10) *al-Ijāza li-Sirāǧ al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Bahāʿ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī al-Majd*

*al-Sirābshanawī*

No manuscript known.

(11) *al-Ijāza li-Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī*

*al-Ḥusaynī al-Tūsī*

Editions: in Muḥammad Muḥsin Āghā Buzurg al-Tihirānī, *Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shiʿa*

Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 5:58-9

(12) *al-Ijāza li-Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad Ḥārūn b. Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. al-Amīr*

*Shams al-Dīn ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī*

No manuscript known.

(13) *al-Ijāza li-ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Yahyā al-Astarābādī*

No manuscript known.

(14) *al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Banī Zuhra*

Editions: in al-Majlisī, *Biḥār*, 107:60-137.

- (15) *al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Najm al-Dīn Muhanna*<sup>2</sup> b. *Sinān* b. *ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī*  
Editions: in *al-Majlisī, Biḥār*, 107:143-146;  
*al-Ḥilli, Ajwiba*, 114-117.
- (16) *al-Ijāza li-Muḥammad* b. *Ismāʿīl* b. *al-Ḥusayn* b. *al-Ḥasan* b. *ʿAlī al-Harqalī*  
No manuscript known.
- (17) *al-Ijāza li-Maḥmūd* b. *Muḥammad* b. *Yār*  
No manuscript known.
- (18) *al-Ijāza li-Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad* b. *Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Buwayhī*  
Editions: *al-Majlisī, Biḥār*, 107:138-141.
- (19) *Ajwibat masāʾil Ibn Zuhra*  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (20) *Ajwibat al-masāʾil al-fiqhiyya*  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (21) *Ajwibat al-masāʾil al-muhannaʿiyya*  
(a collection of answers on a variety of topics)  
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (22) *al-Adʿiyya al-fākhira al-manqūla ʿan al-ʿImma al-tāhira*  
No manuscript known.
- (23) *Arba ʿin masʾala fī uṣūl al-dīn* (theology)  
A manuscript is known to be extant.
- (24) *Irshād al-adhhān fī aḥkām al-īmān* (law)  
Editions: together with *al-Ardabili's Majmūʿat al-fāʿida wa-l-burhān*.  
Qum, 1403/4H.
- (25) *Istiqṣāʾ al-iʿtibār fī taḥqīq maʿānī al-akhbār*  
(also: *Istiqṣāʾ al-iʿtibār fī taḥrīr maʿānī al-akhbār*) (traditions)  
No manuscript known.
- (26) *Istiqṣāʾ al-naẓar fī l-baṭh ʿan al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar* (theology)  
Editions: edited by *ʿAlī al-Khāqānī al-Najafī*. Najaf, 1354/1935.
- (27) *al-Asrār al-khaṣiyya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya* (philosophy)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (28) *al-Ishārāt ilā maʿānī al-ishārāt* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (29) *al-Alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-ṣidq wa-l-mayn* (theology)  
Editions: edited by *Ḥusayn al-ʿAṣlamī*. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-ʿAṣlamī, 1402/1982.
- (30) *Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt* (theology)  
Editions: edited by *Muḥammad Zanjānī*. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no.543.  
Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1338H.



- (31) *Idāh al-ishtibāh fī asmāʾ al-ruwāt* (biographic work)  
Editions: Tehran, 1318H.
- (32) *Idāh al-talbīs fī kalām al-raʾīs* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (33) *Idāh mukhālafat al-sunna* (traditions)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (34) *Idāh al-muʿdilat min sharḥ al-ishārāt* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (35) *Idāh al-maqāsid fī sharḥ ḥikmat ʿayn al-qawāʿid* (philosophy)  
Editions: edited by ʿA. Munzawī. Tehran, 1378/1959.
- (36) *al-Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar fīmā yajib ʿalā ʿammāt al-mukallaḥin min maʿrifat uṣūl al-dīn* (being the 11th chapter of no. 110) (theology)  
Editions: together with the commentaries *al-Nāfiʿ yawm al-ḥaṣhr* by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī and *Miftāḥ al-Bāb* by Abū l-Faṭḥ b. Makhdūm al-Ḥusaynī.  
Edited by Mahdī Muḥaqqiq. Wisdom of Persia, no. 38. Tehran 1365/1986.  
Translations: English: *al-Bāb 'l-Ḥādī ʿAshar. A Treatise on the Principles of Shiʿite Theology*. Translated by W.M. Miller.  
London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1928.
- (37) *Baṣṭ al-ishārāt* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (38) *Baṣṭ al-kāfiya* (grammar)  
No manuscript known.
- (39) *Tabṣirat al-mutaʿallimīn fī aḥkām al-dīn* (law)  
Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 1372H.
- (40) *Taḥrīr al-abḥāṡh fī maʿrifat al-ʿulūm al-thalātha* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (41) *Taḥrīr al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya ʿalā madhhab al-imāmiyya* (law)  
Editions: Tehran, 1314/1896
- (42) *Taḥṣīl al-mulakhkhaṡ* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (43) *Tadhkirat al-fuqahāʾ ʿalā talkhiṡ fatāwī al-ʿulamāʾ* (law)  
Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Murtaḍawiyya, Tehran 1984  
(repr. of the 1388/1968 edn.)
- (44) *Taslik al-adhhān ilā aḥkām al-īmān* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (45) *Taslik al-aḥkām fī maʿrifat al-aḥkām* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (46) *Taslik al-nafs ilā ḥaṡirat al-quḍs* (theology)

Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

- (47) *al-Taʿlīm al-thānī* (also: *al-Taʿlīm al-tāmm*) (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (48) *Talkhīṣ al-marām fī maʿrifat al-aḥkām* (law)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (49) *al-Tanāsub bayn al-Ashʿariyya wa-l-firaq al-sūfiyya* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (50) *Tanqīḥ al-abḥāṡ fī l-ʿulūm al-thalāṡha* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (51) *Tanqīḥ qawāʿid al-dīn al-maʿkhūdhā ʿan al-ʿimma al-fāhirīn*  
(also: *Tanqīḥ qawāʿid al-dīn al-maʿkhūdhā ʿan Āl Yāsīn* and  
*Tanqīḥ al-qawāʿid al-maʿkhūdhā ʿan kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīṡ al-ṣiḥāḥ wa-l-ḥisān*) (traditions)  
No manuscript known.
- (52) *Tahdhīb al-naḡṣ fī maʿrifat al-madhāhib al-khamsa* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (53) *Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* (legal methodology)  
Editions: edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn al-Baqqāl.  
Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1970.
- (54) *Jawāb al-suʿāl ʿan ḥikmat al-naskh fī l-aḥkām al-ilāhiyya* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (55) *Jawāhir al-maṭalib fī faḍāʾil Amīr al-muʾminīn ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib*  
(on the virtues of the Imam ʿAlī)  
No manuscript known.
- (56) *al-Jawhar al-naḡīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd* (logic)  
Editions: edited by Muḥsin Baydār. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Baydār, 1363sh.
- (57) *Ḥāshiyat talkhīṣ al-aḥkām* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (58) *Ḥall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḡāt* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (59) *Khulāṣat al-aḡwāl fī maʿrifat al-rijāl* (biographic work)  
Editions: edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿulūm. Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1972.
- (60) *al-Khulāṣa fī uṣūl al-dīn* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (61) *al-Durr al-maknūn fī sharḥ al-qānūn* (grammar)  
No manuscript known.

- (62) *al-Durr al-maknūn fī ʿilm al-qānūn* (logic)  
No manuscript known
- (63) *al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāḥ wa-l-ḥisān* (traditions)  
No manuscript known.
- (64) *al-Risāla al-saʿdiyya* (theology)  
Editions: in *Kalimāt al-muḥaqqiqīn* (Tehran, 1315/1898), 338-379.
- (65) *Risāla fī adab al-baḥṭh al-mukhtaṣar*  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (66) *Risāla fī buḥlān al-jabr* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (67) *Risāla fī taḥqīq maʿnā al-īmān* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (68) *Risāla fī khalq al-aʿmāl* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (69) *Risāla fī suʿālāyīn saʿāla ʿanhumā al-Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn* (theology)  
Editions: in *Farhang-i irānzamīn* 19 (1952):106-117.
- (70) *Risāla fī l-mawārīth* (legal treatise)  
A manuscript is known to be extant.
- (71) *Risāla fī wājib al-iʿtiqād ʿalā jamīʿ al-ʿibād* (theology)  
Editions: together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's *ʿImād fī sharḥ wājib al-iʿtiqād*, in *Kalimāt al-muḥaqqiqīn* (Tehran, 1315/1897), 380-422.
- (72) *Risāla fī wājibāt al-ḥajj wa-arkānihi min dūn dhikr al-adʿiya wa-l-mustaḥabbāt* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (73) *Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (mysticism)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (74) *al-Risāla al-ʿizzīyya*  
No manuscript known.
- (75) *Ghāyat al-iḥkām fī taṣḥīḥ talkhīṣ al-marām* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (76) *Ghāyat al-wuṣūl wa-īdāḥ al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtaṣar muntahā al-suʿāl wa-l-amāl* (legal methodology)  
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (77) *Qawāʿid al-aḥkām fī maʿrifat al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām* (law)  
Editions: Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn.)
- (78) *al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyya fī sharḥ al-risāla al-shamsiyya* (logic)  
Editions: Edited by Fāris al-Ḥassūn (forthcoming)  
(see *Turāthunā*, 17 (1409):243-4).

- (79) *Qawā'id wa-maqāsid fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ṭabī'ī wa-l-ilāhī* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (80) *al-Qawl al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-ʿazīz*  
(also: *al-Sirr al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-ʿazīz*) (exegesis)  
No manuscript known.
- (81) *Kāshif al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār*  
(also: *Kashf al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār*) (logic)  
No manuscript known.
- (82) *Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-raʿīs*  
(also: *Kashf al-talbīs fī bayān sayr al-raʿīs*) (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (83) *Kashf al-khafāʾ min kitāb al-shifāʾ* (philosophy)  
A manuscript is known to be extant.
- (84) *Kashf al-fawā'id ʿalā iḍāḥ mā ishtamalat ʿalayhi al-risāla al-mawsūma bi-qawā'id al-ʿaqa'id* (theology)  
Editions: in *Majmūʿat rasā'il* (Tehran: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʿuẓmā al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1404H.), 2-97
- (85) *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-iʿiqād* (theology)  
Editions: Saida: Maṭbaʿat al-ʿirfān 1353/1934;  
Qum: al-Maktaba al-Mustawfiyya, n.d.
- (86) *Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (87) *Kashf al-maqāl fī maʿrifat al-rijāl* (biographic work)  
No manuscript known.
- (88) *Kashf al-maknūn min kitāb al-qānūn* (grammar)  
No manuscript known.
- (89) *Kashf al-yaqīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn*  
(on the virtues of the Imam ʿAlī)  
Editions: Najaf n.d.
- (90) *Lubb al-ḥikma* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (91) *al-Mabāḥiṭh: arbaʿūn masʿala fī uṣūl al-dīn* (theology)  
A manuscript is known to be extant.
- (92) *al-Mabāḥiṭh al-saniyya wa-l-muʿaraḍāt al-naṣiriyya* (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (93) *Mabādiʾ al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* (legal methodology)  
Editions: edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Baqqāl.  
Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1390/1970.

- (94) *Muḥakamāt bayn shurrah al-ishārāt* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (95) *Mukhtaṣar sharḥ nahj al-balāgha* (also: *Mukhtaṣar nahj al-balāgha*)  
A manuscript is known to be extant.
- (96) *Mukhtalaf al-shīʿa fī aḥkām al-sharīʿa* (law)  
Editions: Tehran, 1322-24/1905-6
- (97) *Madārik al-aḥkām* (law)  
No manuscript known.
- (98) *Marāṣid al-tadqīq wa-maqāṣid al-taḥqīq* (philosophy)  
A manuscript is known to be extant.
- (99) *Maṣābiḥ al-anwār* (traditions)  
No manuscript known.
- (100) *al-Maṭālib al-ʿaliyya fī maʿrifat al-ʿarabiyya*  
(also: *al-Maṭālib al-ʿaliyya fī ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya*) (grammar)  
No manuscript known.
- (101) *Maʿārij al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuzūm* (theology)  
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (102) *al-Maqāṣid al-wāfiya bi-fawāʿid al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiya* (grammar)  
No manuscript known.
- (103) *al-Muqaddima fī l-kalām* (theology)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (104) *Maqṣad al-wāṣilīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* (also *Muʿaqqad al-wāṣilīn*) (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (105) *al-Muqāwamāt al-ḥikmiyya* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.
- (106) *Mukātaba bayn al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī wa-l-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī* (law)  
Editions: in Muḥsin al-Amīn al-ʿĀmilī, *Aʿyān al-shīʿa*  
Damascus, 1946-1982, 24:237-9.
- (107) *Manāḥij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* (theology)  
Editions: Bombay, 1298H.
- (108) *Muntahā al-maṣṭab fī taḥqīq al-madḥḥab* (law)  
Editions: Tehran, 1333/1915.
- (109) *Muntahā al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl* (theology/ legal methodology)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (110) *Minḥāj al-ṣalāḥ fī ikhtisār al-miṣbāḥ* (law)  
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

- (111) *Minhāj fī manāsik al-ḥajj* (legal work)  
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- (112) *Minhāj al-karāma fī maʿrifat al-imāma* (theology)  
Editions: in *Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya*, by Ibn Taymiyya  
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- (113) *Minhāj al-hidāya wa-miʿrāj al-dirāya fī ʿilm al-kalām*  
(also: *Minhāj al-hidāya wa-maʿārij al-hidāya*) (theology)  
No manuscript known.
- (114) *Nuẓūm al-barāhīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* (theology)  
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (115) *al-Nukat al-badīʿa fī taḥrīr al-dharīʿa* (legal methodology)  
No manuscript known.
- (116) *Nihāyat al-iḥkām fī maʿrifat aḥkām* (law)  
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
- (117) *Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām* (theology)  
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- (118) *Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* (legal methodology)  
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- (119) *Nahj al-imān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān* (exegesis)  
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- (120) *Nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq* (theology)  
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- (124) *Nahj al-waddāḥ fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāḥ* (traditions)  
No manuscript known.
- (125) *al-Nūr al-mushriq fī ʿilm al-manṭiq* (logic)  
No manuscript known.
- (126) *Wājib wuḍūʿ wa-l-ṣalāʾ* (also: *Wājibat al-wuḍūʿ*) (law)  
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