Faculty
Earle Seminar

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

October 27, 1948

Dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

Until Professor Earle returns and we are able to give you a report on last year's seminar on the "Dynamics of Soviet Policy", you might like to see the attached mimeographed schedule of the meetings, which indicates the subject of each week's discussion and the discussion leaders. Also attached is a kind of Who's Who of the seminar--members, visiting participants, and guests.

The attached mimeographed "Studies of the Foreign Relations and Military Policies of the United States" is a report on Professor Earle's seminar prior to 1942. Appendix B of this report is a partial bibliography of the publications of the members of the seminar, many of which grew out of the seminar discussions; also Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1943) grew out of this seminar.

Sincerely yours,

Marion Hartz

Secretary

Seminar on

The Dynamics of Soviet Policy

The Institute for Advanced Study

Edward Mead Earle, Chairman

Spring Term - 1948

Wednesday, Feburary 11

Subject: The Revolutionary (Bolshevik) Content of Soviet Policy

Discussion leader: Professor E. H. Carr

Guest: Professor Felix Gilbert

Wednesday, February 18

Subject: The Revolutionary (Bolshevik) Content of Soviet Policy (continued)

Discussion leader: Professor E. H. Carr

Wednesday, February 25

Subject: The National (Russian) Content of Soviet Policy

Discussion leader: Professor Cyril E. Black

Guests: Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé, Colonel S. F. Giffin

Wednesday, March 3

Subject: The Soviet Economic System as a Reflection of Russian Policy

Discussion leaders: Dr. Alexander Gerschenkron, Professor Abram Bergson and Professor Harry Schwartz

Guest: Mr. Thomas Balogh

Wednesday, March 10

Subject: Soviet Objectives in the Near and Middle East

I. The Arab World

Discussion leaders: Professor Hans Kohn and Professor Walter Livingston Wright

Visiting participants: Professor Philip K. Hitti and Professor T. Cuyler Young

Guest: Dr. Bayard Dodge

Wednesday, March 17

Subject: Soviet Objectives in the Near and Middle East

II. Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor

Discussion leader: Professor Arnold J. Toynbee

Guests: Professors Walter Livingston Wright, T. Cuyler Young, L. V. Thomas, A. H. Lybyer, and Colonel P. M. Hamilton

Wednesday, March 24

Subject: Soviet Objectives in the Far East

Discussion leader: Professor Owen Lattimore

Visiting participants: Mr. Philip Sprouse, Professor Jean Gottmann, Colonel Henry A. Byroade, Professor David N. Rowe

Guests: Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé, Professor Marion Levy, Mr. William W. Lockwood

Wednesday, April 7

Subject: The Western Frontier of the U.S.S.R.

I. The Satellite States

Discussion leaders: Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé, Dr. Edmund Silberner, Mr. John Reshetar, Dr. Oldrich Prochazka

Visiting participant: Professor Max Beloff

Wednesday, April 14

Subject: The Western Frontier of the U.S.S.R.

II. Germany and Austria

Discussion leader: Professor Philip E. Mosely

Visiting participant: Dr. Oldrich Prochazka

Wednesday, April 21

Subject: The Autocratic Tradition in Russia

Discussion leader: Professor B. H. Sumner

Visiting participant: Professor Michael Karpovich

Guests: Dr. Oldrich Prochazka, Colonel Henry A. Byroade, Professor Jorgen Pedersen

Wednesday, April 28

Subject: Leadership and Control in the U.S.S.R.

Discussion leader: Professor Geroid T. Robinson

Visiting participant: Professor Frederick Barghoorn

Guests: Mr. Herbert Feis, Dr. James T. Lowe, Colonel Henry A. Byroade, Colonel P. M. Hamilton, Professor Jorgen Pedersen

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Dr. Oppenheimer

Just for your information.

E. M. Earle

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Princeton, New Jersey

The Institute for Advanced Study, at Princeton, New Jersey, offers to qualified French scholars for the autumn term (September 15 to December 15) of 1950 two or three fellowships in the social sciences.

The attached statement concerning the Institute for Advanced Study taken from the Bulletin for 1945-1946, describes its purposes and character. Although the Institute is not a part of Princeton University, it works in close cooperation with the University and, among other things, enjoys full use of the University Library. Members of the Princeton University faculty frequently take part in Institute seminars.

As part of its program in politics and international relations, the Institute proposes in the autumn of 1950 to hold a seminar on problems of modern France ("modern" being interpreted to mean the period since 1870). The members of this seminar will be distinguished scholars from Great Britain, France, and the United States. The basic approach to the problems of modern France will be historical, and it is probable that the great majority of the members of the seminar will be historians. Nevertheless, consideration will be given in the choice of members to those whose training has been in economics, political science, or jurisprudence.

The following outline is given as a guide to those who will be concerned with the choice of members and the award of the stipends:

Amount of stipend: The amount to be awarded in each instance will be adjusted to the special needs of the individual scholar concerned. In general, however, it will be designed to cover costs of transatlantic travel to and from the United States, all costs of living in the United States, and modest allowances for visits to other American universities and libraries. The Institute cannot undertake to compensate for loss of salary and other income which will be involved in a scholar's absence from his own university. In view of the fact that membership in the Institute is considered to be an academic distinction, it is hoped that each scholar's own university will grant him leave with full pay. The Institute cannot, either, undertake to pay travel and living costs of wives and other dependents.* In general, however, the stipends will be generous enough in amount to provide for any reasonable expenses likely to be incurred by their recipients.

Qualifications for membership in the Institute: Applicants for membership in the Institute are, as a general rule, required to possess the Ph.D. degree. As the award of this degree is less common in France than in the United States, admission will be tendered to French scholars

---

* Transatlantic fares will be paid at first-class rates; these would ordinarily be adequate for husband and wife travelling cabin class.

whose academic training and experience may be considered as equivalent to the Ph.D. degree. The desirable age for candidates for the proposed seminar on modern France would be between 35 and 50, preference being given--all other things being equal--to men between 35 and 45. The prime consideration, however, is that the scholar in question be old enough to have given indisputable evidence of scholarly capacities of a high order and young enough to have ahead of him a substantial scholarly career.

It is imperative that the applicant be able to speak and comprehend English with reasonable facility; otherwise he would not be able to profit from participation in the proposed seminar.

Thanks to the interest shown by a group of distinguished French scholars, who have agreed to assist in the award of the memberships in question, it is probable that membership will be by invitation instead of application. The word "applicant" is here used for convenience.

Obligations of membership in the Institute: As the Institute awards no degrees and conducts no instruction in the conventional sense of the word, visiting scholars who are in residence as members are freed from the usual academic duties of teaching. They are free to conduct their own researches as they choose; in fact, it is hoped that no member will be appointed who is not actively engaged in a research project of some moment. On the other hand, it is desired that recipients of the stipends in question take an active part in the seminar on modern France. This seminar will meet, in all probability, about once a week for a period of about two hours. Although no formal reports or papers are contemplated, it is hoped that each member of the seminar will contribute a substantial essay or essays which can be incorporated in a collaborative book on the place of the French Republic in the world during the past seventy-five years.

Although members of the American Embassy staff in Paris, as well as members of the cultural relations staff of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, will assist in the award of the stipends, the memberships to be granted will be purely unofficial. Recipients will be under no obligations to anyone or any cause except the usual obligations to truth which are implicit in any scholarly activity. Attention is called to paragraph three of the attached statement concerning the Institute which inhibits discrimination because of race, creed, or sex.

It is hoped that definitive choices for the memberships in question can be made by 1 April 1950--in ample time for the scholars concerned to make the professional and personal arrangements necessary to permit their departure for the United States in the autumn. Should any member wish to come to the United States earlier than 15 September 1950, an effort will be made to increase his stipend by an amount necessary to defray his living expenses in America for an additional month or two.

Additional information can be obtained by addressing Professor Edward Mead Earle, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. Cable address ADVANSTUDY.

The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

The Institute for Advanced Study partakes of the character both of a university and of a research foundation. It is an institution in which a small permanent group of professors serves as the nucleus of a larger, temporary group of mature, though generally younger scholars. It has been found that the scholars thus brought together are so much interested in their respective tasks, in their own development and in the advancement of knowledge, that the usual academic arrangements such as regular courses, required attendance, degrees, examinations and administrative supervision can be dispensed with as superfluous.

In these respects, which are all consequences of the fact that it limits its membership to scholars of a high level of maturity, the Institute differs from all American universities. It is like a university in that its success depends on the influence that it exerts on its temporary members as well as on the individual discoveries of its professors. While it is like a research institute in that the members of its staff are contributors to knowledge, it differs in two major respects, (1) the emphasis on the stream of temporary members which flows through it, and (2) the absence of a specified program of research and of all regimentation.

In regard to appointments to the faculty and to membership in the Institute, the Founders in their letter addressed to their Trustees, dated Newark, New Jersey, June 6, 1930, have expressed the following wish: "It is fundamental in our purpose, and our express desire, that in the appointments to the staff and faculty, as well as in the admission of workers and students, no account shall be taken, directly or indirectly, of race, religion, or sex. We feel strongly that the spirit characteristic of America at its noblest, above all, the pursuit of higher learning, cannot admit of any conditions as to personnel other than those designed to promote the objects for which this institution is established, and particularly with no regard whatever to accidents of race, creed, or sex."

(From Bulletin No. 12, 1945-1946, of The Institute for Advanced Study)

PIETER GEYL

Dr. Pieter Geyl is Professor of Modern History at the University of Utrecht, in the Netherlands. In 1914, when he was 27 years old, he went to London as correspondent of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, the leading Dutch newspaper of the time. After five years as a journalist in England, Dr. Geyl was appointed Professor of Dutch Studies in the University of London, a chair which he occupied with great distinction for sixteen years. In 1935 he was appointed to his present professorship at the University of Utrecht. Professor Geyl is well known in the British university world and is an outstanding public figure in the Netherlands. Before the war he was an outspoken anti-Nazi and, as a result, was arrested by the Germans in 1940 as one of a group of hostages; he was imprisoned first in Buchenwald and later in a concentration camp in the Netherlands. Released in February 1944, in very poor health, he returned to his home, which later was gutted by the Gestapo because it had been used by the Dutch underground as a storehouse for arms and ammunition. During the period of his imprisonment, Professor Geyl was able to continue his studies; as a result he was able to complete before the end of the war his most recent book Napoleon, For and Against, published in May 1949 by the Yale University Press.

Professor Geyl's principal historical works have dealt with the Low Countries, especially in the seventeenth century. Two of his outstanding volumes have been published in English: The Revolt of the Netherlands (1932) and The Netherlands Divided (1936). But Professor Geyl's interests are catholic in scope. For example, he contributed to the Journal of the History of Ideas, in January 1948, a brilliant thirty-page critique of Toynbee's "system" of civilizations. The British Broadcasting Corporation later broadcast a debate between Geyl and Toynbee (subsequently published under the title "Can We Know the Pattern of the Past?"). His book on Napoleon is a study in historiography--an analysis of French historical writing on Napoleon and the Napoleonic "myth".

Professor Geyl will be in residence at the Institute for Advanced Study for the autumn term of 1949-1950.

H. H. BUTTERFIELD

Herbert H. Butterfield is Professor of Modern History at the University of Cambridge, where he is a fellow of Peterhouse. His principal research has been in British history during the reign of George III. He has recently completed a volume on George III, Lord North and the People and is presently engaged in preparing a full-length biography of Charles James Fox, which, among other things, has involved a brief period of residence at the Clements Library of the University of Michigan. Professor Butterfield is well-known to American historians for his two brief treatises on English historiography: The Whig Interpretation of History (1941) and The Englishman and His History (1944), which are distinguished for their literary artistry as well as for their historical interpretation. He also has written on Napoleon and on the statecraft of Machiavelli. He is editor of the Cambridge Historical Journal.

During the spring of 1949 Professor Butterfield gave a noteable series of lectures on the Third Programme of the B.B.C., shortly to be published in a volume entitled Christianity and History. These lectures, said the Times Literary Supplement (of London) "must be regarded as the most outstanding pronouncement on the meaning of history made by a professional historian in England since Acton's Inaugural". Also to be published by Professor Butterfield in the autumn of 1949 is a volume The Origin of Science, lectures which he delivered as chairman of a committee charged with inaugurating at the University of Cambridge a course in the history of science.

Professor Butterfield will be in residence at the Institute for Advanced Study during the autumn term of 1949-1950. This is his second visit to the Princeton community. In 1924-1925 he was Proctor Fellow in history in the Graduate College of Princeton University.

Sch E/P "Earle Seminar" 57

Members of Professor Earle's Seminar

Second Term -- 1948

Professor Cyril E. Black, Princeton University

Professor E. H. Carr, Institute for Advanced Study

Lt. Col. A. J. Goodpaster, Princeton University

Professor Hans Kohn, Institute for Advanced Study

Mr. John S. Reshetar, Princeton University

Professor Winfield W. Riefler, Institute for Advanced Study

Dr. Edmund Silberner, Princeton University

Professor Richard C. Snyder, Princeton University

Professor Harold Sprout, Princeton University

Professor Jacob Viner, Princeton University

Professor Earle

TODAY *and* TOMORROW

By WALTER LIPPMANN

The Serious Study of War

A FEW days ago the Princeton University Press published a book called "Makers of Modern Strategy" which is destined to exert a deep and long influence. The book is a symposium, almost an encyclopedia, of military thought during the past 400 years—from Machiavelli and Vauban to Mahan, Maginot, Churchill and Mitchell. It is the product of a group of scholars who have been working for years under the direction of Mr. Edward Mead Earle at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.

The book does not propound a particular military doctrine—like Mahan's doctrine of sea power or Mitchell's doctrine of air power. The purpose of the book is to lay a broad foundation for the continuing study of military affairs among scholars and by public men. . . .

This war has shown that in equipping forces and in employing them in battle, the nation is well endowed. But it has also shown that our long neglect of the serious study of the grand strategy of war has caught us with an insufficient number of men in civilian life and in the professional services who are prepared to shape policy. There is no short and easy way to remedy this neglect. Only a deep seriousness, of which Mr. Earle's book is so fine an example, maintained in the universities for a long time to come, can give the nation the men who know how to guard the Republic.

Contents

"War is much too important a business to be left to the soldiers."—CLEMENCEAU

MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY

MILITARY THOUGHT FROM MACHIAVELLI TO HITLER

EDITED BY EDWARD MEAD EARLE, WITH THE COLLABORATION OF GORDON A. CRAIG AND FELIX GILBERT. 566 PAGES. $3.75

This is the book to be thinking about for use in post-war courses in international affairs and the relation between military affairs and other phases of modern life. No book in any language gives so sweeping a view of the development of modern military thought as this distinguished symposium by twenty leading scholars. It treats strategy in its broadest sense (see table of contents elsewhere in this circular), dealing with strategy, tactics, logistics, national morale, economics, imperialism, geopolitics, sea and air warfare; and each chapter is by an expert.

A Selection of Critical Opinion on

MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY

Max Werner

"Americans can be proud. . . . Neither the German and Russian nor the British or French war literature can boast of a one-volume study comparable to the prodigious scope of *Makers of Modern Strategy*. . . . Enough is being written about the techniques of war, but all too little about the functions of strategy and the relations between strategy and politics. *Makers of Modern Strategy* is a classic in this field."

Herbert Rosinski

"A milestone in the development of military studies. Nothing remotely comparable to it has appeared so far in any language. . . . Many chapters are pioneer studies in their respective fields. While 'scholarly' in the sense that each has been entrusted to a specially qualified contributor, the book is not academic or remote from practical issues."

Review of Politics

"The great advance that has been made in the United States in the serious study of war and military affairs is made evident. . . . The majority of the studies are thoroughly documented and achieve a degree of profundity and scholarly detachment rarely encountered in wartime publications. Indeed, the appearance in wartime of a book of this stature is most remarkable."

Yale Review

"The chapter on Hitler might have been written fifty years hence, and will probably be standing up then."

Journal of International Law

"Bound to remain for a long time, if not permanently, the standard interpretive work for the period which it covers."

The Nation

"It is seldom that any book can lay claim to being unique, yet *Makers of Modern Strategy* merits that distinction. . . . the best thinking and writing on war that has taken place during the past four centuries."

Robert Strausz-Hupé

"A unique, encyclopedic history of military thought from Machiavelli to the doctrinaires of total war . . . casts new light on the complex problems of strategy in the age of the superstate, with its vast human and technical resources and its delicate social balances."

Journal of Modern History

"Characteristic of its treatment is its general freedom from the biases and passions of a war period; historical methods of inquiry and standards of judgment are still honored."

Marine Corps Gazette

"A tremendous undertaking with good results. . . . The book contains the essence of a library on the subject—many of the teachings are made available to us in English for the first time. The contributions of the great masters are clearly presented, and their relations to each other brought out. . . . The best teachings on the subject for 400 years are between the covers of this book. . . . A better selection of men to handle this great survey could not be found."

New York Herald Tribune

"*Makers of Modern Strategy* is the most comprehensively and competently written book that has yet appeared covering the development of warfare during the past four centuries. A book for the intellectual civilian who is willing to ponder as well as read, and for every political and military leader."

Philadelphia Inquirer

"The most fascinating book of this sort ever published."

Military Affairs

"The most significant book on military history to appear in this country in years."

Belfast Telegraph

"It will be surprising if this does not become a standard volume. . . . Interesting and thorough it is, from cover to cover, and a good example of how the Americans, once they tackle a job, carry it through in style."

The New Yorker

"An impressive, well-documented resume."

Contemporary Review (British)

"The object of this valuable and fascinating work is to trace the evolution of military thought from the days of Machiavelli till the present. . . . The American best is unsurpassable, and *Makers of Modern Strategy* is definitely of America's best. . . . Professor Earle has brought to the study of war the spirit of American scholarship at its very best."

American Mercury

"No one who wants to understand modern history can afford to neglect these studies of military and political theory."

Hans Kohn

"Of great value. . . . It is difficult to single out any of the twenty-one chapters for special consideration. All are written by experts and maintain a consistently high level. The book contains bibliographical notes, is well printed, and is very moderately priced."

from Earle folder

list of seminar participants

defense of the U. S.

Studies of national defense

Earle

THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS

A BRIEF READING LIST

NOTE: Volumes marked ** might be included in a small reference library for the home. Those marked * are especially recommended to be read if not purchased.

Introduction to American History

**Jemes Truslow Adams - - THE EPIC OF AMERICA. The best single-volume account.

**Charles A. and Mary R. Beard - THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION. Originally published in two volumes. Now available, also in a less expensive college edition in one volume. Outstanding in authorship, breadth of learning, literary presentation, and catholicity of interests.

L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick - THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1865. A good volume on the period since the Civil War.

**H. S. Commager - DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY. Two volumes in one. An unusually fine selection of documents, containing such indispensable items as the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, Washington's Farewell Address, Lincoln's most important addresses, and significant social and economic papers from Columbus to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Indispensable for ready reference.

*A. M. Schlesinger - NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY. Suggestive chapters on a variety of topics such as immigration, sectionalism, the American Revolution.

American Political Institutions

** Carl Becker - THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. A brilliant study of the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence and, consequently, of the American Revolution. Fundamental to an understanding of subsequent American political history.

*James (Viscount) Bryce - THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH. Published a half a century ago by a British statesman and ambassador to the United States, this remains the most perspicacious and sympathetic study of American political institutions.

W. B. Munro - GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL, (Fourth edition, 1936). Brings Bryce up to date if both are used simultaneously.

*R. L. Schuyler	THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. The best brief but complete treatment of the manner in which the Constitution was adopted. A series of lectures delivered for an English audience at Cambridge.
*W. B. Munro	THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. A BRIEF AND GENERAL COMMENTARY. Analysis of the Constitution clause by clause.
E. S. Corwin	THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY. Another exposition of the Constitution by a distinguished scholar.
A. C. McLaughlin	THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION. An able presentation of much the same subject as Schuyler. Longer with more background material.
C. G. Haines	THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. Origin and development of the sometimes puzzling American practice of judicial review of legislative acts.
*C. A. Beard	AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. One of the most important contributions to American history by the most distinguished American historian.
**A. J. Beveridge	LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL. 4 volumes. This outstanding biography is more than a life of the former Chief Justice of the United States. It is a history of the United States for more than half a century from the Revolution. Useful for an understanding of the Constitution, the practice of judicial review, and the relations between the Supreme Court, on the one side, and the President and Congress on the other. Has a legalistic and patriotic bias and should be read with some appreication of the preceding volume by Professor Beard.
Charles Warren	THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY. 2 volumes. The best history of the Supreme Court. Too detailed for most general readers.

Political Parties in the United States

W. S. Myers	THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. By a professor in Princeton University.
Frank R. Kent	THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. By a Baltimore journalist.
Morris Hillquit	HISTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES. By the man who was for years the intellectual and political leader of the Party. Now out of date, but still the best history of American Socialism from Utopian days to the outbreak of the Great War.

C. A. Beard — THE AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE. A popular account of the parties and party issues.

M. I. Ostrogorski — DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES. An important study by a Russian scholar.

Some Phases of American Cultural Life

**V. L. Parrington — MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT. 3 volumes. A book distinguished for scholarship, critical acumen, and literary presentation. Its broad interests include all phases of American thought, including outstanding political ideas.

*Van Wyck Brooks — THE FLOWERING OF NEW ENGLAND. A literary history of the period 1815-1865 by an outstanding critic.

S. E. Morison — THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD, 1636-1936. Although primarily a history of Harvard University, is incidentally a commentary on American education, Boston, and New England.

F. L. Pattee — FIRST CENTURY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE.
THE NEW AMERICAN LITERATURE. Taken together these volumes are a fairly satisfactory history. A more detailed history, treated topically by specialists is THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, in 4 volumes.

*Lewis Mumford — THE GOLDEN DAY. A history and criticism of American literature by one of the ablest younger writers.

*Lewis Mumford — STICKS AND STONES. The same critic's views of American architecture.

*H. L. Mencken — THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE. A painstaking and scholarly volume, unique in its field.

John Tasker Howard — OUR AMERICAN MUSIC; THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF IT

Ethnic and Racial Influences in American Life

R. G. Thwaites — FRANCE IN AMERICA, 1497-1763.

**Francis Parkman — THE OLD REGIME IN CANADA.
THE JESUITS IN NORTH AMERICA.
A HALF CENTURY OF CONFLICT. The works of Francis Parkman still are incomparable for the establishment of French civilization in America. They represent the highest type of American literature and historical scholarship. At least one of his volumes should be in every library. Others are PIONEERS OF FRANCE IN THE NEW WORLD, COUNT FRONTENAC AND NEW FRANCE UNDER LOUIS XIV, MONTCALM AND WOLFE, to mention a few.

*Howard Mumford Jones	AMERICA AND FRENCH CULTURE. Covers the period since 1750.
*Albert Bernhardt Faust	THE GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. Revised edition in one volume. An important study, made for the Steuben Society of America.
Henry James Ford	THE SCOTCH-IRISH IN AMERICA.
K. C. Babcock	THE SCANDINAVIAN ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
Robert F. Foerster	THE ITALIAN EMIGRATION OF OUR TIMES.
*John Fiske	The DUTCH AND QUAKER COLONIES IN AMERICA. By an historian with unsurpassed powers of narration and vivid presentation. Not always accurate but always readable. This volume is recommended not only for itself but also as an introduction to the many works of Fiske, which have been the most successful of the popular presentations of American history.
Clark Wissler	THE AMERICAN INDIAN, or Livingston Farrand, BASIS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, for a popular account of the aboriginals of North America.
C. G. Woodson	THE NEGRO IN OUR HISTORY)
W. E. B. Du Bois	THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK) These four volumes are selected from the vast literature on the Negro. The first three are by Negroes.
BOOKER T. Washington	UP FROM SLAVERY)
Paul Lewinson	RACE, CLASS, and PARTY)
Donald Young	AMERICAN MINORITY PEOPLES
G. M. Stephenson	A HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
I. B. Richman	THE SPANISH CONQUERORS. A pocket-size volume on the Spanish explorations and early settlements.
E. G. Bourne	SPAIN IN AMERICA, 1540-1580. A longer volume on the same subject.

<u>The South</u>

*W. E. Dodd	THE COTTON KINGDOM. A pocket-size volume, a gem of its kind, on the South before the Civil War.
Holland Thompson	THE NEW SOUTH, Ditto on the post War South.
**Ulrich B. Phillips	LIFE AND LABOR IN THE OLD SOUTH. A charmingly-written account of the South before 1860.
B. B. Kendrick and A. M. Arnett	THE SOUTH LOOKS AT ITS PAST. A brief suggestive volume by two professors in the University of North Carolina.

The West

**Frederick Jackson Turner	THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY. One of the half-dozen indispensable books on American history, portraying the influence of Westward expansion on American life. Stimulating and profound.
F. L. Paxson	HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER. Calls the frontier "the most American thing in all America". (Note: the "frontier" in American history means not an international boundary, but the fringe of settlement westward and southward).
Theodore Roosevelt	THE WINNING OF THE WEST. 2 volumes. By a former president of the United States. Red-blooded, moralistic, he-man stuff. Readable and reasonably reliable.
Robert E. Riegel	AMERICA MOVES WEST.
Walter P. Webb	THE GREAT PLAINS.
Archer B. Hulbert	THE FORTY-NINERS. A popular account, by an able historian, of the overland gold rush to California.
R. L. Duffus	THE SANTA FE TRAIL. Some vivid pictures of the Southwest.

New England

**James Truslow Adams	THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND. Important as the best introduction to the history of New England and also as illustrating the dynamic forces back of the settlement of the American continent.
James Truslow Adams	REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND. NEW ENGLAND IN THE REPUBLIC. Resuming the account down to about the middle of the nineteenth century.
**S. E. Morison	MARITIME HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS. A beautifully written account of the sea-going New Englanders, by a distinguished historian.
Van Wyck Brooks	THE FLOWERING OF NEW ENGLAND. Previously cited.
S. E. Morison	THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD, 1636-1936. Previously cited.

The American Revolution

Edward Channing	THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (being Volume III of his HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES). An excellent account by a distinguished scholar.

*Bernard Fay — THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT IN FRANCE AND AMERICA AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. The American Revolution seen as part of newer political tendencies in the Western World.

C. H. Van Tyne — LOYALISTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. The Revolution seen as a tragic civil war, a much neglected phase of the struggle.

*J. F. Jameson — THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT A reminder that there was a revolution as well as a war for independence.

J. B. Perkins — FRANCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. A popularly written account of the indispensable French aid to the American cause. Less critical than E. S. Corwin, FRENCH POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE.

John Fisko — THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Written in sprightly, readable manner and presenting the patriotic view. The loyalist British point of view is in S. G. Fisher, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

*Carl Becker — THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Previously cited.

The Civil War

**Edward Channing — THE WAR FOR SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE (being Volume VI of his HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES). Much the best study of the Civil War. Eminently fair.

W. E. Dodd — LINCOLN OR LEE. A suggestive short volume.

N. W. Stephenson — ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE UNION.
THE DAY OF THE CONFEDERACY. Two pocket-size volumes, ably written.

Ulysses S. Grant — PERSONAL MEMOIRS, 2 volumes. Fascinating reminiscences of the military career of the general-in-chief of the Union forces.

D. S. Freeman — R. E. LEE. ~~3~~ 4 volumes. The standard biography of the leader of the Confederate armies. Much too detailed, but excellent, in most respects, on Lee's campaigns and on his heroic conduct after his final defeat.

More Recent American History

*Allan Nevins — THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA, 1865-1878

*Arthur M. Schlesinger — THE RISE OF THE CITY, 1878-1898.

*Harold U. Falkner — THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1898-1914.

Harry Thurston Peck — TWENTY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC, 1885-1905. A charmingly written narrative by a contemporary.

*Lincoln Steffens — AUTOBIOGRAPHY. The interesting life of a "muckraking" liberal journalist, especially valuable for the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt and the "new freedom" of Wilson.

Mark Sullivan — OUR TIMES. 6 volumes. Valuable journalistic story, extensively illustrated, of the United States from about 1898 to 1935. Always interesting reading for a rainy day.

Ernest K. Lindley — THE ROOSEVELT REVOLUTION, FIRST PHASE.
HALF WAY WITH ROOSEVELT. Useful journalistic accounts of the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Foreign Relations of the United States

S. F. Bemis — HISTORY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. The most recent and the best history of American foreign policy. Last half of the book is a critical account of American diplomacy since 1898.

John Bassett Moore — PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. Now twenty years old, this volume is principally important for the fundamental policies of the United States in world affairs prior to the World War. By a distinguished student of international law.

A. B. Hart — THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AN INTERPRETATION.

**George Washington — FAREWELL ADDRESS. Available in Commager's collection of documents, cited above, and in numerous other editions.

Herbert Croly — LIFE OF WILLARD STRAIGHT. The biography of an American whose international activities ranged from the Far East to the battlefields of France.

Alfred Vagts — DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN IN DER WELTPOLITIK (New York, 2 volumes). In a class by itself; based upon archives in Berlin and Washington.

The United States in the World War

C. Hartley Grattan — WHY WE FOUGHT. The first and, in many respects, the ablest presentation of the thesis that economic interests as well as propaganda helped determine the course of American policy vis a vis the combatants.

Walter Millis — THE ROAD TO WAR. Well written defense of the thesis that Allied propaganda undermined American neutrality. Pro-German in tone, although not consciously so.

Charles Seymour	AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-1917 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE WORLD WAR. These two volumes are a defense of Wilson's policies by one of his advisers and friends.
Robert Lansing	THE WAR MEMOIRS OF ROBERT LANSING. An amazingly frank statement which shows that America never was neutral "in thought and deed", by the war-time Secretary of State.
Ray Stannard Baker	LIFE AND LETTERS OF WOODROW WILSON, Volume V. The official biography of Wilson but by no means uncritical.
Frederick Palmer	OUR GALLANT MADNESS. A war correspondent's view of American participation in the War.
Frederick Palmer	NEWTON D. BAKER. 2 volumes. A biography of the Secretary of War with much invaluable material on the extent of American aid to the Allies.
James G. Harbord	THE AMERICAN ARMY IN FRANCE. By the general who, next to Pershing, was probably the most important American officer in France. General Pershing's own story is too long for most readers.
W. S. Sims	THE VICTORY AT SEA. By the commander of the American fleet, in collaboration with Burton Hendrick.
Leonard Ayres	THE WAR WITH GERMANY. A small volume of graphic charts and statistics.
Ray Stannard Baker	WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT. 3 volumes. A detailed account of the Peace Conference, based upon Wilson's papers and from Wilson's point of view.
Harvey Cushing	FROM A SURGEON'S DIARY, 1915-1918. A distinguished American surgeon with the British and American armies in France.
Mark Sullivan	OVER HERE (Being Volume V of OUR TIMES) The "home front". Catches very well the spirit of wartime.

<u>The Next War. Neutrality or Participation?</u>

*Charles Warren	"Troubles of a Neutral". An epoch-making article originally published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS (New York) April, 1934, and subsequently reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION and elsewhere.
A. W. DUlles and H. F. Armstrong	CAN WE BE NEUTRAL? A brief statement, favoring neutrality as far as possible.
Phillips Bradley	CAN WE STAY OUT OF WAR? By one of the advisers to the Senate Committee investigating the munitions industry.

Our North American Neighbors

*Stuart Chase	MEXICO. A sympathetic account by an American economist.
*Charles Flandrau	VIVA MEXICO. One of the most charming accounts ever written of the Mexico of before the Revolution.
W. R. Shepherd	THE HISPANIC NATIONS OF THE NEW WORLD. A pocket-size volume by one of the foremost students of the subject.
*J. W. Dafoe	CANADA, AN AMERICAN NATION. A brief volume of significance.
G. M. Wrong	THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA CANADA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Two volumes by a distinguished scholar.
W. B. MUNRO	AMERICAN INFLUENCES ON CANADIAN GOVERNMENT.

Biography

Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (editors)	DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY. A monumental work of twenty volumes containing biographies of non-living Americans of distinction. Each sketch, by a specialist, is supplied with a bibliography. Exceedingly well written and edited throughout.
*Henry Adams	THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS. An autobiography of one of the most civilized Americans of his time. Valuable pictures of Boston and Washington.
James Truslow Adams	THE ADAMS FAMILY. John Adams, second President of the United States, and his remarkable descendants.
Ray Stannard Baker	LIFE AND LETTERS OF WOODROW WILSON. Five volumes published thus far.
**W. E. Dodd	WOODROW WILSON, HIS LIFE AND WORK. A brief biography by one of Wilson's admirers and friends. Author is now American ambassador in Berlin.
**A. J. BEveridge	LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL. Previously cited.
*Godfrey R. B. (Baron) Charnwood	ABRAHAM LINCOLN. One of the best of the Lincoln biographies; by an Englishman.
Carl Sandburg	ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE PRAIRIE YEARS. Interesting interpretation by a Mid-Westerner. Not always strictly accurate but very well written and suggestive.
*N. W. Stephenson	LINCOLN, AN ACCOUNT OF HIS PERSONAL LIFE, etc. Perhaps the most satisfactory biography of Lincoln, everything considered.

**Gilbert Chinard	JEFFERSON, APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM. Best short biography; by a professor in the Johns Hopkins University.
*Francis W. Hirst	LIFE AND LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON. A sympathetic and well-written study; by a distinguished Englishman
*W. E. Dodd	STATESMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH. Beautifully written as well as shrewd estimates of Jefferson, Jefferson Davis and Calhoun.
**Bernard Fay'	FRANKLIN, THE APOSTLE OF MODERN TIMES. The best biography of Franklin for most purposes; by a Frenchman.
**Benjamin Franklin	AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Franklin's youth and life to 1757. A classic.
*Claude M. Fuess	CARL SCHURZ, REFORMER. The life of a German liberal, an emigré in the tradition of '48, who became an important soldier and statesman.
*Carl Schurz	THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ.
Henry Cabot Lodge	ALEXANDER HAMILTON. An artistic piece of work, but hopelessly biased in Hamilton's favor. Hamilton's biographers seem determined either to damn or to canonize him. They also are unkind to Jefferson, as most of Jefferson's biographers are unkind to Hamilton.
Claude Bowers	JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON. A history of the administrations of Washington and John Adams built around the personalities of Jefferson and Hamilton. Strongly prejudiced in favor of Jefferson.
John W. Hammond	CHARLES PROTEUS STEINMETZ. The story of a wizard of electricity.
**Rupert Hughes	GEORGE WASHINGTON. 3 volumes. The most interesting life of Washington. Started in a "debunking" spirit, this work shows that the author quickly developed a sympathetic affection for his subject.
Shelby Little	GEORGE WASHINGTON. Unvarnished facts, without idealization. Perhaps the best single-volume biography, based upon the most important available materials.
Henry F. Pringle	THEODORE ROOSEVELT. The most satisfactory biography of this strenuous American.
Michael Pupin	FROM IMMIGRANT TO INVENTOR. The autobiography of a Servian boy who achieved success in America. One of the innumerable biographies of naturalized Americans.

Jacob Riis	THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN. The story of a Danish-American who left his mark on New York.
*Booker T. Washington	UP FROM SLAVERY. The autobiography of an American Negro.

Fiction

NOTE: The fiction in this list is not presented as a cross-section of American literature. It is merely a list of those books of fiction which help to reveal certain phases of American history and American life.

Sherwood Anderson	WINESBURG, OHIO. A bored town which gets the jitters.
Gertrude Atherton	THE CONQUEROR. A biographical novel of Alexander Hamilton.
Edward Bellamy	LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000-1887. A Utopian and prophetic novel which had a profound influence on Populism and on the campaign for government ownership.
**Stephen Vincent Benet	JOHN BROWN'S BODY. This epic poem tells more about the Civil War than half a dozen histories.
James Boyd	DRUMS. A good novel of the American Revolution.
James Boyd	MARCHING ON. A novel of the Civil War; excellent.
Thomas Boyd	THROUGH THE WHEAT. In many respects the best account of the American soldier in France, 1917-1918.
*A. Cahan	THE RISE OF DAVID LEVINSKY. The most important novel of immigrant life in New York.
*Erskine Caldwell	GOD'S LITTLE ACRE. TOBACCO ROAD. The appaling ignorance, poverty, and degeneration of the poor Whites in Georgia. Realistic although bitterly resented by some Southerners.
**Willa Cather	It is difficult to select particular volumes of Willa Cather, whose novels of the prairie states are beautiful and moving. The following are typical: MY ANTONIA. A Bohemian community in Nebraska. A LOST LADY OBSCURE DESTINIES. A volume of excellent short stories. ONE OF OURS. A bewildered Nebraska farm lad in the World War. With a different locale are: DEATH COMES FOR THE ARCHBISHOP. New Mexico in the 1840's and 1850's. SHADOWS ON THE ROCK. A delicate etching of Quebec under the French.

*James Fenimore Cooper	THE SPY AND THE PILOT. Two thrilling novels of the American Revolution.
	THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS. The Indian and the frontiersman. Has delighted generations of boys from sixteen to sixty.
	SATANSTOE. The colonial gentry of New York.
Stephen Crane	THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE. A short story of the Civil War and one of the best war stories ever written anywhere.
*Clarence Day	LIFE WITH FATHER. A delightful whimsical reminiscence, giving an excellent picture of the substantial citizens of New York City in the 1880's.
John Dos Passos	THREE SOLDIERS. 1919. Two hard-boiled novels of the American soldier and the American laborer in the World War.
Finley Peter Dunne	MR. DOOLEY IN PEACE AND WAR. MR. DOOLEY IN THE HEARTS OF HIS COUNTRYMEN. Two very funny volumes of the fictitious Mr. Dooley, containing a good deal of shrewd sense on that strange national adventure The War with Spain.
Walter Edmonds	DRUMS ALONG THE MOHAWK. Trials and tribulations of the German-American settlements along the Mohawk River during the Revolution. Vivid and historically accurate.
*Ellen Glasgow	VIRGINIA. Decay of Southern gentility after the Civil War. Especially effects of the War upon women.
	THE SHELTERED LIFE. Much the same theme but a more mature work.
Mike Gold	JEWS WITHOUT MONEY. An autobiographical novel. Life in the Ghetto of New York.
Bret Harte	THE LUCK OF ROARING CAMP. Short stories of California during the lawless days of the gold rush.
**Nathaniel Hawthorne	THE SCARLET LETTER. An unforgettable picture of Puritan New England. The foremost of all American historical novels.
William Dean Howells	THE RISE OF SILAS LAPHAM. Boston Brahmins face to face with the new type of successful business man.
Washington Irving	RIP VAN WINKLE LEGEND OF SLEEPY HOLLOW. Legendary figures of the Hudson Valley.

Sarah Orne Jewett	THE COUNTRY OF THE POINTED FIRS BEST SHORT STORIES. Edited by Willa Cather. Delicately painted pictures of New England, especially Maine.
*Sinclair Lewis	MAIN STREET. BABBITT. DODSWORTH.
*Ludwig Lewisohn	UP STREAM. An autobiographical novel. Interesting treatment of anti-Semitism in New York.
J. P. Marquand	THE LATE GEORGE APLEY. Three generations of Boston
**Herman Melville	MOBY DICK. The epic of the American whaling industry.
Margaret Mitchell	GONE WITH THE WIND. Melodramatic story of Georgia during the Civil War. Much overestimated.
Ernest Poole	THE HARBOR. The New York waterfront and its problems.
**O. E. Rolvaag	GIANTS IN THE EARTH. Incredibly vivid picture of the hardships of the Norwegian settlers of the Dakotas. More eloquent than any history of the region ever written.
George Santayana	THE LAST PURITAN. Intellectual Boston.
Dorothy Scarborough	IN THE LAND OF COTTON. Important especially for modern Texas.
Upton Sinclair	THE JUNGLE. A muckraking novel, exposing conditions in the meat-packing industry of Chicago thirty years ago and, perhaps, now.
Ruth Suckow	THE FOLKS. A long novel of an Iowa family with its incidental adventures in New York and in California.
T. S. Stribling	THE STORE. Social problems of Whites and Blacks in Alabama in 1884.
*William Makepeace Thackeray	THE VIRGINIANS. Brilliant portrayal of society in Virginia and in England before and during the American Revolution.
**Mark Twain	ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN. LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI ROUGHING IT.
Margaret Wilson	THE ABLE MCLAUGHLINS. A Scotch pioneering family during and after the Civil War.
Owen Wister	THE VIRGINIAN. A novel of Wyoming; the best of all cowboy stories.

Edith Wharton	ETHAN FROME. Rural New England; cruelty of the winters and of the loneliness on a farm. Her best work.
	THE AGE OF INNOCENCE and THE HOUSE OF MIRTH. New York society from 1870 to 1890.

Drama

NOTE: Selections are made for the same reason as the foregoing list of fiction.

Maxwell Anderson	BOTH YOUR HOUSES. Acid criticism of American politics.
Mark Connelly	THE GREEN PASTURES. Negro folkways and religious lore.
John Drinkwater	ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
Ben Hecht and Charles MacArthur	THE FRONT PAGE. Pungent comments on American journalists and journalism.
George Kaufman and Morrie Ryskind	OF THEE I SING. Hilarious and irreverent satire on American politics.
Sidney Kingsley	DEAD END. Wealth, poverty, and crime along the East River front of New York.
Clifford Odets	AWAKE AND SING and WAITING FOR LEFTY. By the leading Communist dramatist of America. The former life in Bronx, the latter the stirring story of a strike.
Eugene O'Neill	DESIRE UNDER THE ELMS and THE HAIRY APE.
Elmer Rice	STREET SCENE. The sordid slums of New York.
Laurence Stallings and Maxwell Anderson	WHAT PRICE GLORY. Best of the War Plays. Thoroughly American. Hard-boiled life of the Marines in France.
Louis Weitzenkorn	FIVE STAR FINAL. Devastating indictment of yellow journalism.

Poetry

NOTE: Selections made for same reason as in the case of fiction.

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow	HIAWATHA - THE COURTSHIP OF MILES STANDISH - EVANGELINE.
James Russell Lowell	THE BIGLOW PAPERS. Important comment on Northern attitude toward the Mexican and Civil Wars.
Edgar Lee Masters	SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY. A mid-western village.
Carl Sandburg	SELECTED POEMS. Rough-and-tumble America.
**Walt Whitman	LEAVES OF GRASS. Free verse, presenting the complete creed of American democracy.
	DRUM TAPS. Civil War verses, including the famous dirge for Lincoln.
John Greenleaf Whittier	POEMS. His anti-slavery poems and his poems of the Civil War reveal the moral ardor of the Abolitionists.

RECORD OF A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY STUDIES HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE WAR STUDIES COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL AT THE HOTEL CARLTON, WASHINGTON, D. C., MAY 25, 1945

List of Persons Attending the Conference

Professor Roy Nichols, University of Pennsylvania
Mr. Shepard Clough, Social Science Research Council
Professor Pendleton Herring, Littauer School, Harvard University
Major H. A. DeWeerd, Associate Editor, Infantry Journal
Brig. Gen. Donald A. Armstrong, Commandant, Army Industrial College
Mr. Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Study
Professor R. G. Albion, Princeton University
Colonel Joseph I. Greene, Editor, Infantry Journal
Professor Troyer S. Anderson, G-2 Historical Section
Dr. Walter L. Wright, G-2 Historical Section
Mr. John Orchard, State Department
Dr. Luther Evans, Library of Congress
Lt. Col. James T. Lowe, AAF
Mrs. Marilynn Rodda, Reporter

Agenda of the Conference

Chairman, Professor Roy Nichols

Morning Session -- 10:00 A. M.

1. Background of the conference and brief survey of military studies in the United States. . . . Major H. A. DeWeerd

2. The place of social science studies in a comprehensive defense program. . . . . Brig.Gen. Donald Armstrong

3. The place of military studies in a university social science program. . . . . Prof. R. G. Albion

Luncheon -- 1:30-2:30 P. M.

Afternoon Session -- 2:30 P.M.

4. What are the practical means of coordinating work in the social sciences with a comprehensive defense program? . . . . . Prof. Edward Mead Earle

5. A suggested program for establishing a working relationship between civilian and military institutions. . . . . Prof. Troyer S. Anderson

6. Summary of the discussion and presentation of recommendations . . . . . Prof. Pendleton Herring

Morning Session

Professor Roy Nichols: We have called this conference to explore a new field of research in the Social Sciences. The Social Science Research Council is interested in all phases of the impact of war upon society. The Council has established a committee on war studies. We have been very much interested in studying what might be termed the social impact of the war. We are here today to discuss ways and means to promote a comprehensive program of military studies in American academic institutions after the present war. I have asked Major DeWeerd to give you the background of this conference and a brief review of military studies in the United States up to the present.

Major Harvey A. DeWeerd: This conference grew out of a luncheon conversation between Mr. Shepard Clough of the War Studies Committee of the Social Science Research Council and certain members of the American Military Institute. As former editor of Military Affairs, the journal of the American Military Institute, I was interested in trying to raise money to put that magazine on a more substantial and permanent basis than it now enjoys. When we asked Mr. Clough where we could get several thousand dollars to do this, he utilized his considerable talents for evasion by suggesting that we avoid a specific limited objective and aim at the whole program of military studies in the postwar world. From that discussion which followed it became apparent that if any progress was to be made in that direction it would be necessary to explore the field, to clarify and if possible unify the views of a representative group of social scientists and soldiers before presenting them elsewhere. Mr. Clough took the initiative in sponsoring this conference which the committee hopes will consider ways and means of integrating a program of military studies on a broad social science basis with existing academic disciplines and institutions.

You might say that until very recently there was no organized program of military study in the United States, certainly none by civilian scholars. We did not have in this country in the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century such civilian workers in this field as Hans Delbrück in Germany or Spenser Wilkinson in Britain. The men who worked in this field in America were from the services, such as Captain Alfred T. Mahan of the Navy, and Brigadier General Emory Upton.

Historians neglected the field of military studies because of the trend toward the "new history" which put emphasis on the social, economic and cultural aspects of American life. A revulsion against so-called "Battle historians" and "battle histories" made itself apparent. No courses were taught in military studies in graduate schools in the United States largely because graduate students had to specialize in subjects in which teaching jobs were available. There were no teaching positions available in the field of military studies.

Because the average American historian was almost totally ignorant of the military field, he failed to prepare the minds of his students for the tragic events of 1939-45. The "standard" European history texts which served a complacent generation of American instructors and students from 1919 to 1939 now seem as obsolete as the kerosene lamp. To judge by these textbooks American historians did not present an accurate picture of European developments and trends during the pre-war years. Their preoccupation with social, economic and cultural history prevented them from preparing their students to judge the essentially war-like nature and the sinister purposes of Fascist Germany and Italy. A student who finished reading any of the popular American college textbooks in recent European history on August 31, 1939, would be completely surprised at the outbreak of the most terrible war in history on the following day. If he had no other basis on which to shape his judgments, such a student would be completely surprised by every phase of the Second World War since that date. The historians in the field of European history neglected the military aspects of that field and so presented an inadequate picture of European life.

We have never had in the United States Army a program comparable to the Historical Section of the German General Staff. We have had no organization comparable to the Historical Section of the Imperial General Staff in Britain. We have up to date published neither a history of the First World War nor a single volume of war records. Only in the last two years has the Battle Monuments Commission begun to publish a series of brief histories on the American divisions which saw combat in the last war.

The Secretary of War vetoed the projected official history of the last war, and the Army War College Historical Section began a program to produce volumes of records for later study by historians. At the present rate of speed, however, it will be a long, long time before we will have any of these volumes published.

There are a few isolated men working in the field of military studies, but unless a man can train graduate students, his own work in the military field soon dies out. There is a great need for us to assure continuing generations of scholars. That is the only way in which you can establish military studies on an enduring basis. The career of Professor R. M. Johnston of Harvard is a good illustration in point. Professor Johnston taught courses in military history but only on an undergraduate level. He trained no disciples and after his death in 1920, with the exception of a few half-year courses in military history taught by Mr. T. H. Thomas, there has been no resumption of Professor Johnston's work at Harvard.

The only organized effort in this direction was the formation of the American Military Institute in the early thirties, which grew out of lectures held at the Army War College by Professor C. J. H. Hayes, Professor J. B.

Scott, Colonel E. T. Lull, and Colonel A. L. Conger. In 1933 an organization called the American Military History Foundation (now the American Military Institute) was incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia. This organization has published a quarterly journal, Military Affairs, now in its eighth year of publication. The Institute holds joint annual meetings with the American Historical Association and occasional private meetings in Washington. It maintains a small but useful reference library in the National Archives. But the organization has never attracted a large number of supporters, and the interest shown in its efforts by other organizations and by the public at large has been disappointing.

One noteworthy accomplishment of the American Military Institute during the years 1935-1941 was to establish a strong cell of interest in the War Department, Division of the National Archives, then under the direction of Dr. Dallas D. Irvine who trained and inspired a considerable number of young men who are at present rendering valuable work in the Army of the United States and in related war agencies.

An outstanding advance in this field has been the development of a school of military studies at Princeton centered around the seminar led by Professor E. M. Earle at the Institute for Advanced Study. Conducted on the post-doctoral level and participated in by a small number of American and foreign scholars, Professor Earle's seminar has produced an unusually qualified group of men who are now serving effectively in various phases of the National war effort. A number of publications, including the important collaborative volume Makers of Modern Strategy, were written or projected in the Princeton group. College and university teachers who spent a year or more at the Institute for Advanced Study went back to their academic posts enriched by the experience. Judged by the writing that many of them have done since, it would appear that they are bringing a new concept of military studies as a factor in statecraft and history to the students of their institutions. The success of Professor Earle's pioneer effort demonstrates what can be accomplished by an outstanding scholar in the military field when placed in a position to carry out a planned program over a number of years. There has been a high degree of cooperation between men at Princeton University and the Institute for Advanced Study. The University has taken the lead in establishing a course in collaboration with the Navy on the Foundations of National Power.

The present war has called scholars from all branches of the social sciences into the national war effort. The Army, the Navy, and the Federal Government have utilized academic men in all phases of their work. Both the Army and the Navy have organized historical sections on a much more extensive scale than existed during the last war. Several hundred men are now engaged in compiling the histories of the Armed Forces. We will thus have at the end of the war a reservoir of social scientists trained in various specialties and acquainted with the ways and needs of the Armed Services. The questions which this conference should face are: (1) What use should be made of this accumulation of talent and experience in the future; and (2) can specific recommendations be drawn up to ensure that military studies receive due consideration in our academic institutions in the future?

Professor Nichols: In your relations with these scholars who are now in Washington, have you had any personal indications that they are going to stick to the study of these problems, or is this just a war job to be cast aside after the war?

Major DeWeerd: This varies with individuals. Most of us have had to put on uniforms for so long that it will be difficult to separate ourselves entirely from this experience. I don't believe the same amount of return to normalcy will occur this time as after the last war.

Professor Nichols: Have you any definite knowledge of experiments that are being carried out -- say, at the University of Missouri?

Major DeWeerd: Certain universities are considering establishing men in positions where they will give what amounts to military courses. Bernard Brodie is going to Yale on a two-year appointment in international studies. He will undoubtedly give a course in military and naval affairs of some kind. I am going to the University of Missouri and will give a course or courses in military studies of some kind. The question in my mind is whether after all what we need is the establishment of graduate instruction in such courses.

Mr. Shepard Clough: The answer depends upon the opportunities that are made available for the persons who have an interest in the field of military history.

Professor Nichols: People oftentimes make their own opportunities if they are sufficiently interested. It depends on how deep their interest is.

Dr. Edward Mead Earle: You would be surprised at the lack of knowledge on the part of the average college president or dean regarding this whole thing. Ten years ago anybody who proposed the study of military affairs as a department or chair was looked upon as an eccentric. He was told that there were certain courses that had to be taken in college and there was no room for studies of this kind. Harold Sprout has established a course at Princeton after ten years of hard work. If it hadn't been for the war we might not have won out on this.

Professor Nichols: Do you expect to progress still further?

Professor Robert G. Albion: In general I think we have enough of a start. The plan is fairly well fixed along that line.

Professor Nichols: Have you secured adequate support by way of library facilities?

Professor Albion: Our libraries are very good along that line -- extremely cooperative. We have access to the library of the Institute For Advanced Study. Between the two we are very well fixed.

Professor Nichols: Is it the idea of the Washington group to concentrate on two or three institutions?

Major DeWeerd: My own view would be that we should start out as widely as possible because, in the nature of things, we may end up anyway with only a few or one or two. If, for example, one cell or chair of military studies could be established in a university on the east coast, and one on the west coast, and one in the center of the United States, it would be very advantageous.

Professor Nichols: I think we have before us the situation -- at least the possibilities. General Armstrong has been particularly interested in the relationship between the military and civilian population on a scientific basis. Will you tell us of your plans at the Army Industrial College?

Brigadier General Donald A. Armstrong: During my thirty-five years of service I have been extremely concerned with the relationship between the Army and the civilian population of the country. By civilian population I mean largely labor leaders, with labor and industry on the one hand and colleges and engineering societies and similar groups on the other. I think Professor Herring has expressed the thing as well as anybody in his book (The Impact of War) in showing the changes that have taken place in the Army during our lifetime. In 1910 when I was a second lieutenant the Army had all the isolationism that Pendleton Herring has so clearly pointed out. Great change has come over the Army since the First World War. This is illustrated best by the establishment in the United States Army of the Army Industrial College. Ours is the only Army in the world that has a college devoted to studies of industrial mobilization and the utilization of economic resources of the nation.

When I attended the college in 1926 I discovered that there was a barrier between the Army and civilians that had to be done away with if we were going to operate successfully together. The professors in the universities looked upon Army officers as rather moronic individuals, people without much intellectual capacity, with very limited vision, interested exclusively in military affairs.

To get back to the work of the Army Industrial College, I have felt that we should have a far more extensive mutual understanding between the social scientists and the people in the Army who are concerned with the industrial mobilization. This meeting was most welcome from my point of view because I can refer not only to the American Military Institute but also to how the Industrial College operates, a phase of this work which should be understood by universities.

We at the Industrial College today have a group of research specialists who are government employees. Members of this staff of the Industrial College belong to the Department of Research under Colonel Walter H. E. Jaeger, who himself is a research specialist in many fields, an extremely competent officer in charge of this line of work. Our whole office -- and there are a number of civilians working with us -- analyzes the current experience with a view to determining the errors, the troubles that have prevented us from being more efficient.

The great surprises in this war have been military surprises, but back of the military surprises have been the production and distribution surprises that have been made possible by the thought and planning that have been devoted previously to production and distribution. That is clearly not entirely a military job. I concur with Clemenceau on this phase of the work when he said that "War is too important a matter to leave to generals." Most people look at me in some amazement as if to say, "That's unusual for a general to be quoting that remark." I mean it most sincerely, particularly in the field in which we operate. Our field is the effective utilization of the entire national resources, and that is seventy-five per cent of modern war. What defeated Germany is defeating Japan. They underestimated what we could do on the production side.

A large army and large navy don't necessarily mean under present wartime conditions that this country is safe for the future. The French Army was great in my opinion but it didn't stay that way.

I have been talking to a number of university deans and presidents. Anything that savors of war certainly does not meet with much favor in academic circles. I think that that particular attitude is going to be strong, but not nearly as strong as it used to be. People understand that war is something that doesn't depend on good will or on our feelings, but can come to us whether we want it or not. I think this should be very clearly understood.

I have said earlier that warfare is seventy-five per cent the effective utilization of the resources in which you gentlemen here in civilian life are concerned. It is the function of political science to determine and evaluate these resources. I want to go to the sociologists and economists, and tell them of the social and economic problems of warfare. Let them think along these lines. Plan graduate schools to develop research which would be integrated to a certain degree with the research of the Army Industrial College. I am setting up industry and labor advisory committees to the Army Industrial College. I have six already organized. It is a slow job. We want them to maintain a committee and keep in contact with the Industrial College so that when our industrial mobilization plans are prepared in the future, they won't be an unknown quantity to the nation. Thus those are things in which we need the intellectuals of the country to help us on.

As time goes on we want to have advice continually from Mr. Clough's organization. We want him and his group to work with us and to check our plans. If such a program could have been adopted after the last war, I feel that our industrial mobilization in this war could have been even more effective than it was. For that purpose we need the help of a group like this.

The Army Industrial College and the American Military Institute are both organizations in which I am personally interested. I think that this cooperation can result in valuable achievement later on. The Department of Research of the Army Industrial College does not make primary research -- secondary research only. We propose to utilize what is being accomplished elsewhere and work it into our own planning for the benefit of future generations. That is most important. We must leave behind us a careful analysis of what happened on the industrial front in this war. That is our purpose.

Professor Nichols: Have you drawn up any suggestions for university graduate schools in the way of courses that you would like?

General Armstrong: I haven't been as specific as that. I have been mainly spreading the idea. I have talked to officials at various colleges and universities. They are all exactly in the same situation. They have already got so many required subjects to teach that the possibility of putting in some kind of military course is very difficult.

Professor Nichols: You look at it more as a separate department rather than courses taught in already-established departments?

General Armstrong: There should be something along that line. It seems to me that if we could even include a course of only a few weeks which would include the history of industrial mobilization in World Wars I and II, including the principles of the industrial mobilization plan, and what war does to business, the railroads, the utilities, social conditions and relationships, and all the rest, I think it would have some merit.

Professor Nichols: That would be a course in what is now the Economics Department.

General Armstrong: Of course I would be delighted to see it in the Economics Department.

Mr. Clough: I think it would be interesting if you or Colonel Jaeger explained the work of the Research Department.

General Armstrong: We are interested in manpower. The manpower group is very busily engaged in studying the effective utilization of manpower and the way it was used in this war. It hopes to derive certain definite conclusions as to the distribution of manpower between the armed services and industry. We are investigating the civilian services in this war, going to them and finding out how they operate with a view to determining the overlapping, the inefficiency in organization and methods. Everywhere we operate I can say this: We are not trying to whitewash history. This group is concerned not only with our own population but the populations of foreign countries.

Colonel Walter H. E. Jaeger: We have another group -- a Historical Studies Group. This activity is engaged in the preparation of the history of industrial mobilization in the nation during this war, and a comparison of this industrial mobilization with that in the last war. The analysts in the department are highly trained, very skilled men who can recognize to what extent the results of the research work are accurate.

General Armstrong: I want to get industry to let us have on loan for six months or a year industrialists who would work with us. I want to get Earle and Herring and people like them to do exactly the same thing. If we change our national tactics and try strength instead of weakness as a preventative of war, we shall have a much better chance of avoiding war. When I say "strength" I don't mean excessive Army and Navy strength -- but the strength of people like you helping us carry out our program. That is the strength I'm talking about.

Mr. Clough: Had you contemplated taking social scientists on loan the way you would industrialists?

General Armstrong: Oh yes, definitely.

Major DeWeerd: It would be a matter of personal and professional pride to academic men if you invited them to participate in this work. It would give them recognition that was lacking before the war. Recognition is the lifeblood of the academic profession. You cannot specialize in a field in which you cannot get academic returns.

General Armstrong: I think in this war there has been a great breakdown of the barrier between the military and academic worlds. I think that one of the objectives we should have here is to try to continue to break down that barrier.

Dr. Earle: I would like to add one thing. There are an enormous number of general officers and flag officers in the services who are going to suffer sharp reductions of rank after the war. I know most intimately certain officers in the Air Forces, and there are several brigadier and major generals in their thirties who are going to be reduced to less than general officer rank after the war. They are an able group of young men who have been thinking in rather larger terms than they have ever thought before. One

of the ways of cushioning them against the shock would be for the War Department to farm them out to academic institutions for study of military affairs. There is a great interest on the part of some government officials in sending these general officers back to academic institutions to do graduate work on this level. I think we will get enthusiastic cooperation from the War Department in that respect.

Professor Nichols: We have heard the interesting suggestions set forth by Major DeWeerd, General Armstrong, and Dr. Earle. I would like to hear from Dr. Albion who can give us some light on how military studies came to be taught at Princeton.

Professor Albion: I was struggling along alone at Princeton in this field some time before Earle and Sprout came along with their most helpful contributions. A remark of Major DeWeerd's struck me: The student is going to hesitate to take a course in military studies unless there is a teaching opportunity. While this is generally true, I think there are some possible opportunities in the undergraduate level especially with the group we have here in the Army and Navy historical sections to build up a field for it.

An ROTC had been set up at Princeton and the University decided to give academic credit for a course in military history which had always been given by one of the officers. Soon after I took over undergraduate civilian students began to come to the class. We got good results from it. Later on I managed, when one of the older professors passed away, to get in another course in naval or maritime history. While the rest of the department frowned on it, it was pretty successful. We took the opportunities as they came and made the most of them.

In the matter of the ROTC, both the Army and Navy programs call for something which is given by the officers. I think it would not be too difficult, rather than working on isolated deans, to go to whoever has charge of the ROTC in the Army and get an agreement that they would be willing to have military history taught under civilian auspices, thereby making the thing academically much more sound. I feel that there are a good many of the colleges going to have Army and Navy ROTC after the war.

Professor Nichols: Do you have facilities for introducing the industrial material you propose?

Professor Albion: I think we can do it. I count on Paul Strayer to work in this field.

Dr. Earle: There is one other thing in that connection. We are very much hoping that we can set up a study of economic warfare which will be partly history and partly tactics after the war at the Institute for Advanced Study. We are working on that now. We want to set up a sizeable study of what was done in this war in the matter of economic warfare, what might be done with economic warfare as a means of enforcing the terms of peace. Our ability to do the work will depend on our being able to get the wherewithal with which to do it. I think we probably can but it is going to take a lot of work. One of the difficulties that we face is that academic people shouldn't have to go around rattling a tin cup. It is distressingly time-consuming for a professor who ought to be doing scholarly work to go around soliciting funds. It is an appalling loss of time and academic capabilities.

Professors shouldn't be soliciting funds. Somebody else ought to be doing that. Actually, however, it is the professors who have to go out and solicit funds.

Dr. Walter L. Wright: Nobody else will go -- only the men who consider it worth doing.

Dr. Luther Evans: It seems to me that everybody has been making an assumption without stating it; that the fight for military studies after this war is going to be comparable to the uphill fight which we had in the earlier years. I seriously wonder whether there isn't a very big change in the offing in the whole intellectual climate as regards the problem of war. When I compare the feeling of the citizen today with the feeling of the citizen at the end of the last war, it seems to me that there is much less likelihood of our having the kind of psychology that we had before. I think nearly everybody was convinced at the end of the last war that we weren't going to have another war, and hence military studies were ridiculous. I seriously question whether any such psychology like that is going to exist this time. I think the psychology is likely to be that another war is inevitable and that we had better do all sorts of things to win it.

Dr. Wright: I think one answer is that whether or not there will be that change with reference to war, I think undoubtedly there will be a different attitude with respect to the use of force and its role in human affairs.

Major DeWeerd: You should probably add that we may have a larger Army, partly based on compulsory training, so that whether the public wants to ignore the military field or not, it cannot do so.

Professor Nichols: To what extent are these ideas being considered in the West Point and Annapolis programs?

General Armstrong: I haven't discussed that with anybody. Undoubtedly they are being considered. There is no question but that the War Department will change its methods in postwar years. It may be an entirely different system of education.

Dr. Wright: Many of the faults and difficulties result from the way in which the Academy is organized. A group of senior professors control it. The Commandant does not have very much influence on policy. Any college that is run that way would suffer the same consequences.

General Armstrong: That is why in the work of the Army Industrial College I am urging that we not only have Army and Navy officers teaching but also civilians. I think in setting up the Department of Research with civilian specialists we really started something.

Dr. Evans: I think the continuation of military studies is going to have to take accessibility of materials far more into account than the people working in the field have had to do in the past. Getting the materials from certain countries for the World War II period is going to be a far more serious problem than we have ever faced before. It is quite likely that it is going to be impossible to build up large collections on military developments in Europe during the past five years in more than one or two places because so many of the books have been destroyed. Much material published in Europe during the last five years is impossible to procure in the United States. The Library of

Congress copies of many books may well be the only copies ever to reach this country.

The Library of Congress has been trying for several years to gain the support of the libraries of this country in undertaking obligations for completeness of their collections of foreign publications in agreed-upon fields. We have tried to secure agreements among the large research libraries by which each would say: "We collect in many fields, but in view of the fact that X library will assume completeness in one field, our library will agree to collect everything in print that it can possibly lay its hands on in a designated field." Then, by putting all of these agreements together you have complete coverage for the country as a whole. I think the scholars in the various fields should back this movement or the Library of Congress will be unable to put it across.

You may be surprised to know that of all the books ever printed in the history of the world, a rather large proportion do not exist in a single copy in the United States. Whereas if libraries were to undertake obligations to secure complete collections in particular fields, we could have somewhere in the country practically all the books of research value ever printed everywhere. But libraries in universities aren't competent to make binding agreements in regard to these things because the fields in which they collect are determined finally by the university administrations. The scholars in the various departments of learning must cooperate with the libraries or they will never achieve this desirable end.

Professor Nichols: What are your relations with the Army War College?

Dr. Evans: They aren't very well developed as yet. As soon as the War Department decides what it is going to do with its library system we will be very glad to deal with it on a cooperative basis. What the Industrial College Library setup in the future is going to be I don't know.

If libraries will agree with the Library of Congress as to the things it ought to go after with its money, we are willing to cooperate with them by using our funds in the general public interest rather than just to accumulate material for our own collections.

Mr. Clough: It occurred to me that it might be feasible to establish seminars on a graduate level where you would have economists, political scientists, sociologists, geographers, and possibly historians, to deal with the combined field that we are all interested in.

General Armstrong: The Industrial College holds a series of seminars at least on the average of once a week in which we bring in representatives of the Army and Navy and Government departments, and try to get people like yourself who are interested. We have had very good luck with the seminars which we consider one of the most valuable means of making other Government agencies like the State Department realize the part they play in planning with the Army Industrial College for the future.

Mr. Clough: It would seem to me very logical that a series of these could be established to deal primarily with the foreign military potentials.

Dr. Evans: There is a related subject that has concerned a number of us who are such long-time residents of Washington that we are almost native sons. As you well know, there have been discussions since the time of George Washington as to what to do about the city of Washington as an educational center. This city has now developed into the greatest center in the country for research, and it has great potentialities for advanced instruction. What to do about it? A number of people have discussed this over a period of the last few years. They have been thinking chiefly in terms of a research center of some kind over behind the Supreme Court. There are other ideas about it. Harold Lasswell has proposed that the Library of Congress be a center around which to build research institutes, and I think that if the matter were properly presented and developed you could get an organization to put money into the building up of such institutes. People would be able to use the resources of the Library of Congress and the National Archives and so on. I think we are going to have to face this question one of these days.

I think this group ought to take hold of the problem and work on it because in my opinion a new program of military studies must concern itself with the role of the city of Washington in research. I don't have any proposals as to what the Library of Congress should do. I don't think it is our job to solve the problem. It is our job to serve in a way that will fit in with the general plans of the scholars. The Library of Congress is willing to build up a great collection of military and naval histories if that is desirable. I think we have enough military and naval materials now to take care of the needs of Congress. If the War Department will take care of the needs of the agencies of the Government and the needs of the schools, we are perfectly willing for it to do that.

Dr. Wright: If you are going to have a good deal of graduate work being done, the most natural field will be the military history of the United States. You will have to have research materials. It is highly likely that automatically there is going to be a demand of a very practical nature in connection with the matter.

Dr. Evans: Would it be of help if the Library of Congress and the National Archives were to say: "OK, with the many specialists in this field on our staff, we will take the responsibility for organizing a seminar in various subjects of study just as a way of getting people together and focussing attention?" Would something like that be useful?

General Armstrong: How could I bring this to the attention of the Library of Congress? This brings up an entirely new point looking to the future of the Army Industrial College established in some permanent home. Our old library was taken away from us. Harvard prepared a bibliography of books that had been published in the last five or six years having anything to do with industrial mobilization -- 5,000 titles.

Dr. Evans: We would be glad to acquire these 5,000 titles.

General Armstrong: They are being acquired at the Pentagon with the understanding that we can have them when we get our own building and library. But what I am thinking about for the moment is the thousands of books from Germany, England and France, which we have absolutely no way of getting at the present time, on the experiences of industrial mobilization during this war.

Dr. Evans: Let me tell you of the arrangements we have worked out with the National Gallery of Art. It became obvious as soon as the National Gallery opened its doors that it would have the choice of building the library that would have to be in existence for it to operate successfully, or of having the Library of Congress develop a collection that would be so complete and so easily available to the Gallery that the problem would be solved. We told the National Gallery we would be willing to buy whatever books were needed for the use of the National Gallery except that we would expect the Gallery to buy a working reference collection for itself. We have worked the thing out successfully. We have established a pattern which is workable as between the Library of Congress and another library in a specialized field.

We guarantee to send them any book in the Library of Congress collection that they have to have, even if it is ordinarily restricted and isn't available to other people. If they have to have a certain book and we have an extra copy, we will send it to them. If they want an expensive German book, of which we only have one copy, we will go out and buy them the copy rather than their having to buy it themselves. We have thus created a system that is much more efficient and much less costly to both sides than it would be otherwise. We would be perfectly willing to do the same for the War Department and the Navy Department. We have designated five members of the staff of the National Gallery as fellows of the Library of Congress for the purpose of selecting books for us to buy in their fields of interest.

General Armstrong: How do you establish that relationship?

Dr. Evans: By an exchange of letters with the head of the agency. We have a similar setup with the Department of Agriculture and the Army Medical Library. One copy of every American medical book which comes into the Library of Congress by copyright goes automatically to the Army Medical Library.

Professor Nichols: We have laid the subject wide open. After lunch we shall attempt to formulate conclusions. We will now adjourn for lunch.

Afternoon Session

Dr. Earle: What we are all trying to do is to study military affairs as a branch of politics or economics or what you might call "statecraft." I took the trouble about ten years ago of going through the catalogues of a number of large universities in the courses of history, economics, and politics. I found no reference at all to military affairs in any of those three branches. I was particularly impressed with the fact that in courses in politics you could find out how the county clerk's office operates but nothing about how the War and Navy Departments operate. This was also reflected in the textbooks.

There is a remarkable little essay, which most of you in this room know, by Professor Oman of Oxford entitled: "A Plea for Military History." He advances the theory that some of the most important decisions in the whole historical process have revolved around military tactics -- not just military strategy but tactics -- and that a slight shift one way or the other in the success or failure of those tactics might have changed the whole course of European history. That is only part of the essay. It is imperative that there be a more general comprehension on the part of the average citizen, and certainly on the part of the scholar who influences the quality of citizens through his teachings and understanding, of these fundamental military principles. This is by way of emphasizing what has already been said one way or the other.

I have been asked to discuss "the practical means of coordinating work in the social sciences with a comprehensive defense program."

The proper understanding of military history is not only essential to an understanding of all history, but also is essential to an understanding of the foreign and military policies of the nation. The state of the geographical sciences in the United States is a very sad one and something desperately needs to be done to improve the study of geography. What is true in this country in geography is that we have had almost no geographers, certainly none comparable to the French geographers. Our geographers are mostly geologists. There is a desperate need for the training of young geographers. What has to be done is not to set out and train geographers as such, but take able young political scientists and see that they get the best geographical training possible. The approach to political geography should not be through geography but should be through political science in the field of geography.

Military affairs also includes international relations. It is a matter of very great moment to all of us because after the last war the teaching of international relationships was, generally speaking, utterly unrealistic. This also involves economics and in the field of economics it involves a great many sub-divisions. One of the most interesting and fruitful of these has been the work of Frank Notestein in population analyses of present-day population and population trends. Unless studies of that kind are made, it is going to be impossible to measure the war potential of other nations. The war potential of the United States cannot be stated except in terms of the war potential of other nations as well. That is the work of economics. Obviously psychology enters into military studies to some extent. The psychological, emotional, and other related causes of war have been very much underestimated and the economic causes of war very much overestimated.

The psychologists have a role to fill in an understanding of these problems of military affairs. General scientific research is something on which any student of military affairs ought to keep a watchful eye.

I think it is clear, also, for us to understand what it is we can do in this field and what we cannot do. We are not and we do not wish to be masters or directors of military strategy. We may influence those things very markedly but that is not our primary job. Our job is to relate a study of military affairs to statecraft, and particularly to tie up military policies with foreign policies. Foreign policy, however, isn't the right word. I visualize foreign policy as going quite beyond things that center in the State Department.

The most important single thing that a university professor has to contribute to specific policies is time. He may have to teach classes, but he doesn't have to meet eight classes a day six days a week. He does have time for the consideration of public questions in a way that the public official doesn't have. He has time to write about them and thus to influence specific policies. He has an opportunity of influencing successive generations of college undergraduates, not to dictate to them, but to see to it that they understand all of the implications of political questions. We can make undergraduates see that any given question isn't quite as simple as they are prone to think it is. They can draw their own conclusions. The fact that we do have both power and the opportunity in perfectly legitimate ways to influence the formulation of public opinion is a matter of great concern to all of us, and I think a priceless opportunity.

We can also maintain effective cooperation with the various service schools and with the various services. It is true that academic people have come to have a higher respect for the professionals in the Armed Forces during the war. Professional soldiers have also come to respect highly the academicians. One of the surprising things about this war is that a high percentage of civilians are influencing military decisions at a fairly high level and influencing them to the satisfaction of the Armed Forces. I think the Armed Forces have been impressed with the ability of the civilian mind to bring a certain type of knowledge and intellect to bear on military problems which the members of the Armed Forces, through their preoccupation with detail, have not been able to bring to bear. What are we going to do about this?

There are a great many people in this country who are working on studies of military affairs, but they are not in contact with one another. We at Princeton in the Institute For Advanced Study conduct post-doctrinal education. We are in a position to create the conditions under which people interested in this subject can work together to advantage. What we ought to do is to make it possible for people who are working in this field to come together for a year at a time on leave of absence for the purpose of giving them maximum freedom to do their own work plus the opportunity to participate in joint discussions of broad studies of military affairs. There is an enormous amount of work being done here and there and elsewhere which needs some center of study and exchange of ideas to give it maximum effectiveness, and I think that is our job. Nobody can afford to come to the Institute for Advanced Study except on leave from his university on part pay. But if it can be shown that a leave under these conditions produces rich dividends, we shall get cooperation from the universities. There is great need for first

class instruction in military affairs. There should be seminars conducted in various places which should be as far as possible cooperative endeavors cutting across departmental lines. We have got to think in terms of instruction beyond departmental lines. There are going to be possibilities of teaching in this field.

Something of the same kind has got to be done with Army ROTC units. The tendency has been just to assign somebody to head them because they don't know what else to do with him. That is wrong. The Army shouldn't send the poorest men. It should send the best. If the Army and Navy want to attract young men for reserve commissions or military careers they ought to put their best foot forward, not their worst foot. A lot of colleges don't have ROTC units because of that. In the undergraduate level there are several ways in which this sort of thing can be done successfully. There is great room for the study of military history as a regimented academic subject. That has been done at Oxford for a long time in the teaching of military history. Men teaching military history could make a tremendous contribution to the broad field of history. Undergraduates will take and enjoy military history if it is properly taught, not for ROTC purposes but for the same reason you would study any other phase of human history.

There is room in the study of the ordinary courses in politics, not to teach the whole course in military affairs, but certainly a course in politics which would give adequate emphasis to the Armed Forces as part of national life. It seems nonsensical to teach all about national policy except one of the most essential things -- the role of the Armed Forces in statecraft.

What is true of politics is true of economics. The preparation for war and the conduct of war have a tremendous impact on our economic life. No course in economics which is properly taught would leave that out. There are a number of other ways in which military affairs can be taught.

As to the institutions which are interested -- I might mention Dartmouth, Stanford, Rutgers and Columbia. As to specific subjects for research, there are so many that it really isn't advisable to mention any single one over others. We certainly need a definition of the military systems of the several powers, changing conditions of security for each of the great powers, economic warfare, the garrison state, the need for increasing correlation between the military policy in the United States and our foreign policy. I could give an even larger list. The difficulty is not that there aren't enough things to do. There are not enough people to do them and do them well.

Professor Nichols: You have given us a good many valuable suggestions.

Professor Troyer S. Anderson: What we have been talking about today so far has chiefly been in the direction of how to bring military affairs into the universities -- into the educational circle. What I am going to talk about is how to bring the universities into certain aspects of military affairs. My interest in this arises primarily from some thinking I have done on the future of the Historical Branch of G-2 or whatever form or shape historical work within the War Department takes.

We have been doing some thinking about the future. I am also very much interested in the aspect that Earle especially emphasized -- that of the coordination in our national defense of thinking of all aspects of the defense

problem. There is a tremendous need for getting away from thinking of defense as primarily something done by the troops and ships. I think we are all agreed that the Army and Navy need the very best sort of historical work that can be provided for them, and that the public needs to be put in touch with the problems of national defense. If we have any luck at all there will be some sort of historical work carried on in the Army and Navy. We have, in comparison with other countries, been terribly remiss in this. How is it going to be done?

The organizational problems I will not attempt to go into. I will confine my remarks and suggestions to one or two aspects of it.

Experienced personnel. Let us suppose you have, subsequent to this war, some sort of historical office, as I trust we shall. My feeling is that in this historical office one of the grave problems is going to be the question of adequate personnel. Right now, during the war, you can get personnel in uniform. When you have so many of the colleges and universities operating on half speed, you can get them by leave of absence for the war effort. But when the civilians in uniform drop back into civilian clothes, then a very considerable problem arises -- that of getting an adequate staff to carry on historical work of the very highest kind. The problem must be solved by an approach from two directions. You must have the Regular Army and Navy in on the thing. Any historical work which was manned solely by civilians and reserve officers would be inadequate. We must get some personnel from the Regular officer class, some from civilian sources. Two things must be done to get this personnel:

(1) Set up some conditions of service in the historical branch which will enable the very best Army officers to serve some of their time in the historical work, to serve a regular tour with really worthwhile promotion prospects. There will probably be some military men that would discover that writing Army and Navy histories was something they could do. Make it possible for officers to serve not just one short tour but perhaps several tours of duty in the Historical Branch so that they could build up their experience and give the benefit of their constant training to the higher command. You would have to begin by taking certain men and sending them to graduate schools to be trained in historical methods for two or three years. Then make it possible to use that experience from time to time so they won't lose the skills they have acquired.

(2) Now take the other side, the civilian side. How are you going to get them in times of peace? You will get perhaps a few people who might be willing to spend their whole careers in this work, but relatively few. For, as things are now, the intelligent civilian in the War and Navy Departments is considered a little "below the salt," a status the very desirable man will not willingly accept. To get good men you will probably have to get them on some sort of temporary basis.

It should be made possible for men to serve in the Historical Branch pretty much on terms of semi-permanent tours, comparable to the status of assistant or associate professors. They should be given abundant opportunity to do research which would be published with the authority of the branch but under their own names, so that by their writings they could make positions for themselves in the scholarly world. Probably the majority of them would expect to seek academic positions later on. In the Historical Branch they would be free from the heavy teaching obligations which restrict the amount of time which

younger men can usually devote to research. It would be a considerable attraction to men of that sort, who might serve with the Historical Branch of the War Department as part of their academic careers.

An arrangement ought to be made whereby professors can take sabbaticals to serve with the Historical Branch. The Historical Branch, with just a little financial support, could hold out a very strong inducement. Usually any man who takes a year's sabbatical has to do it on half salary. If the War Department or Defense Department would be willing to set up a salary for those people, and then make it financially feasible for them to take a sabbatical and work in the Historical Branch, you could get people in for a year or so and perhaps get a lot more done than otherwise possible. Perhaps you could even do it on a smaller scale, say in the summer school periods. You could have people coming in and going out constantly.

It would also be possible to make the Historical Branch a sort of "farming out" institution for as many graduate schools as would be willing to cooperate. If the Historical Branch with a small permanent staff of skilled people can be set up, it could supervise the research of a number of men. Bring them in for a year or so on scholarships to write their theses as part of the work of the Historical Branch. They might get far better and more careful guidance than they would get at their universities. Then they could seek academic positions in the usual way.

Not only would you get good personnel coming in, but every one that went out would be a distributor of that interest and a builder of that interest. Through it all you would build up contact between the historical work of the Defense Department and the academic work outside.

The same opportunities might be extended, in appropriate cases, to economists and political scientists.

Dr. Earle: We are all troubled in the Army Air Forces about the Historical Section. We have an enormous amount of work to do in the story of the Army Air Forces. There is more work than any of us can see getting done unless a lot of us get more help than we have. We could use some really good academicians on specific jobs within the Army Air Forces which will not get done in any reasonable time unless we could draw on qualified personnel from the outside. We might even get professors to utilize the resources of the Historical Division in their summer holidays or year off for substantial pieces of work which would add to their own prestige and do something which the Army needs to have done. We have an enormous amount of material on the role of the Army Air Forces in this war which could use the type of specialized knowledge that the historians of this country could provide, and I think it could be arranged without too much difficulty to have that material put at their disposal because, although the documents are classified and over-classified, they will be de-classified within a reasonable time. We would welcome that kind of assistance.

Dr. Wright: I think the problem is whether it will appeal to Congress or not.

Professor Anderson: There is a tremendous amount of work which will have to be done in military history affairs which will not be directly the history of our own Army. We very much need to study the history of other

armies. It is particularly necessary in connection with this war. An enormous amount of material has fallen into our hands and will be available for that study. The Historical Branch could and should make itself responsible not only for the study of American operations but for the study of the operations of other countries.

Dr. Earle: It is very important that there be a historical section of the General Staff which is not under G-1. The way to do it would be to make it a section of the Office of the Chief of Staff, if you can't make it part of the Secretary's office. Then you have got it in its proper position. It carries a lot more weight there.

Professor Pendleton Herring: This discussion has followed unusually straight lines. I am quite willing to attempt a summary but hardly think this is necessary.

Where do we go from here? I have this impression: In the first place, we as a group see this problem in common terms. We are talking the same language. Moreover, we have been analyzing the problem in fairly specific terms as to what is desirable; so that it seems to me a record of our proceedings would be an excellent tool with which to work. I think one question would be whether or not we could bring some of these problems to the attention of different institutions, colleges, and the government. We had suggested arrangements that seemed to this group desirable. One device we might consider on the academic side would be to propose to the Social Science Research Council that they have a committee on military studies that would provide a focal point for people in our colleges, provide the means for holding occasional meetings, and a means for continuing interest through a planning committee.

It might be that that would be a feasible first step. It seems to me that what we need to do is get this kind of discussion disseminated and get our university people to see the range of possibilities that have been canvassed here. We need to do the same thing on the Government side.

We have made a very clear statement of the problem and that statement should be brought to the attention of people who do not have a clear understanding of the problem. I think that in order to prevent this meeting from simply evaporating and becoming a pleasant memory, we should try to carry through at least to that extent.

Major DeWeerd: Would it not be advisable to make a record of this conference and have it written up and such segments of the report as could be useful published in the form of an article in one or more publications? It seems to me that there ought to be more than one place where people would be interested in what has been said here today. Military Affairs would be very eager to print this. I think that the American Historical Review should carry a note embodying some of the things we have said here today. I think we should consider the possibility of writing up something along this line for one of the more literary journals.

Mr. Clough: Just to make the thing a little more concrete: I make a motion to the effect that Major DeWeerd be instructed to prepare the minutes of this meeting before they are made public; that he prepare these minutes for distribution; and that he also assume the responsibility of seeing that

it be prepared in article form for the appropriate journals whose clientele would profit from the ideas we have given expression to. Is there a second to this motion?

Professor Albion: I second the motion.

Professor Anderson: Do you think it would be wise for this group to consider ways and means of working on behalf of getting the historical organization in the Defense Departments set up adequately on a permanent basis?

Professor Herring: Are there any individuals who would carry the ball -- any people within the Government -- assuming that this document is prepared?

Mr. Clough: I was going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that some action committee be appointed. We might contemplate the appointing of a committee in the Social Science Research Council. I am not entirely certain that that is feasible at the moment. Perhaps we might get more action, at least more ready action, if a committee were set up, let us say, in the Military Institute. It would be an action committee, and it also might be possible to set up within the War Department or within the Army and Navy Industrial College another committee that would try to spread the thinking in Government circles.

General Armstrong: I think that this could very well be made something to consider before a monthly meeting of the American Military Institute to which we should urge the attendance of all military and naval historians. Now is the time to get these people who have actually engaged in this research interested in the American Military Institute.

Professor Nichols: I think we are particularly interested in keeping the Industrial College in the picture. That is certainly essentially in the interest of the Social Science Research Council. The thing they are most interested in is interdisciplinary cooperation.

General Armstrong: You are not working to break down the barriers any more than I am.

Professor Herring: If we had another meeting we could then bring in a few other people who might help.

Mr. Clough: Would it be appropriate for us to suggest that the American Military Institute appoint a committee on research and action? If any committee of the Council were set up it would cooperate very closely with it. If the committee wanted a meeting of this sort we might be able to find money to pay for it. And if you had a similar committee in the Army Industrial College we would like somebody to whom we could pass the ball.

Professor Nichols: Then as I get it, General, there are going to be several committees set up and the Washington people are going to endeavor to get all those that are interested in the history of the Armed Forces together.

General Armstrong: It is valuable to have a strong indication of interest from a group like the Social Science Research Council which is broader

than the American Military Institute.

Professor Nichols: That means, of course, coming in direct contact with executive secretaries of the National organizations.

Dr. Earle: If the Social Science Research Council can be kept interested in this it would help enormously.

Professor Nichols: The Problems and Policy Committee of the Social Science Research Council will receive a report on this meeting. The minutes will also be prepared for limited circulation. If there is no further discussion the meeting stands adjourned.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

September 26, 1942

Dear Mr. Aydelotte:

Over the past week end we held in Princeton a very successful conference on military man power, the agenda and "Who's Who" of which I am enclosing because I think they will be of some interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

E.M.

Edward Mead Earle

CONFIDENTIAL

Agenda

Conference on

MAN POWER, MILITARY POTENTIAL, AND AMERICAN POLICY

Princeton, New Jersey
Friday Afternoon and Evening
September 25, 1942

Under the combined auspices of The Geopolitical Section of G-2,
The Institute for Advanced Study, and Princeton University

Introduction

Analysis of the man power resources--military and civilian, present and prospective--of all important states and regions, is a prerequisite to the formulation of sound conclusions:

(1) As to the most effective strategy for prosecuting the present war;
(2) As to terms of peace consistent with the larger interests of the United States; and
(3) As to the future military strategy and foreign policy of the United States.

The relation between population and state power cannot be reduced to a simple formula. A large population may be an element of strength, or an element of weakness, depending on the people's material resources, their capital equipment, their age distribution, their vitality, their literacy and skills, and on many other conditions and circumstances. However, with the spread of technical skills, there may be a trend today toward an increasing correlation between numbers and power.

This trend assumes special importance in the light of changes taking place in the over-all picture of world population. Profound demographic changes amounting to a vital revolution are taking place. In Western Europe, Great Britain, the British Dominions, and in the United States, this vital revolution has reached the stage of incipient population decline. Other regions, notably eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., are in earlier stages, characterized by very rapid growth of total numbers. Still other regions, such as China and India, are in even earlier stages, characterized by high fertility, high mortality, great congestion, and poverty.

These differences both in the rate and in the direction of population change, in conjunction with other developments, already show signs of radically altering the power potential of certain states and regions, and of profoundly affecting the future power relations of all states. The nature of these effects, and their probable impact on the geopolitical position of the United States, should be thoroughly understood, in order that the national interest may be safeguarded in prosecuting the war, in framing the terms of peace, and in shaping the post-war military policy of the United States.

Afternoon Session

Opening remarks by the Chairman (Dr. Edward Mead Earle)

Population trends in Europe (Presented by the technical staff of the Office of Population Research, Princeton University)

I. In general:

A. The fundamentals of population change in Europe (Dr. Frank W. Notestein)

1. Population changes in the inter-war period
2. Prospects for population change in Europe
   a. the underlying situation
   b. Changes in total numbers
   c. Changes in age distribution
   d. The effects of war

B. The shifting balance of man power in Europe (Dr. Irene B. Taeuber)

1. Resume of declining populations under 15, increasing proportions over 65, and the regional differences
2. The declining military potential of Europe outside the U.S.S.R. (Numerical trends 15-19 and 20-34, males, for Western and Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.)
3. Changes in the total industrial population (Trends in total population 15 to 64; shifting dependency loads; internal aging.)
4. Military and economic implications (Changing proportions of military manpower in the various regions of Europe, and the U.S.S.R. versus the remainder of Europe)

II. Two illustrative cases, showing the relation of man power to geopolitical position:

A. The U.S.S.R. (Dr. Frank Lorimer)

1. Population and resources
2. Ethnic composition and literacy
3. Industrial structure
4. Dynamics of population growth
5. Redistribution
6. Conclusion

B. Germany (Mr. Dudley Kirk)

1. The demographic basis of German power
2. The relative decline of German military potential
   a. Following the last war
   b. As projected on the basis of past population trends
3. The influence of Nazi population policies on future German man power
4. The probable influence of war losses on future German man power

Evening Session

Some geopolitical and geomilitary implications of population facts and trends:

I. In what ways do demographic conditions in Latin American countries affect the military potential of the Western Hemisphere? (Dr. Dana G. Munro)

II. In what ways do demographic conditions affect the military potential of China? (Dr. David N. Rowe)

III. In what ways do demographic factors affect the balance of forces in the Moslem world? (Dr. Jean Gottmann)

IV. Suggested topics for general discussion

A. Does a stationary or declining population, in geographical proximity to an expanding population, impose on the former a purely defensive military strategy? The case of France?

B. How does age distribution affect military potential? Compare the situations of France, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, and the U.S.S.R.

C. To what extent has the increase of Russian power potential been a result of the coincidence of rapid population growth, large resources, and rapid industrialization?

D. Is this phenomenon likely to be repeated in China? or in India?

V. What bearing do population trends in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere have on the terms of peace and on the post-war military policies of the United States? (Dr. Harold Sprout)

. . . . .

Personnel of Conference on Military Man Power

Princeton, New Jersey
September 25, 1942

From the United States Army

Colonel Herman Beukema, Head of the Department of History, Economics and Politics at the United States Military Academy

Colonel John H. Ives, Chief, Aviation Cadet Section, Directorate of Personnel Army Air Forces

Lt. Colonel Edward Y. Blewett, Chief, Enlisted Branch, A-1 Division, Air Staff, Headquarters Army Air Forces

Lt. Colonel William S. Culbertson, Chief, Geopolitical Section, Military Intelligence Service

Lt. Colonel Clayton DuBosque, Chief, Personnel Research Section, Directorate of Personnel, Headquarters Army Air Forces.

Major Homer A. Stebbins, Evaluation and Dissemination Branch, War Department General Staff

From the Naval Training Unit at Princeton University

Captain Ralph C. Parker, Commanding Officer (evening session only)

Commander G. E. Sage, Executive Officer (evening session only)

Lt. Commander F. L. Douthit

Lt. Commander C. M. Green

Lieutenant Richard G. Breeden (evening session only)

Lieutenant F. C. Dugan

Lieutenant D. D. Snyder

From Princeton University

Dr. Robert G. Albion, Professor of History; military and naval historian; President of the American Military Institute.

Dr. William S. Carpenter, Chairman of the Department of Politics

Lt. Colonel Arthur E. Fox, Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics

Dr. Wm. T. R. Fox, of the School of Public and International Affairs

Dr. Dana G. Munro, Director of the School of Public and International Affairs

Colonel J. M. McDowell, Professor of Military Science and Tactics

Dr. Frank Notestein, Director of the Office of Population Research

Members of the staff of the Office of Population Research

Dr. Kingsley Davis
Mr. Dudley Kirk
Dr. Clive Kiser
Dr. Frank Lorimer
Dr. Irene Taeuber

Dr. David N. Rowe of the School of Public and International Affairs; just returned from China on a mission for the Office of Strategic Services

Dr. Harold Sprout, Associate Professor of Politics; author of volumes on American naval history and policy.

From the Institute for Advanced Study

Dr. Harvey A. De Weerd, editor of Military Affairs and presently to be made associate editor of the Infantry Journal.

Dr. Edward Mead Earle, Professor in the School of Economics and Politics. Consultant to the Office of Strategic Services, the War Department General Staff, and the Board of Economic Warfare.

Dr. Jean Gottmann, geographer; Rockefeller Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study

Mrs. Valentine T. Bill, research assistant

From other institutions

Dr. S. W. Boggs, Geographer of the Department of State

Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé of the University of Pennsylvania, author of Geopolitics, The Struggle for Space and Power.

Dr. Max Ways, Assistant Chief, Enemy Branch, Board of Economic Warfare

Dr. Donald Wheeler, Chief of the Labor Supply Section, Office of Strategic Services

. . . .

PARTIAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE PRINCETON MILITARY STUDIES GROUP 1939-1944

Edward Mead Earle, Chairman	Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study; special consultant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces; served at Headquarters, Army Air Forces and overseas with the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and United States Strategic Air Forces; special advisor to the Secretary of the Navy on Naval R.O.T.C. course "The Foundations of National Power"; visiting lecturer at the Army War College, the Army Industrial College, the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the Army and Navy Staff College; Fellow in Military Science, the Library of Congress.
Robert G. Albion	Professor of History in Princeton University, now associated with the Historical Section of the Navy Department.
Harold G. Sprout	Associate Professor of Politics in Princeton University; civilian advisor to the Navy Department in connection with the course "The Foundations of National Power."
Bernard Brodie	Formerly member of the Institute for Advanced Study; now a Lieutenant, U.S.N.R., assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, on detached duty with the Department of State at the San Francisco Conference; after the war will become an associate of the Institute of International Studies at Yale University
Gordon A. Craig	Assistant Professor of History in Princeton University; now Captain, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve (Air Intelligence).
Pierre Cot	French Under-Secretary of State; Minister of Aviation (1933-1934 and again in 1936-1937). Minister of Commerce (1938).
Étienne Dennery	Professor at the École libre des Sciences Politiques; now Director of the American Section, French Foreign Office; formerly a Captain on the staff of General De Gaulle.
Harvey A. DeWeerd	Formerly a member of the Institute for Advanced Study; now a Major of Infantry, Army of the United States; an editor of the Infantry Journal; after the war will become Professor of History at the University of Missouri.
William T. R. Fox	Formerly Instructor in Princeton University; now an associate of the Institute of International Studies at Yale University.

Felix Gilbert	Formerly a member of the Institute for Advanced Study; now with OSS Detachment in Germany.
Jean Gottmann	Formerly a member of the Institute for Advanced Study; special consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration; now special advisor to the French Ministry of National Economy; Assistant Professor of Geography in Johns Hopkins University.
Stefan T. Possony	Formerly a member of the Institute for Advanced Study; now in the Navy Department in Washington.
Charles P. Stacey	Assistant Professor of History at Princeton University; now Colonel, General Staff, Canadian Expeditionary Forces.
Richard P. Stebbins	Formerly a member of the Institute for Advanced Study; now a research assistant, Office of Strategic Services.
Alfred Vagts	Formerly a member of the Institute for Advanced Study; author of Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik.

PARTIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PRINCETON MILITARY STUDIES GROUP 1939-1944

Edward Mead Earle

Editor and co-author, Makers of Modern Strategy; Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton University Press, 1943) 553 pp.

"American Military Policy and National Security," Political Science Quarterly, March 1938, Vol. LIII, No. 1, pp. 1-13

"National Defense and Political Science," Political Science Quarterly, December, 1940, Vol. LV, No. 4, p. 481-495

"National Defense, A Program of Studies," The Journal of the American Military Institute, Winter 1940, Vol. IV, pp. 199-208

(The foregoing articles stated in general the purposes and objectives of Professor Earle's research and the work of the scholars associated with him.)

"Political and Military Strategy for the United States," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, November 1940.

(A discussion of the concepts of "defense", "security" and "strategy" based in part upon suggestions and criticisms of members of the seminar.)

"National Security and Foreign Policy," The Yale Review, Spring 1940, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, pp. 444-460

"The Threat to American Security," The Yale Review, Spring 1941, Vol. XXX, No. 3, pp. 454-480

(Two related articles, constituting an examination of military security as a predominant consideration in the formulation of American foreign policy from colonial times to the present.)

"American Security--Its Changing Conditions," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1941, Vol. 218, pp. 186-193

"The Future of Foreign Policy," The New Republic, (Twenty-fifth Anniversary Number) November 8, 1939, pp. 86-94.

(An examination of the basic factors in American foreign relations as they are related to the present European war.)

Against This Torrent (Princeton University Press, 1941), 73 pp.

(A commentary on American foreign policy with special reference to security as its principal desideratum.)

Edward Mead Earle (continued)

"Inter-American Factors in Security," Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Canadian-American Affairs (1941) pp. 198-209, 244-27

Relentless War: The Key to Victory (Columbia University Press, 1942) 30 pp.

Robert G. Albion

Sea Lanes in Wartime; the American Experience, 1775-1942 (Princeton University Press, 1942) 367 pp.

Harold Sprout

The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton University Press, 1939) 398 pp.

Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton University Press, 1943) 336 pp.

Editor of a forthcoming volume of readings Foundations of National Power: Readings on World Politics and American Security, to be used as a text in the Navy course on The Foundations of National Power

Bernard Brodie

Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton University Press, 1941) 472 pp.

A Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1944) 314 pp.

"Defense and Technology," The Technology Review, January 1941, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, pp. 3-7

"War at Sea," Virginia Quarterly Review, Winter 1943, Vol. 19, pp. 1-19

"Revolution in the Pacific," Virginia Quarterly Review, Autumn 1944, Vo. 20, pp. 496-510

"Our Ships Strike Back," Virginia Quarterly Review, Spring 1945, Vol. 21, pp. 186-206

Gordon A. Craig

Chapter on Hans Delbrück, the military historian, in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1943) pp. 260-283

"Technique of Peacemaking," The Yale Review, Autumn 1944, Vol. 34, pp. 113-128

Étienne Dennery

"Democracy and the French Army," Military Affairs, Winter 1941, Vol. V, No. 4

Harvey A. DeWeerd

Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars (New York, 1941) 378 pp.

Chapter on Churchill, Lloyd George and Clemenceau in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1943) pp. 287-305

"Emergence of Coalition War," The Yale Review, Summer 1942, Vol. 31, pp. 649-670

"De Gaulle As a Soldier," The Yale Review, Summer 1943, Vol. 32, pp. 760-776

"Japan's Fatal Miscalculations," The Yale Review, Fall 1944, Vol. 34, pp. 129-141

William T. R. Fox

The Super-Powers (New York, 1944) 184 pp.

Felix Gilbert

Chapter on Machiavelli in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1943) pp. 3-25

Jean Gottmann

Les Relations Commerciales de la France; Études de Géographie Economique (Montreal, 1942) 211 pp.

Chapter on Bugeaud, Galliéni and Lyautey in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1943) pp. 234-259

"The Background of Geopolitics," in Military Affairs, Winter 1942, Vol. VI, pp. 196-207

Albert T. Lauterbach

Economics in Uniform (Princeton University Press, 1943) 282 pp.

"Roots and Implications of the German Idea of Military Society," The Journal of the American Military Institute, Spring 1941, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 1-20

"European Lessons for American Preparedness," The South Atlantic Quarterly, July 1941, Vol. XL, No. 3, pp. 195-210

Modern War--Its Social and Economic Aspects (1941). A mimeographed bibliography,

Stefan T. Possony

Chapter on DuPicq in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1943) pp. 207-233

Tomorrow's War, Its Planning, Management and Cost (London, 1938)

Co-author of The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War (New York, 1942), 614 pp.

Translator of Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb's Defense (Harrisburg, Pa., 1943) 159 pp. and Lieutenant General Waldemar Erfurth's Surprise in War (Harrisburg, Pa., 1943) 200 pp.

"Organized Intelligence; The Problem of the French General Staff," Social Research, May 1941, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 213-237. Reprinted under the title "The General Staff and the Downfall of France" in The Infantry Journal, November 1941, 65-71

Herbert Rosinski

The German Army (Washington, D. C., 1944) 220 pp.

"Mahan and the Present War," Brassey's Naval Annual, May 1941

Command of the Sea, the Lowell Lectures for 1941

Edmund Silberner

The Problem of War (Princeton University Press, 1945) 300 pp. A study of war as reflected in the history of economic thought of the nineteenth century.

Charles P. Stacey

The Military Problems of Canada (Toronto, 1940) 157 pp.

Colonel Stacey is the official historian of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces and will be author and editor of a series of volumes dealing with the Canadian Army overseas 1939-1945.

Richard P. Stebbins

Co-editor of War and Defense Policy, a Syllabus (New York, 1941) 131 pp.

Alfred Vagts

"War and the Colleges," Military Affairs, Summer 1940, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Document No. 4 of the Professional Series of the American Military Institute)

"Ivory Towers into Watchtowers," Virginia Quarterly Review, Spring 1941, Vol. XVII, pp. 161-178

(The foregoing papers dealt with the desirability of including in the curriculum of colleges and universities a discussion of the problems of war and defense.)

"Hopes and Fears of an American-German War," Part I and Part II, Political Science Quarterly, December 1939, pp. 514-535 and March 1940, pp. 53-76

"The German Army of the Second Reich as a Cultural Institution," in The Cultural Approach to History, edited by Caroline F. Ware (Columbia University Press, 1941)

Werner B. Ellinger and Herbert Rosinski

Sea Power in the Pacific, 1936-1941. A bibliography. (Princeton University Press, 1942) 80 pp.

Seminar project

(Tentative Outline)

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN MILITARY THOUGHT

General Editor, Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.

Foreword by Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, Columbia University

Section I: The Origins of Modern War: From the 16th to the 18th Century.

Chapter 1. Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the art of war.

Dr. Felix Gilbert, Institute for Advanced Study.

Chapter 2. Frederick the Great, Marshal Saxe, Guibert.

Professor Robert R. Palmer, Princeton University.

Chapter 3. Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton.

Professor Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Study.

Section II: The Classics of the 19th Century.

Chapter 4. Jomini.

Professor Hajo Holborn, Yale University, or
Dr. Peter Viereck, Harvard University.

Chapter 5. Clausewitz.

Professor Hans Rothfels, Brown University.

Section III: Military Thought from the Middle of the 19th Century to the First World War.

Chapter 6. Moltke and Schlieffen: the Prussian-German school.

Dr. Alfred Vagts, Institute for Advanced Study, or
Professor Hajo Holborn, Yale University.

Chapter 7. DuPicq and Foch: the French school.

Dr. Stefan Possony and Dr. Étienne Mantoux, Institute for Advanced Study.

Chapter 8. Mommsen, Delbrück, Fortescue, Oman: the military historian.

Sir Charles William Oman, All Souls College, Oxford, or
Dr. Alfred Vagts, Institute for Advanced Study.

Section III (continued)

Chapter 9. Modern Naval Thought.

1. Advocatos of Fleet Action: Mahan and others.

Mrs. Margaret Sprout, Princeton, New Jersey.

2. Advocates of the Guerre de Course.

Dr. Theodore Ropp, Duke University.

Chapter 10. Marx, Engels, Malaparte: military concepts and revolution.

Professor J. Rumney, University of Newark.

Chapter 11. Colonial and Frontier Warfare: Washington, Lyautey and others.

As yet unassigned.

Section IV: From the First World War to the Present.

Chapter 12. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Churchill, Trotski: the emergence of the civilian.

Professor Harvey A. DeWeerd, Denison University, Granville, Ohio (now at the Institute for Advanced Study).

Chapter 13. Ludendorff, Rathenau, Hitler: German concepts of total war.

Professor Hans Speier, New School for Social Research.

Chapter 14. The role of the journalist, military correspondent, and columnist.

André Géraud (Pertinax)

Chapter 15. The problems of global warfare.

Professor Harold Sprout, Princeton University.

Chapter 16. Air warfare: Douhet and others.

Major Alexander P. de Seversky.

Chapter 17. Russian Military Theorists.

Dr. Jean Gottmann, Institute for Advanced Study.

Chapter 18. Japanese military and naval thought.

Professor John Masland, Stanford University.

Chapter 19. American contributions to the theory and practice of war.

Professor Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Study.

PURPOSES AND CHARACTER OF PROPOSED VOLUME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MILITARY THOUGHT

The proposed book is primarily concerned with military thought and with those men who have made essential contributions in the field of military thinking. In a work of this kind the main steps of military history and the development of military technique will be reflected, but these factual developments should be described only insofar as they are crystallized or reflected in the literature; for instance, Napoleon's art of war will be illustrated as it is reflected in the theoretical analyses of Jomini and Clausewitz. Thus we are concerned not with military history but with military thought, as expressed by representative military men rather than by chronological classification.

A book of the type proposed does not exist in the English language and it is designed to answer important needs of the moment. Colleges and universities finally are concerning themselves with military affairs. They either have established courses in military history or have begun to stress military affairs in the teaching of history and political science. In either case the book should be of use as collateral reading. Schooling in the intellectual background of modern war forms an essential part of the training of the soldier, and officers in the army have urged the publication of the book as an aid to such instruction. Finally, the book is addressed to the general public. In a democratic nation the influence and pressure of public opinion on the conduct of the war is often considerable, and at present the American public has not been trained to think and to judge in military and strategic matters. All who have been consulted on this project agree that a book on the development of military thought, indicating the permanent elements in its makeup, would possess immediate practical political value.

If it is to be published in time to be of maximum usefulness in the

present crisis, the book must be the product of a cooperative effort. A single author would have to work years before he could complete a work of such scope. Historical completeness cannot be attained in such an enterprise, nor is it desired. The purpose is to cover the main stages of the development of military thought.

In cooperating on this volume the contributors should keep the following points in mind:

1. Main objective in preparation of each chapter is for it to contribute to the understanding of the pattern of military thought, the development of its terminology and semantics (strategy and tactics), to show the role of the commander-in-chief, the relation of planning, organization, and execution of military operations, the development of the idea of the place of war in politics, and the role of economy and technology in and for war.
2. Each chapter should contain one or two paragraphs providing a transition from the earlier period, and affording the reader a connection between the special subject concerned and previous military thought.
3. Though the amount of historical background to be included in each chapter will vary, it should not ordinarily exceed more than 10% of the entire chapter.
4. Quoted matter will be essential in many cases to illustrate the military thought of a man or period, but it should not ordinarily exceed 30% of the chapter.
5. While the chapters will vary in length and can be determined between the editor and the contributor, a minimum of 6,000 words and a maximum of 12,000 words will serve as tentative limits. Every effort should be made to employ non-technical language understandable by the layman. Essential technical terms should be defined in the text or footnotes.

6. Each contributor should include an annotated bibliography of 10-15 titles selected with a view to maximum usefulness as collateral reading. In order to expedite the preparation of the manuscript for the printer each contributor is asked to check all his references, footnotes and bibliographical citations for accuracy and completeness. Suggestions concerning maps would be welcome; colored maps will probably be impracticable because of expense, but black and white line maps can doubtless be included.

7. In matters of style, it would be advantageous for all contributors to follow a single accepted form of making citations. Since all are familiar with the usage of the Journal of Modern History, it is suggested that we adopt the Manual of Style of the University of Chicago Press as a basis for this volume.

Although no time limit has been set for the completion of manuscripts, it is obviously desirable that they be prepared with the least possible delay, especially as the proposed volume undoubtedly will have a very real utility during the war as well as in the period immediately following the termination of hostilities.

Institute for Advanced Study
March 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM REGARDING AID TO BRITAIN

How can the United States render more substantial aid to Britain than is now forthcoming? It becomes increasingly clear from the available evidence that the situation of Britain is not merely serious but critical, and that only a maximum effort on the part of the United States--in which our own defense program would be integrated with the needs of the British Empire--can forestall ultimate and perhaps early British collapse.

There is a certain psychological advantage in not discussing the topic under the heading, "Aid to Britain," but rather under "The Defeat of Germany as an Objective of American Policy." It is doubtful in fact whether we are "helping" Britain at all in any real sense. What we are doing, of course, is to sell her munitions just as we did between 1914-1917, this time, however, without credits and for "cash on the barrel head." What we are primarily concerned with in our own interest is the defeat of Germany, although there is none of us who would not also like to see Britain survive for her own sake and for the sake of the things she stands for.

The following are topics which might profitably be taken under advisement and explored at some length:

1. How can American ship-building facilities best be used and, if necessary, to what extent should they be expanded? This topic will involve not only the question of providing large numbers of cargo vessels of sufficient speed to escape from submarines and to make rapid trans-Atlantic crossings. It should lead to a reconsideration of our naval building program with a view to countering most effectively the present submarine menace. A vastly expanded ship-building program would seem to be essential not merely for the present emergency but to meet the possibility that Britain may be defeated and that the United States may be required in the future to send substantial expeditionary forces to Latin American countries or to our own insular possessions or to the islands now held by Britain, France, and Denmark.

2. To what extent can existing American tonnage be diverted to meet demands for the uninterrupted supply of the British Isles?

3. Is complete industrial mobilization now necessary if production of aircraft and other munitions is to be speeded up? If so, how should this be achieved? Can it be achieved short of a formal declaration of war? How does the existing system of priorities need to be strengthened?

4. Do we need now a council on national defense with plenary powers of wartime scope? Do we need also a committee on political and military strategy (similar to the Committee of Imperial Defense) which will have over-all supervision of the policies of the United States vis-a-vis the world crisis?

5. Should we create immediately an American equivalent to the Ministry of Economic Warfare which will tighten the blockade against the Continent of Europe, restrict the flow of war supplies to Japan and Soviet Russia, and also consider such questions as bringing pressure to bear upon Spain and other neutrals to stay out of the war or to adopt a policy favorable to Britain?

6. To what extent should we make immediately available to Britain the existing equipment of the Army and Navy and their air forces? By what means can this best be accomplished?

7. Should Americans be encouraged to volunteer as pilots, instructors and mechanics in the Royal Air Force, if necessary by a public appeal for such

volunteers conducted by appropriate American organizations? (Such appeals by belligerent powers are now clearly contrary to our neutrality laws.) In this same connection should commissioned officers of the Army and Navy air forces be granted leave of absence for the purpose of gaining actual combat experience in Europe in the interest of supplementing the supply of British pilots and at the same time of raising their own standard of technical competence. American officers flying American planes over Britain and Germany might do for us what the Spanish War did for the military establishment of Germany and, to a lesser degree, Italy.

8. How can we encourage and perhaps finance at public expense the training of cadets of the Royal Canadian Air Force at American schools during the winter months when flying conditions are relatively unfavorable in Canada?

9. Should numbers of American physicians and nurses be mobilized and sent abroad immediately to combat the outbreak and spread of epidemics in Britain during the coming winter? In particular, should the United States Government send qualified officers of the Public Health Service, especially epidemiologists? Should we establish at American Embassies and Consulates in the British Isles medical attaches whose responsibilities would be similar to those of the military and naval attaches except they would be related to prolems of public health? Should British scientists now engaged in medical and other research be invited to come to the United States to work in American laboratories where they will be free from the inevitable interruptions and distractions occasioned by air raids?

10. In this same connection, should a large number of British scholars and research workers be brought to the United States for the duration of the war and established in American universities to carry on their own researches and to collaborate with American scholars and scientists in the common defense effort?

11. How can Canadian war industry be integrated with the American war effort, particularly as regards priorities and sub-contracts?

12. How can credits of Occupied Countries and of the totalitarian states best be utilized for common Anglo-American purposes?

13. Should the United States place unreservedly at the disposal of Great Britain its huge surpluses of agricultural commodities? Should there be another trade of rubber and tin for cotton and wheat which would serve the joint purpose of avoiding further strain upon British financial resources and of accumulating stock-piles of raw materials essential for American defense. Are there possibilities of similar trades in other commodities?

14. Should we lift the ban on credits to Britain, or better still, engage in an open policy of subsidies which would avoid future recriminations over debts?

15. Should there not be an immediate and far-reaching discussion of our Far Eastern policy in order that we may do everything to aid China, bring pressure to bear upon Japan, improve the defense of the Philippine Islands, and by all of these means to lessen the possibility of a Japanese invasion of

British and Dutch territories in the South Pacific? At the same time, we should keep our eye on the ball and remember that the future of the Far East will in large measure be settled in the English Channel, in the Mediterranean, and along the North Atlantic Convoy routes, as well as in the air over Britain and Germany.

16. What should be the relations of the United States with the Vichy government? Is there any practicable way in which the resources of the French Colonial Empire can be made available for the defeat of Germany? Should we make it plain to France that any action on her part to turn over the fleet or any of her colonies to Germany would bring immediate and unconditional occupation by the United States and other American states of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere?

17. Should the American military, naval, and political intelligence services be radically expanded so that we can obtain more adequate official information of the course of the war not only in the interest of our own defense but also for the purpose of acquainting us with what it is that Britain really needs? There is some evidence now that press censorship and wishful thinking are concealing from the American people and even from the American government the seriousness of the crisis.

18. Should we enter into effective alliances, political and military, with all Latin American states, not merely for hemispheric defense as against actual attack, but also for the utilization of the resources of the Western Hemisphere to the end that German power may be curtailed before it can possibly be directed against us?

19. Should immediate naval aid be given to Britain even if it involves entering into the war? If so, should the fleet be withdrawn from the Pacific (with the exception of a defensive force to keep Japan at arm's length) and concentrated in the Atlantic and Mediterranean? In particular, should we seek to put Italy out of the war as a first step?

20. How can we best avoid the possibility that an American declaration of war might divert from Britain to the American military, naval, and air forces supplies which it is essential that Britain have if she is to hold out even until Spring? This would seem to be largely a matter of intelligent staff work.

21. How can American morale as a whole be raised, particularly by making it plain that we are now faced with probably the most serious crisis in our history, and that only measures of scope and intensity comparable to the "miracle" of 1917-1918 will suffice?

Edward Mead Earle

The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey
November 25, 1940

Dr. Oppenheimer

This is bound for Willits and Kefauver via my Committee and you. If you can find time to read it sometime soon I should be very grateful

E.M.E.

THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

Our Problem, Our Potential, Our Policy

A Memorandum by

Edward Mead Earle
The Institute for Advanced Study

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Princeton, New Jersey

October, 1940

THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

Our Problem, Our Potential, Our Policy

In an earlier memorandum, "Studies of National Defense an Obligation of Scholarship," I raised the following questions: Are military affairs a legitimate and, indeed, a vital concern of the political and social scientist? If so, what can he contribute in point of view, in method, and in content which cannot be or ordinarily is not contributed by the professional army or navy officer? There remains a third question: What topics, in particular, might profitably engage the attention of the scholar not only in the near future but over a longer period of study and research? Over a long period of time it will be desirable and even necessary to undertake basic research in military problems and in war as a fundamental social phenomenon. For the present it is the part of wisdom to concentrate attention upon the immediate military problems, the military potential, and the military policy of the United States, keeping in mind, however, their relationship to world-wide conditions.

The following specific topics are suggested, without reference to relative immediacy and importance and without contention that the list is more than an illustration of possibilities once the field as a whole is given the attention which it deserves.

The Role of the Military Services in a Democracy

There is no adequate history of the military policy of the United States, similar to the as yet incompleted work of Harold and Margaret Sprout on the Navy (The Rise of American Naval Power, 1939, and Toward a New Order of Sea Power, 1940). This would seem to be the proper time to initiate such a study, which should be something more than history, valuable as history itself would be. It would require an analysis of the theories or assumptions upon which American armies heretofore have been recruited and trained, in time of peace and in time of war, and an examina-

tion of the adequacy of those theories to present conditions. It would take due account of the role which maintenance of a professional army (including in the case of England, a mercenary army) as contrasted with a militia and citizen soldiery, has played in British and American constitutional history and in the development of republican government in the United States. It would recount our previous experiences with conscription (as in the Civil War, both North and South, and in the Land Grant colleges) and with Selective Service in 1917-1918. It would discuss the theoretical question of the obligation of military service in organized society.

Such a study would, likewise, require an appraisal of the experience of others. Most pertinent is the theory and practice of universal military service in France, particularly in the Third French Republic, where the institution of conscription was intimately associated with the ideas of the Revolution and the system of liberalism and democracy which the Revolution implied. "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" all had their application to the French military system. In Germany, on the other hand, there was an altogether different conception of the role of the army; and aside from theoretical considerations, the army was in fact a bulwark of political conservatism and reaction--until the Third Reich, when an entirely different order of things supervened. In Great Britain the practice was still different and, incidentally, more in accord with our own ideals and our practices, except that in the recruitment of the officer class there was a marked favoritism for certain social groups which had consequences of its own, good, bad, or indifferent. During the past two years the experiences of England with compulsory service have been rich with suggestions for the United States. There have also been important changes in the Swiss military system which warrant our attention. And it cannot be too strongly emphasized that we need, and need very soon, an intensive study of the processes by which Nazi Germany has produced its powerful military machine. In any such studies, there should constantly be kept to the fore not so much questions

of tactics but problems of morale, physical training, education (military, vocational, and other), collaboration of military and civilian authority, the relations between the several branches of the service, and finally the return of the soldier to civilian life, including the question of service in an organized reserve. There is a great fund of interest and human affection invested in our New Army. Its success or failure will involve the utmost we can give in way of intelligent consideration of problems of morale and of the place which the Army is to play in promoting greater national unity as well as in our efforts to acquire an effective defense.

Closely associated with these questions are others: is the maintenance of a national army and a greatly enlarged professional navy consistent with the continuance of a liberal democracy? What has been the extent to which the military establishments of other powers (Russia, Japan, Germany, France, Britain) have been able to prejudice larger questions of national policy, both foreign and domestic? What effect will rearmament have upon health, the standard of living, freedom of thought and discussion, and the national psychology? Experience abroad seems to indicate there will be diversified answers to inquiries of this sort. And although the experience of others is important for an understanding of our own problems, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the road which we are to take will of necessity be charted with primary reference to American conditions. There is a task here not merely for the historian but for the political scientist, the economist, and the psychologist as well.

The Military Potential of the United States

There have been many discussions, particularly at the Geneva disarmament conferences, of the meaning of "military potential" or "war" potential. Taken as a whole, they have been less than satisfactory--however useful as a

point of departure--because of the dominance of political as distinct from scholarly motives. There has, however, been little study of the manifold factors which enter into the military power of the United States. We have had surveys of our national resources and of industrial capacity in relation to the demands of national defense. But the military potential demands more than these: it involves consideration of geographical position in the light of the new technologies of war and, especially, civil and military transportation; man power (including, in addition to mere numbers, education, intelligence, mechanical ability, loyalty, organization, adaptability, health, occupational skills, and the like); immigrant populations and the influence they may have upon the national military effort or upon industrial efficiency; vulnerability of war industries to attack or to transportation breakdowns by reason of concentration in the northeast; the character of political and military leadership (including the organization of the high command), and the like. There is no absolute military potential; there is a relative military potential which is available at a given time and operates with reference to given situations. As was pointed out in an earlier memorandum, there must be kept to the fore the difference between the potential strength of a nation and its existing strength.

A study of the military potential of the United States would in and of itself be of enormous importance to the body of knowledge available to social scientists and to the responsible officers of the government. In addition, however, it would have relevance to the fundamental questions of national policy which we are going to have to face as a people. It is useless to have a diplomatic frontier which lies far beyond the boundaries of any military frontier we can hope to defend; in other words, we should not, as a rule, formulate policies to which in the last analysis we cannot give effect should they be challenged by armed force. This is not to say that we have been underestimating the ultimate military potentialities of the United States; on the contrary, it is probable that we have failed to appreciate

the immediate striking power of the United States in defense of many of the policies which we have enunciated vis-a-vis Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. But however this may be, it is impossible to formulate, either for academic or for practical purposes, any clear-cut picture of the place of the United States in international politics unless we understand the weight and extent of our actual and potential military strength.

What is more, we need to know how the power we possess (particularly our economic power) can be used, in time of peace as well as in time of war, in the furtherance of national policy--so that we shall not increase the strength of potential enemies or weaken ourselves or the powers whose interests most nearly coincide with those of the United States. The fact is: we have been drawn into a power-competition much against our hopes and we have to measure, as far as possible, the factors of our strength and of our weaknesses as well as to speculate on the imponderables.

The military potential of the United States has not heretofore been the result of conscious and purposeful forces but has been an incidental development in a social and economic system which has been concerned with "welfare" rather than with "military" objectives. Whether the future will change this fundamental fact remains to be seen. We must at least understand, however, the fundamental relationships between guns and butter.

The Concept of Hemispheric Defense

At present, as a result of a long series of developments since the original enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States stands officially committed to the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere--not only against military invasion but against any attempt on the part of European or Asiatic powers to "extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent" or to control the

"destiny" of any Latin-American state "in any manner." It can hardly be doubted that the existence of this policy over the past century and a quarter has been a contributing factor in world stability. But it can be questioned whether the Monroe Doctrine has not been enforced more by moral sanctions and by the existence of a balance of power in the Atlantic and Pacific areas than by any effective military support which the United States has given it or is now prepared to give it in the event of a showdown. As the balance of power in the world is now upset and may, indeed, be destroyed for some time to come, and as moral forces seem to have less weight than heretofore in the world as now constituted, it may well be that the United States must reconcile itself to maintaining an establishment on land, at sea, and in the air capable of giving effect to the Monroe Doctrine (as supplemented by certain acts of Pan American Conferences) by military force and, perhaps in addition, by military alliances. At the moment it seems as if the opinion of the American people, formulated with the help of such data as they now have at their disposal, is in accord with the official policy of maintaining the integrity of the Hemisphere by all necessary means.

But the wish is not necessarily father to the deed. As has previously been said in this memorandum, we should not have a policy which is incapable of military implementation; we should not have a diplomatic frontier which does not approximate a defensible military frontier. Sooner or later we must face the question whether we can in fact, whatever our wish, maintain forces capable of resisting both armed invasion and ideological penetration of the twenty republics to the south of our own border. And if we could maintain such forces, what would be the cost, social as well as financial, of so doing? Or is it conceivable that the political and military objectives of our Latin American policy might not be as well or better served by a narrower delimitation of our diplomatic and military frontiers? If the present policy is to be continued, how shall we construct for it a solid founda-

tion in those elements of power which can resist the assaults of the totalitarian powers?

As military power now involves a vast complex of forces--economic, political, psychological, ideological, racial, religious, geographic, and the like--it is doubtful if an answer to any of these questions can be given in terms of strategic positions and weight of armaments alone. The writer of this memorandum does not pretend to know the answers. But he does know that the problem of cooperation between the United States (and Canada) with the Latin American republics is a complicated and not a simple problem which will not be solved by political pronouncements, however well intended or however honored by past observance. He also knows that there are a good many ~~anti-stabilizing~~ centrifugal forces at work in Central and South America and that situations may well arise which will be made to order for the sinister methods and purposes of the totalitarian states. It will be universally agreed that it would be a serious threat to the security of the United States, as well as a tragedy of the first magnitude for Latin America itself, if our neighbor republics were to become the stakes of European diplomacy or were to be Balkanized by competitive trade and armament policies devised and fostered by outside influences. To prevent all of this is a task of the first magnitude. It is a problem in military strategy in the first instance. But it is also an economic problem. And it has emotional and psychological factors of far-reaching influence. It will require as much concentrated intelligence, sympathetically applied, as it can be given. It deserves all the effort we can spare. But it also requires cold-blooded, scholarly analysis and appraisal of all the facts in the case, with only such consideration to precedent as seems to be warranted by experience.

Out of such research might come one or more conclusions. It might be found that the concept of hemispheric solidarity has real substance, in which case hemispheric defense may be a less difficult task than appears on the surface. On

the other hand, it might be concluded that hemispheric solidarity does not now exist but that effective measures must be taken to make it a reality in a measurable future. Or it might seem to be the part of wisdom to recommend serious consideration of an alternative policy which would--to pick such an alternative policy at random--limit our diplomatic and strategic commitments to an area in the Caribbean and South America which would assure the defense of the Canal Zone and the approaches to this Hemisphere from the west coast of Africa. But whatever the conclusions (which certainly should set forth at some length all the conceivable alternatives available to us), there can be little doubt of the great utility, as well as the inherent scholarly interest, of a project of this kind. That it would cut across the boundaries of several academic disciplines goes without saying.

The Strategic Position of the United States in the Far East

This would not attempt to usurp the duties of the professional officer in appraising what is admittedly a complicated and delicate problem. It would rather concern itself with some of the fundamental data an understanding of which is essential to intelligent discussion and conclusions. It would seek to indicate the difference between causes of conflict in the Pacific which are transitory and those which are likely to endure for some time to come. As in the case of the study of hemispheric defense, it would require a thorough-going, rational examination of the policies which we have heretofore pursued and should we decide upon their continuance, would seek to determine whether they are capable of effective implementation, both economic and military. In the event that our historic policies require modification, in what respect?

Introspective rather than retrospective scholarship of this kind would seem to be particularly imperative in the case of the Far East because of the entirely new situation created by the formation of the Triple Axis. As Sir Robert Peel once said

in another connection, "We walk, if not in danger, at least in darkness." Although there may be some question of the wisdom of isolating a geographical area for examination without reference to our military problem as a whole, it would seem to be justified in the case of the Pacific region as well as in the case of Latin America. And it would, of course, be hoped that the research conducted in Far Eastern affairs would not be hermetically sealed against appropriate reference to world conditions.

The crux of our Far Eastern problem is, of course, the military and imperialistic resurgence of Japan, accompanied by the rapid decline throughout Asia of the prestige and power of the West. To what extent does the Japanese program of a "New Order" menace vital interests of the United States? If we are determined to resist Japanese expansion, what are the means at our disposal? Is it possible for us to maintain, at a cost which we are willing to pay, a military and naval establishment capable of meeting her in her own sphere with reasonable chances of success? Should China and perhaps Russia be made actual if not nominal allies in such a program? To what extent would an economic blockade of Japan (supplemented, if necessary, by long-range naval activity) bring her to terms? What would be the effect upon our internal economy of economic sanctions against Japan? In the circumstances, should we reconsider the Tydings-McDuffie Act which sets the Philippines free in 1946? If not, should we go further than the Act in reserving military, naval, and commercial aviation bases in the Islands? Should we fortify Guam? Should we acquire the use of Singapore or should we even consider its virtual acquisition from Great Britain? What should be the political and military relationships between the United States and Australia and New Zealand in the event of a British defeat by Germany? What should we do, if anything, in the way of denunciation of the Washington Treaties insofar as they still restrict our freedom of action? Or should we continue to observe them because they have heretofore been a concrete expression of our hopes and aspirations?

What part do the Dutch and British East Indies occupy in our economy, particularly with reference to such strategic commodities as rubber, tin, and quinine? How far could we locate and encourage other sources of supply (here there would be a tie-up with the Hemispheric defense study) or depend upon synthetic substitutes? To what extent would Japanese occupation of these territories be prejudicial to our interests in times less critical than the present? Or would Japanese dependence upon the American market for disposal of East Indian products outweigh our dependence upon them?

Quite aside from such economic and strategic considerations, can the United States stand by and witness the deterioration of international society which would be inherent in a tripartite plundering of the Far East by Germany, Italy, and Japan?

If it be objected that these questions are political rather than military, it must be pointed out that in the Far East (as in certain other regions like the Mediterranean) it is virtually impossible to isolate political factors from military factors. It was the basic premise of the Washington Conference, for example, that there could be no strategic settlement which was not inseparably tied with a political settlement and that there was no possibility of a political and economic realignment unless it were accompanied by compensatory measures of a military and naval character It was because the Washington Treaties were at first believed to offer an all-round sense of security in the entire Pacific area that they were of genuine significance to international politics and had a marked influence for a time in easing political tension the world over.

Civilian Control of Military Policy

This is a subject to which Professors Lindsay Rogers, of Columbia, and Pendelton Herring, of Harvard, have given some attention. Professor Rogers has published two noteworthy articles in Foreign Affairs, and Professor Herring has recently brought out an extensive bibliography of the available materials. It is

understood, however, that neither of them proposes to carry his research much further at this time, except that Professor Herring is conducting a seminar on some phases of the subject at the Littauer School.

There is still much to be done on this subject, however, which will require amplification at a later date.

Military Policy as a Problem of Legislation and Administration

The formulation and enactment of legislation dealing with military and naval affairs has heretofore been affected by the character of the American system of government and politics. It is not suggested that the system itself need necessarily be changed. But it is believed that a study of the processes by which legislation is framed and administered would throw a good deal of light on some of our problems of national defense. In the formulation of defense policies, the Executive, the armed forces, private groups, several committees of the House and Senate, and ultimately the Congress as a whole have special roles to fill. The President's relations with his secretaries of War and of the Navy and with the commissioned officers of the services; the relations between the War and Navy departments, with special reference to the critical question of air power; the planning functions of the Army General Staff, the Office of Naval Operations, the Navy General Board, and other professional bodies; the process of framing estimates within the War and Navy Departments; the attitude of the armed services toward civilian cooperation and advice; the relation of these services with Congress in general and with Congressional committees in particular; the activities of private pressure groups in relation to military legislation; the character of Congressional hearings and debates; the influence of sectional rivalries and special economic interests--factual studies of these factors (some of which admittedly would be difficult of documentation) would throw a flood-light upon some of the shortcomings which heretofore have marked our

defense system. Such studies, also, would keep in mind the marked influence which war scares, on the one hand, and periods of public apathy, on the other, have had on the processes of legislation. In the political campaign of 1940 all sorts of charges were bandied about by representatives of both parties without cognizance of the patent fact that many of our difficulties grow out of the system by which military appropriations are determined and are subsequently given effect.

The process of military preparedness begins with planning and legislation but ends with administration. The best planned armament program will fall short of its objectives unless it is intelligently carried into execution. It is an open secret that in the United States the administration of military affairs leaves something to be desired. Some of our shortcomings have been indicated in a former memorandum: the lack of distinction of our secretaries of War and the Navy in the past, for example, and the inability of the President, in view of all the pressing demands upon his time, to give adequate time to what has heretofore been regarded as a matter which somehow or other would take care of itself. There are other factors which require examination: the recruitment and education of officers; methods of promotion within the commissioned personnel; the organization of the War and Navy departments; the relations between the services, as well as between the several branches of each of the services. Studies of this character would have to be critical of the existing system but not hostile to it; they should be scholarly and not political in character.

Closely connected with all of this is the universally acknowledged necessity of more careful and more far-sighted planning of the national defense in all of its various aspects. Whether we require a Council of National Defense, with a permanent secretariat, or whether a different device would serve our purpose can only be decided after a thorough study has been made of the experiences of other countries--France and Great Britain and, above all, Nazi Germany. For whatever we may think of the Nazi system as a whole, it has demonstrated the importance to military success of a complete integration of national policies, as well as effective collaboration

between all branches of the armed establishment.

Conclusion

The topics given above by no means constitute a syllabus of the subject as a whole. There are others which might be mentioned en passant and for each of which a detailed prospectus might easily be drafted:

European Lessons for American Preparedness
American Economic Power as a Weapon of Defense
Social Implications of a Military Economy
Technological Changes in Warfare and Their Influence on World Politics
Changing Concepts of Peace and War
Psychological and Emotional Weapons of War: the Crucial Problem of Morale

It is not deemed necessary in this memorandum, however, to indicate more than the possibilities of the field as a whole. There is, indeed, more to be done than any research program could hope to do in several years. And the results of any single project will suggest new approaches and new subjects for investigation.

Perhaps one final question needs to be raised. Is it possible for the scholar to study war and preparedness for war and still maintain his scholarly objectivity? Admittedly, military affairs are closely bound up with powerful emotions, and it is not always easy to view them without patriotic or nationalistic bias. And even if one could, it might not be altogether desirable to do so. Heretofore scholars have largely abandoned the field to others. But ignoring a problem or running away from it is no approach to its solution. National defense has always been a powerful motive in American history. It is more so now than ever. And, if contemporary affairs are a ny indication of the future, it will continue to be so for some time to come. There is no danger that intelligence will be degraded to the mentality of an old-fashioned drill sergeant just because it concerns itself with military affairs. In fact, militarism occurs only when civilian influence is superseded by the military to such an extent that the latter takes command of national policy. One of the surest

ways to avoid the militarization of our world is, within the United States at least, to maintain a considerable body of civilian interest and competence in what is one of the basic problems of all government and, therefore, of self-government: the common defense. In creating and sustaining civilian interest in military affairs the scholar has a special place of responsibility. In discharging an obligation to the nation he can, at the same time, make a valuable contribution to the several branches of the social sciences which, whether they will or no, have found that rearmament has been crowding into their purview with increasing insistence for almost three decades. Surely it is no reflection upon scientific inquiry if, in addition to being worth while of and for itself, it serve the cause of the nation and of democracy in this great human crisis and help to guard against the recurrence of similar crises.

. . . . . .

STUDIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AN OBLIGATION OF SCHOLARSHIP

A memorandum submitted

by

Edward Mead Earle
The Institute for Advanced Study

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Princeton, New Jersey

October, 1940

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

October 30, 1940

The contents of this memorandum on "Studies of National Defense and Obligation of Scholarship" were submitted orally for comment and criticism at a small dinner held in New York on Friday evening, October 18, which was attended by the following persons:

Hanson W. Baldwin, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy and now military critic of the New York Times.

James P. Baxter, President of Williams College, and a student of naval history and naval affairs.

Lt. Col. Herman Beukema, Head of the Department of History, Government and Politics, U. S. Military Academy.

Allen Cook, formerly naval officer, now professor of English and History, U. S. Naval Academy.

Tyler Dennett, specialist in the international politics of the Far East.

A. Whitney Griswold, Associate Professor of International Relations, Yale University, author of "Far Eastern Policy of the United States."

Major General Frank R. McCoy (retired), President of the Foreign Policy Association.

David H. Popper, defense expert in the Research Department of the Foreign Policy Association

Elihu Root, Attorney

Major T. H. Thomas, of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Formerly lecturer at Columbia University and now engaged in free-lance military studies.

Harold Tobin, Professor of Politics, Dartmouth College. Author of "Mobilizing Civilian America."

Frederick P. Todd, Secretary of the American Military Institute.

Edward P. Warner, Civil Aeronautics Authority.

In a discussion following the presentation of the contents of this memorandum, there was helpful comment, practically all of it enthusiastically in favor of the proposed studies. The Committee is now in possession of letters from several members of the group confirming the original judgments; but as the text of the memorandum has not yet been circulated among them for comment and criticism, it has seemed wiser not to circularize these letters at this time but to make them available later, together with any supplementary remarks.

Edward Mead Earle

STUDIES OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

AND MILITARY POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

at

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
School of Economics and Politics
Princeton, New Jersey

Revised to
December 1941

STUDIES OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND MILITARY POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

at

The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

This memorandum and its appendices are intended to describe one phase of the research now being conducted in the School of Economics and Politics of the Institute for Advanced Study.

It is a striking paradox that, although military defense has been a perennial problem of the American people, there has been until recently no conscious, integrated and continuous study of military security as a fundamental problem of government and society. It is another paradox that, although we live in a warlike world and have ourselves been participants in large-scale wars, there has been almost no systematic consideration by American scholars of the role of war in human affairs--this despite the transparent truth, however deplorable, that war is a recurrent phenomenon which from time to time transcends all other human activity. As democracy is based upon belief in the power of public opinion and other moral sanctions, we have understandably given great weight to the problem of collective security, both before and after the outbreak of the present war. It is now necessary, without decreasing our interest in post-war problems of political and economic reorganization, to restore a balance as between such studies and studies of national power. Indeed there can be no permanent security in the world unless statesmanship understands the role which controlled and socially directed military force must play in the maintenance of order and stability.

Political and social scientists have not heretofore undertaken adequate systematic inquiry into the problems of defense and strategy. An examination of contemporary textbooks on politics, economics, geography, and international relations reveals that - with some notable exceptions - military affairs are a conspicuous lacuna or, at best, have been treated as incidental and peripheral in

character. This is not surprising, for although writers on politics, since the days of Aristotle and Plato, have given some attention to military subjects, and although Machiavelli, Sir Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Franklin, among others, have shown an acute understanding of the role of military power in statecraft, the treatment of national strategy throughout the nineteenth century and until recently in the twentieth has been left, on the whole, to soldiers writing for soldiers rather than civilians writing for civilians.

The truth seems to be that liberalism and democracy, being predicated upon the ideals of peace and progress, have viewed with repugnance an international society based upon armed, competitive nation-states. Liberals and democrats likewise were suspicious (at times with justification) that defense was inextricably connected with imperialism, aggression, vested armament interests, political conservatism, and potentially militarized society. Liberal scholars shared these suspicions and therefore avoided the problem altogether. But by abandoning the field to others, they solved none of the problems and resolved none of their fears. The net result has not been the avoidance of war but the victimization of those who hate it most.

Anglo-American constitutional history is so closely associated with control of the army by Parliament and Congress that the British and American peoples have had an instinctive and deep-rooted fear of permanent military establishments. Furthermore, as a consequence of the insular position of Great Britain and of the geographical isolation of the United States, large peace-time armies have been unnecessary, and only under the most compelling necessity have we resorted to compulsory military service[1]. Rapidly changing military technologies and the shifting balance of power, however, necessarily raise the

---

1. Great Britain in 1916 and 1939, the United States in 1863, 1917 and 1941. There was also a theoretical levée en masse in England during the Napoleonic threats of invasion.

question whether conditions have not so fundamentally changed as to require new points of view as regards the place of the army, the navy, and the air force in the life of the nation.

It is essential that we return to an earlier tradition, which treated military problems as an inherent element in the science of government and politics, as well as a factor in a broader education. And, in view of the integrated character of the modern world, they must now be regarded as one of the most important concerns of economics, geography, and social psychology as well.

The curricula of American colleges and universities have, with only rare exceptions, avoided or ignored the many-sided problems of defense. Even in military history we have been negligent. For example, it is foreigners rather than Americans who have had the fullest realization of the contributions to strategy and tactics of the American Civil War and, until recently, it was Englishmen rather than Americans who wrote the outstanding biographies of certain of our military leaders. Until recently few civilian societies have actively interested themselves in national defense, except for purposes of propaganda; some have had primarily antiquarian interests. The most successful professional writing on military and naval subjects has heretofore been done in the United States by men like Mahan and Upton, who were members of the armed forces. It is only recently that military criticism has become a feature of American journalism; military commentators are few in number, and not all of them possess an adequate knowledge of history, economics, psychology and politics, nor should they be expected to possess such knowledge in a profession which, in general, calls for different skills. But the avidity with which military journalism is read is an indication of the potentialities which exist for more adequate treatises on defense, written in accordance with the canons of scholarship. And if the American objective is not merely defense but security and grand strategy as well, it is imperative that the foreign and military policies of the United States be formulated with reference to our history, tradition, and aspirations as well as the

demands of military technology.

The study of military affairs is not an emergency matter, although the emergency gives it added importance and, indeed, a character of importunity. If we now had on hand a reserve of trained scholars who had devoted any considerable portion of their lives to problems of strategy, they could be of inestimable service to the nation. The Army War College has been closed for the period of the emergency because of the shortage of commissioned personnel in the higher ranks. Until recently there has been even within the military and naval services no group of trained personnel continuously and exclusively engaged in theoretical studies---a deficiency which expert scholars might overcome were they available in any number. In general, however, what is required is not a temporary expedient to meet an emergency but a long-term program of research and, ultimately, of teaching which will enable the United States in times of peace as well as in times of crisis and war to build up a body of expert knowledge directed to the formulation of public policy and an understanding of military problems and potentials. There have recently been encouraging signs that competent scholars, working principally as individuals in the universities, have come to recognize their responsibility in this respect. In addition, a small number of colleges and universities have inaugurated more formal military studies, at least for the duration of the emergency.

In the past our apparent invulnerability, combined with the balance of political and economic forces in Europe and the Far East, made a coherent military policy discretionary rather than imperative. However, as the conditions of American security undergo fundamental change, it is essential in the national interest as well as in the cause of learning that the social scientist take a conspicuous and far-sighted position of leadership in the process of planning the national defense; otherwise, we shall lose some of the values which it is essential that we retain and we shall, in the end, be the less rather than the more secure.

It was with these considerations in mind that Professor Edward Mead Earle established at the Institute for Advanced Study in the autumn of 1939 a seminar in the military and foreign policies of the United States. The seminar has included in its membership scholars both from the United States and from abroad and has benefited from the active cooperation of interested members of the faculty of Princeton University, whose writings on foreign policy and on naval and military affairs have achieved a nation-wide reputation.

The result is that there has been created in the Princeton community a centre d'études militaires which is not concerned with immediate technical military and naval problems but rather with broad questions of national strategy, military security, the elements of military and economic power, and the role of the United States in world politics. It has been composed of students of history, economics, and political science whose major interest is the clarification of the several phases of national policy and a unified concept of Grand Strategy.

The seminar has the important quality of continuity, although its personnel is constantly changing. This brings to the individual effort the benefit of previous group experience and lends a permanent character to what otherwise might be the transitory and incoordinate activity of the individual. As scholars who have participated in the projects of the seminar go back to their academic posts, they carry with them new concepts of national problems and international relations. The free interchange of ideas with other mature scholars, the emphasis upon qualitative work, the critical and introspective character of seminar discussions, the absence of departmentalization—these and other factors will, it is believed, contribute to real and long-term influences on academic thinking and research in the social sciences. Hence the seminar offers qualified scholars exceptional opportunities for advanced study during a sabbatical leave.

Among the subjects which have received detailed consideration in the discussions of the seminar (which meets ordinarily once a week for two hours

throughout the academic year) are the following: the elements of sea power and "command of the sea"; changes in military technology as they affect world politics; the balance of power in Europe and the Far East not only as a phenomenon in itself but as a factor in the defense of the United States; the "military potential"—that is to say, the basic factors in military strength; war as a social and economic institution; strategic factors in the foreign policies of the Great Powers, including the United States; the impact of war upon the economic and social structure; the meaning of terms like "security," "strategy," "defense," and "sea power," which are commonly used but not always with exactitude; Wehrwirtschaft and economic warfare; the spread of geo-political doctrines in Europe, especially since 1919; changing power relationships in the Atlantic area and in the Pacific; the historical origins and development of the American doctrine of isolationism and non-entanglement; the European background of early American foreign policy; theories and practice of diplomacy; the role of the army in a democratic society; comparative methods of recruitment and discipline of military personnel; the concept of hemispheric defense and hemispheric solidarity; the historical development of American military policy; non-political—especially psychological—aspects of warfare.

The study of the foregoing has not been viewed as an examination of isolated and unrelated topics but rather has been conducted with a view to a single unifying objective: American security, its basic assumptions, its changing conditions, and its present imperatives. As the strategic factor has heretofore been underemphasized or, indeed, largely overlooked, by scholars in the treatment of American foreign relations, a study of American security involves among other things a new problem in historical interpretation.

The members of the seminar have likewise been concerned with the relation of their studies to American education and American public opinion, because they believe that during a "total war" basic research has a special relation to

theoretical politics. Among other things they have collaborated with a group of scholars at Columbia University in the preparation of a syllabus, "War and Defense Policy," which is now in the process of publication by Farrar and Rinehart. They are likewise engaged in editing a book of readings to be used in connection with the syllabus and they have in preparation, in collaboration with the American Military Institute, a scholarly bibliography on war and defense. A tentative bibliography on "Modern War--Its Economic and Social Aspects" has been completed and is now being distributed to a selected list of teachers of international relations. Professor Earle and his colleagues likewise have assisted scholars in several American universities in the organization of courses in military affairs, and some former members of the seminar have been appointed to academic posts for the specific purpose of conducting such courses.

It is hoped that the facilities of the Princeton community for the study of military affairs will be steadily improved. Already substantial progress has been made, through collaboration of the librarians of the Institute for Advanced Study and Princeton University, in building up a valuable collection of published works, manuscripts, and archives dealing with naval affairs, military history, American foreign relations, and power politics. Although, for the immediate present, funds are available for the purchase of most current publications, there is still a large work to be done in acquiring books, periodicals, and official records long since out of print. Collection of the latter materials requires patience, vigilance, and larger sums than are now in hand or in prospect. It is to be hoped, therefore, that persons who are interested in the work described in this memorandum will consider Princeton as a suitable depository for collections or for individual titles which might be of value to the seminar.

Two appendices to this statement will give a further indication of the scope of the work achieved and in progress. Appendix A is a cumulative list of the members of the seminar from 1939 to the academic year 1941-1942. Appendix B is a selected bibliography of the publications of members of the seminar, many of which have grown out of group discussions.

A striking illustration of the usefulness of the work of the seminar has been provided by the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. Almost a year ago Dr. Werner B. Ellinger (then bibliographical assistant to the seminar and now on the staff of the Library of Congress) began the compilation of a selected bibliography of books and periodical articles on "Problems of Sea Power in the Pacific", covering the period from the end of the London Naval Conference of 1936 to the year 1941. Dr. Ellinger's bibliography included his own analytical comments. These are being supplemented by critical notations by Dr. Herbert Rosinski (a member of the seminar 1940-1941) based upon his extensive knowledge of the Pacific Area and naval affairs. The bibliography is now virtually completed at a time when the vital interests of the United States in the Pacific will make it particularly valuable.

Appendix A

The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

MEMBERS OF PROFESSOR EARLE'S SEMINAR ON
AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
1939-1942

Edward Mead Earle	Ph.D. Columbia University, 1923. L.H.D. Union College, 1941. Professor School of Economics and Politics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, since 1935. Professor in the Department of History at Barnard College and Columbia University, 1923-1935. Author of Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway, A Study in Imperialism (1923); Against This Torrent (1941). Has served as visiting lecturer at the Army War College, the Army Industrial College, and the U. S. Military Academy. Trustee of the American Military Institute.
Robert G. Albion 1941-1942	Ph.D. Harvard University, 1924. Professor of History in Princeton University. Author of Forests and Sea Power (1926); Introduction to Military History (1929); The Rise of New York Port (1939), and other works. Trustee of the American Military Institute.
Thomas A. Bailey 1939-1940	Ph.D. Stanford University, 1927. Professor of History, Stanford University. Author of Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis (1934); A Diplomatic History of the American People (1939), and many articles in the journals of the learned societies. Notable among the latter was an article on the sinking of the Lusitania in the American Historical Review. Albert Shaw Lecturer on American Diplomacy, Johns Hopkins University, 1940-41.
Bernard Brodie 1940-1941	Ph.D. University of Chicago, 1940. Instructor in the Department of Political Science, Dartmouth College. Author of Sea Power in the Machine Age. Mr. Brodie's special interest is naval technology and naval strategy.
Gilbert Chinard 1939-1940	Professor in Princeton University; author of Thomas Jefferson, Apostle of Americanism (1928); Honest John Adams (1933), and other works dealing with American foreign policy.
Pierre Cot Spring 1941	French Under-Secretary of State; Minister of Aviation (1933-1934 and again in 1936-1937). Minister of Commerce (1938).
Étienne Dennery 1940-1941	Agrégé de l'Université, Paris, 1926. Professor at the École libre des Sciences Politiques since 1935. General Secretary, Centre d'Études de Politique Etrangère. Author of books on the Far East and on economic factors in international relations. Now a member of the staff of General de Gaulle at headquarters of the Free French forces, London.

Harvey A. DeWeerd
1941-1942

Ph.D. University of Michigan, 1937. Associate Professor of History at Denison University. Editor of Military Affairs, the journal of the American Military Institute, and adviser to W. W. Norton & Co. on military publications. He has written a monograph on "Production Lag in the American Ordnance Program 1917-1918" which has been used by the OPM. Author of Great Soldiers of Two World Wars (1941), a collection of military biographies.

William T. R. Fox
1941-1942

Ph.D. University of Chicago, 1940. Conference Director and Instructor in the School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. Author of Some Effects upon International Law of the Governmentalization of Private Enterprise (unpublished doctoral dissertation).

Felix Gilbert
1939-1942

Ph.D. University of Berlin, 1931. A student of political thought and of diplomacy. Former research assistant to the editor of the German Documents on the causes of the war of 1914. Mr. Gilbert's book, The European Background of Early American Foreign Policy, will be ready for publication soon.

John H. Herz
1939-1940

Ph.D. University of Cologne, 1931. Instructor in political science, Howard University. An international lawyer who has written an important book on The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law, and who was principally valuable at the seminar in discussing such questions as the importance of national sovereignty as a factor in military and diplomatic affairs.

Albert T. Lauterbach
1940-1941

Ph.D. University of Vienna, 1925. Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Denver. Research Associate, Institute of Social Research (Columbia University) 1939-40. Author of a manuscript shortly to be published on Military Economy and the Social Structure.

William W. Lockwood
1940-1941

A. M. Harvard, 1929. Secretary, the American Committee for International Studies. Secretary, American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Etienne G. Mantoux
1941-1942

Docteur en Droit, University of Lyon, 1941. Research Student, London School of Economics and Political Science (1935-1936); Lecturer in Economics, British Institute in Paris, (1939); Author of L'Epargne Forcée Monétaire (Lyon, 1941).

Horst Mendershausen
Autumn, 1940

Ph.D. University of Geneva, 1938. Cowles Commission Research Fellow and Instructor in Economics at Colorado College, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Author of The Economics of War (New York, 1940).

DeWitt Clinton Poole
Autumn 1941

A. B. University of Wisconsin, 1906. M. Dip. George Washington University, 1910. Onetime chief Division of Russian Affairs, Department of State. Former Director, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. Author of Democracy and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (1924). Consultant, Office of the Coordinator of Information, Washington.

Stefan T. Possony 1941-1942	University of Leipzig. Ph.D. University of Vienna, 1935. Author of Tomorrow's War, Its Planning, Management and Cost (London, 1938). Now engaged in a study of certain non-military - especially psychological - aspects of war.
Herbert Rosinski 1940-1941	Ph.D. University of Berlin, 1930. Lecturer on military and naval affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Author of The German Army and editor of a German edition of Théories Stratégiques by Admiral Castex. Lecturer in the German Naval Academy 1932-36. Gave Lowell Lectures at Harvard in the spring of 1941 on "Command of the Sea."
J. Rumney 1939-1940	Ph.D. University of London. Professor, University of Newark. A Sociologist whose interest is in the problem of military security in its relation to domestic policies, particularly social welfare. Author of Herbert Spencer's Sociology: A Study in the History of Social Theory, and of The Science of Society.
Harold Sprout Mrs. Margaret Sprout 1939-1942	Authors of The Rise of American Naval Power and of Toward A New Order of Sea Power. Dr. Sprout is Associate Professor of Politics in Princeton University. He has also been visiting lecturer at the U. S. Naval Academy and the Army War College.
Charles P. Stacey 1939-1940	Assistant Professor of history at Princeton University. The foremost authority on the defense policies of Canada and of their relation to British Imperial diplomacy. Author of The Military Problems of Canada (Toronto, 1940). Now Historical Officer of the Canadian Active Service Force in Great Britain.
Richard P. Stebbins 1940-1941	Ph.D. Harvard, 1940. Research assistant, Division of Special Information, Library of Congress. Author of Italian Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1911-14. (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation) and with L. P. Stebbins, a documented biography of Carl Maria von Weber. Member of the Editorial Board of Military Affairs.
Alfred Vagts 1939-1942	Ph.D. Hamburg, 1927. Author of Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik, (2 volumes, 1935), and A History of Militarism (1937). Mr. Vagts has completed an important manuscript on the balance of power and is now concerning himself with problems of military discipline.
Maxim von Brevern 1941-1942	Ph.D. University of Washington, 1935. Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Washington, Seattle, and Executive Secretary of the Bureau of International Relations at the same institution.
Jean Sylvain Weiller 1941-1942	Docteur, University of Paris, 1929. Agrégé des Facultés de Droit, Paris, 1936. Formerly professor in the universities of Poitier and Toulouse. Author of L'influence du change sur le commerce exterieur (1929) and of numerous articles in French economic journals. Rockefeller Fellow, 1941-1942.

Albert K. Weinberg
1939-1941

Ph.D. Johns Hopkins University, 1931. Fellow of the American Philosophical Society. Author of Manifest Destiny (1935). Albert Shaw lecturer in diplomatic history, Johns Hopkins University, 1940. Mr. Weinberg has completed a manuscript on the dogma of isolation in American history and is engaged in a study of American nationalism. Associate Social Science Analyst, Division of Special Information, Library of Congress.

Bibliographical and Research Assistants

Robert A. Kann
1941-1942

Doctor of Law, University of Vienna, 1930. Graduate of the Columbia University School of Library Service, 1940. Author of various essays in the field of public law.

Deborah A. Hubbard
1941-1942

A. B. Bryn Mawr College, 1938. Member of staff of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939-40. Author of articles in the Far Eastern Survey, 1940.

Appendix B

The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

PARTIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE MEMBERS OF PROFESSOR EARLE'S SEMINAR
1939 - 1941

Edward Mead Earle

"American Military Policy and National Security," Political Science Quarterly, March 1938, Vol. LIII, No. 1, p. 1-13.

"National Defense and Political Science," Political Science Quarterly, December, 1940, Vol. LV, No. 4, p. 481-495.

(The foregoing two articles stated in general the purposes and objectives of Professor Earle's research and the work of the scholars associated with him.)

"Political and Military Strategy for the United States," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, November 1940.

(A discussion of the concepts of "defense", "security" and "strategy" based in part upon suggestions and criticisms of members of the seminar.)

"National Security and Foreign Policy," The Yale Review, Spring 1940, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, pp. 444-460.

"The Threat to American Security," The Yale Review, Spring 1941, Vol. XXX, No. 3, pp. 454-480

(Two related articles, constituting an examination of military security as a predominant consideration in the formulation of American foreign policy from colonial times to the present.)

"American Security--Its Changing Conditions," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1941, Vol. 218, pp. 186-193.

"The Future of Foreign Policy," The New Republic, (Twenty-fifth Anniversary Number) November 8, 1939, pp. 86-94.

(An examination of the basic factors in American foreign relations as they are related to the present European war.)

Against This Torrent, Princeton University Press (1941) 73 pp.

(A commentary on American foreign policy with special reference to security as its principal desideratum.)

"National Defense, A Program of Studies," The Journal of the American Military Institute, Winter 1940, Vol. IV, pp. 199-208.

"Inter-American Factors in Security," Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Canadian-American Affairs (1941) pp. 198-209, 244-247.

Robert G. Albion

To be published shortly: Sea Lanes in Jeopardy. A study of the American merchant marine in wartime, 1776-1941, with some reference to the doctrine of "freedom of the seas."

Bernard Brodie

Sea Power in a Machine Age, Princeton University Press (1941) 472 pp.

"Defense and Technology," The Technology Review, January 1941, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, pp. 3-7.

"The Strategy of the Atlantic," Memorandum prepared for the American Committee for International Studies, being Document No. 2 of the Conference on North Atlantic Relations, 17 pp.

"New Tests of Sea and Air Power," Current History, October 1941, pp. 97-108.

Etienne Dennery

"The French Army, 1789-1939, with Particular Reference to the Third French Republic," a memorandum as yet unpublished.

"Democracy and the French Army," Military Affairs, Winter 1941, Vol. V, No. 4.

Harvey A. DeWeerd

Great Soldiers of Two World Wars (1941). A volume of military biographies.

"Soldiers and Civilians in Total War," Infantry Journal, April 1941, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4, pp. 23-28.

William T. R. Fox

"The 'Non-Sovereign' Acts of Foreign States," American Journal of International Law, October 1941, pp. 632-640.

In preparation (with Mrs. Annette Baker Fox): A study of Brazilian society, especially as regards leadership, with reference to its effects upon Brazilian-American relations.

Felix Gilbert

"The Humanist Concept of The Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli," The Journal of Modern History, December 1939, Vol. XI, No. 4, pp. 449-483.

"Political Thought of the Renaissance and Reformation," The Huntington Library Quarterly, July 1941, Vol. IV, No. 4, pp. 443-468.

Ready for publication: The European Background of Early American Foreign Policy.

"The Idea of Democratic Diplomacy," a series of lectures at Colorado College during the summer of 1941, which will likewise be published.

John H. Herz

"National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of International Organization," Political Science Quarterly, December 1939, Vol. LIV, No. 4, pp. 536-554.

"Bolshevist and National Socialist Doctrines of International Law," Social Research, February 1940, pp. 1-31. (In collaboration with Joseph Florin)

Albert T. Lauterbach

"American Economic Power as a Weapon," Plan Age, Washington, November-December issue, 1940.

"Roots and Implications of the German Idea of Military Society," The Journal of the American Military Institute, Spring 1941, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 1-20.

"Germany's Challenge to America's Defense," Planning Pamphlets No. 4, Washington, D.C., March 1941, 39 pp.

"European Lessons for American Preparedness," The South Atlantic Quarterly, July 1941, Vol. XL, No. 3, pp. 195-210.

"The Changing Nature of War," International Conciliation, April 1941, No. 369.

Modern War--Its Social and Economic Aspects (1941). A mimeographed bibliography, prepared with the collaboration of Dr. Kann and Miss Hubbard.

William W. Lockwood

"Our Far Eastern Record: A Reference Digest," American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. (Pamphlet 47 pp.)

"Future of the China Trade," The Annals, September 1940, pp. 130-137.

"War and Economic Welfare in Japan." A paper read at the American Historical Association meetings, December 1940, and to appear in a forthcoming volume.

"American-Japanese Trade: Its Structure and Significance," The Annals, May 1940, pp. 86-92.

"Showdown at Singapore?", American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. (Pamphlet 31 pp.)

De Witt Clinton Poole

"Russia and the United States," New Europe, September 1941, Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 246-249.

"The Balance of Power," an unfinished monograph to be completed and published at a later date.

Stefan T. Possony

"Organized Intelligence; The Problem of the French General Staff", Social Research, May 1941, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 213-237. Reprinted under the title "The General Staff and the Downfall of France" in The Infantry Journal, November 1941, pp. 65-71.

Book in preparation, Total War, with Special Reference to Psychological Warfare.

"Britain Can Win," The New Republic, March 10, 1941, pp. 329-330.

"Can Britain Be Stormed?" The Nation, January 25, 1941, pp. 94-97.

Herbert Rosinski

"Mahan and the Present War," Brassey's Naval Annual, May 1941.

"The Great Axis Squeeze," The Nation, November 9, 1940, pp. 440-443.

"The Turning Point in the Study of War," a paper read to the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in New York December 27, 1940.

"Strategic Aspects of American Defense," a paper read to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, December 30, 1940.

To be published: Command of the Sea, the Lowell Lectures for 1941.

J. Rumney

"The Biology of War," The Journal of Social Philosophy, July 1939.

Harold Sprout

The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, Princeton University Press (1939).

Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922, Princeton University Press (1940).

"Strategic Considerations in Hemisphere Defense," Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations, October 1939, Vol. I, pp. 21ff.

"Changing Power Relations in the Pacific," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1941, pp. 107-114.

In preparation: a volume on American sea power since 1922.

Charles P. Stacey

The Military Problems of Canada, Toronto, 1940, The Ryerson Press, 157 pp.

"Canada and the Second World War," 1940. (Pamphlet)

"Canadian Military Problems and the Present War," Inter-American Quarterly, April 1940.

"The New Canadian Corps," Canadian Geographical Journal, July 1941, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, pp. 3 et seq.

Richard P. Stebbins

Co-editor with Grayson Kirk of Columbia University of War and Defense Policy, A Syllabus, Farrar and Rinehart (1941). A collaborative effort of the Seminar and members of the departments of history and government of Columbia University.

Review of Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde, Political Science Quarterly, September 1941, Vol. LVI, No. 3, pp. 440-441. A discussion of the mass army in modern war and society.

Alfred Vagts

"War and the Colleges," Military Affairs, Summer 1940, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Document No. 4 of the Professional Series of the American Military Institute).

"Ivory Towers into Watchtowers," Virginia Quarterly Review, Spring 1941, Vol. XVII, pp. 161-178.

(The foregoing papers dealt with the desirability of including in the curriculum of colleges and universities a discussion of the problems of war and defense.)

"Hopes and Fears of an American-German War," Part I and Part II, Political Science Quarterly, December 1939, pp. 514-535 and March 1940, pp. 53-76.

"The German Army of the Second Reich as a Cultural Institution," in The Cultural Approach to History, edited by Caroline F. Ware, Columbia University Press (1941).

Albert K. Weinberg

The Doctrine of Isolation in American History, the Albert Shaw Lectures at the Johns Hopkins University, 1940. Now ready for publication by The Johns Hopkins Press.

"Traditional Factors in Contemporary American Foreign Policy," paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 30, 1940.

"The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation," American Political Science Review, June 1940, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 539-47.

"Washington's 'Great Rule' in its Historical Evolution," Historiography and Urbanization, Essays in honor of W. S. Holt (Baltimore 1941), pp. 109-138.

STUDIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AN OBLIGATION OF SCHOLARSHIP

It is a striking paradox that, ~~whereas~~ although military defense has been a perennial problem of the American people since the first colonists landed on this continent, there has been no conscious, integrated, and continuous study of military security as a fundamental problem of government and society. It is another paradox that, although we live in a warlike world and have ourselves been participants in large-scale wars, there has been almost no systematic consideration by American scholars of the role of war in human affairs - this despite the transparent truth, however deplorable, that war is a recurrent phenomenon which from time to time transcends all other human activity and assumes command of our lives, our fortunes, and our destiny.[1] Even in time of peace the shadow of war falls upon the world in the form of naval and military establishments which determine in large measure how we shall spend our energies and our substance. In fact, in the present stage of world affairs, military organization absorbs an ever-increasing part of the productive capacity of mankind, tends to determine the character of our social structure, and threatens in various ways to revolutionize some of our most cherished institutions and ways of life.

Quite aside from their inherent interest, the problems of national defense have a claim upon the political and social sciences. The need of security against aggression is, as Hamilton said, "the most powerful dictator of national conduct". It involves one of the most delicate of political problems - the reconciliation of liberty and authority, the provision of the maximum degree of security with the highest degree of freedom.

---

1. As democracy is based upon belief in the power of public opinion and other moral sanctions, we have understandably given great weight to the problem of collective security. It is now necessary that we restore a balance as between the factors of national power and international cooperation.

It is, indeed, intimately related with all the other objectives of organized society and, in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, the "common defense" is significantly enough linked with the establishment of justice, the insurance of domestic tranquillity, the promotion of the general welfare, and the preservation of "the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity". In short, national defense is a basic function of government in a world of competitive national states; the world being as it is, perhaps/ it is the basic function. As one American student of government has put it: "By general consent this is the supreme consideration of every government. At all events, no other appeal commands such widespread popular support, receives such undivided allegience. Those who resist it are loaded with the heaviest social opprobrium and those who betray it are stamped with the highest of crimes, treason."

Nor is the organization of defense the problem of the soldier alone. Under parliamentary and representative government, particularly as exemplified by Great Britain and the United States, the control of military affairs by civilian authority has been one of the foundation stones of the arch of freedom. This does not necessarily imply that there is any inherent conflict between two mutually antagonistic forces, civil and military. The size, organization, and objectives of the armed forces having been defined, it is essential that there be effective collaboration between the civilian, military/ and naval authorities in the interest of maximum efficiency and, of coordinate importance, that there be adequate and intelligent military implementation of national policies.

There is ample evidence that civilians and soldiers alike have come to recognize that it is vital both to military efficiency and to national integrity that war and the costly and elaborate preparation for war shall

not be reserved either to technicians alone or to civilians alone. The organization of security and, in the event of war, the organization of victory require that there be sympathetic, intelligent, and unreserved collaboration between the several groups which contribute to the total military effort. A blunt civilian Clemenceau said: "War is much too important a business to be left to the soldiers." A distinguished British officer, Sir Frederick Maurice, agreed that as war requires the employment of the whole resources and the maximum power of the nation, it is "clearly not a matter to be left to soldiers or sailors, nor would any responsible soldier desire it to be so left." The mere mention of the names Rathenau, Lloyd George, and Baruch will suggest what civilian influence meant in the last war. Even in the realm of military technology, one can point to innumerable instances in which civilian contributions concerning even the employment of weapons of war - as well as their invention, development and supply - were outstanding and sometimes controlling: this was notably true in questions involving tanks, convoys, artillery fire, machine guns, and submarine detection.

What was true in the war of 1914-18 is likely to be even more true in the present struggle. No modern war can be waged without the national effort going far beyond the boundaries of technical military efficiency into almost every realm of civilian activity. The British and American officer of today is encouraged to widen his horizons of knowledge to include an understanding of social and economic questions. There is no reason, in turn, why the civilian should not bring military affairs, which so vitally affect the nation at large and even himself as an individual, into his purview. After all, military problems do not dwell in the realm of the occult, the supra-temporal, or the recondite, for "secrecy" is largely

confined to matters of matériel. Military problems are susceptible of analysis, criticism and practical contributions by informed laymen, and factual data upon which to base sound scholarship are generally accessible. Indeed, it is imperative that laymen, especially scholars, concern themselves with the problem of national defense, for failure to do so may be disastrous to the success of rearmament or of the war effort. Germany has become the foremost military power on the Continent of Europe not only because of the technical efficiency of German armed forces, but also because of acute realization of the role which theoretical studies of a non-technical character may play in modern war. Such studies existed in Imperial Germany but have been extended and intensified under the Nazis, with the result that Germany entered the present war well prepared in the non-military as well as the military phases of warfare. In fact, the "bloodless victories" which have distinguished the Hitler regime were the outgrowth of a long-range strategy which took into account all the known factors of economics, psychology, domestic politics, class prejudice, inertia, and the like. A covert war has been waged against Western Europe since 1933, with its victims seemingly unaware even that the struggle was going on. Comprehension of the true state of affairs was a civilian rather than a military responsibility.

As against German preparedness, in which civilians in general and the universities in particular played an influential part, British, French, and even existing American efforts seem feeble. The result is not merely attributable to palsied leadership in London and Paris but also to a fundamental failure to comprehend intimate interrelationships of politics, economics, and military strategy.[1] There has been a lamentable paucity of

1. It is appropriate at this point to explain that the term "military" is intended throughout this manuscript to include not merely the army but the navy and air forces as well.

civilian discussion of geographic and demographic factors in international politics. There has been a good deal of muddle-headedness concerning elements of military power; potential strength was complacently confused with existing strength, the latter, unlike the former, being available to initiate or to resist sudden and overwhelming attack. There has been woeful disregard of the strategic implications for Britain and France of the war in Spain. Whereas Count Ciano was quoted as saying that "There are no longer frontiers; there are only geographical and strategic positions", statesmen of the democratic powers were proceeding to judge the situation by nineteenth century concepts of politics. There has been virtually no informal liaison between civilians and soldiers; one of the foremost British political leaders, a potential Prime Minister, and now a member of the Inner Cabinet, told the writer of this memorandum in 1938 that he had no acquaintance with any British army or navy officer and had no means of knowing the views of the armed services on Spain and other vital questions. Mutual suspicion between civilians and professional officers - which has been typical of Anglo-Saxon society, and which can only be broken down by continuous collaborative efforts in time of "peace" as well as in time of war - has prevented an over-all view of the situation, growing out of intelligent, widespread, and frank discussion.

In the absence of a general scholarly interest in the political and social aspects of national defense, the field was largely left to publicists of the Liddell Hart school whose writings contributed to the general collapse by preaching the doctrines, unwarranted by experience or reason, of limited liability, superiority of the defense (psychological and moral as well as tactical), and the alleged inability of either side to "win" a war. It will never be possible, of course, to eliminate popularizers of a special thesis. But if the Liddell Harts had been balanced by, say, two-score scholars who had

been trained in the fundamental disciplines, who understood the role of military force in statecraft, and who constituted a body of genuinely informed civilian experts in the larger phases of warfare - to say nothing of the elementary facts of history - the discussion of military affairs in Britain would have been on an entirely different level and might have had entirely different results. And what is true of Britain was likewise true of France. Furthermore in France the conservatism of the General Staff operated to prevent acceptance of even more advanced military, as well as civilian, thought.

The truth of the matter is that, in a democratic society, it is imperative that we have the widest possible discussion of military problems, conducted on the highest possible plane. In the absence of such discussion, we cannot formulate intelligent and practicable foreign policies or, for that matter, domestic policies. Few military decisions (such, for example, as the acquisition and fortification of bases or the choice of types of ships and aircraft) are without widespread political repercussions. Likewise, political decisions - hemispheric defense, the Monroe Doctrine, the balance of power, alliances, aid to Britain and China - must be susceptible of military and, as well, economic implementation unless they are to be largely devoid of result. There must be an understanding of the impact of a vast armament program - what amounts in fact to national mobilization before M-day - upon the normalactivities of a peaceful people: economics, education, psychology and morale, the standard of living, the social services. It must be clearly comprehended that in and of itself the financing of the military effort will have portentous effects upon capitalism and democracy. It must be kept in mind that vested economic interests within the nation do not always coincide with the national interest vis-a-vis foreign powers and that such conflicts of interest must be frankly faced and intelligently and fairly resolved. (For example, independence for the Philippines

was legislated not primarily with reference to the political and strategic position of the United States in the Pacific area, but because of the persistent pressure of the beet and cane sugar interests and other lobbies at Washington). In short, there must be effective coordination of military with foreign and domestic policies, so that there may emerge a grand strategy which will assure that the will and the arms of the nation shall be so integrated that war shall be prevented or, failing this, that the nation shall enter war with the maximum chances of victory. Strategy is not merely a concept of war-time but an inseparable element in statecraft at all times; as such it is a legitimate and, indeed, an unavoidable concern of the social scientist. Only a narrowly restricted terminology would define strategy as the science and art of military command. If this be true, as it seems to be, then the scholar and the soldier have indispensable and mutually complementary tasks to perform. The mere appropriation of vast sums for armaments will not give assurance of effective defense. These arms must be supplemented by and related to a comprehensive national policy. And the formulation of such policy is a function of the executive and legislative brances of the government. If they are to arrive at the desired goal, they must have clearly before them the facts upon which alternatives may be weighed and decisions arrived at. It is the function of scholarship to make the facts available and, over a period of years, to provide by education a trained personnel which will understand the essential place of military affairs in the science and operation of government.

It must be admitted that political and social scientists have not heretofore undertaken adequate systematic inquiry into the problems of defense and strategy. An examination of contemporary textbooks on politics, economics, and international relations reveals that military affairs are a conspicuous lacuna or, at best, have been treated as incidental and peripheral in character. This

is not surprising, for although writers on politics, since the days of Aristotle and Plato, have given some attention to military subjects, and although Machiavelli, Sir Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin, among others, have shown an acute understanding of the role of strategy in statecraft, the treatment of military affairs throughout the nineteenth century and until recently in the twentieth has been left to soldiers writing for soldiers rather than civilians writing for civilians.

The truth seems to be that liberalism and democracy, being predicated upon the ideals of peace and progress and a brotherhood of man, have viewed with repugnance an international society based upon armed, competitive nation-states. Liberals and democrats likewise were suspicious (at times with justification) that defense was inextricably connected with imperialism, aggression, vested armament interests, political conservatism, and a potential militarized society. Scholars shared these suspicions and therefore avoided the problem altogether. But by abandoning the field to others, they solved none of the problems and resolved none of their fears. It is therefore essential that we return to an earlier tradition, which treated military problems as an inherent factor in the science of government and politics and, in view of the integrated character of the modern world, one of the most important concerns of economics and social psychology as well.

The most successful professional writing on military and naval affairs in the United States has been done by men like Mahan and Upton, who were popularizers and propagandists as well as technicians. The curricula of American colleges and universities have with only rare exceptions been destitute of a discussion of the many-sided problems of defense. Even in military history we have been negligent. For example, it is foreigners rather than Americans who have had the fullest realization of the great significance

to strategy and tactics of the Civil War and, until recently, it was Englishmen rather than Americans who contributed the outstanding biographies of certain of our military leaders. Few civilian societies have actively interested themselves in national defense, except for purposes of propaganda; some have had primarily antiquarian interests. It is only recently that military criticism has become a feature of American journalism; military critics are few in number, and not all of them possess an adequate knowledge of history, economics, psychology and politics, nor should they be expected to possess such knowledge in a position where different skills are called for. But the avidity with which military journalism is read is an indication of the potentialities which exist for more adequate treatises on defense, written in accordance with the canons of scholarship. The influences of the writer on military affairs may be widespread, far transcending the bounds of the casual reader and reaching into high places - of this truth Mahan affords an outstanding example. What is essential to the national interest is that the writing be above the transitory and the superficial.

Within the Government itself there has, as a rule, been insufficient thought on questions of defense and insufficient attention to the formulation of military policy. The committees of the House and Senate which deal with military and naval affairs (including the committees on appropriations) have not always risen above partisan considerations and frequently have shown a tendency to treat national defense as a "local issue" (as in the location of arsenals, army posts and naval stations). An occasional chairman of unusual competence lifts a committee above the average, but in the large Congress has been remiss in making appropriations with a view to long-range policies, rather than ad hoc considerations. And the same is true of the Executive arm. The

President of the United States is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but the exigencies of his office rarely give him time for critical thought on defense subjects, except in periods of impending war and only to a limited degree even then.[1] His immediate subordinates, the Secretaries of War and of the Navy have not generally been men of high calibre; and as compared with Secretaries of State they have been distinctly mediocre. When a really capable statesman like Calhoun, Jefferson Davis, Root, Baker, or Whitney holds the War or Navy portfolio it is an unusual rather than a frequent occurrence. There is no Council of National Defense, similar to the Committee of Imperial Defense in Great Britain, charged with continuous and non-partisan study of military affairs. It is no exaggeration to say, furthermore, that Presidential messages and quadrennial party platforms have contributed little more than a collection of platitudes.

All this is understandable in view of the peculiar geographical position of the United States, its absorption for a century and a half with domestic affairs, the deep-rooted suspicion of what the Fathers called "swollen military establishments", and the protection which was offered us by the balance of power in Europe. But this state of things has always been deplorable in this respect: it has prevented us from assessing clearly the extent of our potentialities and the nature of our shortcomings. As a French minister wrote to his government about a century ago, "one would say that there is something providential in the success that crowns the enterprises of the young republic, for it seems to act more by the instinct of its destiny than by serious reflection on its power."

Whatever may have been the role of instinct and Providence, heretofore, the American people is now aware that something more is needed. We live in an

---

1. Professor Lindsay Rogers has recently pointed out that Hitler's frequent periods of contemplation at Berchtesgaden may be an important factor in the formulation and execution of German strategy. Foreign Affairs, Volume XIX, pp. 5-6 (October 1940).

age of stark military power and have just had the experience, unique in our history, of seeing a military alliance directed against us. The new coalition may not be a "nightmare" to us (to borrow a phrase from Bismarck) but it certainly is not a sedative. We now know that conventional military standards and time-honored concepts of defense are no longer relevant to our security. Confident reliance upon the militia and the citizen soldier - of which our political literature of two hundred years is redolent - has given way to a grim determination to recruit an army of maximum efficiency by means of Selective Service. Facing the possible destruction of an Anglo-American hegemony of the seas, we are determined if necessary and if possible to substitute a primacy of our own. We are keenly aware that bold strokes are required in the political field as well; hence the trade of destroyers for bases, which ranks with the Louisiana Purchase and the Monroe Doctrine as a broadly conceived measure of defensive strategy. We are slowly gaining consciousness that Total War can be met only by planning for Total Defense and are therefore entering upon an era which will bring radical alterations in our attitudes as regards military and naval power. This is not of our choice, nor, judging by contemporary evidence, is it likely to be transitory phase in the history of the world.

The study of military affairs is not an emergency matter, although the emergency gives it added importance and, indeed, a character of importunity. If we now had on hand a reserve of trained scholars who had devoted any considerable portion of their lives to problems of strategy, they could be of inestimable service to the nation. Staff officers have been transferred to service with troops, and the Army War College has been closed because of the shortage of commissioned personnel in the higher ranks. There is now no group of trained personnel engaged in theoretical studies - a deficiency which expert scholars might overcome were they available in any number. In general,

however, what is involved is not temporary measures to meet an emergency but a long-term program of research and, ultimately, of teaching which will enable the United States in times of peace as well as in times of crisis and war to build up a body of knowledge and a corps of scholarly experts who can help in the formulation of public policy and who can contribute to an understanding of the military problems and the military power of the nation.

It is not, of course, suggested that there should be any competition with the permanent personnel of the armed forces. The effort here proposed would be complementary thereto and would attempt to open up entirely new fields of investigation and research. Lest inquiries be conducted in water-tight compartments, there should, indeed, be cordial cooperation. The social scientist can keep constantly to the fore the political, psychological, and economic factors which are of ever increasing importance in national defense. He can deal with the dynamics of foreign and military policy. He can explain the role which attempts to provide for military security have played in the history of the world in general and of the United States in particular. Indeed there are phases of human society and political organization--mercantilism, Anglo-American constitutional history, autarchy, imperialism, totalitarianism, for example--which cannot altogether be understood without reference to the role which military considerations have played. Our failure to keep in mind the hold on statesmanship and on the popular mind of military security accounts in part for some of the eclectic interpretations of American history from 1914 to 1917 and of the course of European politics between 1919 and 1939.

There are certain subjects which the civilian can take within his purview but which the professional officer can deal with not at all or only with the greatest reserve. Every commissioned officer is subject to severe restrictions, explicit or

implied, in dealing with questions which border on the political. In time of crisis, as at present, official orders make it difficult for officers to write or speak on anything but the purely technical, military aspects of international relations and national policy. This is probably as it should be. But it would seem to be in the public interest that competent persons be free to speak with authority at all times, and particularly in times of an emergency, and that they speak as individuals without official fear, favor, or bias. This the scholar can do.

Questions of strategy fall into three general categories: first, those which are primarily or predominantly political, even though they be of prime importance to military policy (such, for example, as the fortification of a position like Guam, or the future retention of bases in the Philippine Islands, or the acquisition of leases on strategically important areas in Latin America or the Pacific); second, those which are predominantly military, even though they have political implications (such as the type of naval vessel and military plane to be constructed); third, those which are in a kind of "twilight zone" between the political and military. In the first and third, the scholar can speak with authority and without reserve, and he may have something to contribute even in the second; the second is preeminently the field of the armed forces, although officers may appropriately express opinions on the others, subject to the limitations imposed upon them by official order or by the traditions of the services and the usual practice of democracies, which is that policy shall primarily be the responsibility of the civilian rather than the military branch of the government.

The professional officer, too, suffers from some disqualifications which would not afflict the civilian working in the field. The strength of tradition, precedent, and "regulations" operates on even the most competent of officers. Although the method of selection for the Military and Naval Academies is the most democratic conceivable (in marked contrast to the situation in Europe as a whole),

the cadets and midshipmen come from what seems to be a fairly uniform social and intellectual background, and it is by no means certain that at present the academies are attracting to the service their fair share of the outstanding young men of the nation. The educational methods of the academies, furthermore, tend to encourage esprit de corps and a degree of uniformity which, although desirable and indeed essential, does not always develop independence of judgment or conspicuous initiative. And in the technical services, such as engineering and naval architecture, there might well be further utilization of what lay education could offer. (Parenthetically it might be pointed out that some layman might appropriately undertake a study of military and naval education in the United States similar to the study of Abraham Flexner on medical education, which revolutionized the methods used in the training of physicians).

The hierarchical organization of the services (which is unavoidable, of course) has notable disadvantages. This is the more true where, as in ordinary circumstances in the United States, promotion is necessarily slow and seniority frequently weighs more heavily in the scales than conspicuous ability and independence of judgment. It is too much to ask an officer to jeopardize his career by furthering principles contrary to those which are more generally accepted. Furthermore, the pressing demand for officers with troops and with the fleet, together with the assignment of commissioned personnel to administrative posts, makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for the best brains of the services to be devoted to theoretical studies and to the formulation of policy. The civilian suffers from none of these disadvantages and, in addition, his voice is likely to carry more weight because he is independent and is presumed to have no interest to serve other than the cause of scholarship and the welfare of the nation.

This brings up another point of almost equal importance to the discussion. A study of the defense policies of the United States, especially of appropriation bills, would demonstrate that there is a sort of "fever chart" of public and official

interest. In times of acute crisis, of fear or panic, the people will demand and Congress will enact legislation enlarging the Army and Navy without regard to rational considerations and certainly without regard to long-term policy. War scares are a kind of intoxication. They secure the adoption of measures which otherwise would be deferred or rejected. But like all forms of intoxication and profligacy, such scares are followed by periods of apathy, in which the ordinary demands of prudence are ignored and the national defense is allowed to fall into a state of desuetude. In short, the military history of the United States is marked by alternate periods of feast and famine. What seems to govern the degree of preparedness is a kind of abnormal psychology, rather than any reasoned and systematic consideration to national defense as one of the coordinate functions of government. Fear and recurrent panic are no basis for a public policy, but it must be admitted that fear on the one hand and indifference on the other have frequently been the determining factors in military and naval appropriation bills in most democracies, including the United States. It goes without saying that abrupt peaks and depressions in the chart of such appropriations are bad for the armed services. But they are also an unhealthy, febrile condition for the whole body politic and have, in particular, unfortunate consequences to the national economy. Means must be found to build up a healthy defense system which will not receive shots-in-the-arm in periods of alarm and powerful soporifics in periods of comparative calm.

This healthy state of affairs cannot be brought about, it may confidently be predicted, unless there be an entirely new approach to the problem of national defense. The professional officer is powerless to deal with the phenomenon, because, in the public eye and in the Congressional mind, he is associated with a vested interest. In times of apathy he is regarded with suspicion, in time of alarm with undue reverence. Only the scholar is capable of maintaining a continuous, objective, and documented study of the problem. Experience shows that comparable results cannot

be expected from the public, the politician, the government, or even the armed services. Furthermore, only the scholar can create a vast reservoir of competence in the field. The people whom he teaches and for whom he writes today will be the voters, teachers, reserve officers, and statesmen of tomorrow. No such reservoir of competence now exists, but it requires no great imagination to see, did it exist, what it would mean to the national morale, the national economy, and the national security in the existing crisis. Studies now undertaken will have some influence, of course, before the present emergency is passed. But their greatest importance will be in laying sound and broad foundations for a national military policy in the longer future which will be concerned not merely with a passing crisis--however menacing and prolonged--but will be intimately related to our political ideals, geographical position, industrial resources, governmental institutions, standard of living, and long-run national objectives.

In the past our apparent invulnerability, combined with the balance of political and economic forces in Europe and the Far East, made a coherent military policy, however desirable, discretionary rather than imperative. Such is no longer the case, for the tragic fact seems to be that for some time to come the world will be ruled by power politics in which the United States already has taken a conspicuous role. The American Way appears destined to receive an armor-plating and a streamlining. The militarization of America, however, would be a tragedy of the first magnitude. But there can be no militarism where there is a nice balance and an effective cooperation between professional and civilian interest in and control over political and military strategy. Unless, therefore, the social scientist takes a conspicuous and far-sighted position of leadership in the process of planning the national defense, we shall lose some of the values which it is essential that we retain and we shall, in the end, be the less rather than the more secure.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

November 21, 1939

My dear Dr. Aydelotte,

Do you suppose that out of your busy life you could snatch enough time to read the enclosed memorandum? Later I should like to tell you its history and its present status.

Sincerely yours,

Edward Mead Earle

Dr. Frank Aydelotte, Director
The Institute for Advanced Sutdy
Princeton, New Jersey

Revised
11/16/39

Memorandum Concerning a Study of American Military Policy

Almost three years ago I suggested that national defense as a phase of American foreign policy might prove to be the most pressing problem facing the United States in this decade. Nothing which has happened in the intervening time has altered this prophecy. Aside from the immediate and practical exigencies of the situation, however, I am convinced that we in America have not considered military policy in its broadest aspects as something vitally associated with the national welfare. We have been too much disposed to disregard the problem altogether in times of relative peace and to treat it in times of stress as primarily a technical question of battleships, guns, aircraft and munitions, and of the Congressional appropriations necessary to provide them. These questions are relatively the simplest to answer and may, with some minor reservations, be left to the decision of technical experts.

Policies of national defense, however, involve a great deal more than this. They are not military problems solely or even primarily. Events of the last year have shown, indeed, that armaments of themselves may be a tragic futility unless accompanied by clear-cut comprehension by both a government and its people of the purposes for which armaments are to be used and of the limitations to which they are subjected. Arms without policy may be as ineffective as policy without arms. Some of the present difficulties of Great Britain are clearly a result of her failure to appreciate this fundamental and inescapable fact. On the other hand, the thoughtful and purposeful integration of diplomatic and military policies may result in the formulation of a Grand Strategy which will merit respect and in support of which the effective mobilization of national resources may be planned, and, when necessary, carried out. Such a strategy will and should be deeply rooted in, although not handicapped by, historical tradition and political ideals and

must give full consideration to geographical position, industrial organization, natural resources, and the governmental system.

An examination of the foreign policies of the United States will show that they may be divided into two general categories: First, those concerned primarily with national defense (such as isolation, neutrality, the Monroe Doctrine, sea power, supremacy in the Caribbean, and, where possible, disarmament by agreement). Second, those based primarily upon economic considerations (such as freedom of the seas, the open door, "dollar diplomacy," and imperialism). It will be observed that the former group are more controlling today than ever and that the latter have either been modified or are in the process of modification or virtual abandonment. The history of the United States, therefore, shows that our greatest successes have been in the field of what might be called grand strategy, and it may confidently be predicted that such will continue to be the case. It is likewise a tribute to this grand strategy that, whatever its ultimate sanction, it has heretofore been pursued with relatively little military force.

It is here suggested that we need a historical and critical study of a Grand Strategy[1] for the United States. Such a study would be useful not only to those who are charged with the formulation of national policies, but also to the vast public which has shown an increasing interest in foreign policy and national defense and which certainly should be concerned and informed regarding them. The enthusiasm which recently has greeted Major George Fielding Eliot's The Ramparts We Watch is an indication that even circumscribed studies of this character will receive an audience. In totalitarian states official authorities claim omniscience in all such matters. But it is the essence of democracy that vital decisions be arrived at as a result of

1. Grand Strategy might be defined as that combination of diplomatic and military policies by which the vital interests of a nation may be most effectively advanced and defended. In some circumstances the diplomatic and in others the military instrumentalities will be the more important, but they are always inextricably connected.

public discussion and that as far as possible they represent deliberate and rational processes of choice. National policy cannot be separated from the interests and ideals for which the people as a whole are willing in a crisis to pledge their lives and fortunes. In the long run, no policy can last which does not command a large measure of popular support founded upon enlightened opinion. Competence to judge overflows the boundaries of governmental agencies into the larger body politic and into the realm of scholarship.

The proposed study will not be one in military tactics and should therefore not be written by a military expert. It will concern itself much more largely with the component elements of military power--geographic, economic, and political. It is in its historical and economic phases, for example, that the study is most urgently needed. There seems to be a lack of appreciation of the fact that during the period 1775-1830--when, as now, Europe was going through a period of revolution and war--the fathers of this nation did in fact lay down (in The Federalist, the Neutrality Proclamation, the Farewell Address, and in Monroe's annual message of 1823, for example) a grand strategy for the United States which has stood the test of time better than might have been anticipated and which still constitutes the foundation of American statecraft. This is notably true of the Monroe Doctrine which has steadily gained in authority and prestige and which, judged solely as a military policy, commands not only the virtually unanimous support of the American public but the unchallenged respect of the Great Powers.

With the possible exception of Alexander Hamilton, no American statesman seems to have understood the impact of armaments upon the national economic life or the importance of economic organization ~~upon~~ to military efficiency. A study of contemporary text books and other treatises in economics, for example, shows that national defense is mentioned not at all or only in

the most casual manner. The relationship of armaments to certain key industries, to the national debt, to taxation (which may redistribute wealth and determine the social organization), to transportation, and to foreign trade has only recently received any attention at all. There has been little consideration in the United States of a far-sighted national program concerning man-power, designed to raise the physical and mental capacities of all citizens to the highest practicable level and to provide in peace time physical and vocational training which will assure the maximum utilization of human resources in time of emergency. And we have only begun to appreciate the importance of conservation of natural resources and of the storage of vital raw materials as essential measures of defense. We need a fresh and unbiased appraisal of the components of military power--at sea, on land and in the air--with special reference to the geographical, economic, and political situation of the United States and with some consideration of the revolutionary character of the modern world.

The subject of investigation here proposed has at the moment indubitable intrinsic significance in foreign relations and domestic policy, and according to all indications it will have increasing importance for the future. Although the inquiry would have a frankly utilitarian purpose, it should be conducted according to the most rigorous canons of factual scholarship and empirical thinking. If scientific investigation be valuable in itself and if, in addition, it render the public service of aiding in the clarification of nationalpolicy in a highly explosive situation, it may be said to be justified by any standards. The person designated to carry out such a study should be a scholar with training in American history and politics and with enough reportorial ability to enable him to pick the brains of experts in the government services and other specialists. He should have associated with him, if possible, someone who is acquainted with

the enormous amount of European literature, particularly German, upon what is called "the military potential." A more detailed statement of objectives could be formulated, if required, based upon the general principles here set forth. It would not seem wise, however, to set narrow limits to the inquiry at its inception.

It is of the utmost importance that the proposed study of American Military Policy be carried on as part of a larger project of research in American Foreign Relations. This would put military affairs in a proper setting, for they are inextricably connected with larger phases of international relations. The term "grand strategy" has been used above to indicate something of this sort, but it by no means covers all the possibilities. There should, for example, be extensive consideration of such vital factors as the economic causes and effects of armaments, the manner in which public opinion operates upon and influences foreign affairs, and the inter-relations of domestic and international politics. Results from the study on military policy as such could be reasonably expected in about two years, whereas the larger study in foreign relations might have to be extended over a longer period. All of this, of course, would be a matter for further discussion when and if the proposal is under definitive consideration.