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Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?*)

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In this introduction to vol. xxiv of the Bibliotheca Persica Tabari translation David Powers expresses the view that “Although scholars disagree over whether the terms “Qays” and “Yaman” refer to tribal confederations, political parties, or interest groups, it is generally accepted that the Qays stood for the expansion of the empire and the exclusion of non-Arab clients, while the Yaman criticized the policy of expansion and advocated equal status for Arab Muslims and non-Arab converts to Islam”¹⁾. One is slightly puzzled by this statement in that Qays and Yemen only stood for the policies in question if they were political parties, which cannot be disputed and generally accepted at the same time. But the thesis to which Powers refers, which is that of Shaban²⁾, certainly tends to win general acceptance among undergraduates; whether it has done so among their teachers is more difficult to say³⁾, but the fact that a scholar of Powers' stature should espouse it shows that it has survived better than it deserves — for Shaban's theory is so faulty that it should have been generally dismissed by now. Since it will not apparently be dismissed without a systematic demonstration of its errors, and since further it is tedious to explain its shortcomings year in and year out to undergraduates, the present article seeks to refute it once and for all.

In quotations from al-Tabari I sometimes follow, sometimes modify and sometimes depart freely from the translation to which reference is made.

*) I should like to thank Dr. G. R. Hawting for the comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

¹⁾ D. S. Powers (tr.), *The history of al-Tabari*, vol. xxiv, Albany 1989, p. xiv.

²⁾ M. A. Shaban, *The 'Abbāsid Revolution*, Cambridge 1970; id, *Islamic History A. D. 600–750 (A. H. 132), a New Interpretation*, Cambridge 1971.

³⁾ H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, London and New York 1986, pp. 104f, thinks that there is some truth to Shaban's thesis; but it is not accepted by G. R. Hawting, *The First Dynasty of Islam, The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750*, London and Sydney 1986, chs 6–8; Shaban's works are not listed in the bibliography to A. Noth, 'Früher Islam' in U. Haarmann (ed.), *Geschichte der arabischen Welt*, Munich 1987; and his thesis comes in for heavy criticism in R. Eisener, *Zwischen Faktum und Fiktion. Eine Studie zum Umayyadenkalifen Sulaimān b. 'Abd almalik und seinem Bild in den Quellen*, Wiesbaden 1987.

The problem

The problem to which Shaban addresses himself is the relationship between two apparently tribal groups in the Umayyad period. The genealogists divide the Arabs into sons of Ismā'il and sons of Qaṭṭān, who are northerners and southerners respectively⁴); and according to the historians, this division was of acute importance in the later Umayyad period, in which the two descent groups would behave as rivals and engage in 'aṣabiyya, 'partisan behaviour'.

The historical sources usually refer to the two descent groups by different names, however. The label Qaṭṭān does occur, but the most common designation for the southerners is (ahl) al-Yaman or al-Yamāniyya, 'Yemenis'. The northerners, on the other hand, are never referred to as 'sons of Ismā'il', possibly because this term tends to mean 'Arabs' tout court (the separate descent of the southerners notwithstanding⁵) and possibly because the northerners do not start branching out until we reach a certain 'Adnān, so that they are adequately described as '(descendants of) 'Adnān'. But since the only son of 'Adnān to have descendants relevant to the Umayyad period was Nizār, they were also subsumed as 'Nizār' (or 'Nizāriyya'). More commonly, however, they were known as 'Muḍar' (or 'Muḍariyya'), Muḍar being one of Nizār's sons, or as 'Qays' (or 'Qaysiyya'), Qays being a descendant of Muḍar. Even the more inclusive term Muḍar excluded some northerners, however, for Nizār was the father not only of Muḍar (and thus of Qays), but also of Rabi'a, the tribes of eastern Arabia. But the Rabi'a were a special case in that their allegiances went now to the northerners and now to the southerners, their Nizāri genealogy notwithstanding, so that when the sources speak of Qays or Muḍar (henceforth Qays/Muḍar) versus Yemen, they usually mean, and sometimes actually say, Qays/Muḍar and Rabi'a versus Yemen, or Qays/Muḍar versus Yemen and Rabi'a⁶).

What then was the rivalry about? In 1861 Dozy presented it as a carry-over from pre-Islamic Arabia, not only in the sense that the Arabs were unlikely to have shed their propensity to clannishness and feuding immediately after their adoption of Islam, but also in the sense that there had been hosti-

⁴) See W. Caskel, *Ġamharat an-nasab. Das genealogische Werk des Hišām ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbī*, Leiden 1966 (an immensely useful work for Umayyad history).

⁵) Attempts were in fact made to turn all Arabs into sons of Ismā'il, cf. I. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, tr. S. M. Stern, London 1967-71, vol. i, p. 99 (of the original pagination).

⁶) Wellhausen goes so far as to include the Rabi'a under the label of Yemen (J. Wellhausen, *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall*, tr. M. G. Weir, Calcutta 1927, e.g. p. 210), which seems a bit excessive.

lity between these very groups already in pagan times⁷. In 1902 this thesis was summarily dismissed by Wellhausen, who pointed out that there is no antagonism between northerners and southerners in the pre-Islamic tradition and that it only made its appearance in the Islamic world during the Second Civil War: in Syria it was triggered by the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ (684 AD), in which the Kalb defeated the Qays, and in Basra, from where it spread to Khurasan, it was a reponse to tensions exacerbated by the immigration of Azd from Oman⁸). Both points have been generally accepted⁹). Wellhausen did not however explain why momentary hostility between Kalb (classically Yemenis) and Qays in Syria, or between Azd (classically Yemenis too) and Rabi'a on the one hand and Qays/Muḍar on the other in Basra and Khurasan, should have continued throughout the Umayyad period or why it should have escalated to involve all Arab tribes; nor did he say whether the escalation took place along existing genealogical lines or on the contrary created them. But he clearly assumed the hostility to be authentically tribal and therefore, perhaps, in no need of further explanation: once the feuds had started, they were bound to escalate and eventually divide the Arabs into two antagonistic groups whether this division had existed before (without being antagonistic) or not.

Thereafter little new was said on the subject until 1970-71, when Shaban published his first two books. Shaban did not offer any insight into the creation of the classical genealogies, being distinctly uninterested in the tribal organization and outlook of the early Arabs, and indeed irritated by the Western insistence on their importance. What he did offer was a conviction that the antagonism between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen is unlikely to have remained a purely tribal phenomenon throughout the Umayyad period: "it is absurd to interpret this conflict as simply a tribal squabble", as he puts it¹⁰). This is true. No doubt the antagonism started as such a "squabble" in Syro-Jazira, Basra and Khurasan, and the protagonists did continue to speak in a manner reminiscent of feuding tribesmen (though neither point is conceded by Shaban); but one nonetheless gets the impression that some-

⁷) R. Dozy, *Histoire des musulmans d'Espagne*, Leiden 1861, vol. i, ch. 6. Similarly P. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, tenth edition, London 1975 (first published 1937), p. 280, where it reflects "a deep-rooted national distinction".

⁸) Wellhausen, *Kingdom* (first published Berlin 1902), pp. 180f, 209f. Goldziher had earlier proposed that the antagonism developed out of rivalry between Quraysh and the Anṣar (*Muslim Studies*, p. 99), but this hypothesis has rightly been ignored.

⁹) In 'A. H. al-Kharbūṭli, *Ta'rikh al-'Irāq fī ḡill al-ḥukm al-Umawī*, Cairo 1959, pp. 246ff, however, the antagonism starts in the days of the Rāshidūn.

¹⁰) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 120.

thing new had intervened to keep the hostility going, and indeed to change its nature, for the intensity of the 'aṣabiyya increased in direct proportion to the Arab loss of tribal ties. By the 740's the Arab had lived in the complex society of the Middle East for three generations, adapted to life in provinces of very different types, taken up careers as traders, scholars, soldiers and even peasants, admitted a huge number of non-Arab converts to their increasingly differentiated social, economic and cultural ranks, and adopted a wide variety of conflicting values and beliefs in the process. Neither subtribes nor tribes could act as units any more, still less could the larger descent groups of which they formed part. An Iraqi scholar of Sa'd/Tamim/Muḍar, for example, would not feel obliged to side with a Sa'di soldier in Iraq on the basis of common descent, still less with one in Khurasan, or with all Tamimis, for the simple reason that there were no longer any common interests for the joint descent to articulate. Yet it is precisely in the 740's that the 'aṣabiyya between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen culminates.

Shaban's solution

Shaban, then, puts his finger on a genuine problem. He solves it by postulating that the originally tribal labels of Qays/Muḍar and Yemen came to stand for political parties in the Marwānid period (684–750 A.D.). Those who pledged their allegiance to Qays were committing themselves to a programme of continued military expansion on the one hand and segregation of Arab and non-Arab Muslims on the other, the ultimate aim of both policies being the preservation of Arab privileges; by contrast, those who pledged their allegiances to the Yemen were committing themselves to the end of expansion and the assimilation of non-Arab converts, their ultimate aim being the creation of a Muslim community in which Arabs and non-Arabs enjoyed the same position¹¹). The foremost representative, indeed founder, of the Qaysī party was al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī, who served as governor of Iraq for 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I; but the majority of Umayyad caliphs opted for Qaysī governors, the notable exceptions being Sulaymān and 'Umar II, though there was also a Yemeni interlude under Hishām. Eventually, the conflict engendered civil war, for the Yemenis staged a coup against al-Walid II in 744 and raised Yazid III to the throne; and though they were defeated by Marwān II, the last exponent of Qaysism, they won again at the hands of the 'Abbāsids, whose revolution brought about the complete assimilation of Arabs and non-Arabs in Islam.

¹¹) Shaban, *Islamic history*, pp. 119ff. There are also passages in which the Yemenis support the assimilation of Arabs and non-Arabs regardless of faith, their ultimate aim being apparently the creation of a modern nation state (cf. pp. 123, 142, 156, 157f).

It is easy to see why undergraduates respond warmly to this theory. The Qaysis stood for the imperialist and racist policies practised by our colonial ancestors while the Yemenis subscribed to the liberal views which we ourselves espouse and which, we happily note, won out among the Muslims too. But unfortunately the theory does not work.

Parties rather than descent groups?

Shaban postulates that membership of Qays/Muḍar and Yemen was based on political conviction rather than descent: "Certainly these words are the names of actual tribal groupings, but in this context they were used to indicate Arab groups who had common interests which had nothing to do with tribal divisions¹²). If the common interests had nothing to do with tribal divisions, the tribal origins of those who pursued them should be random: we should find Kindis, Azdis, Khuzā'is, Kalbis and other Yemenis by descent supporting Qaysī policies and conversely 'Uqaylis, Kilābis, Kinānis and other Qaysis/Muḍaris by descent espousing Yemeni views. Shaban does assert that this is the case. But of the fifty men known to have been members of Yazid III's *Yamāniyya*, no less than forty-five were Yemenis in terms of descent¹³); and of the thirty-eight men known to have supported Marwān II's *Qaysiyya*, at least thirty-two, possibly thirty-four, were of Qays/Muḍar and Rabi'a¹⁴). In other words, practically all belonged to the party to which their *nishbas* assigned them; membership to the supposed political parties was overwhelmingly determined by descent. What is more, exceptions are hard to come by before the Civil War: in 'aṣabiyya on behalf of, or between, Qays/Muḍar and Yemen before 744, the protagonists seem always to have sided with the party to which they belonged by descent¹⁵)

¹²) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 120.

¹³) P. Crone, *Slaves on Horses, the Evolution of the Islamic Polity*, Cambridge 1980, p. 42 and note 307 thereto, and appendix IV, nos 1–46 (where 49 men are covered; add Bishr b. Ḥalbā' al-Kalbī, one of the killers of al-Walid II, Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rikh Madinat Dimashq*, vol. x, ed. M. A. Dahmān, Damascus n.d., p. 134). Four members of the Yamāniyya were of Qays/Muḍar (nos. 2, 12, 22) and one is of uncertain background (no. 37).

¹⁴) Crone, *Slaves*, appendix IV, nos. 47–85. The four certain Yemenis are nos. 78–9, 83–4, the two possible ones are nos. 77, 82.

¹⁵) Shaban thinks it accidental that the fighting at Barūqān was between Muḍar and Yemen ('*Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 103f). Would he also claim that the prisoner freed by Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen out of regard for the Yamāniyya merely happened to be of Khuzā'a/Yemen (al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk*, ed. M. J. de Goeje and others, Leiden 1879–1901, ser. ii, p. 119 = M. Hinds (tr.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. xxiii, Albany 1990, pp. 63f), that the Syrian

(as they seem to have done after 750, too, though there was far less of it by then¹⁶).) Shaban implicitly concedes this point, for all the men he singles out as exponents of Qaysi and Yemeni policies happen to be Qaysis and Yemenis in terms of descent as well. The founding father of the Qaysi party was a Qaysi, that is al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafi, and one assumes this to be why the policies came to be known as Qaysi in the first place. But there is no tendency thereafter for political views to be dissociated from the tribal groups which had engendered them, for the main representatives of Qaysi policies from al-Ḥajjāj to the fall of the Umayyads were Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili/Qays, 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays and Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays, while the foremost leaders of the Yemeni political party were Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen, Khālid and Asad al-Qasri/Yemen and Juday' b. 'Alī al-Kirmānī al-Azdi/Yemen. There can thus be no question of arguing that Qays/Muḍar and Yemen were political parties *rather* than descent groups: they can only have been political parties *based* on descent groups. The exceptions notwithstanding¹⁷), the sources leave no doubt that one was born into these parties; one did not choose to join them.

There is nothing implausible about the proposition that two large descent groups should have developed different political aspirations. It is sometimes said that the Yemenis were mainly settled people by origin whereas the Muḍaris were mainly bedouin¹⁸), and Shaban's theory seems to be an elaboration of this idea: coming as they did from a settled and fairly complex society, the Yemenis were less warlike and less given to ethnic chauvinism than their crude Muḍari counterparts¹⁹). At the same time Shaban denies that the issues were related to tribal divisions because he finds the Islamicist interest in such divisions offensive: modern scholars, he says,

despatched by the Yamāniyya to Khurasan along with 500 soldiers in the days of the 'aṣabiyya merely happened to belong to a different tribal group from al-Ḥārith b. Surayj al-Tamimi/Muḍar, of whom he was determined to be the killer (Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1580), or that pure accident caused the Khurasani feuds on the eve of the 'Abbasid revolution to involve Tamimi and other Muḍari tribesmen versus Azdis and other Yemenis by descent?

¹⁶) Ṭabari, ser. iii, pp. 366, 609, 624f, 639, 688; cf. also al-Azdi, *Ta'rikh al-Mawṣil*, ed. 'A. Ḥabiba, Cairo 1967, pp. 218ff.

¹⁷) For an attempt to explain them, see Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 47f.

¹⁸) See for example Kharbūṭli, *al-'Irāq*, p. 244. Though Shaban does not cite this work, several of his ideas could have their roots in it.

¹⁹) Compare H. Pérès, 'Les éléments ethniques de l'Espagne musulmane et la langue au V^e/X^e siècle', *Étude d'Orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de Lévi-Provençal*, vol. ii, Paris 1962, p. 720, on the Yemenis in Spain; and note how the Arab treatment of *mawālī* is assumed to reflect bedouin, as opposed to simply tribal, attitudes in 'A. al-Wardi, *Dirāsa fī ṭabī'at al-mujtama' al-'Irāqī*, Baghdad 1965, p. 112.

"sadly underrate Arabs' ability to groups issues more relevant than those of tribal rivalries and jealousies"²⁰). The result is incoherent, but the denial is easily discounted. In short, it could well be that the tribes subsumed under the label of Muḍar had developed different political views from those subsumed as Yemen.

Where is the debate?

But if Qays/Muḍar and Yemen subscribed to different ideals, why did they never say so? It is not as if the Arabs of the Umayyad period were reluctant to air their views; on the contrary, their culture was highly argumentative. People were for ever debating the rights and wrongs of the participants in the First Civil War, the legitimacy or otherwise of the Umayyads, the nature of the caliphate, the limits of obedience, the status of the sinner, the nature of God, free will versus predestination and much more besides. But of debates about expansion and assimilation between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen there is not a trace. The two groups do not in fact seem to have engaged in debates of any kind before their rivalry turned into civil war.

This point has been made before, but without illustrations of how the participants actually talked²¹), so it may help if some examples are given here.

(a) According to Shaban, the appointment of 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays to Iraq in 102/720 marked the return of Qaysi policies after Sulaymān and 'Umar II's Yemeni interlude²²). Ibn Hubayra was indeed conscious of his membership of Qays. "Who is the most eminent man (*sayyid*) of Qays?", he once asked his companions, who politely replied that he was; but he disagreed, giving the answer as al-Kawthar b. Zufar al-Kilābi/Qays, the son of a famous chief from Qinnasrin, on the grounds that "he only has to sound the bugle at night and twenty thousand men will show up without asking why they have been summoned". Of himself he merely said that he was always pursuing the best interests of Qays. A Fazārī bedouin objected that "if you really had the best interests of Qays in mind, you would not have ordered their horseman *par excellence* (*fāris*) to be slain", with reference to the fact that Ibn Hubayra had given orders for Sa'id al-Ḥarashi/Qays, the recently dismissed governor of Khurasan, to be tortured to death; and Ibn Hubayra duly cancelled the order²³). Other Qaysis too, disapproved of the treatment that Ibn Hubayra had meted out to Sa'id: "You have put the horseman of Qays in chains and disgraced him", Ma'qil b. 'Urwa al-

²⁰) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 120.

²¹) Crone, *Slaves*, p. 42.

²²) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 137.

²³) Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1455 = Powers, p. 185; cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 320f.

Qushayri/Qays said. But Ibn Hubayra told Ma'qil of an incident which so enraged the latter that he visited Sa'id in prison in order to pour abuse at him, and this too was felt to be wrong: "you have mistreated your fellow-tribesman and slandered him; therefore God has allowed him to prevail over you", a Kilābi/Qays told Ma'qil after Ibn Hubayra had been dismissed and Sa'id had regained the upper hand²⁴). Qays is plainly a tribal group in all these exchanges; its most eminent man is a chief able to summon 20,000 warriors so loyal that they do not ask questions, and its members are fellow-tribesmen expected to display loyalty towards each other, though in practice they frequently do not. There is no suggestion, explicit or implicit, that the tribal group was associated with political views of its own.

(b) When Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays, another exponent of political Qaysism in Shaban's view, was appointed to Iraq 120/738, he received a list of men eligible for the governorship of Khurasan, all of them Qaysis and Muḍaris (one of them by *walā'*); so he wrote to Hishām "lavishing praise on the Qaysiyya" and mentioning Naṣr b. Sayyār al-Laythi/al-Kināni/Muḍar last. Hishām wrote back saying "I have understood your letter and your praise of the Qaysiyya; you mentioned Naṣr b. Sayyār and the small size of his tribe, but how can it be small when I am his tribe? Rather, you have displayed Qaysi feelings to me (*taqayyasta 'alayya*), but I am going to display Khindif feelings to you (*wa-anā mutakhandif 'alayka*), so despatch Naṣr's appointment... Besides, Tamim [Muḍar] are the bulk of the troops of Khurasan"²⁵). Now one might have expected correspondence between the caliph and a Qaysi leader regarding the appointment of Naṣr, supposedly "a confirmed imperialist from the right-wing Muḍar"²⁶), to be a context in which the political overtones of the terms Qays and Muḍar would be revealed. But once again Qays is simply a tribal group, this time contrasted with Muḍar, or more precisely with Khindif, the ancestor of Tamim, Kināna and other Muḍari tribes; and Naṣr's suitability turns on his tribal status, not on his political persuasions: Yūsuf tried to eliminate him with reference to the small number of Kinānis in Khurasan, not on the grounds that he was too right-wing or left-wing for the job, while Hishām insisted on appointing him with reference partly to the caliphal backing he would receive and partly to

²⁴) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1456f. = Powers, pp. 186f. (*pace* Powers, *ibn 'amm* must mean 'fellow-tribesman' here).

²⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1662f. The *mawlā* on the list was Yūnus b. 'Abd Rabbih (cf. Crone, *Slaves*, p. 53).

²⁶) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 143.

his acceptability to Tamim, who were also Muḍaris and who constituted the majority of the Khurasani troops²⁷).

(c) In 100/718f Jarrāḥ b. 'Abdallāh al-Ḥakamī/Yemen was described to 'Umar II as a crude '*aṣabī*', and if we follow Shaban, he must have been an '*aṣabī*' on behalf of his political party. Since he was a Yemeni by descent, yet associated with al-Ḥajjāj, the reader wonders which party he had sided with, but the speech reported in illustration of his '*aṣabiyya*' merely has him tell the Khurasanis that "I came to you with solicitude [for all of you], but now I am partisan ('*aṣabī*'); by God, one man from my people (*qawm*) is dearer to me than hundred others"²⁸). This is plainly a declaration of partiality for his Yemeni descent group. Shaban nonetheless has Jarrāḥ declare himself biased in favour of the *Arabs*, the statement being a declaration of support for the anti-assimilationist policies of al-Ḥajjāj's party!²⁹). When Asad al-Qasri/Yemen transferred the troops from Barūqān to Balkh, somebody warned him that they would engage in partisan behaviour (*yata'aṣṣabūn*) if they were settled in fifth (the tribal units in which the Khurasani army was divided), to which Asad reacted by settling them in a mixed pattern instead³⁰). Even Shaban would hardly construe this as a warning that the troops would engage in debates over the desirability of assimilation if they were settled in tribal units, a prospect so disagreeable to Asad that he settled them otherwise.

(d) In 109/727 Asad was himself accused of stirring up '*aṣabiyya*', for which he was dismissed and of which the following is given as an example: "Asad took partisan action against (*ta'aṣṣaba 'alā*) Naṣr b. Sayyār [al-Kināni/Muḍar] and some Muḍaris who were with him and had them lashed. He [also] made an oration one Friday in which he said, 'may God blacken these faces, the faces of people of dissension, hypocrisy, disturbance and corruption. Oh God, separate me from them and take me to my place of *hijra* and fatherland. Few are those who covet what is in my hands or who speak up, [for] the Commander of the Faithful is my maternal uncle, Khālīd b. 'Abdallāh is my brother, and with me I have twelve thousand Yemeni swords'"³¹). To Shaban, this means that Asad punished Naṣr and other Arab

²⁷) Wellhausen takes Hishām to have appointed Naṣr *because* his tribes was small (*Kingdom*, pp. 474f.). But this seems to be contradicted by the reference to his kinship with Tamim.

²⁸) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1354, cf. p. 1355 and the glossery s.v. '*qb*'.

²⁹) Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 87; similarly Powers' translation, pp. 83f.; cf. my review in *Der Islam*, 69 (1992), p. 123.

³⁰) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1490; cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 468f. (and p. 456n for the date).

³¹) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1498, cf. p. 1497; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 455f.

leaders for their opposition to his projected alliance with the Hepthalites, the impracticability of this alliance being the real reason why he was dismissed!³²).

(e) In 744 the Yemenis murdered al-Walid II, who was alleged to have vented his pro-Qaysi feelings in poetry such as this: "...We are those who rule men by force... We have trampled on the Ash'aris [Yemen] with the might of Qays... Behold Khālid [al-Qasri/Yemen] a prisoner in our midst! Would they not have defended him if they had been men?... As for Kinda and Sakūn [Yemen], they have never risen up again..."³³). One Yemeni poet retorted that "We gave long battle-days to the tribes of Nizār on the morning of Marj [Rāhit]... Whenever you confront Sakūn and Kalb [Yemen] with the 'Abs (var. Qays), you may be sure that [the latter's] sovereignty is at an end..."³⁴). Another boasted that al-Walid had been killed by Kalb/Yemen and Madhḥij/Yemen³⁵); yet another rhetorically asked whether "a single soul from Muḍar came to his defence?"³⁶ The poems are replete with tribal names; Yemeni martyrs such as Ibn al-Ash'ath, the Muhallabids and Khālid al-Qasri are defended against charges of ignominy, the argument being that they were noble warriors and that "Khālid used to provide shrouds for the dead of Nizār"³⁷), not that these people had fallen in a good cause. One would hardly infer from all this that the Yemenis had joined the Yamāniyya "regardless of their nominal tribal affiliations" or that the Yamāniyya was a party advocating "practical measures to meet rapidly changing social conditions"³⁸).

That the participants should have been abusive is not surprising: participants in religious debates were not invariably polite. But the abuse never takes the form of 'you are foolish/corrupt/rebellious in adhering to such and such views', always 'you are not my people and therefore weak and

³²) Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, pp. 108f.

³³) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1781 = C. Hillenbrand (tr.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. xxvi, Albany 1989, p. 133. The poem probably was not by al-Walid, but rather by a Yemeni trying to stir up Yemeni feelings against him.

³⁴) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1782 = Hillenbrand, p. 134, where *matā talqa 'l-Sakūn^a wa-talqa Kalb^{am} bi-'Absⁱⁿ* has been taken to mean "when[ever] you confront the Sakūn and the Kalb and the 'Abs".

³⁵) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1822, ult. = Hillenbrand, p. 178, where *asbāq Madhḥij* has been taken to mean 'the forefathers of Madhḥij' rather than 'the Madhḥiji competitors' (trying to kill al-Walid before the Kalbis did). The forefathers were obviously not in a position to participate.

³⁶) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1823, ult. = Hillenbrand, p. 179.

³⁷) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1782f. = Hillenbrand, p. 135.

³⁸) Shaban, *Islamic History*, pp. 124, 155.

ignoble'. It is of course for this reason that the sources identify the antagonism as '*aṣabiyya*: the protagonists defended their people, right or wrong, not their party with reference to its rectitude.

The parties in action

Though Qays/Muḍar and Yemen never identify their political convictions in words, they could still display them in action; but their supposed convictions are not reflected in their behaviour either, as the following examination of the Marwānid period should suffice to show.

(i) 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I (685–715).

According to Shaban, 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I were supporters of Qays. Let us start, then, by reviewing the governors they appointed to their main provinces.

Egypt:

'Abd al-'Aziz b. Marwān/Umayyad³⁹)
'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Malik/Umayyad⁴⁰)
Qurra b. Sharik al-'Absi/Qays⁴¹).

North Africa:

Zuhayr b. Qays al-Balawi/Yemen
Ḥassān b. al-Nu'mān al-Ghassāni/Yemen⁴²)
Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, *mawlā* of Lakhm/Yemen and/or the Umayyads; also claimed as a genuine Lakhmi/Yemeni or Balawi/Yemeni or Bakri/Rabī'ī⁴³).

Iraq:

Bishr b. Marwān/Umayyad
al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafi/Qays⁴⁴).

³⁹) *EI*², s.v.

⁴⁰) al-Kindi, *The Governors and Judges of Egypt*, ed. R. Guest, Leiden and London 1912, pp. 58ff.

⁴¹) *EI*², s.v.

⁴²) al-Balādhuri, *Futūḥ al-buldān* ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden 1866, p. 229; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrib*, ed. G. S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal, Leiden 1948–51, vol. i, pp. 31ff., 34ff.

⁴³) al-Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 230; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 39ff.; E. Lafuente y Alcántara (ed.), *Ajbar machmuḍ*, Madrid 1867, pp. 3ff.

⁴⁴) *EI*², s.vv.

Khurasan:

- Umayya b. 'Abdallāh/Umayyad⁴⁵)
- al-Muhallab b. Abi Šufra al-Azdi/Yemen
- Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen⁴⁶)
- Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili/Qays⁴⁷).

There is no systematic preference for men of Qaysi/Muḍari descent here. More strikingly, there is no such preference in the appointments made by al-Ḥajjāj, the Qaysi governor of the East for 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid: of the forty-eight men known to have received appointments from him, twenty-five were of Qays/Muḍar, nineteen of Yemen and four of Rabi'a⁴⁸). One would infer from this that Qays/Muḍar and Yemen had not yet come to be associated with rival political views.

This is corroborated when we turn to the policies pursued under 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid. Both caliphs certainly supported a programme of expansion: it was in their reigns that Qutayba b. Muslim began the conquest of Central Asia, that Mūsā b. Nuṣayr occupied Spain and that Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim embarked on the conquest of India⁴⁹). But Mūsā b. Nuṣayr was a Yemeni (by *walā'*), while al-Muhallab, 'Abd al-Malik's Yemeni governor of Khurasan, had spent his entire life fighting wars of conquest before taking on the Azraqite campaigns for which he was rewarded with the governorship of Khurasan, so one must conclude that Yemen still had not come to be associated with a policy of non-expansion.

Nor does the evidence suggest that Qays/Muḍar had come to stand for a policy of *apartheid*. The bureaucracy was headed by *mawālī*, which was not particularly remarkable since it had always been dominated by non-Arabs⁵⁰).

⁴⁵) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 421f.

⁴⁶) *ET*², s.vv. 'al-Muhallab', 'Muhallabids'.

⁴⁷) *ET*², s.v.

⁴⁸) Crone, *Slaves*, p. 43 and appendix III, nos. 1–47 thereto. Similarly 'A. – A. 'A. Dixon, *The Umayyad Caliphate 65–86/684–705*, London 1971, pp. 115ff.

⁴⁹) H. A. R. Gibb, *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia*, London 1923, pp. 29ff.; E. Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*, Paris and Leiden 1950–53, vol. i, pp. 8ff.; *ET*², s.v. 'Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim'.

⁵⁰) Mūsā b. Nuṣayr was in charge of the *kharāj* of Basra in the time of 'Abd al-Malik until he was found to have embezzled money and fled to 'Abd al-'Aziz in Egypt, whence he was appointed to North Africa (thus Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 39f.; cf. also Ibn Qutayba (attrib.), *al-Imāma wa'l-siyāsa*, Cairo 1969, vol. ii, pp. 59f.); 'Abdallāh b. Hurmuz, a *mawlā* of the Sufyānids, was in charge of the *diwān al-jund* in the time of al-Ḥajjāj; he was succeeded by his sons and his family was both rich and highly influential in Basra (al-Balādhuri, *Ansāb al-ashraf*, vol. ivb, ed. M. Schloessinger, Jerusalem 1938, p. 123); Yazid b. Abi Muslim, a *mawlā* of Thaqif,

but the first appointment of a *mawlā* to a judgeship in Iraq was allegedly made by al-Ḥajjāj: the Iraqis were so outraged by the appointment that the *mawlā* did not take it up⁵¹). As regards military positions, 'Abd al-Malik (or his brother 'Abd al-'Aziz) appointed the client Mūsā b. Nuṣayr to North Africa, and Mūsā in his turn appointed his client Tāriq to Spain⁵²). This is perhaps not remarkable either given that the first *mawlā* governor of North Africa had been appointed in the time of Mu'āwiya⁵³). When 'Abd al-Malik appointed a client to a military command against the Byzantines⁵⁴), he was once more following a precedent set in the time of Mu'āwiya⁵⁵). But he also appointed a client to the governorship of Qinnasrin⁵⁶), and yet another to Medina⁵⁷), while al-Ḥajjāj is said (probably wrongly) to have appointed a

though not by manumission, and a foster-brother of al-Ḥajjāj's, served as head of the latter's *diwān al-rasā'il* (al-Jahshiyārī, *Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa'l-kuttāb*, ed. M. al-Saqqa and others, Cairo 1938, p. 42) and as fiscal governor of Iraq after al-Ḥajjāj's death (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1268f. = Hinds, p. 217). For further examples, see I. Š. al-'Amad, *al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī, ḥayyātuhu wa-ar'uhu al-siyāsiyya*, Beirut 1973, pp. 383, 435; *ET*², s.v. 'mawlā'.

⁵¹) Thus al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, ed. W. Wright, Leipzig 1864–92, p. 285, on Sa'id b. Jubayr. This passage was first adduced by Š. A. al-'Alī, *al-Tanzīmat al-ijtimā'iyya wa'l-iqtisādīyya fī'l-Baṣra fī'l-qarn al-awwal al-hijrī*, second printing, Beirut 1969, p. 96n, where al-Ḥajjāj is said also to have appointed the *mawlā* Nūḥ b. Darrāj to the judgeship of Kufa (followed by Crone in *ET*², s.v. 'mawlā'). But though al-Ḥajjāj did make Ibn Jubayr assistant to the *qādī* (al-'Amad, *al-Ḥajjāj*, pp. 316, 401), one wonders whether he had really intended him for the *qadā'* itself; and he certainly did not appoint Ibn Darrāj. The context in which Ibn Darrāj is mentioned (Mubarrad, *Kāmil*, p. 286; Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, *al-'Iqd al-farīd*, ed. A. Amin and others, Cairo 1940–9, vol. iii, p. 417) does suggest that he was a contemporary of al-Ḥajjāj; but the verse describes al-Ḥajjāj as dead, and Ibn Darrāj was in fact judge of Kufa under Hārūn; he died in 182 (Waki', *Akhbār al-quḍāh*, ed. 'A. 'A. al-Marāghī, Cairo 1947–50, vol. iii, pp. 182ff.; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, Hyderabad 1325–27, vol. x, pp. 482f.).

⁵²) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, pp. 230f.

⁵³) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 94; Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 228; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 21f., on Abū 'l-Muhājir.

⁵⁴) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, pp. 160f.; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1185 = Hinds, p. 134 and note 456 thereto, on Maymūn al-Jurjūmānī.

⁵⁵) Khalifa b. Khayyāt, *Ta'rikh*, ed. S. Zakkār, Damascus 1967–8, p. 198, cf. 102, on 'Ubaydallāh b. Rabāḥ, whose father was a prisoner-of-war from 'Ayn Tamr captured together with the father of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr. Al-'Alī is mistaken when he claims that the first mention of a *mawlā* commanding an army refers to the revolt of al-Mukhtār (*Tanzīmat*, p. 97n).

⁵⁶) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 188, on Dīnār b. Dīnār, *mawlā 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān, wa-kāna 'alā Qinnasrīn wa-kuwarīhā*.

⁵⁷) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 834, 852, 854, on Tāriq, *mawlā* of 'Uthmān.

client of his to the *shurṭa* in Iraq⁵⁸). It is also under 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid that clients begin routinely to appear in the army, not just as servants accompanying their masters in the field (a role in which one continues to find them⁵⁹), but also as regular soldiers, be it in Syria, Egypt, Iraq or Khurasan⁶⁰). We are told that there were 7,000 *mawlā* soldiers in Khurasan under Qutayba, where they outnumbered 'Abd al-Qays (4,000) and were numerically on a par with Bakr b. Wā'il (7,000), though they were outnumbered by Qays and other Ahl al-'Āliya (9,000), by Tamim (10,000) and by the Azd (10,000)⁶¹).

Shaban presumably credits al-Ḥajjāj and his caliphal employers with a policy of discrimination because the former repatriated fugitive peasants⁶²). Peasants fled in a variety of directions, but many headed for the garrison cities where they claimed to be converts in the hope of escaping their taxes and receiving membership of the *dīwān*. Al-Ḥajjāj did not accept their conversion and sent them back to their villages, where they continued to be liable for the taxes they had tried to escape, a policy for which he doubtless had caliphal support and which the sources condemn as 'putting poll-tax on Muslims'⁶³). This was certainly a distinctive policy, but it was not a policy towards *mawālī*. Clients were non-Arabs who had been accepted as members of Muslim society, usually with and occasionally without conversion, and who had proof of their membership in the form of their patrons. But the

⁵⁸) Cf. Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 48, on Yazid b. Abi Muslim. No other sources know this man to have been in charge of the *shurṭa* for al-Ḥajjāj (cf. above, note 50). Note also that when al-Ya'qūbi, *Ta'rikh*, ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leiden 1883, vol. ii, p. 328, describes Shabīb the Khārijite as killing Maymūn *mawlā Ḥawshab b. Yazid ṣāhib shurṭa al-Ḥajjāj*, he is describing Maymūn's patron as head of al-Ḥajjāj's *shurṭa*, not Maymūn himself (cf. the parallel passage in Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 918 = E. K. Rowson (tr.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. xxii, Albany 1989, p. 69).

⁵⁹) Cf. Crone, *Slaves*, note 272.

⁶⁰) Crone, *Slaves*, p. 38 and the notes thereto.

⁶¹) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1290f.; cf. also Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 423.

⁶²) Cf. Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 109.

⁶³) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1122 = Hinds, p. 67; Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 336f. (al-Ḥajjāj's fiscal agents wrote that the *kharāj* was in arrears, the *dhimmīs* having converted and gone to the *amṣār*; so he wrote to Basra and elsewhere ordering them to be returned to their villages); Mubarrad, *Kāmil*, p. 286; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. iii, p. 416, citing Jāḥiẓ (converts participated in Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt, al-Ḥajjāj told them *antum 'ulūj wa-'ajam wa-qurākum awlā bikum*, etc); Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr wa-akhbārūhā*, ed. C. C. Torrey, New Haven 1932, pp. 155f (the first to collect poll-tax from converts was al-Ḥajjāj in Iraq; 'Abd al-Malik wanted the same to be done in Egypt, but his brother and governor there was allegedly dissuaded). Cf. also D. Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll Tax in early Islam*, Cambridge Mass. 1950, pp. 38, 82ff.

runaway peasants repatriated by al-Ḥajjāj were *dhimmīs* aspiring to recognition as *mawālī*; some did find patrons to legalize their presence, others undoubtedly contrived to hang on without them, but many were deported as illegal immigrants. They were *mawālī* in the eyes of the sources, a *mawlā* to them being simply a non-Arab Muslim, but not in the eyes of the authorities, a *mawlā* to them being a non-Arab whose presence in Muslim society was endorsed by an accredited member of this society⁶⁴). The distinction is important because the so-called *mawlā* grievances that figure so strongly in the secondary literature were in fact grievances nourished by *dhimmīs* outside Muslim society, not by the clients within. A client was a naturalized citizen, so to speak, and whatever problems he might encounter in Muslim society, repatriation and demands for poll-tax were not among them. It was a *mawlā* who applied al-Ḥajjāj's policy towards *dhimmīs* seeking client status in North Africa⁶⁵: being insiders, clients had as strong an interest as their patrons in keeping the *dhimmīs* out.

Shaban, however, thinks that the caliphs and their governors must have discriminated against *mawālī* too, and no doubt they did in the sense that they were prejudiced against them. Non-Arabs were inferior beings in Arab eyes, presumably including those of 'Abd al-Malik and al-Ḥajjāj: the latter figures among those who tried to prevent *mawālī* from marrying Arab women⁶⁶), and both he and 'Abd al-Malik clearly employed *mawālī* because the latter were too numerous and too skilled to be ignored, not because they envisaged God as presiding over a Racial Relations/Equal Opportunities Board. But official measures of discrimination are hard to document. There is good evidence that clients received lower pay in the army than their Arab counterparts, at least in some places⁶⁷); but the widespread notion that they received no pay at all is mistaken⁶⁸), and Shaban does not adduce it. What he does adduce is rather the fact that *mawālī* in the army were placed in a unit of their own rather than dispersed in the quarters or fifths of their patrons⁶⁹). He even discerns a segregationist policy behind the fact that

⁶⁴) Cf. *EI*², s.v. 'mawlā'; P. Crone, *Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law*, Cambridge 1987, pp. 35f., 90.

⁶⁵) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1435 = Powers, p. 165; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 57, on Yazid b. Abi Muslim (cf. above, note 50). Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 231; and Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 48, give a different reason for his assassination.

⁶⁶) al-'Amad, *al-Ḥajjāj*, p. 348, citing the Cairo manuscript of Balādhuri's *Ansāb*.

⁶⁷) Cf. J. M. D. M. Jūda, *al-'Arab wa'l-arḍ fī 'l-'Irāq fī ṣadr al-Islām*, ['Ammān] 1979, p. 212.

⁶⁸) *EI*², s.v. 'mawlā', col. 879a.

⁶⁹) Shaban, *Abbāsīd revolution*, p. 73; id., *Islamic History*, p. 175.

the *Arabs* were divided into tribal units, taking it to mean that "[in Khurasan] they were deliberately kept outside the structure of Iranian society", being organized "by Qutayba along tribal lines to emphasize the division of the two communities"⁷⁰). But to take the second point first, it was not of course Qutayba who had introduced the Arab units. The Arab had been divided into tribal quarters (in Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and fifts (in Basra and Khurasan) since the time of Mu'āwīya, having previously been divided into tribal units of other kinds⁷¹): how else could a tribal population possibly be organized? It is perfectly true that the tribal nature of Arab society reinforced the gulf between the conquerors and the conquered and that assimilation would have been easier without it, in the sense that the conquerors might have been absorbed and eventually disappeared (a possibility Shaban never envisages). But their tribal organization was a given which could not simply be thought away, and which no Arab *wanted* to think away, be he a Qaysi or a Yemeni, partly because he took pride in it and partly because he had no interest in his own disappearance. "Do not be like the Nabataeans of the Sawād who, when asked about their origins, say that they come from such and such a village", as 'Umar I is reputed to have said⁷²).

As regards the first point, one may grant Shaban that the separate organization of the *mawālī* reflects prejudice. Non-Arab Muslims were affiliated to individual patrons and took their patron's side in the rivalry between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen⁷³), yet they were treated as a tribe of their own. The prejudice was not Qaysi, however, but rather pan-Arab. All the Arabs saw *mawālī* as forming a group of their own, clearly because collective clientage had been the normal mechanism whereby non-Arabs were placed under Arab protection in the pre-Islamic past; and *mawālī* had their own streets and mosques to match their separate regiments, a fact which even Shaban would hardly credit to Qaysi policies⁷⁴). Yemenis were as prejudiced as anyone else. The idea that their pre-Islamic lifestyle should have

⁷⁰) Shaban, *Abbāsid revolution*, p. 96.

⁷¹) Jūda, *al-'Arab*, pp. 168f. (on the Kufan sevenths); al-'Alī, *Tanzīmāt*, pp. 53ff. (the Basran fifts); Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 30f.

⁷²) Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddīma*, ed. 'A. 'Abd al-Wāhid Wāfi, second edition, vol. ii, Cairo 1966, p. 596; tr. F. Rosenthal, second edition, London 1967, vol. i, p. 266, and the references given in note 55 thereto.

⁷³) Cf. Ṭabari, ser. ii, pp. 1856, 1933. The *mawālā* units seem to have been subdivided on the basis of *walā'*: in Egypt we incidentally learn that the *mawālī* of Tujib/Kinda/Yemen had an 'arif of their own (Kindi, *Governors*, p. 51, with reference to the Second Civil War; cf. Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig 1866-73, vol. i, p. 734, s.v. 'Balhib', for a similar account set in the First Civil War).

⁷⁴) Cf. Crone, *Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law*, p. 41 and chapter 4.

made them more tolerant of non-Arabs than their northern counterparts is not in fact persuasive. For one thing, the sons of Qaḥṭān included numerous tribesmen such as the Kalb who did not come from settled South Arabia at all, but rather acquired their southern genealogy in the course of the Umayyad period and who had been (and indeed continued to be) bedouin on a par with the Qays⁷⁵). For another thing, settled tribes are no less tribal than nomadic ones, and the modern tribesmen of South Arabia can hardly be said to be noted for their tolerance of non-tribesmen, who form (or until recently formed) unarmed groups under tribal protection on such a scale that South Arabia is sometimes loosely described as a caste society⁷⁶). One is hardly surprised, then, to find that no Yemeni governor is described as having complained of, or tried to change, the separate organization of the *mawālī* in the army. (What the clients themselves felt about it is not recorded.)

In short, 'Abd al-Malik, al-Walid and their governors did not systematically prefer governors of Qays/Muḍar nor did they pursue a policy of discrimination against clients, however prejudiced they may have been against them. They did pursue a policy of expansion, and they did refuse to admit non-Arab peasants seeking membership of the Muslim community, but neither policy was peculiar to Qays/Muḍar or unacceptable to Yemen at this stage.

(ii) Sulaymān and 'Umar II (715-21)

This takes us to the two reigns which constituted a Yemeni interlude according to Shaban. Once again, we may start with the governors.

Egypt:

Sulaymān: 'Abd al-Malik b. Rifā'a al-Fahmī/Qays

'Umar II: Ayyūb b. Shurahbī al-Aṣḥabī/Yemen⁷⁷)

⁷⁵) Cf. below, pp. 47, 53 and note 254, 282 thereto.

⁷⁶) See for example R. B. Serjeant, 'Société et gouvernement en Arabie du sud', *Arabica* 14 (1967), or his English version of this article, 'South Arabia', in C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze (ed.), *Commoners, Climbers and Notables*, Leiden 1977; A. S. Bujra, *The Politics of Stratification*, Oxford 1971, chapter 2; T. Gerholm, *Market, Mosque and Mafrag. Social Inequality in a Yemeni Town*, Stockholm 1977, pp. 103ff.

⁷⁷) Kindi, *Governors*, pp. 66f., 67ff.; cf. Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 94f.

North Africa:

Sulaymān: Muḥammad b. Yazīd, *mawlā* of Quraysh or Anṣār

ʿUmar II: ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥājir, *mawlā* of Anṣār⁷⁸)

Ismāʿil b. ʿUbaydallāh b. Abī ʿI-Muḥājir, *mawlā* of Quraysh⁷⁹)

Iraq:

Sulaymān: Yazīd b. al-Muḥallab al-Azdi/Yemen

ʿUmar II: (Basra) ʿAdi b. Artāh al-Fazārī/Qays

(Kufa) ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān/Quraysh⁸⁰)

Khurasan:

Sulaymān: Yazīd b. al-Muḥallab al-Azdi/Yemen

ʿUmar II: Jarrāḥ b. ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥakamī/Yemen⁸¹)

(military) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Nuʿaym al-Ghāmīdi/Yemen

(fiscal) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qushayrī/Qays

(fiscal) ʿUqba b. Zurʿa al-Ṭāʾi/Yemen⁸²)

Sulaymān dismissed most of his predecessor's governors, appointing a client to North Africa, a Yemeni to Iraq and Khurasan, and confirming a Qaysi in office in Egypt. We do not know what he would have done if he had ruled for twenty years instead of two and a half, but as Eisener notes, one cannot credit him with a clear preference for Yemenis⁸³). Of the seventeen men known to have received appointment from Yazīd b. al-Muḥallab in Iraq and Khurasan, however, only one was a Qaysi, fourteen being Yemenis and one a Rabiʿi⁸⁴). This does suggest incipient polarization between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen, if only at a provincial level, so can they be shown to stand for rival policies by now?

Yemen certainly had not come to stand for the end of expansion if the behaviour of Sulaymān (at a metropolitan level) is anything to go by, for

⁷⁸) Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 48; Khalifa, *Taʾrikh*, p. 466; According to Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 22, Sulaymān's governors of North Africa was ʿUbaydallāh b. Zayd/ʿAbdallāh b. Yazīd, [client] of Quraysh.

⁷⁹) Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 48; Khalifa, *Taʾrikh*, p. 466; Abū Zurʿa al-Dimashqī, *Taʾrikh*, ed. Sh.-A. al-Qūjānī, Damascus 1980, no. 711 (cf. no. 707).

⁸⁰) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 259ff., 269. Quraysh were usually regarded as a neutral group, cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 860, where this view is explicit; cf. also Azdi, *Mawṣil*, p. 219, line 9.

⁸¹) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 428f.; Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 132f.

⁸²) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1356f., 1365f. = Powers, pp. 85f., 94f.; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 451. ʿUqba does not seem to be otherwise known.

⁸³) Eisener, *Sulaymān*, p. 139.

⁸⁴) Crone, *Slaves*, Appendix III, nos. 48–64.

apart from the fact that the conquest of Spain continued in his reign, he mounted the greatest assault ever made by the Arabs on Constantinople, expending vast sums on the enterprise and swearing not to leave his camp at Dābiq in northern Syria until it had been crowned with success⁸⁵). To Shaban, this was an anti-expansionist measure in disguise in that it was meant to “end the ceaseless and exhausting campaigns along the Byzantine front”⁸⁶). No doubt one could have said the same if Sulaymān had sworn to conquer *dār al-ḥarb* in its entirety, the simplest way of eliminating frontier warfare being the elimination of frontiers altogether. Shaban does unhappily note that “in some respects” Sulaymān's foreign policy “seemed to be an intensification of previous policies” or “almost an extension of Ḥajjāj's policy”⁸⁷), but on what does he base the qualification? Sulaymān continued al-Ḥajjāj's attempt to conquer western India too, the Syrian troops in Hind (like those in Anatolia) being told to feed themselves by cultivating the land until they had completed the job: “no Syria for you”, as he put it in his letter⁸⁸). And (at a provincial level) Yazīd b. al-Muḥallab likewise pursued an expansionist policy in Khurasan. According to Shaban, he merely aimed at consolidation already made (pursuing an anti-imperialist policy for which he brought some 60,000 Syrian troops to Khurasan): “He is reported to have objected to Qutayba's policy of furthering the Arab conquests in central Asia while leaving behind him, in Gurgān and Ṭabaristān, hostile territory which might threaten his line of communication in Iraq”, Shaban says⁸⁹). This is correct, but it wholly fails to convey the spirit in which the objection was made: according to the passage cited, Sulaymān and Yazīd were *envious* of Qutayba's conquests and wanted to do better. “Don't you see what God is accomplishing through Qutayba?”, Sulaymān would ask, to which Yazīd would haughtily reply that “they are nothing, Jurjān is what counts”, adducing the point made by Shaban. When Yazīd became governor, “his sole ambition was to conquer Jurjān”⁹⁰). In Ṭabaristān he initially refused an offer of peace because he wanted to acquire it by conquest⁹¹); in Jurjān he swore that “he would neither loosen his hold on them nor raise the sword from them until he had mixed [their] blood into wheat, made bread of the mixture and

⁸⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1316 = Powers, p. 41.

⁸⁶) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 129.

⁸⁷) Shaban, *Islamic History*, pp. 128f.

⁸⁸) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1274f. (For the troops at Constantinople, see *ibid.*, p. 1315 = Powers, pp. 39f.)

⁸⁹) Shaban, *ʿAbbāsid revolution*, pp. 80; cf. *id.*, *Islamic History*, pp. 128f. On Yazīd's Syrian troops, see also Eisener, *Sulaymān*, pp. 99, 105f.

⁹⁰) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1327 = Powers, p. 52

⁹¹) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1320, 1327 = Powers, pp. 45, 52.

eaten the bread"⁹²); and having conquered Jurjān and fulfilled his oath, he wrote to Sulaymān boasting that he had accomplished something which the Sasanid emperors Shapur II, Khusraw I and Khusraw II had been unable to achieve and which had likewise proved too difficult for 'Umar, 'Uthmān and subsequent caliphs of God⁹³). One would infer that Yazid was out to prove himself a greater conqueror than anyone else, not that he felt expansion to be undesirable.

There is of course no guarantee that Yazid b. al-Muhallab ever said anything of the kind, all we have being statements of what he must or ought or could have said in the eyes of later historians. (*Mutatis mutandis* this is true of all the evidence discussed in this article.) But Shaban does not argue that the sources misrepresent Yazid, that the statements credited to him must be rejected, that there is evidence of an altogether different Yazid behind the façade, or the like; he does not engage in source critical analysis of any kind. What he does is rather to adduce sources saying A in support of the contention that they mean B, on the grounds that if you ignore their general import and supply an alternative message yourself, then some of the words they use would fit the alternative message too. It is for the reason that Hawting characterizes his theories as "only loosely related to the sources" and that Eisener repeatedly dismisses them as "pure speculation"⁹⁴). Shaban in fact treats the sources as traditional Muslims scholars treated their *uṣūl*, that is to say as so many pegs on which to hang theories of contemporary inspiration, not as sources properly speaking; his concern is with the message one can read into them rather than what one can deduce from them by immersing oneself in their bygone modes of thought. This is the fundamental reason why his work must be rejected.

But let us return to the survey. As regards *mawālī*, there is not much evidence that Sulaymān had special policies towards them, and Shaban adduces none. "On balance he continue the same imperial policy as his immediate predecessors, only softening it by trying to bring in the non-Arabs into this structure", he claims⁹⁵), now conceding that there was no change in foreign policy; but who are the non-Arabs in question? Sulaymān appointed a *mawālā* to North Africa, but so did his predecessor; he was hostile to the *mawālā* appointed by his predecessor, i.e. Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, but obviously not because the latter was a *mawālā* or (in Shaban's view) an

assimilationist⁹⁶); Mūsā's ethnic origin were as irrelevant to his downfall as were his policies towards the Berbers⁹⁷). According to an Egyptian traditionist, Sulaymān raised the stipends of *mawālī* from twenty to twenty five (dinars); but since the same source informs us that 'Abd al-Malik had previously raised it from fifteen to twenty and that Hishām was later to raise it from twenty five to thirty, the measure obviously is not envisaged as a change of policy⁹⁸).

Sulaymān's views on runaway *dhimmīs* are also badly attested. One source claims that he put right what al-Ḥajjāj had destroyed and "redressed grievances, released prisoners and *radda 'l-manfiyyin*", i.e. allowed exiles to come back⁹⁹). This is hardly a reference to the return of exiled peasant converts¹⁰⁰). But another version of the same passage states that Sulaymān released prisoners and *radda 'l-manqūshin*, i.e. allowed back the Basran converts that al-Ḥajjāj had repatriated in the aftermath of Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt after branding the names of their villages on their hands¹⁰¹). This version adds that al-Ḥajjāj wished to oust the *mawālī* from their position of

⁹⁶) "From the very beginning of the conquest the Berbers... were granted equal status with the Arab tribesmen as long as they accepted Islam and joined the Arab armies" (Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 150), a statement in which Mūsā's policies must be included.

⁹⁷) Like so many other governors, Mūsā kept getting into trouble over money. In Iraq he had embezzled funds which he later repaid with the help of 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Marwān (thus Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 39f.; cf. above, note 50). Having embarked on the conquest of Spain, he was recalled by al-Walid, but the latter had died by the time he arrived in Syria, and it was Sulaymān who extorted large sums of money from him (Lafuente, *Ajbar*, pp. 19, 29f.; compare Ibn Qutayba, *Imāma*, vol. ii, pp. 81ff.). Sulaymān also ordered his *mawālā* governor of North Africa to confiscate the wealth of Mūsā's family and the latter duly had them tortured and killed (thus Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 47; cf. also Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 260).

⁹⁸) Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. iv, p. 400. Al-Kharbūṭlī, whose understanding of Sulaymān is similar to Shaban's, nonetheless adduces it as evidence that Sulaymān reversed al-Ḥajjāj's policy towards non-Arab Muslims (*al-'Irāq*, p. 179). Eisener queries its reliability (*Sulaimān*, p. 82).

⁹⁹) M. J. de Goeje (ed.), *Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum* Leiden 1871, p. 17. This passage was drawn to my attention by Dr. G. R. Hawting.

¹⁰⁰) Exile was a common form of punishment in the Umayyad period (cf. Kh. 'Athāmina, "Uqūbat al-nafy fi ṣadr al-Islām wa'l-dawla al-umawiyya", *al-Karmil* 5 (1984); and a caliph as early as 'Uthmān is said to have redressed grievances by allowing exiles to come back (cf. below, note 201).

¹⁰¹) Mubarrad, *Kāmil*, p. 286. Mubarrad does not name an authority for his account, but the parallel (though shorter) version in Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, pp. 416f., is cited from al-Jāhīz' *Kitāb al-mawālī wa 'l-'arab*, on which see C. Pellat, 'Ġāhiziana III. Essai d'inventaire de l'œuvre Ġāhizienne', *Arabica* 3 (1956) no. 23.

⁹²) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1330, cf. 1333 = Powers, pp. 55, cf. 57f.

⁹³) Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1334 = Powers, pp. 58f.

⁹⁴) Hawting, *First Dynasty*, p. xx; Eisener, *Sulaimān*, pp. 105, 138, 217n, 218nn.

⁹⁵) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 130.

preeminence in cultural activities, seeing that they had sided with Ibn al-Ash'ath, and so ordered them out of Basra whereas the Arabs were allowed to stay; and back in their villages the converts produced a new generation of children whose language and manners were coarsened to the point that when Sulaymān allowed them back, they seemed to be Nabataeans¹⁰²). All this is clearly embroidery. For one thing, there were only fifteen years between Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt and Sulaymān's accession (700 and 715 A.D. respectively), which hardly suffices for the transformation of cultural leaders into Nabatī peasants. For another, al-Ḥajjāj only exiled runaway *dhimmīs*, not *mawālī* in the global sense of non-Arab Muslims. The *mawālī* who were cultural leaders in Basra were sons of prisoners-of-war and fully-fledged members of Muslim society. There were men such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, a soldier who had participated in the conquest of eastern Iran, or Ibn Sirin, the husband of an Arab woman¹⁰³), not to mention the *mawālī* in charge of al-Ḥajjāj's Basran bureaucracy; and al-Ḥajjāj did not of course despatch such men to villages. Nor did he despatch a *mawālā* such as Muslim b. Yaṣār, a *faqīh* of whom we actually know that he participated in Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt and who supposedly lived to regret his participation, not because al-Ḥajjāj retaliated by turning him into a Nabataean, but because his prestige among his Basran peers was diminished by it¹⁰⁴). It could of course still be true that Sulaymān allowed the peasant converts of Basra to come back, but it seems more likely that the whole story was engendered by the mention (in the original version) of exiles being allowed back. Abū Mikhnaḥ did not remember Sulaymān and Yazid b. al-Muhallab as fiscal reformers¹⁰⁵); the appointment of the *mawālā* Ṣāliḥ b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān to the taxes of Iraq is not a sign of reformist attitudes to clients (the post had previously been held by Yazid b. Abi Muslim, a client of al-Ḥajjāj)¹⁰⁶); and peasant converts were still being refused entry when 'Umar II took over, at least in Egypt and Khurasan.

As Sulaymān had dismissed the governors of al-Walid, so 'Umar II dismissed those of Sulaymān, once again without displaying a clear preference for Yemenis¹⁰⁷). He called a halt to the campaign against Constantinople,

¹⁰²) *fa-tawālada 'l-qawm hunāka fa-khubithat lughāt awlādihim wa-fasadat tabā'i'uhum....fa-raja'ū fī ṣūrat al-ambāt.*

¹⁰³) *EI*², s.vv. 'Ḥasan al-Baṣrī', 'Ibn Sirin'.

¹⁰⁴) Ibn Sa'd, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut 1957–60, vol. vii, p. 188; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, vol. x, pp. 140f.

¹⁰⁵) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1306 = Powers, p. 31. compare Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 261f. But Abū Mikhnaḥ's story is probably fictitious (Eisener, *Sulaimān*, p. 76).

¹⁰⁶) For Ṣāliḥ, see the preceding note; for Yazid b. Abi Muslim, see above, note 50.

¹⁰⁷) For other Qaysi governors of his, see Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 269.

which is not significant since it had ended in disaster, allowed the Syrians in Hind to return, which may or may not be significant (given that we do not know whether he replaced them with others)¹⁰⁸), and ordered his second governor of Khurasan to evacuate the Muslims in Sogdia¹⁰⁹), which does suggest an unusual policy in that only one apparently minor defeat is on record here¹¹⁰). He is also said to have considered the evacuation of Spain¹¹¹). Shaban accordingly has a point when he credits him with anti-imperialist views. But the Khurasanis refused to comply with the evacuation order; 'Umar II is said to have been pleased by their refusal¹¹²); and other Khurasanis thought that one could curry favour with him by conducting campaigns¹¹³), all of which makes sense in view of the fact that a pious caliph must have approved of *jihād*. Contrary to what Wellhausen conjectures, it is unlikely that his reluctance to fight wars of conquest reflects doubts as to whether *jihād* was being fought for the sake of God or booty¹¹⁴). For on the one hand, he continued the warfare against the Khazars¹¹⁵), though the Qaysi Jazirans, on whom the brunt of the burden fell, are unlikely to have been morally superior to their counterparts in Sogdia or Spain; and on the other hand, his readiness to call a halt to expansion is explicitly said, in the context of Spain, to have arisen from concern for the safety of the Muslims, not from doubts over the purity of their motives. But his readiness to protect the Muslims of Sogdia and Spain by going so far as to evacuate them was certainly unusual, as was his order to the Sogdians, when they refused to move, that no further campaigns should be undertaken¹¹⁶). The sources indisputably present 'Umar II's policy in respect of expansion as unique. But in what respects was the policy *Yemeni*? The sources do not of course characterize it as such; it runs counter to the policies of the previous Yemeni governor of Khurasan; and the Yemeni al-Jarrāḥ appointed by 'Umar II himself was "one of al-Ḥajjāj's swords" and a great general who eventually fell in battle against the Khazars in the Caucasus¹¹⁷).

¹⁰⁸) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1274f. = Hinds, p. 223.

¹⁰⁹) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1365 = Powers, p. 95; al-Ya'qūbi, *Ta'rikh*, ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leiden 1883, vol. ii, pp. 362f.

¹¹⁰) Ya'qūbi, *Ta'rikh*, vol. ii, p. 362.

¹¹¹) Lafuente, *Ajbar*, 23; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. ii, p. 26; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kāmil fī 'l-ta'rikh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leiden 1851–74, vol. v, p. 373; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire*, vol. i, p. 39.

¹¹²) Ya'qūbi, *Ta'rikh*, vol. ii, p. 363; also noted by Powers, p. 95n.

¹¹³) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1353 = Powers, p. 82.

¹¹⁴) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 268.

¹¹⁵) Ya'qūbi, *Ta'rikh*, vol. ii, p. 363.

¹¹⁶) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1365 = Powers, p. 95.

¹¹⁷) Cf. Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 132f.

‘Umar’s unusual policy was neither Yemeni nor Qaysi, but rather peculiar to ‘Umar himself.

Whether he had peculiar policies in respect of *mawālī* is more difficult to say. He is reputed to have taken a dim view of intermarriage with them¹¹⁸); but he employed them in their normal roles, including that of governor of North Africa; and he is credited with ruling that Arab and non-Arab Muslims were to receive the same stipends insofar as the latter were freeborn, that of freedmen continuing to be lower¹¹⁹). He certainly reversed al-Ḥajjāj’s policy in respect of runaway *dhimmīs*, as a clear from his fiscal edict¹²⁰) and several stories showing the policy in action¹²¹): their conversion was accepted, indeed encouraged, and those desirous of military service were enrolled in the *diwān*. Once again, however, one may ask what was Yemeni about this policy? It is not attested for previous Yemeni governors, and was not, according to one story, in accordance with the wishes of the Yemeni Jarrah; and when ‘Umar dismissed him, he chose a Qaysi for the fiscal administration.

Sulaymān, then, did not pursue the policies that Shaban identifies as Yemeni whereas ‘Umar did pursue these policies without there being anything Yemeni about them¹²²). The idea that there was continuity between the reigns of Sulaymān and ‘Umar II does have advocates in the sources¹²³); one informant even claims that Sulaymān never took any decisions without consulting ‘Umar first, which obviously cannot be right given the latter’s disapproval of Sulaymān’s governors¹²⁴). The alleged continuity seems to be a mere rationalization of Sulaymān’s unexpected choice of ‘Umar as his successor¹²⁵), and this is certainly what it is in Shaban. Shaban effectively concedes that Sulaymān was a Yemeni only in the sense that he dismissed two Qaysis by descent and replaced them with an Azdi; the policies were unchanged or, as Shaban puts it, Sulaymān is an “ambiguous figure”. But, he says, Sulaymān’s choice of ‘Umar II as his heir “strongly tempts us to

¹¹⁸) al-‘Alī, *Tanzīmāt*, p. 96n, citing Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, Bulaq 1300–7, vol. x, pp. 103f., and the Cairo manuscript of al-Balādhuri’s *Ansāb*.

¹¹⁹) Jūda, *al-‘Arab*, p. 212.

¹²⁰) Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥam, *Sirat ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz*, ed. A. ‘Ubayd, Beirut 1967, p. 94 = H. A. R. Gibb, ‘The Fiscal Rescript of ‘Umar II’, *Arabica* 2 (1955), p. 3, § 2.

¹²¹) Cf. Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll Tax*, pp. 84f. (Egypt); Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1354 = Powers, p. 83; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rikh*, vol. ii, p. 362 (Khurasan).

¹²²) Compare the conclusion of Eisener, *Sulaimān*, p. 240.

¹²³) Cf. Eisener, *Sulaimān*, p. 81; add de Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 17; Sulaymān began his reign by doing good and ended it by doing good, i.e. by appointing Umar, so he came to be known as *miṣṭāḥ al-khayr*.

¹²⁴) Abū Zur‘a, *Ta’rikh*, no. 123.

¹²⁵) Cf. Eisener, *Sulaimān*, pp. 207ff.

view him as a very cautious Yaman supporter”¹²⁶). Why so? ‘Umar II’s first act was to jail Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi, “an acknowledged leader of the Yaman”, but this, we are told, was really a Yemeni act in disguise because his own Yemeni policies were so radical that even Yazid might not go along with them: Yazid’s arrest was “a precautionary measure”. ‘Umar II also replaced Yazid with a Yemeni belonging to the school of al-Ḥajjāj, but this too was really a declaration of anti-Ḥajjājite policies in disguise, for in order to implement his Yemeni vision he was prepared to appoint men of that school when they possessed the right qualities¹²⁷). Shaban’s reasoning, then, is that (a) Sulaymān’s traditional policies must have been unusual because he designated ‘Umar II as his successor; (b) ‘Umar II’s unusual policies must have been Yemeni because Sulaymān had relied on an Azdi; (c) therefore both must have pursued a Yemeni policy that had nothing to do with tribal groups; (d) all contradictory evidence can be explained away with a bit of imaginative effort¹²⁸).

Shaban’s imaginative efforts are visible on every page on his books, but his treatment of Yazid b. al-Muhallab is as good an illustration as any of his method. Yazid’s father, al-Muhallab, was a participant in the early conquests who supported Ibn al-Zubayr in the Second Civil War, assumed command of the campaigns against the Azāriqa, switched to the Umayyads when the Zubayrids were defeated, suppressed the Azāriqa on behalf of ‘Abd al-Malik and was rewarded with the governorship of Khurasan, where he died and was succeeded by Yazid¹²⁹). Yazid thus rose in the service of al-Ḥajjāj, who was married to one of his sisters¹³⁰). The amicable relations between them came to an end when al-Ḥajjāj dismissed Yazid from Khurasan and relatives of his from other offices in the East for reasons unknown: the sources conjecture that Yazid had made himself unpopular in Khurasan, even among his own Azdis, or that he has behaved in an ‘*aṣabi*’ fashion by only sending the Muḍari captives from Ibn al-Ash‘ath’s revolt to al-Ḥajjāj, setting free the Yemenis, or that he had embezzled money or that al-Ḥajjāj was acting on a premonition¹³¹). According to Shaban, Yazid was dis-

¹²⁶) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 130.

¹²⁷) Shaban, *Islamic History*, pp. 132f. Compare Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 269.

¹²⁸) For a similar approach to the caliphates of Sulaymān and ‘Umar II, see ‘A. M. al-Khaṭīb, *Al-ḥukm al-umawī fī Khurāsān*, Baghdad and Beirut 1975 (in which Shaban is not cited). His postulates are rightly rejected by Eisener (*Sulaimān*, p. 84n).

¹²⁹) *ET*², s.v. ‘al-Muhallab b. Abi Ṣufra’.

¹³⁰) According to Dixon, however, he only married her shortly before Yazid’s dismissal in order to hide his intentions (*Umayyad Caliphate*, p. 117).

¹³¹) Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, p. 117.

missed because he was "a well-known leader of the Yaman" in the political sense of that word, for all that Yazid had never said or done anything to suggest that he had anti-expansionist or pro-assimilationist views¹³²). Dismissal in the Marwānid period customarily meant imprisonment, demands for the return of wealth embezzled and torture to facilitate repayment¹³³; this was the treatment that al-Ḥajjāj meted out to Yazid, divorcing his Muhallabid wife in the process. Yazid, however, managed to escape from jail and flee to Palestine, which had a substantial Azdi population and which was governed by Sulaymān, the heir-apparent. Through his Azdi connections he could get to Sulaymān and through Sulaymān he could get to the caliph. This is how things worked out: Sulaymān persuaded al-Walid to grant Yazid *amān* from al-Ḥajjāj. He was safe as long as Sulaymān could protect him¹³⁴).

Now al-Walid I wanted to designate his own son as successor at the expense of Sulaymān and received support for this enterprise from his governors al-Ḥajjāj and Qutayba¹³⁵). Sulaymān and Yazid thus acquired common enemies: if Sulaymān succeeded, al-Ḥajjāj and Qutayba were bound to be dismissed and Yazid was bound to replace them. Since al-Walid I died prematurely, Sulaymān did succeed. Al-Ḥajjāj had died in the meantime and Qutayba was killed when he tried to rebel, but al-Ḥajjāj's relatives were rounded up and subjected to torture by Šāliḥ b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, the *mawlā* who was appointed to the fiscal administration and whose treatment of al-Ḥajjāj's family comes across to Shaban as "a close study of the financial policy of al-Ḥajjāj"¹³⁶). His vengeance accomplished, Yazid went off to display his supposedly anti-imperialist persuasion by conquering Jurjān.

As far as the sources are concerned, then, the Muhallabids and al-Ḥajjāj's family fell out over the governorship of Khurasan and ended up on different sides in the network of kinsmen, friends and other allies which formed around two rival claimants to the throne. The leading men of the two networks were playing for control of the lucrative provinces held at the time by al-Ḥajjāj and Qutayba, and indeed for their lives: had Sulaymān not acceded, al-Ḥajjāj's network would have stayed in power and the Muhallabids would have been back on the rack; conversely, Sulaymān's accession meant that the network in power was ousted and its members subjected to

¹³²) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 128. Yazid is also depicted as an assimilationist in al-Kharbūṭli, *al-'Iraq*, pp. 178f.

¹³³) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 449f; Crone, *Slaves*, p. 44.

¹³⁴) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1208ff. = Hinds, pp. 156ff.; *ET*², s.v. 'Muhallabids'.

¹³⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1274 = Hinds, pp. 222f.

¹³⁶) Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 78. For a discussion of why Qutayba rebelled, see Eisener, *Sulaimān*, pp. 91ff.

torture, in some cases to death. Shaban is right that the rivalry cannot be described as a "tribal squabble", but it has not in fact been described as such for over a hundred years. Wellhausen explicitly rejects Dozy's contention that al-Walid was allied with the Qaysi tribes and Sulaymān with the Yemenis, a theory that Shaban has now revived with the modification that Qays and Yemen were political parties; and Wellhausen further points out that Sulaymān's policies were no different from al-Walid's, thereby anticipating Shaban's modification as well¹³⁷). To Shaban, the only alternative to a tribal squabble is a conflict over policies, but there are other possibilities, and the most appropriate word for the phenomenon would be factionalism. The fact that Marwānid politics were dominated by such factions in no way means that the Arabs were less able to grasp political issues than anyone else in the past¹³⁸), or for that matter in the present.

The Muhallabids were favourites of Sulaymān, but not of 'Umar II, who is said to have disapproved of Yazid's appointment and to have disliked his entire family¹³⁹). This too is probably mere rationalization of later events¹⁴⁰), but at least the events in question are clear: Yazid was once more dismissed, jailed and asked to pay up, and though he was apparently spared the torture this time round, he was paraded on a donkey and threatened with exile to Dahlak¹⁴¹). When 'Umar died, he escaped from jail, not because he disapproved of Yazid II's Qaysi policies, as Shaban would have it, but because the new caliph was a kinsman of al-Ḥajjāj's and therefore bound to exact vengeance for the torture that the Muhallabid had inflicted on the latter's family¹⁴²). Yazid b. al-Muhallab went to Basra and raised a revolt, but did he call for the end of expansion and equal treatment of *mawālī*? Of course not. He demanded *kitāb Allāh wa-sunnat al-nabi* from the Umayyads, spelling it out as a demand for Iraqi participation in decision making¹⁴³), the departure of the Syrian troops from Iraq and a promise that

¹³⁷) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 259–63. Cf. also Eisener, *Sulaimān*, pp. 83f.

¹³⁸) Cf. P. Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies*, Oxford 1989, pp. 60f.

¹³⁹) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1313, 1350 = Powers, p. 37, 79.

¹⁴⁰) Cf. Eisener, *Sulaimān*, pp. 211ff., on stories in which Sulaymān is used as a foil for 'Umar II's piety.

¹⁴¹) Tabari, ser. ii, 1351 = Powers, pp. 80f. Eisener suggests that Yazid was jailed as a kind of hostage because the Muhallabids had grown in power and 'Umar II could not take their loyalty for granted (*Sulaimān*, p. 114).

¹⁴²) Tabari, ser. ii, 1359 = Powers, p. 89; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 312f. Eisener proposes conjectures of his own (*Sulaimān*, p. 114 and note 410 thereto).

¹⁴³) Tabari, ser. ii, 1391f., 1398 = Powers, pp. 123, 131, with the spelling out at p. 1400 = 132, where Yazid asks his followers, "Do you really believe that the Umayyads will act in accordance with the Book and the *sunna*...? They don't tell you 'we accept your conditions' with the intention of only exercising their authority

al-Ḥajjāj's policy would not be reimposed on the Iraqis¹⁴⁴). In other words, he adopted an Iraqi cause that he had displayed no interest in so far, having been keen enough on the Umayyads when they gave him appointments and keen enough on Syrian troops as well, having been accused of favouritism towards them when he was governor of Khurasan for Sulaymān¹⁴⁵). His revolt was opportunistic, but more importantly, the cause he took up was provincial autonomy, not frontier policies or racial issues, though Shaban of course finds it easy enough to blur the distinction¹⁴⁶). Shaban is right that the revolt cannot be interpreted as "a mere tribal struggle between Yaman and Qays"¹⁴⁷), but he is once more banging on open doors, for the sources do not present it as such and the only modern author to see it as a struggle between Qays-Muḍar and Yemen is Shaban himself¹⁴⁸). The Muhallabids did come to be regarded as Yemeni martyrs after their defeat, but it was as Azdis, not as sponsors of 'Yemeni policies', that later Yemenis wished to avenge them¹⁴⁹).

(iii) Yazīd II, Hishām, al-Walid II (721–44).

Little is left of Shaban's theory by now, but for the sake of completeness we may continue the survey down to the Third Civil War.

Egypt

Yazīd II: Bishr b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi/Yemen
 Ḥanzala b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi/Yemen
 Hishām: Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Malik/Umayyad
 al-Ḥurr b. Yūsuf/Umayyad
 Ḥafṣ b. al-Walid al-Ḥaḍrami/Yemen
 'Abd al-Malik b. Rifā'a al-Fahmi/Qays
 al-Walid b. Rifā'a al-Fahmi/Qays

in accordance with your orders and instructions; rather, they [say it] with the intention of appeasing you until they can engage in treachery". (Powers' translation is not satisfactory here.)

¹⁴⁴) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1398 = Powers, p. 131.

¹⁴⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1313 = Powers, p. 37; noted by Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 82.

¹⁴⁶) Shaban *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 94; id., *Islamic History*, p. 136.

¹⁴⁷) Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 136.

¹⁴⁸) Wellhausen can perhaps be accused of schematizing the tribal alignments (*Kingdom*, p. 314). But unlike Shaban, he does not present the revolt as being about, or triggered by, the conflict between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen.

¹⁴⁹) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1858 = Hillenbrand, p. 225.

'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Khālīd al-Fahmi/Qays
 Ḥanzala b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi/Yemen
 Ḥafṣ b. al-Walid al-Ḥaḍrami/Yemen
 al-Walid II: Ḥafṣ b. al-Walid al-Ḥaḍrami/Yemen¹⁵⁰)

North Africa

Yazīd II: Yazīd b. Abi Muslim, *mawlā* of al-Ḥajjāj/Qays¹⁵¹)
 Muḥammad b. Yazīd, *mawlā* of the Anṣār or Quraysh¹⁵²)
 Bishr b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi/Yemen
 Hishām: Bishr b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi/Yemen¹⁵³)
 'Ubayda b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī/Qays¹⁵⁴)
 'Ubaydallāh b. al-Ḥabḥāb, *mawlā* of B. Salūl/Qays¹⁵⁵)
 Kulthūm b. 'Iyād al-Qushayri/Qays¹⁵⁶)
 Ḥanzala b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi/Yemen¹⁵⁷)

al-Walid II: none

Iraq

Yazīd II: 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays¹⁵⁸)
 Hishām: Khālīd al-Qasrī/Yemen¹⁵⁹)

¹⁵⁰) Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 69–82.

¹⁵¹) Cf. above notes 50, 58, 65.

¹⁵²) Previously governor of North Africa for Sulaymān and dismissed by 'Umar II (above, note 78). Reinstated by the army after the murder of Yazīd b. Abi Muslim and confirmed by Yazīd II (thus Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1435 = Powers, p. 165; unknown to Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 231).

¹⁵³) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 231; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, p. 49. Previously governor of Egypt.

¹⁵⁴) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 231; id., *Ansāb al-ashraf*, vol. v, ed. S. D. F. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936, p. 142 (he engaged in 'aṣabiyya against Kalb); Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 50f.; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, vol. i, p. 326, s.v. 'Ifriqiyya' (he was a nephew of Abū 'l-A'war al-Sulamī, i.e. a Syrian); Abū 'l-Faraj al-Iṣbahānī, *Kitāb al-aghānī*, Cairo 1927–74, vol. ix, p. 313 (he had previously been governor of Urdunn).

¹⁵⁵) Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 51ff.; cf. Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 231; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, vol. i, p. 326, where his name is 'Abdallāh. He had previously been fiscal governor of Egypt (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 73–6; Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 25). According to Ibn 'Idhārī, he rose to become [military] governor of Egypt, North Africa and Spain alike and appointed his son al-Qāsim deputy governor of Egypt; this is unknown to Kindī, though cf. *Governors*, p. 327.

¹⁵⁶) Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 232; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 54ff.; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, vol. i, p. 326; cf. Crone, *Slaves*, p. 128.

¹⁵⁷) Kindī, *Governors*, p. 82; Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 232; Ibn 'Idhārī, *Bayān*, vol. i, pp. 58f. Previously governor of Egypt.

¹⁵⁸) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 319ff.; Crone, *Slaves*, p. 107.

¹⁵⁹) *ET*², s.v.

Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays
al-Walid II: Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays¹⁶⁰)

Khurasan

Yazid II: Sa'id Khudhayna/Quraysh
Sa'id al-Harashi/Qays
Muslim b. Sa'id al-Kilabi/Qays¹⁶¹)
Hishām: Asad b. 'Abdallāh al-Qasri/Yemen¹⁶²)
Ashras b. 'Abdallāh al-Sulami/Qays
Junayd b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Murri/Qays
'Āsim b. 'Abdallāh al-Hilāli/Qays
Asad al-Qasri/Yemen
Naṣr b. Sayyār al-Kināni/Muḍar
al-Walid II: Naṣr b. Sayyār al-Kināni/Muḍar¹⁶³)

Yemeni governors predominate in the West, Qaysi/Muḍari ones in the East, but the pattern is mixed in both regions. It is not however mixed when we consider the appointments made by the governors themselves, for in Iraq and Khurasan the governors were now so conscious of the rivalry between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen that all relied overwhelmingly or exclusively on members of their own descent group.¹⁶⁴)

As regards expansion, however, there was plainly no disagreement over the need to continue the conquest of Central Asia, which continued under the 'Abbāsids too for all that the latter were 'Yemenis' in Shaban's view.

As regards *mawālī*, they continued to dominate the bureaucracy and to proliferate within the army, from where they rose to increasingly important posts regardless of the supposed political convictions of the caliphs or their governors: the Qaysi 'Umar b. Hubayra appointed a client of Bāhila/Qays to Kirmān (which the client resented, having hoped for a better province)¹⁶⁵), while the 'right-wing Muḍari' Naṣr b. Sayyār is constantly seen in the company of his own and other people's clients, though never those of the Yemenis: he turned down an offer of the governorship of Bukhārā

¹⁶⁰) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 333ff., 355, 357f.

¹⁶¹) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 451–55.

¹⁶²) *EI*², s.v.

¹⁶³) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 456ff., 459ff., 467ff., 474ff.; Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 98, 166.

¹⁶⁴) For the governors of Iraq, see Crone, *Slaves*, appendix III, nos. 65–122. For illustrative examples relating to Khurasan, see Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1529, 1664.

¹⁶⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1458 = Powers, p. 188.

on the advice of a client of B. Shaybān/Rabi'a¹⁶⁶), appointed a client of the Umayyads to Shāsh¹⁶⁷), a client of his own to (apparently) Nishapur¹⁶⁸), a client of Layth/Muḍar to his *haras*¹⁶⁹), and bestowed favours on a runaway peasant convert he had picked up in the infantry¹⁷⁰); two clients of his fought for him against al-Hārith b. Surayj, one of them a secretary of his who was accompanied by his own *shākiriyya*, or armed retinue¹⁷¹); another client of his fought for him against Abū Muslim¹⁷²); Sa'id al-Ṣaghīr, a famous horseman and *mawla* of Bāhila/Qays, likewise supported Naṣr¹⁷³), as did a client of Layth/Muḍar in charge of the coinage in Iraq who brought him vital information about events in that province¹⁷⁴).

There was however a change of policy towards runaway peasants in Khurasan, for Ashras al-Sulami/Qays encouraged the *dhimmi*s of Sogdia to convert with promises that their conversion would be accepted; and though he went back on his word when he saw the fiscal implications, the tax system was eventually reformed along 'Umar II's lines by Naṣr b. Sayyār¹⁷⁵). Given that both governors were members of Qays/Muḍar, while the Yemeni Asad al-Qasri is explicitly said to have penalized converts in Bukhārā (at the request of the local ruler) and to have 'sealed the necks' of converts in Marw¹⁷⁶), the intensification of the conflict between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen in Khurasan can hardly reflect disagreement over the admission of converts, unless we are to take it that the parties had switched stances.

¹⁶⁶) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1661; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, pp. 66f. (adds that the *mawla* later became Naṣr's secretary and was killed by Abū Muslim).

¹⁶⁷) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1694f. = Hillenbrand, p. 31.

¹⁶⁸) Cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1846 = Hillenbrand, p. 208 ("When I reached Nishapur, Humayd, Naṣr's *mawla*, stopped me").

¹⁶⁹) Cf. below, note 196.

¹⁷⁰) Crone, *Slaves*, p. 53, on Yūnus b. 'Abd Rabbih.

¹⁷¹) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1926, 1928 = J. A. Williams (tr.) *The History of al-Tabari*, vol. xxvii, Albany 1985, pp. 37f.

¹⁷²) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1957–9 = Williams, pp. 68–70.

¹⁷³) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1920 = Williams, p. 32, where he returns to Marw with *fur-sān*, along with other Muḍari supporters of Naṣr; cf. ii, p. 1599 (*mawla* of Bāhila, *fāris*).

¹⁷⁴) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1845f. = Hillenbrand, pp. 207f.

¹⁷⁵) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 456ff., 477ff.; Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll Tax*, pp. 120ff.

¹⁷⁶) Narshakhi, *Description de Boukhara*, ed. C. Schefer, Paris 1892, p. 58 (where al-Qasri has become al-Qushayri) = id., *The History of Bukhara*, tr. R. N. Frye, Cambridge Mass. 1954, pp. 59f; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1920.

Non-militant Khurasanis?

In general, it must be said that Shaban's anti-imperialism is an implausible ideal in a society so unashamedly militant as that of the early Muslims. Expansion was divinely enjoined (*jihād*¹⁷⁷), death in battle against infidels was martyrdom rewarded by Paradise¹⁷⁸, and the attributes of warriors were greatly admired whether people had their minds on Paradise or not. Men were praised as "youths who grew up amidst the fires of war and accomplished noble deeds before their beards began to grow"¹⁷⁹; boasting took the form of "the Qaḥṭān were smitting the head of every full-armed warrior"¹⁸⁰; and when someone gave the poet al-Farazdaq a blunt sword so that he failed to cut off the head of a Byzantine prisoner despite repeated attempts, everyone laughed, except presumably the prisoner¹⁸¹. It was not a culture in which one would expect to encounter a pacifist ideal, and if such an ideal had in fact been conceived, it would have required a great deal of thought for its justification; but of such thought there is no trace.

The pacifist vision is particularly implausible in a Khurasani setting, for one would hardly expect non-militancy to flourish in a frontier province under constant threat of invasion; and in fact, Shaban's presentation rests on high-handed treatment of the sources. When Qutayba presented himself in the best of lights to his troops in order to persuade them to rebel with him, he reminded them of how little interest his predecessors had taken in campaigns, obviously expecting them to find his own very different behaviour as laudable as his regular payment of stipends, of which he reminded them too. Shaban nonetheless claims that it was for his ceaseless campaigning that he was killed¹⁸². When Yazid II appointed the Umayyad Sa'id b. 'Abd al-'Aziz to Khurasan, the troops found him to be "a soft and easy man who lived in comfort and luxury" and nicknamed him Khudhayna, loosely

¹⁷⁷ Cf. al-Farazdaq on events in Khurasan in 96: "Men for Islam who, as soon as they fought for religion, caused it to spread in every place" (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1303 = Powers, p. 25).

¹⁷⁸ For Khurasani commanders reminding their troops of this, see Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1422, 1424 = Powers, pp. 153, 155.

¹⁷⁹ Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1396 = Powers, p. 128 (al-Farazdaq).

¹⁸⁰ Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1303 = Powers, p. 27. Al-Tabari's chronicle abounds in poetry of this kind.

¹⁸¹ Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1338 = Powers, pp. 63f.

¹⁸² Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1287 = Powers, p. 9; cf. 1288 = 12 ("God has conquered the lands for you and made your roads secure"); Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 128.

translatable as 'housewife'¹⁸³); they taunted him as "the effeminate one of Quraysh" and satirized him in poetry as a woman equipped with mirror, comb, kohl containers, incense burners and musical instruments, as opposed to "a full coat of mail composed of double rings and a sharp sword fashioned to cut"; they also complained directly of his inactivity, telling him that "the fact that you are no longer carrying out military expeditions has allowed the Turks to take the offensive and caused the Sogdians to renounce Islam"¹⁸⁴. In Shaban's summary all this comes out as "Sa'id Khudhayna does not seem to have deviated much from the policy of 'Umar II...his campaigning policy...was certainly not expansionist"¹⁸⁵. The supposedly pacifist Khurasanis also accused their next governor, Sa'id al-Ḥarashi/Qays, of cowardice, this time because he rejected a *mawlā*'s advice to attack the Sogdians at Khujanda¹⁸⁶; and when his successor, Muslim b. Sa'id al-Kilābi/Qays sent a delegation of Khurasanis to Iraq in connection with a dispute over money, the Khurasani spokesman Mihzam b. Jābir (presumably a *mawlā*) told the governor 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays that "We live on a frontier where we fight against an enemy that is constantly at war. We wear iron so often that rust sticks to our skin; indeed, the smell of iron causes a female servant to turn her face away from her master and from other men that she serves. You, on the other hand, stay at home, adorning yourselves in fine clothes dyed with saffron", meaning that Ibn Hubayra lived too soft a life to appreciate the needs of warriors, not that the warriors resented his Qaysi policy of expansion¹⁸⁷. Twelve years later, according to Shaban, Hishām nonetheless decided to "yield to the forces of assimilation" and to drop about half of the war-weary Khurasanis from the *dāwān*, supposedly telling his governor Junayd al-Murri/Qays to "enlist [only] 15,000 men because enlistment is purposeless to you", a strange statement. What he actually said was *fa-'frīḍ fa-lā ghāyata laka fī 'l-farīḍa li-khamsata 'ashara alfan*, which obviously means "recruit; there is no limit for you in the recruitment of 15,000 [men]", or in other words "you may recruit 15,000 men or more". Shaban has taken *ghāya* to mean 'purpose' rather

¹⁸³ Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1417f. = Powers, p. 149. *Khudhayna* meant 'noblewoman in charge of the household'. Compare the Khurasani reaction to Umayya (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 426).

¹⁸⁴ Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1428, 1432, 1437, = Powers, p. 158, 162, 167.

¹⁸⁵ Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 99.

¹⁸⁶ Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1443 = Powers, pp. 173f. The *mawlā* was al-Faḍl b. Basām, on whom see below, note 196.

¹⁸⁷ Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1460f. = Powers, pp. 190f. Shaban's presentation of the financial dispute is also questionable (*Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 103).

than 'limit', shifted the words around and ignored al-Balādhuri's version, in which Hishām *aṭlaqa yadahu fi 'l-fariḍa fa-faradā li-khamsata 'ashara alf rajul*, "gave him a free hand in respect of recruitment, so he recruited 15,000 men"¹⁸⁸). There is no question of dropping men from the *diwān* here. The context is the aftermath of the Battle of the Pass: severe losses had been suffered, 20,000 men were despatched from Iraq and the governor was told to recruit as many men as he wanted in Khurasan.

Shaban's pacifist ideal is not just implausible, but also gratuitous: why *should* assimilation have been incompatible with a desire for conquest? Shaban's implicit answer is that Arab tribesmen were warriors whereas non-Arab non-tribesmen were peasants and traders and thus bound, where they prevailed, to deprive the former of their warlike inclinations¹⁸⁹). But though Arab tribesmen were indeed warriors endowed with the habit of branding all non-Arabs as peasants and traders, it does not follow that all non-Arabs were peaceful civilians in actual fact; and though the tribal organization of the Arabs was indeed being eroded, the Arabs did not automatically become pacifists thereby. History is not lacking in examples of warlike non-tribesmen; the ethos of the Sasanid empire had been militant enough, and the ethos of soldiers tends to be martial wherever they are found. Is it likely that Arab soldiers should have conceived a desire to trade or cultivate when they began to hobnob with Iranian soldiers? Are we to take it that the runaway peasants who clamoured for entrance in the army wanted to get out of it again as soon as they learnt Arabic, or that the Yemenis who so nobly sponsored the converts' right to membership of the *diwān* resented their own membership of this institution? If Arab and Iranian soldiers got to know each other in the army, one would expect the end-product to have been assimilated soldiers, and so of course it was. The Yemenis who ended up (along with numerous Muḍaris) in the imperial troops of the 'Abbāsids evidently were not would-be traders inconvenienced by warfare, and the *mawālā* soldiers of Khurasan were as militant as their Arab counterparts, though Shaban is not of course prepared to admit it. When Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī, who had commanded the *mawālā* unit in Qutayba's army, is described as advising the effeminate governor Sa'īd Khudhayna to attack the Sogdians during a campaign, Shaban gratuitously credits the *mawālā* with a desire for plunder and further writes him off as "a representative of the *dahāqīn* of Marw" (who also had an interest in preventing assimilation):

¹⁸⁸) Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 116; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1545; Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 429; cf. Crone, *Slaves*, note 266, where this point was first made.

¹⁸⁹) Compare al-'Amad, *al-Ḥajjāj*, p. 348, where it is al-Ḥajjāj's desire to restore a warlike spirit to Kufa and Basra that causes him to repatriate peasants converts.

Ḥayyān was an advocate of constant campaigning who realized that "the continuation of 'Umar II's policy... was going to lead eventually to the destruction of his own class"¹⁹⁰). Ḥayyān was in fact a prisoner-of-war from Daylam (though some did hold him to be from Khurasan)¹⁹¹), a devout Muslim in so far as one can tell¹⁹²), and the father of a religious scholar¹⁹³) who converted infidels at Kābul after fleeing there from Abū Muslim¹⁹⁴). The *mawālā* who advised Sa'īd al-Ḥarashī to attack should presumably also be construed as a representative of the *dihqāns* of Marw in Shaban's opinion, though his father was in fact a prisoner-of-war from Sistān¹⁹⁵), while he and his various relatives and clients were highly respected members of the Khurasani army in the period from Qutayba to Naṣr b. Sayyār¹⁹⁶), whom they eventually deserted to fight on Abū Muslim's side in the revolution¹⁹⁷). If anybody was in league with *dihqāns* it was Asad al-Qasrī, Shaban's Yemeni hero of whom we are explicitly told that the *dahāqīn* of Khurasan escorted

¹⁹⁰) Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 100; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1430 = Powers, p. 160.

¹⁹¹) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1291, cf. 1329 = Powers, p. 14, cf. p. 54 and note 200 thereto; al-Sam'ānī erroneously infers from his *nisba* that he came from Iraq (*al-Ansāb*, Hyderabad 1962–82. vol. xiii, p. 26).

¹⁹²) Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1291 (where his piety articulates selfish interests), 1430 (where it does not) = Powers, pp. 15, 160.

¹⁹³) On whom, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, vol. ii, Berlin and New York 1992, pp. 510ff.; P. Crone, 'A Note on Muqātil b. Ḥayyān and Muqātil b. Sulaymān', forthcoming in *Der Islam*.

¹⁹⁴) Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, vol. x, p. 278; compare Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1998 = Williams, p. 105, where he leads the resistance against the *Musawwida*. He had also been an opponent of al-Kirmānī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1930 = Williams, p. 41).

¹⁹⁵) *Tārīkh-i Sistān*, tr. M. Gold, Rome 1976, p. 14; Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 393, on Bassām, *mawālā* of Ibn 'Umar al-Laythī.

¹⁹⁶) Ibn Bassām al-Laythī was in Qutayba's service (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1222 = Hinds, p. 168); al-Faḍl b. Bassām, possibly the same man and possibly a brother, at all events the man whose advice was ignored by al-Ḥarashī (above, note 186), was among the *mawālā* known for their insight into Khurasani warfare (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1544); the family had *mawālā* of their own, at least one of whom also rose to prominence (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1444 = Powers, p. 174). 'Ubaydallāh b. Bassām was a friend of Naṣr b. Sayyār, of whose *ḥaras* he was in charge and on whose side he fought against al-Ḥārith b. Surayj (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1723f., 1859, 1923 = Hillenbrand, pp. 63, 208, 226; Williams, p. 34); Ibrāhīm b. Bassām commanded 10,000 men under Junayd al-Murri (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1532) and fought with Naṣr against al-Ḥārith as late as 128/745f. (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1927 = Williams, p. 38).

¹⁹⁷) 'Ubaydallāh b. Bassām joined even though he had influential with Naṣr b. Sayyār (*Akhbār al-dawla 'l-Abbāsiyya*, ed. 'A.-'A. al-Dūrī and 'A.-J. al-Muṭṭalibī, Beirut 1971, p. 233); Bassām b. Ibrāhīm [b. Bassām] also began in Naṣr's service,

him to Iraq on his dismissal for 'aṣabiyya in 109 A.H.¹⁹⁸); but naturally Shaban knows better: the *dahāqīn* mentioned here were not *dahāqīn*, but rather Hephtalite princes with whom Asad had sought an alliance in order to promote his pacifist vision and for the failure of which he had been dismissed!¹⁹⁹)

The only evidence Shaban adduces in support of Khurasani and other war-weariness is complaints of *tajmīr*, keeping the troops too long in the field, and *takhalluf*, failure to appear when called up. No soldiers liked being kept away from their homes for too long, whatever too long might be: presumably keeping the troops in the field beyond the summer months was *tajmīr*; whoever ordered the troops to cultivate was certainly guilty of it, this being the order issued by al-Ḥajjāj to his Peacock Army in Sistān and by Sulaymān to his troops in India and Anatolia²⁰⁰). At all events, *tajmīr* was certainly an issue in the Umayyad period; even the rebels against 'Uthmān are alleged to have complained of it²⁰¹); indeed, 'Umar I foresaw the problem and warned against it²⁰²). The complaint does not seem to be encountered in a Khurasani context, but this could well be accidental. It should however be obvious that those who made it, wherever and whenever they may have been, did not thereby protest against expansion, only against the

but defected on Abū Muslim's *zuhūr* (al-Balādhuri, *Ansāb al-ashraf*, vol. iii, ed. 'A. 'A. al-Dūri, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 171), joined Qaḥṭaba's army and participated in the conquest of Syria (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1959, 1996f.; ser. iii, pp. 18, 21, 48 = Williams, pp. 70, 104, 140, 143, 172; de Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 166; *Akhbār al-dawla*, pp. 321f., 351; Khalifa, *Ta'rikh*, p. 591 [here Ibrāhīm b. Bassām, a common inversion]); his brothers 'Abdallāh, Ahlum, Hishām and al-Haytham fought along with him (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 17, 18, 28, 48 = Williams, pp. 139, 140, 151, 172; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, vol. ii, p. 413); he himself was one of *fursān ahl Khurāsān*, but he rebelled and was killed in 134 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 75ff.; Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iii, p. 171).

¹⁹⁸) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1501, cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 456.

¹⁹⁹) Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 108f.

²⁰⁰) For Sulaymān, see above, note 88; for al-Ḥajjāj, see Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1053, cf. 1054 = Hinds, p. 4, cf. pp. 5f., where this is explicitly characterized as *tajmīr*.

²⁰¹) Cf. 'Uthmān's letter to the Egyptians in Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 64: he promises to act in accordance with *kitāb* and *sunna*, to recall exiles, to make *fay'* abundant, not to deprive anyone of stipends and not to keep anyone in the field for too long, etc. (all of which could be taken to suggest that 'Uthmān had followed the *sira* of al-Ḥajjāj). Ziyād b. Abihi similarly promised not to deprive anyone of stipends and not to keep troops in the field for too long (Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iva, p. 173; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 75; so too did Yazīd III (below, note 226).

²⁰²) Tabari, ser. i, pp. 2741, 2742, 1775; al-Jāhiz, *al-Bayān wa 'l-tabyīn*, ed. 'A. S. M. Hārūn, Cairo 1960–61, vol. ii, p. 48.

methods by which it was pursued. No doubt the soldiers who disliked being kept in the field for too long *could* have rationalized their feelings by rejecting the desirability of conquests altogether; but if they did, it failed to be recorded.

Takhalluf was also an old problem. One could be a member of the *dīwān* for a long time without being called up, if one was lucky, given that only a certain percentage of each quarter or fifth would be mobilized for a specific campaign²⁰³) and that the intervals between mobilizations might be long²⁰⁴). We do hear of people who were keen to get their names onto the mobilization lists²⁰⁵), but many hoped to escape military service altogether. If their names came up, they would respond to their orders by despatching substitutes (*budalā'*), whom they would pay a sum (*ju' l, ja' ā'il*)²⁰⁶), without, presumably, paying them as much as they themselves received through membership of the *dīwān*²⁰⁷); or they would simply fail to turn up, with or without contriving to have their names erased from the mobilization lists²⁰⁸). Soldiers despatching substitutes or defaulting are attested from

²⁰³) See for example Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 902f. = Rowson, p. 54, where a thousand men are called up from each of the quarters in Kufa; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 856 = Rowson, p. 4, where al-Muhallab is allowed to pick the best Kufans for his troops.

²⁰⁴) Under Ziyād b. Abihi, the Kufans were called up every year or every second year, depending on where they were registered for service (Jūda, *al-'Arab*, p. 221, citing a somewhat enigmatic passage in Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iva, p. 173); but one does not get the impression that the Iraqis (let alone the Medinese) were called up with such regularity under the Marwānids.

²⁰⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 393, cited by Jūda, *al-'Arab*, p. 220 (on Salm b. Ziyād's appointment to Khurasan in 61).

²⁰⁶) Cf. M. Bonner, 'Ja'ā'il and Holy War in Early Islam', *Der Islam* 68 (1991).

²⁰⁷) Differently the caliph Hishām, who was allegedly so fussy about restricting stipends to combatants that he would hand his own stipends plus an extra dinar to the client who acted as his substitute on campaigns (thus Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1732 = Hillenbrand, p. 74).

²⁰⁸) *Kuntu fi-man uktutiba thumma maḥawtu ismī*, as a Medinese informs us with reference to the campaign against Abū Ḥamza al-Khārījī in 129 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1983 = Williams, p. 92, where the translation "then his name was erased" fails to convey the message; Azdi, *Mawṣil*, p. 103). Jūda takes this passage to mean that frontier service was voluntary when there was no emergency, (*al-'Arab*, p. 220). But leaving aside the facts that Medina was not a frontier and that Abū Ḥamza's revolt was indeed an emergency, service was voluntary only in the sense that one did not have to be a member of the *dīwān*. Since this man was called up, he must have been registered and thus obliged to serve when mobilized.

the time of Mu'āwiya or the Second Civil War onwards in Syria²⁰⁹), Iraq²¹⁰), Medina²¹¹) and Khurasan²¹²). Even the pre-Islamic Meccans are supposed to have engaged in the practice of sending substitutes!²¹³) The Muslim habit

²⁰⁹) Bonner, 'Ja'ā'il', pp. 47f., citing T. Nöldeke (ed.), *Delectus Carminum Arabicorum*, Wiesbaden 1933, p. 77, and other sources for a poem by a Syrian Shāfiq b. Sulayk al-Asadi called up for a campaign in Khurasan in the 50's. Elsewhere, however, the story is set in the reign of 'Abd al-Malik (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1029, on Shāfiq b. Salil al-Asadi). In the Second Civil War al-Hajjāj reputedly burnt the houses of Syrians who failed to turn up for a campaign against Muṣ'ab (Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd.*, vol. iv, p. 410). In 69 the Syrians *takhallafu* 'an al-ghazw, so 'Abd al-Malik deducted a fifth of their property from their stipends in 70 (Khalifa, *Ta'rikh*, pp. 336, 337). Hishām did not pay stipends to the Marwānids unless they actually fought, so some fought, some performed non-military services in the *diwān* and some sent substitutes (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1732 = Hillenbrand, p. 74).

²¹⁰) Bonner, 'Ja'ā'il', pp. 48f., citing Nöldeke, *Delectus*, p. 90, and other sources for a Khārījite reference to recipients of *ja'ā'il* among their Iraqi opponents in the time of Mu'āwiya; al-Balādhuri, *Ansāb al-ashraf*, MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Reisülküttap Mustafa Efendi), nos. 597–8, vol. ii, p. 66, on al-Muhallab's mobilization of troops against the Azāriqa in the time of Bishr b. Marwān (*balaghat al-ja'āla bayna 'l-nās arbā'a ālāf*). When al-Hajjāj took over from Bishr, he promised to execute defaulters (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 865, 866 = Rowson, pp. 14, 16; Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. xi (= *Anonyme arabische Chronik*, ed. A. Ahlwardt, Greifswald 1883, pp. 273f.; Ibn Ḥamdūn, *al-Tadhkira al-ḥamdūniyya*, ed. I. 'Abbās, Beirut 1983–, vol. i, p. 437). Among those called up was an old man who offered his son as a substitute with reference to his own infirmity, which al-Hajjāj accepted until he discovered that he was a former rebel against 'Uthmān (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 869ff. = Rowson, pp. 19ff.; Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, pp. 274f.; Ibn Ḥamdūn, *Tadhkira*, vol. i, p. 438). Al-Hajjāj also threatened those who stayed behind from campaigns against Shabīb al-Khārījī with *barā'at al-dhimma* (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 896, 903, 911, 930 = Rowson, pp. 48, 54, 62, 82).

²¹¹) An army raised by al-Ashdaq, apparently in Medina, in the reign of Yazid I for an expedition against Ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca consisted mostly of *budalā' min al-'aṭā'* and sympathizers of Ibn al-Zubayr (Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. ivb, p. 24, line 14; wrongly placed in the reign of 'Uthmān in Bonner, 'Ja'ā'il', p. 47); or the army had been raised in Syria and consisted largely of clients of the Umayyads and people who were not members of the *diwān* (Balādhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 25, line 16; cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 224). When 2000 Medinese were mobilized in 88, they *tajā' alū* and sent 1500, while 500 stayed behind (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1192 = Hinds, p. 141). In 106 Hishām raised troops during his pilgrimage for a summer campaign against the Byzantines in 107, *fa-qadīmū... 'alā 'l-ja'ā'il* (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1487f.). Cf. also above, note 208.

²¹²) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1473, 1477f., 1482. Cf. also the Arab who *ba'atha badīlan makānahu fī ba'ḍ al-bu'ūth* in an unspecified place (al-Jāhiz, *Kitāb al-ḥayawān*, ed. 'A.-S. M. Hārūn, Cairo 1938–58, vol. vii, p. 82).

²¹³) Bonner, 'Ja'ā'il', p. 47; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Kitāb al-munammaq*, ed. Kh. A. Fāriq, Hyderabad 1964, pp. 456f.

of writing the present into the past is nothing if not thoroughgoing. It is also enduring, for the twentieth-century Shaban presents the defaulters of the Umayyad period as conscientious objectors: passive resistance to the imperialist policies of the Qays/Muḍar party was the only weapon left to them²¹⁴). Now of the future Khārījite Shabīb b. Yazid we are told that his father moved from Kufa to Mosul, where Shabīb was enrolled in the *diwān* on reaching adolescence; under the influence of a preacher, however, he turned ascetic and began to absent himself, among other things to go on pilgrimage; due to his frequent absences his name was eventually removed from the list, which he regretted and tried to rectify without success, whereupon he joined the Khārījite Šāliḥ b. Musarriḥ²¹⁵). Are we to take it that the adolescent Shabīb practised *takhalluf* as a conscientious objector to Umayyad imperialism and decided to re-enrol on reaching the more mature conviction that imperialism was right after all? Obviously not. The story says that Shabīb was an adolescent drifter whose pay was cut off, whereupon he wanted to sign up again and turned rebellious when he failed. The story may be true or false, but this is how *takhalluf* was perceived by those who saw it in action. "I will cut off the head of any man who fails to turn up within three days of taking his stipends", as al-Hajjāj announced on one occasion²¹⁶); "you have taken your stipends, so join your commander", as Naṣr b. Sayyār told the defaulters at Barūqān²¹⁷): membership of the *diwān* was a source of income that people were reluctant to forego. When Yazid b. al-

²¹⁴) Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 103

²¹⁵) Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, MS, vol. ii, pp. 88f. (*wa-qad kād kāna ismuhu saḡaṭa min al-diwān li-kathrati ghaybatihi wa-takhallufihi 'an al-'tirād 'alā 'l-'urrād*; al-'Amad's understanding of this episode does not tally with the text available to me, cf. al-Hajjāj, p. 413, with reference to the Cairo manuscript of Balādhuri's *Ansāb*). The story of Shabīb's attempt to (re)gain membership of the *diwān* is also told in Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, vol. vii, pp. 84f., but in a somewhat embellished fashion and without reference to his previous membership. However, compare Tabari, ser. ii, p. 893 = Rowson, p. 44, where Shabīb is said to have met Salāma b. Sayyār *idh kāna fī 'l-diwān wa-'l-maghāzi*.

²¹⁶) Ibn Ḥamdūn, *Tadhkira*, vol. i, p. 437. An old man asked to be excused with references to his infirmity, claiming to have been granted exemption by Bishr and to have returned his stipends to the treasury; but al-Hajjāj had him executed even so (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 873 = Rowson, p. 23 and the references in note 103 thereto; add Ibn Abi 'l-Ḥadid, *Sharḥ naḥj al-balāgha*, ed. M. A.-F. Ibrāhīm, Cairo 1965–67, vol. iv, pp. 183f.).

²¹⁷) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1473.

Muhallab, acting on behalf of his father during the Azraqite campaigns, threatened to remove the names of defaulters from the *diwān*, he obviously meant it as a dire punishment²¹⁸); so too did Khālīd b. 'Abdallāh, briefly governor of Iraq, when he threatened deserters from the Azraqite campaigns with not only loss of their stipends, but also confiscation of their property and exile²¹⁹); and when a deserter from al-Muhallabs's army came back to find that the scribes had removed his name from the *diwān*, he reacted like Shabīb by trying to have himself reinstated (successfully in his case), not by praising himself lucky to have been dropped²²⁰). All non-Khārijites were agreed on the desirability of suppressing the Azāriqa, yet it is above all in connection with the Azraqite campaigns that desertion and defaulting are attested: to stay away was to shirk one's duty, not to act on a conviction²²¹). Shaban presents the Khurasani defaulters as hapless victims of an imperialist organization that would not allow their names to be removed from the army lists (until Hishām 'yielded to the forces of assimilation'), but one did not have to be a member of the *diwān* if one did not want to. Many Arabs were not²²²); and those who wished to drop out, be it for political or other reasons, were perfectly free to do so²²³). It should however be obvious that membership of the *diwān* was a privilege which people would go to great lengths to acquire, recover or preserve whether they intended to perform the services for which the payment was meant or not. And as might be expected, defaulting was combated by Yemeni governors no less than by Muḍari one: Yazīd b. al-Muhallab's reaction to Iraqi *takhalluf* was as

²¹⁸) Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, vol. vii, p. 40.

²¹⁹) Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 858 = Rowson, p. 6.

²²⁰) *Aghānī*, vol. xiii, p. 88.

²²¹) The troops were well aware of this. When the Khurasani troops heard that their governor had been dismissed, they gleefully inferred that *laysa 'alā mutakhallif al-'ām ma'siya*, with the result that 4,000 men stayed behind (Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1478). See also the sensible account in Jūda, *al-'Arab*, p. 214.

²²²) Cf. Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 893 = Rowson, p. 45; Jūda, *al-'Arab*, pp. 209, 215.

²²³) This is taken for granted in traditions recommending non-membership of the *diwān*: al-Zubayr supposedly erased his name when 'Umar was killed, for example; Ibn al-Zubayr supposedly did the same when 'Uthmān was killed ('Abd al-Raz-zāq b. Hammām al-Ṣan'ānī, *al-Muṣannaḥ*, ed. Ḥ.-R. al-A'zamī, Beirut 1970-2, vol. xi, nos. 20043f.; cf. also no. 20042, where Maymūn b. Mihrān declines Muḥammad b. Marwān's offer to inscribe him). One could obviously describe these people as conscientious objectors (though not to imperialist policies), but they objected by refusing to take money, not by taking it and refusing to serve.

draconian as that of al-Hajjāj²²⁴); and it was Asad al-Qasri/Yemen who wanted the soldiers of Khurasan to swear that their wives would be divorced if they were to respond to their mobilisation orders by placing substitutes or failing to turn up²²⁵).

The Third Civil War

The only suggestion that Qays/Muḍar and Yemen might be associated with different political visions comes in the Third Civil War, more precisely in the enthronization speech of Yazīd III, the candidate of the *Yamaniyya*. Yazīd III promised not to engage in building programmes or the digging of canals, not to accumulate wealth on behalf of his wives and children, not to transfer money from one province to another unless there was a surplus, and then only to provinces in need, not to keep troops in the fields for too long, not to deprive his subjects of his attention, not to overtax their *jizya*-payers to the point where they would flee from the land, but on the contrary to pay stipends regularly whether the recipients be far away or near at hand, and to step down if he failed to abide by his promise or a better candidate was found²²⁶). To Shaban, this was an anti-expansionist and pro-assimilationist programme. But Yazīd said nothing whatever about the end of expansion, only about the end of *tajmīr*. Nor did he say anything about relations between Arabs and *mawālī*: his promise to pay stipends regularly to subjects far and wide obviously was not a promise to pay them to Arabs and non-Arabs alike. And his abolition of the pay rise granted by al-Walid II to the Syrians obviously did not signal an intention to end the Syrian privilege/duty to provide imperial troops²²⁷)! Who *was* he going to use in that role? Shaban's idea that the provinces could be left to police themselves is strangely naive and all the odder in that he surely must have noticed that his 'Yemeni' 'Abbāsids merely replaced the Syrians with Khurasanis.

It is nonetheless a fact that there is a political programme in Yazīd's speech, as there is in his letter to the Iraqis promising government in according with *kitāb* and *sunna* and referring to his own election by

²²⁴) Having announced that he would erase the names of defaulters from the *diwān*, he proceeded to give orders for their heads to be cut off. (cf. the reference given above, note 218). Muslim b. Sa'id al-Kilābi/Qays similarly ordered Naṣr to kill defaulters (Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1477f.).

²²⁵) Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1482.

²²⁶) Ṭabari, ser. ii, pp. 1834f. = Hillenbrand, pp. 193f.; cf. the variants listed in note 979 thereto; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. iv, pp. 95f., 462f.; Azdi, *Mawṣil*, pp. 57f.; Ibn Ḥamdūn, *Tadhkira*, vol. i, pp. 422f.; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 366.

²²⁷) Shaban, *Islamic History*, pp. 155f.

*shūrā*²²⁸). The programme is directed against imperialism in the sense of absolutism, not that of expansionism or racialism: the stress is on fairness, consultation and deference to the wishes of the community. But the programme is more likely to reflect Yazid III's Qadarite convictions than his Yemeni associations²²⁹), and this is the one and only occasion on which a convergence between Qadarism and Yemenism is attested. The Yamaniyya needed a programme for the obvious reason that one could not start killing caliphs without offering a reasoned account of what one was doing and why; and Yazid's ideas must have made sense to them, and indeed to many others as well. But the Yamaniyya did not refer to these ideas in the poetry with which they celebrated their victory, nor did they use them as programmatic statements or slogans in their subsequent battles with Marwān's Qaysiyya, and one certainly cannot use them as the key to the antagonism between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen from beginning to end.

Starting again: the premises

All in all, then, Shaban's thesis is implausible and based on a remarkably tendentious reading of the sources. What then can be said about the phenomenon in positive terms? We may start with three basic observations.

First, the antagonism between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen was a military phenomenon. We hear of it in connection with governors, generals, soldiers and their diverse appointees, not in connection with traders, craftsmen or peasants. The rivalry divided *ahl al-Shām*, *ahl al-Khurasān* and so on in the sense of the Syrian and Khurasani troops, not the populations of Syria or Khurasan in general²³⁰). Now as mentioned already, it was difficult for tribal groups such as Sa'd or Huddān, let alone larger units such as Tamim or Azd, to take collective action because they were widely dispersed over the Islamic lands and highly differentiated even within a single province; the tribal organization of the conquerors had been subject to a process of erosion from the moment they settled in the conquered lands. But it was not impossible for such groups *within the same army* to behave as units, or for such groups within *different* armies to act together when they came in contact with each other, as they did wherever the Syrians had to cooperate

²²⁸) Cf. P. Crone and M. Hinds, *God's Caliph. Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam*, Cambridge 1986, p. 68.

²²⁹) Cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 366f.; J. van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gai-lāniya de Yazid III', *Studia Islamica* 31 (1970).

²³⁰) Powers brings this out well by consistently translating *ahl* as 'troops' in military contexts.

with local troops. The armies were after all divided into tribal regiments which could gang up in accordance with their real or supposed genealogical relationship if this was perceived to be in their interest. The key question is what the interests were.

Secondly, the rivalry was first and foremost a provincial phenomenon. The caliphs appointed governors of both Qays/Muḍar and Yemen till the end of the Umayyad period, but their governors increasingly restricted themselves to one or the other descent group when they appointed sub-governors in their turn, or so at least in the east. The factionalism clearly affected the caliphs, but it was not until the Third Civil War that it engulfed the Syrian metropolis. What we are looking for, then, are provincial interests open to transformation into metropolitan aims.

Thirdly, the rivalry took the form of *ʿaṣabiyya*. People were born into one group or the other and defended their *qawm* for the simple reason that it was their own, without there being any ideological dimension to the rivalry before it culminated in civil war. To repeat, then, the most appropriate term for the phenomenon would be factionalism. It is a fatal mistake to explain factionalism by supplying the participants with supposed programmes which they themselves failed to articulate, for it is a distinguishing feature of factional behaviour that it is not open to rationalisation in ideological terms; when ideology creeps into it (as it obviously can), the behavioural patterns change. The absence of programmes is a clue that we should follow up, not a deficiency that we should try to remedy, and its message is surely that the participants were too similar in terms of social, cultural and political background for different visions and aspirations to be involved in their hostilities: some were sons of X and some were sons of Y, or, in different imagery, some were greens and some were blues, some were Montagues and some were Capulets. The participants were men of the same kind striving for the same aims; yet provincial interests of one kind or another divided them into opposing groups along lines that have an arbitrary appearance because they did not articulate substantive differences. This takes us back to the question of what the interests were.

Thus far the premises: how one should proceed will no doubt remain a matter of dispute. My own interpretation of the phenomenon was presented fourteen years ago²³¹), and I do not have much to add to it now; but my original presentation cannot be described as user-friendly, and I shall accordingly restate the argument in a hopefully more intelligible manner here.

²³¹) Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 42ff.

The Sufyānid background

As regards the Sufyānid period, there seems to be general agreement on two points: first, politics were genuinely tribal; and secondly, the tribal alignments were different from those that we encounter in the Marwānid period.

That Sufyānid politics were tribal obviously does not mean that they were about nothing (as Shaban's expression "tribal squabble" might be taken to suggest). A tribe is simply a group of a particular kind, and politics are tribal when people pursue their interests through groups of this kind rather than others, such as factions, political parties, churches, classes, nations or whatever. In Sufyānid Syria the interest of the tribes lay in gaining access to, and influence with, the caliph, the ultimate decision-maker, and the story of their competition for this access is well known²³²). Mu'āwiya was allied with the Syrian tribe known as Kalb, which in its turn was allied with many other Syrian tribes; and all the allies, who were collectively known as the Quḍā'a, achieved a highly privileged position. The chief of the Kalb, who was also the chief of the Quḍā'a, had extracted a promise from Mu'āwiya (endorsed by Yazid I) that in return for his cooperation he and other Quḍā'is should be consulted in all decisions made by the caliph, that they should have the right to propose and veto measures, and that 2000 members of the confederacy should receive stipends of 2000 dinars a year (i.e. *sharaf al-'aṭā'*) on a hereditary basis²³³). Members of this chiefly house were appointed to high office in Syria under Mu'āwiya and Yazid, the son of the Kalbi woman that Mu'āwiya married by way of sealing the alliance²³⁴). The non-Quḍā'i tribes of Syria were thus left with the choice between trying to gain membership of Quḍā'a and trying to oust them, and the period was marked by intense discussion of possible genealogical alignments among tribes such as Judhām²³⁵), 'Āmila²³⁶) and

²³²) See for example Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, pp. 83ff.

²³³) al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*, ed. A. C. Barbier de Meynard and A. J. B. Pavet de Courteille, Paris 1861-77, vol. v, p. 200 (ed. C. Pellat, Beirut 1966-79, §1963). The summary by R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, Cambridge 1969, p. 413, is not correct.

²³⁴) Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 93f.

²³⁵) The Syrian tribe of Judhām was held by some to be sons of Qanaṣ b. Ma'add, by others to be sons of Asada b. Khuzayma (brother of Asad, a descendent of Nizār b. Ma'add), and by most to be of Qaḥṭān (Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *al-Inbāh 'alā qabā' il al-ruwāh*, Cairo 1350, pp. 104ff.). In the Sufyānid period, Rawḥ b. Zinbā' al-Judhāmī supported the affiliation of his tribe to Asad (Asada?) (al-Balādhuri, *Ansāb al-ashraf*, vol. i, ed. M. Ḥamidallāh, 1959, pp. 36f.), or he supported its affiliation to Ma'add, telling Yazid that they were a Syrian rather than a Yemeni tribe and ought to be joined to their Ma'addi brothers, i.e. Quḍā'a (thus *Aghānī*, vol. ix, p. 314; note

(apparently) Kinda²³⁷). Ḥimṣ was the centre of genuine South Arabian tribes (i.e. tribes which indisputably lived in South Arabia before the conquest, as opposed to tribes which merely claimed to have done so after adopting Yemeni descent), notably Ḥimyar and Hamdān; and these tribes identified themselves as Yemenis in opposition to the Quḍā'a. According to Caskel, the collective name of Qaḥṭān was first adopted by them, though this is somewhat conjectural²³⁸). At all events, northern Syria and the Jazīra were meanwhile filling up with immigrants from North Arabia who went together under the name of Qays and who became so numerous that Qinnasrin was detached from Ḥimṣ to become a *jund* of its own²³⁹), the Jazīra being detached from Qinnasrin soon thereafter²⁴⁰); and these tribesmen were also keen to oust the Quḍā'a from their privileged position: "we will never pay allegiance to the son of a Kalbi woman", as they said when Mu'āwiya arranged for the succession of Yazid I²⁴¹). When Yazid died prematurely in 683, the Qays supported the candidature of Ibn al-Zubayr, or more precisely Ibn al-Zubayr's Syrian representative al-Daḥḥāk b. Qays al-Fihri. Genuine South Arabians such as the Ḥimyarites in Ḥimṣ also opted for Ibn al-Zubayr, as did more recent members of the Yemeni bloc such as the Anṣār in Ḥimṣ and the Judhām in Palestine²⁴²) along with "the majority

that two Asads are enumerated along with Ma'add and Nizār in the Nemara inscription, cf. I. Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century*, Washington 1984, pp. 31ff.). His rival, Nātil b. Qays al-Judhāmī, backed the ultimately dominant affiliation to Qaḥṭān (Crone, *Slaves*, p. 34; Caskel, *Ġamhara*, vol. pp. 53f., where Caskel ignores his own view that the Quḍā'a were Ma'addis at the time; cf. also H. Lammens, 'Le Califat de Yazid (suite)', *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l'Université de Saint-Joseph* 5 (1912), pp. 626ff.).

²³⁶) The 'Āmila and Lakhm counted as brothers of Judhām and thus acquired the same Qaḥṭānid genealogy (cf. Caskel, *Ġamhara*, vol. ii, pp. 53f.); but the 'Āmila are said by some to have been descendants of Quḍā'a (Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, p. 103)).

²³⁷) For Kinda's Ma'addi genealogy, see Crone, *Slaves*, note 243.

²³⁸) Caskel, *Ġamhara*, vol. i, p. 34.

²³⁹) According to Sayf b. 'Umar, the *jund* of Qinnasrin was established by Mu'āwiya in response to the influx of refugees from 'Alī's Iraq (Tabari, ser. i, p. 2673); according to Balādhuri, *Futūḥ*, p. 132, it was established by Yazid I; and according to the Andalusian *Akhbār majmū'a*, it was established some time after al-Mukhtār's revolt (Lafuente, *Ajbar*, p. 56). It is the second claim that I assume to be correct.

²⁴⁰) *ET*², s.v. 'Djazira'.

²⁴¹) G. G. Freytag (ed.), *Hamasa Carmina*, Bonn 1861-78, p. 319 (repeated p. 658).

²⁴²) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 468f., 474; Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 132, 134, cf. 301, line 1 (unspecified Yemenis with Daḥḥāk).

of the Yemenis in Damascus²⁴³); and the Kinda very nearly did²⁴⁴). But the Qudā'a naturally wanted the Umayyad dynasty to continue and eventually settled for Marwān, on condition that he granted them the same privileges that they had enjoyed under the Sufyānids²⁴⁵); and when the two parties met in battle at Marj Rāhiṭ in 684, the Qudā'a and their Kindi allies defeated the Qays and Qaṭṭān despite the latter's numerical superiority.

Once more, then, the throne was occupied by an Umayyad caliph allied with the Qudā'a. But the restoration was accompanied by a major genealogical reshuffle, for shortly after the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ the Qudā'a joined the Qaṭṭānid confederacy, thereby generating the Yemeni group that we encounter in Marwānid times.

The Qudā'a counted as sons of Ma'add in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times²⁴⁶). Ma'add was a northern tribe which is mentioned in the Nemara inscription and Greek sources²⁴⁷); and the Kalb, the leading tribe of the Qudā'a, had lived in the Syrian desert for so long before the Arab conquests that it seems pointless to speculate where they may originally have come from. When genealogists were called in to divide the Kufan population into sevenths in 17 AH, they assigned the Qudā'a to the same seventh as the Ḥadramawt and other South Arabian tribes, suggesting that the Qudā'i group was remembered to have South Arabian links²⁴⁸). The Kufan genealogists did not however assign the Qudā'a to the same seventh as the Ḥimyar, the tribe with which the Syrian Qudā'is were eventually to merge,

²⁴³) Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 474. Note also that 'Abdallāh b. Yazid al-Bajali, the father of Khālid al-Qasrī, is here said to fought on Ibn al-Zubayr's side at Marj Rāhiṭ (ibid., p. 794), though he figures on Marwān's side in Ibn Ḥabīb, *Kitāb al-muḥabbar*, ed. I. Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942, p. 262.

²⁴⁴) Ḥusayn b. Numayr b. Sakūnī, who was in charge of the expedition against Ibn al-Zubayr at the time of Yazid's death, offered Ibn al-Zubayr his allegiance when he heard that Yazid had died, on condition that he come to Syria; but Ibn al-Zubayr refused to leave (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 430ff.; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 166f.). thereafter the Sakūn favoured Yazid I's son Khālid (Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 134). For the privileges they demanded in return for supporting Marwān, see ibid., pp. 149f.; Mas'ūdī, *Murūj*, vol. v, pp. 200f. (ed. Pellat, §1964).

²⁴⁵) Mas'ūdī, above, note 233.

²⁴⁶) Thus al-Sharqī b. al-Quṭāmi cited in Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, p. 60; similarly Abū 'Amr b. al-'Alā' cited in Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. i, p. 16, §35; Abū 'l-Baqā', *al-Manāqib al-mazyadīyya fī akhbār al-mulūk al-asadīyya*, ed. Š. M. Darāka and M. 'A.-Q. Kharisāt, 'Ammān 1984, vol. i, pp. 339f.

²⁴⁷) Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs*, p. 43.

²⁴⁸) Tabarī, ser. i, p. 2495, where the seventh in question consists of Qudā'a, Ghassān b. Shibām who were part of the Qudā'a in those days, Bajila, Khath'am, Kinda, Ḥadramawd and Azd (Sarāt).

so the relevance of their views is uncertain²⁴⁹). At all events, in Syria and/or Egypt the first person to claim a Yemeni, more precisely Ḥimyarī, descent for the Qudā'a was supposedly a Juhani Companion of the Prophet²⁵⁰) whose views are said to have been backed by Mu'āwiya²⁵¹) or alternatively to have been disliked by Mu'āwiya²⁵²), but whose role is exceedingly doubtful²⁵³). It was only after the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ that the Qudā'is developed an interest in Yemeni descent. "The Qudā'a formed an alliance between themselves and the Yemen in the days of the *fitna* between Ibn al-Zubayr and Marwān b. al-Ḥakam and his son 'Abd al-Malik, at the time when 'Umayr b. al-Ḥubāb al-Sulamī [Qays] was raiding Kalb and Ḥumayd b. Hurayth al-Kalbi was raiding Qays 'Aylan", as a Kalbi genealogist explains²⁵⁴). The alliance was expressed in the adoption by Qudā'a of descent from Ḥimyar²⁵⁵); and Khālid b. Yazid, the disinherited son of Yazid I

²⁴⁹) Ḥimyar, Maḥdhij, Hamdān and allies formed another seventh. In view of this fact the report cannot be rejected as anachronistic with reference to later Syrian developments; this is nonetheless how Caskel rejects another passage in which the Kufan Qudā'a appear as Yemenis along with other members of their former seventh (*Ġamhara*, vol. ii, p. 40, on Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 122, year 51).

²⁵⁰) Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. i, p. 15, §33; Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, pp. 337, 340; cf. W. Madelung, 'Apocalyptic Prophecies in Ḥims in the Umayyad Age', *Journal of Semitic Studies* 31 (1986), p. 182, on 'Amr b. Murra al-Juhani.

²⁵¹) Madelung, 'Prophecies', pp. 182f.

²⁵²) Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb ta'rikh Ibn 'Asākir*, ed. 'A.-Q. Badrān and A. 'Ubayd, Damascus 1911-32, vol. v, p. 395, s.v. 'Zuhayr b. 'Amr b. Murra'.

²⁵³) Madelung takes the reports on 'Amr b. Murra al-Juhani seriously. But for one thing, he is a pretty shadowy figure: he was a very old man (*shaykh kabīr*) in the time of the Prophet, yet supposedly died in the caliphate of Mu'āwiya or even that of 'Abd al-Malik; he settled in Egypt, yet wintered in Byzantium in 59 and left descendants in Damascus (Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba fī tamyiz al-ṣaḥāba*, Cairo 1328, vol. iii, pp. 15f., s.v.; Tabarī, ser. i, p. 188; Caskel, *Ġamhara*, vol. ii, s.v.). For another thing, his sole function is to transmit the Prophet's supposed views on the matter (cf. Ibn Ḥajar, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 16, cited in Madelung 'Prophecies', p. 182; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, p. 60; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, p. 395). This is as might be expected: why else should the first advocate have been a Companion? The function of 'Uqba b. 'Āmir, the Companion who supposedly shared 'Amr's views, is likewise to invoke the Prophet in favour of Qudā'a's Ḥimyarite genealogy (cf. Madelung, 'Prophecies', p. 182).

²⁵⁴) Naṣr b. Mazrū' al-Kalbi in Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, pp. 337f.; similarly al-Sharqī b. Quṭāmi in Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, p. 60, cf. Ibn Ḥabīb, *ibid.*, pp. 60f.; Caskel, *Ġamhara*, vol. ii, pp. 73f.

²⁵⁵) Madelung is right that this is problematic: why did the Qudā'a choose to present themselves as subordinate to the Ḥimyarites whom they had just defeated, when other Syrian tribes were attached to Qaṭṭān through Ḥimyar's brother Kah-lān? ('Prophecies', pp. 181f.). But I am not persuaded by his explanation.

by a Kalbī woman, is said to have encouraged it in the hope of withdrawing tribal support from the Marwānids²⁵⁶). Thereafter, we are told, the alliance was clinched by Maslama b. 'Abd al-Malik's partisan behaviour in favour of Qays during the siege of Constantinople, and supported by Khālid al-Qasri, who lavished a great deal of money on his attempt to 'spoil' the genealogies of the Quḍā'a and Bajila (his own tribe)²⁵⁷). His efforts were reprehensible in the eyes of those who regarded the Quḍā'a's repudiation of their ancestor Ma'add as unlawful²⁵⁸), and the issue generated such passion that the Prophet was invoked in support of both sides²⁵⁹), while at the same time ingenious harmonizations between the Ma'addi and Himyari genealogies were proposed²⁶⁰). But though the descent of the Quḍā'a continue to be disputed by scholars, the political alliance was a fact. It resulted in a neat genealogical division between Syria proper and Syro-Jazira: Syria was overwhelmingly Yemeni in the four southern *junds* of Filastīn, Urdunn, Dimashq and Hims²⁶¹), overwhelmingly Qaysi in Qinnasrīn and the Jazīra²⁶²).

The sources on Sufyānid history abound in schematized accounts of tribal relationships in which the Quḍā'a are anachronistically subsumed under the label of Yemen. For example, we are told that the Yamāniyya supported the Umayyads in the Second Civil War, whereas the Qaysiyya supported the Zubayrids²⁶³), or that Ḥassān b. Baḥdal al-Kalbī was the chief of Qaḥṭān²⁶⁴), or that originally Mu'āwiya only gave stipends to the Yemen, but later he recruited 4,000 Qays and used the Yemenis for campaigns by sea, the Qaysi for campaigns by land (which is incorrect even if

²⁵⁶) Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, p. 338; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, pp. 60f.

²⁵⁷) Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, p. 338.

²⁵⁸) Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, p. 338, where the informant Naṣr b. Mazrū' al-Kalbī is among those who disapproved.

²⁵⁹) The Prophet pronounced the Quḍā'a to be Himyaris (above, note 253) or he pronounced them to be of Ma'add (Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, p. 340 (via 'Ā'ī-sha)).

²⁶⁰) Cf. Muṣ'ab b. 'Abdallāh al-Zubayrī, *Kitāb nasab Quraysh*, ed. E. Levi-Provençal, Cairo 1953, p. 5; Ibn al-Kalbī cited in Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. i, p. 15, §32; in Abū 'l-Baqā', *Manāqib*, vol. i, p. 339; and in Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Inbāh*, pp. 61.

²⁶¹) Cf. Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1775: *al-Yamāniyya hum 'uẓm jund ahl al-Shām*; Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, pp. 83f.

²⁶²) Cf. Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 708: *wa-kānat Qays kulluhā bi'l-Jazīra fa-hum ahl khilāf li-Marwān*. This is correct if the Jazīra is understood to include Qinnasrīn. Compare Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 170.

²⁶³) Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. iv, p. 395. (Higher up on the same page Ḥassān b. Baḥdal al-Kalbī says that there are many Qays in Urdunn and describes them as his people, which cannot be right; Qays must be a mistake for Quḍā'a.)

²⁶⁴) Mas'ūdi, *Murūj*, vol. v, p. 200.

we translate Yemen into Quḍā'a)²⁶⁵). The Quḍā'i tribes of the Sufyānid period are usually described as Yemenis in the secondary literature too²⁶⁶), but the neat division between Qays and Yemen in Syria was an outcome of the Civil War, not a factor behind its outbreak.

The parallel story of tribal rivalries in Iraq and Khurasan is more complicated²⁶⁷), but all we need to note here is that the tribes involved included Qays again, though far outnumbered by their Tamimi allies, and Azd 'Uman in alliance with Bakr/Rabi'a. The Azd 'Uman and Bakr were both tribes from eastern rather than southern Arabia, so on the face of it there was not much overlap between the rivalries in Syria on the one hand and Iraq and Khurasan on the other. But there was too much contact between Syria and the eastern provinces for the hostilities to remain discrete: the feuds between Kalb and Qays in the Syrian desert had repercussions in Iraq²⁶⁸), and the Syrian Qays took a keen interest in the fate of Qaysis in Khurasan²⁶⁹). The Syrian tribe known as Azd came from the Sarāt in South Arabia rather than Oman, as did the Azd of Kufa and a few of those in Basra, and thanks to this fact the Basran and Khurasani Azdis came to be identified as Yemenis too²⁷⁰). We thus have a situation in which tribesmen everywhere could, should they so wish, identify themselves as members of the bloc composed mostly of Qays in Syria and mostly of Tamim elsewhere, the group in question being known as Muḍar, or as members of the bloc composed mostly of Quḍā'a in Syria and mostly of Azd elsewhere, the bloc in question being known as Yemen.

²⁶⁵) *Aghāni*, vol. xx, pp. 208f.; cf. Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iva, p. 82; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tahdhīb*, vol. v, pp. 303f. A Yemeni such as Mālik b. Hubayra al-Sakūni/Kinda conducted campaigns by both land and sea under Mu'āwiya (Ṭabari, ser. ii, pp. 82, 84, 85 = M. G. Morony (tr.), *The History of al-Ṭabari*, vol. xviii, Albany 1987, pp. 88, 91, 93), and 'Amr b. Murra al-Juhāni, a Yemeni by the standards of these sources, is said to have conducted a land campaign against the Byzantines the year before Mu'āwiya died (ibid., p. 188 = Morony, p. 199).

²⁶⁶) See for example Hitti, *History*, pp. 280f.; Levy, *Social Structure*, p. 413; Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, pp. 83ff.; Shaban, *Islamic History*, pp. 83f.; Kennedy, *Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, pp. 87, 92; M. Fishbein (tr.), *The History of al-Ṭabari*, vol. xxi, Albany 1990, note 11 (published one hundred and five years after the Quḍā'i change of genealogy was first discussed by an Islamicist, cf. W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, Cambridge 1885, pp. 8f.).

²⁶⁷) Cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 401ff.; Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, pp. 105ff.

²⁶⁸) Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, pp. 95f.

²⁶⁹) Cf. Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 66 = Morony, p. 69; cf. also Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 210 ("The dualism of the eastern groups at last united with that of the western, mainly through the fault of the Qais").

²⁷⁰) Cf. *EL*², s.v. 'Azd'.

The Marwānids

But why *should* they have wished to identify themselves in such terms? Obviously, once the Marwānids, were in power they had to conciliate the disgruntled Qays of Syro-Jazīra. The latter remained in a state of opposition for several years after Marj Rāhiṭ, conducting feuds with the Kalb and eventually also with Taghlib, a Jaziran tribe on whose territories they had encroached, and doing their best to obstruct the Marwānid attempt to reconquer the rest of the Islamic world from the Zubayrids²⁷¹). 'Abd al-Malik allegedly refused to hear poetry composed by Muḍaris with reference to their Zubayrid sympathies²⁷²); but he nonetheless spent a great deal of time trying to win them over and eventually established marriage alliances with them: his two heir-apparents al-Walid and Sulaymān were both sons of an 'Absī woman from a chiefly house in Qinnasrīn²⁷³). So despite the privileges that the Quḍā'a had wrung from Marwān, they never regained their former predominance, and they are said to have resented this fact²⁷⁴). But the feuds died down, and something else must have intervened to shape the subsequent evolution.

The operative factor is presumably to be sought in military developments. In the course of the Marwānid period the old citizen militia began to give way to professional armies²⁷⁵), with the result that governors increasingly had to be chosen from among generals capable of running the army, whatever their tribal background might be. Previously, practically all top governors had been chosen from among kinsmen of the caliph, that is to say from among men distinguished by their loyalty towards their own caliphal family on the one hand and by their neutrality in the tribal rivalries on the other. This was also how 'Abd al-Malik began; but as has been seen, it was not how he continued²⁷⁶).

A general appointed to Iraq and/or Khurasan controlled a huge number of military and administrative sub-governorships for which he had to find trustworthy men. On whom then was he going to rely? There was no short-

²⁷¹) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 201ff; Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, pp. 89ff.

²⁷²) *Aghānī*, vol. viii, p. 66, line 9.

²⁷³) Crone, *Slaves*, appendix 1, no. 15; cf. Dixon, *Umayyad Caliphate*, p. 94, for his marriage alliance with Zufar b. al-Ḥārith al-Kilābi.

²⁷⁴) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 211, with reference to Freytag, *Hamasa Carmina*, p. 658, where Jawwās b. al-Qa'tal al-Kalbi accuses 'Abd al-Malik of ingratitude.

²⁷⁵) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 372f. (with reference to the very end of the Umayyad period); Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 37ff.

²⁷⁶) Cf. Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 32, 39. 'Abd al-Malik's initial reliance on kinsman was in fact even more systematic than that of the Sufyānids (as Wellhausen rightly observes, *Kingdom*, pp. 221f.).

age of eager candidates among his officers; on the contrary, there were too many: some sort of criteria of selection had to be worked out. The obvious criterion was kinship. People always relied on members of their own family where they could, but even large families offered an insufficient number of candidates and no governor could hope for popularity with his troops without rewarding at least some of them with lucrative posts. Close relatives apart, the obvious choice was fellow-tribesmen. Who then was a fellow-tribesman of the governor? Clearly anyone eager for appointment now had an interest in presenting himself as a loyal member of the governor's descent group, however remote, and so the upper levels of the genealogical tree acquired urgent relevance: a Laythi was a Kinānī and thus a Muḍari, in which capacity he could offer his services to the governor if the latter was a Murri, that is a Qaysi and thus a Muḍari too. But if a man stressed his allegiances to Muḍar in the hope of making himself eligible in the eyes of a Murri, he thereby rendered himself ineligible for appointment if the next governor happened to be a Yemeni, for the latter would not unnaturally view the zeal displayed on behalf of Qays/Muḍar as a declaration of inability to serve men from other descent groups. Once a tribal group had publicly declared its alignment, it was hard to go back. The best one could do thereafter was to pull as many strings as possible to secure the appointment of a governor from one's own tribal group.

Things clearly had not reached this point when al-Ḥajjāj was appointed. He had risen through the army, but he was also an affinal kinsman of the Umayyads, and it was as such that he behaved: like everyone else he relied greatly on his own family, but he freely appointed men from diverse tribal backgrounds in addition, clearly feeling that tribal rivalries did not affect him. But when Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi, an ex-governor on the run, fled to Sulaymān, an heir-apparent threatened with deposition, high politics caused the provincial competition for office to polarize. Everyone in or aspiring to appointment now had to place bets on one or the other candidate for the throne, which in its turn meant placing bets on one or the other network of kinsmen, allies and friends with which the candidates were associated; declaring oneself a loyal member of Yazid's Azd meant damning oneself in the eyes of al-Ḥajjāj's Thaḳīf and Qutayba's Bāhila. When Yazid b. al-Muhallab was appointed to Iraq and Khurasan, the men he appointed in his turn were chosen from the Yemen with a new consistency: loyalty to the larger group containing Azd was rewarded, the reliability of that containing Thaḳīf apparently doubted. All governors thereafter proved highly sensitive to the tribal/factional membership of their subordinates. Jarrah b. 'Abdal-lāh al-Ḥakami/Yemen, who had served under both al-Ḥajjāj and Yazid b. al-Muhallab before being appointed to Khurasan by 'Umar II, was converted

into an *‘aṣabi* on behalf of his Yemeni people in Khurasan, clearly because his troops were too partisan for neutrality to be possible²⁷⁷); other governors responded by trying to manipulate tribal genealogies so as to strengthen their own factional support²⁷⁸); and the troops who ganged up under the names of Qays/Muḍar and Yemen found the behaviour rewarding, for all provincial appointments went to their own faction when the governor was one of theirs. Given that there was only one top-governor in each province, there was only room for two competing groups, one in and one out, so the polarization would presumably have taken place even without the Yazid-Sulaymān episode. But this episode undoubtedly had a triggering effect.

That the antagonism had a bearing on appointments is explicit in the sources. "Never did I see such *‘aṣabiyya*", a Syrian Yemeni exclaimed when he heard of Naṣr b. Sayyār's uniformly Mudari appointments, only to be reassured that previous *‘aṣabiyya* had been just as bad (presumably a reference to the Yemeni appointments under Asad al-Qasri)²⁷⁹). When Yūsuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays, the governor of Iraq, tried to withdraw Qaysi support from Naṣr b. Sayyār in Khurasan, he "promised that if Maghrā' [b. Aḥmar al-Numayri/Qays] would impugn Naṣr's reputation in front of Hishām, he would make him governor of Sind". Maghrā''s acceptance of the offer was treachery, for Naṣr had favoured him, among other things by appointing Maghrā' nephew to Juzjān and putting him in charge of the fifth known as the Ahl al-‘āliya (to which the Qays belonged)²⁸⁰). When the Yemenis murdered al-Walid II in Syria and appointed their own governor to Khurasan, Naṣr b. Sayyār reacted by trying to unite the factions around him: "the Azd in Khurasan caused turmoil by spreading false rumours that Manzūr b.

²⁷⁷) See the reference given above, note 28.

²⁷⁸) The sons of Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili/Qays had tried to present Bāhila as part of Taghlib/Rabi'a, which was resented by the Bakr/Rabi'a who feared that Taghlib might become too numerous thereby (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1473f., where the Taghlib invoke this genealogy to make a descendant of Qutayba cooperate with them; the Ma'n/Azd/Yemen had also claimed the Bāhila as theirs). Khālīd al-Qasri successfully endeavoured to strengthen the Yemeni descent of Bajila and Qudā'a (cf. the reference given above, note 257). Bishr b. Ṣafwān al-Kalbi requested and received permission from Yazid II to turn the Qudā'a into a military unit of their own in Egypt (Kindi, *Governors*, pp. 70f.). (The future?) Marwān II restored the Asadi genealogy of Judhām, obviously in the hope of turning a troublesome Yemeni group into a Mudari one, but without success (Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. i, p. 36, § 68; cf. Crone, *Slaves*, p. 161, on his troubles with Thābit b. Nu'aym al-Judhāmi). The claim that the generals took no interest in genealogy for purposes other than abuse now strikes me as odd (Crone, *Slaves*, note 312).

²⁷⁹) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1664 (compare Ibn A'tham, *Futūḥ*, vol. viii, p. 146).

²⁸⁰) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1721ff. = Hillenbrand, p. 60, 62.

Jumhūr [al-Kalbi/Yemen, the new governor] was coming there. Naṣr preached a sermon... Naṣr appointed governors from Rabi'a and the Yamāniyya²⁸¹).

The faction could of course have had a bearing on appointments without being actually generated by them, but it was only in the context of military competition for office that the supposed descent groups held together. The civilian South Arabians of Ḥimṣ loathed the Qudā'i soldiers with whom they were assumed to be allied, dismissing them as despicable bedouin²⁸²) and rebelling against them when the latter took control of Ḥimṣ as members of Yazid III's Yamāniyya²⁸³). The Syrian soldiers of Qudā'a in their turn were happy enough to fight against Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen when the latter rebelled, writing him off as an Iraqi *munāfiq*²⁸⁴). But when the Syrian Qudā'a sent Manzūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbi/Yemen as governor to Khurasan, they nonetheless generated immense excitement among the Azdis there, because a Syrian Yemeni was bound to appoint Khurasani Yemenis to office; hence Naṣr b. Sayyār was forced to give appointments to their faction.

Governorship generated intense competition because they were positions of power, prestige and above all wealth, not only in that they were salaried, but also in that all governors from the highest to the lowest would divert part of the tax revenues into their own pockets, almost as of right: everyone knew that they would do so, and they were rarely called to account before the top governor was dismissed, which normally meant that all of his sub-governors were dismissed as well. This is why governors of the Marwānid period were usually jailed and subjected to torture when their appointments came to an end: termination of office meant forcible regurgitation of spoils. Appointment was thus immensely lucrative, while dismissal meant loss of power and wealth alike, possibly of health as well and not infrequently of life. In other words, the participants in the competition played for high stakes, and this intensified the antagonism between the competitors. When a new top-governor was appointed, he would start by maltreating his

²⁸¹) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1847 (*wa-wallā Naṣr Rabi'a wa l-Yaman*) = Hillenbrand, p. 209 (where this is wrongly translated "Naṣr appointed [governors] over the Banū Rabi'a and the Yamāniyyah").

²⁸²) Madelung, 'Prophecies', pp. 163ff., 181.

²⁸³) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1826ff. = Hillenbrand, pp. 183ff.; Crone, *Slaves*, p. 46. Conversely, note that Yazid b. al-Muhallab is depicted as perfectly friendly, and indeed generous, to the Qaysi chiefs of Syria who did not form part of his troops (Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. i, p. 304).

²⁸⁴) *qatalnā Yazid' bna' l-Muhallab'... fa-mā kāna min ahl' l-‘Irāq' munāfiq' an al-din' illā min Qudā' at' qātih* (al-Mas'ūdī, *Kitāb al-tanbih wa l-ishrāf*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden 1894, p. 321).

predecessor and/or his appointees, only to be subjected to worse treatment when he and his appointees were dismissed in their turn, the faction which ousted him being now bent not just on the extraction of money, but also on revenge²⁸⁵). One ex-governor committed suicide when he was caught by the rival faction²⁸⁶). When the new governor belonged to the same descent group as his predecessor, factional loyalties were strained²⁸⁷), and the behaviour of Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays suggests that the eastern Qays/Muḍar faction was close to splitting into two in response to the apparent elimination of the Yemenis.

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The faction was a purely provincial phenomenon down to the Third Civil War because it was only in the provinces that the generals took over as governors, Syria continuing to be ruled by old-fashioned kinsmen of the caliph and tribal nobles²⁸⁸). In the Third Civil War, however, the generals took over Syria as well.

The key to the coup of 744 is presumably to be sought in the Marwānid tendency to rely on men of Qays/Muḍar for the governorship of the eastern provinces, especially Khurasan, which in its turn is in need of explanation. The fact that the Marwānids intermarried with the Qays of Syro-Jazīra did not prevent them from relying preponderantly on Yemenis in the western provinces, where the local tribes were overwhelmingly Yemenis too. Possibly, they preferred governors of Qays/Muḍar in Khurasan because the Khurasani troops had come to be dominated Muḍaris. The figures given for the fifths in Qutayba's army do not support this conjecture, but several armies had been despatched from Iraq since Qutayba's time, and as has been

²⁸⁵) Cf. Crone, *Slaves*, p. 44.

²⁸⁶) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1839 = Hillenbrand, pp. 199f.

²⁸⁷) In Khurasan the Umayyad Sa'id Khudhayna arrested the governors of 'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Abdallāh al-Qushayri/Qays, appointed by 'Umar II, but not apparently 'Abd al-Rahmān himself; however an Umayyad did not really count as a Qaysi (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1419 = Powers, p. 150). The Qaysi Sa'id al-Harashi is explicitly said to have left Khudhayna's governors alone, suggesting that this was unusual (ibid., p. 1437 = Powers, p. 167). Sa'id himself was eventually despatched (presumably by his Kilābi/Qaysi successor) to 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazāri/Qays in Iraq, where he narrowly avoided being tortured to death (ibid., pp. 1453ff. = Powers, pp. 183ff.). We are not told how Junayd al-Murri/Qays treated the governors of Ashras al-Sulami/Qays, but Junayd's own governors were jailed and tortured by 'Āṣim b. 'Abdallāh al-Hilālī/Qays, who would presumably have done the same to Junayd if he had not died (ibid., pp. ii, 1565).

²⁸⁸) Crone, *Slaves*, p. 40 and appendix II thereto.

seen, Hishām is credited with the view that most of the Khurasani troops were Tamimis²⁸⁹). In addition, however, the Qays of Syro-Jazīra were frontier-troops and thus better suited than their Yemeni counterparts to the frontier warfare of Khurasan. Possibly, they were also better horsemen. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih has it that most of Marwān's Qudā'i troops at Marj Rāhiṭ were infantry, whereas most of Ḍaḥḥāk's Qaysiyya were cavalrymen, and infinitely more numerous to boot²⁹⁰). This is late information of dubious value, but the Mesopotamian desert must in fact have been better suited to horse-rearing than its Syrian counterpart.

At all events, as far as control of the most lucrative and prestigious provinces of the caliphate were concerned, that is Iraq and Khurasan, the Syrian Yemenis were doing badly in the competition; and since local troops related to their Syrian governors on the basis of descent, the Yemenis of Iraq and Khurasan were doing badly too. The Syrian Yemenis were responsible for garrison duties all over the empire, and above all in Iraq. *Pace* Shaban, there is no evidence that they resented this duty, what they resented being rather that they did not have undisputed control of this province. They did rule Iraq for a full fifteen years under Khālīd al-Qasri (a very long time in view of the short tenures that most governors enjoyed), but they lost control of it again when Khālīd was dismissed in favour of yet another member of al-Ḥajjāj's family, who was unwisely allowed by al-Walid II to torture Khālīd al-Qasri to death²⁹¹). It was against this background that the Yamāniyya planned their coup, which obviously was not meant to end their role as imperial troops, but rather to give them control of the Syrian metropolis in which the highest decisions, including those affecting the allocation of Iraq, were made. Whatever their intentions, there certainly is no doubt that the events of 744 amounted to a military coup. The generals who had so far governed the provinces now took over the capital as well, and though the Yamāniyya were to be ousted, first by Marwān II and next by the Hāshimiyya, the men who ousted them were generals too.

The Marwānid period generated its own spate of schematizing statements regarding tribal relationships. Thus Mu'āwiya, who only gave stipends to Yemenis according to one piece of wisdom, recommended governors of Muḍar according to another, allegedly instructing his governor of Iraq to honour the Yemenis in public but to stay aloof from them in private,

²⁸⁹) Above, p. 8.

²⁹⁰) Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. iv, p. 396. Marwān allegedly had 13,000 men, mostly footsoldiers, whereas Ḍaḥḥāk had 60,000 men, mostly mounted. Elsewhere we are told that Marwān had 7,000 men against Ḍaḥḥāk's 30,000 (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 175).

²⁹¹) Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 326ff., 358f.

no doubt because he had foreseen their murder of al-Walid or the 'Abbāsīd revolution²⁹²). An Iraqi of the Second Civil War supposedly opined that whether the Marwānids or the Zubayrids were going to win, their allegiances would be with Qays, a remarkable display of foresight given that the Marwānids were at odds with Qays at the time²⁹³). Qays were 'Uthmānis and affines of kings, al-Jāhīz informs us with blithe disregard for the fact that Qays were nothing of the kind before 'Abd al-Malik²⁹⁴); but this being the Qaysi image, Yazid III allegedly opined that the strength of Qays was achieved at the expense of Islam, which is very much what Shaban tells us too²⁹⁵). But Yazid III's thesis was problematic in that the Prophet, the Hāshimītes and the Rāshidūn were all of Qays/Muḍar, so others held that the Jāhiliyya belonged to Yemen, Islam to Muḍar and *fitna* to Rabi'a²⁹⁶). The Rabi'a were given to *fitna* because they were angry with God for sending prophet of Muḍar, and this is why they were Khārījites²⁹⁷). Or maybe it was the Yemenis who were given to *fitna*, for they killed 'Uthmān, renounced obedience to 'Abd al-Malik (under Ibn al-Ash'ath) and rebelled again under Yazid b. al-Muhallab²⁹⁸). But there was also a case for the view that the real troublemakers were Muḍar, for they killed the Prophet's family (i.e. al-Ḥusayn), supported the Umayyads and oppressed the Khurasanis, which is again a view close to Shaban's²⁹⁹). The organizers of the Hāshimīte *da'wa* in Khurasan supposedly told their missionaries to reside among Yemenis and conciliate Muḍar, or to honour the Yemen, be wary of Rabi'a and slay the Muḍarīs, one way or another reversing Mu'āwiya's advice³⁰⁰). And so one could go on. It should be obvious that tropes of this kind are not to be

²⁹²) Balādhuri, *Ansāb al-ashraf*, vol. i va, ed. M. J. Kister, Jerusalem 1971, p. 13.

²⁹³) Balādhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 318, line 13.

²⁹⁴) al-Jāhīz, *al-Risāla fī 'l-hakamayn*, ed. C. Pellat in *al-Mashriq* 52 (1958), pp. 427f.

²⁹⁵) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1837 = Hillenbrand, p. 197.

²⁹⁶) Thus Dagfal the genealogist in Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Iqd*, vol. iii, p. 329.

²⁹⁷) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 493, 1858 (= Hillenbrand, p. 225, misunderstood); ser. iii, p. 1142 (= C. E. Bosworth (tr.), *The History of al-Tabari*, vol. xxxii, Albany 1987, p. 234).

²⁹⁸) Thus a Tamimi to Khālīd al-Qasri in Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1468.

²⁹⁹) Thus a Sulami (i.e. Qaysi) *naqīb* of the Hāshimīyya, Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1986 = Williams, pp. 94f. Al-Manṣūr allegedly went further than that: Muḍar had no right at all to claim the Prophet as one of theirs, for they (= Quraysh) had rejected him, whereas the Yemen (= Anṣār) had accepted him, and did he not say "Azd and the Ash'aris and Kinda are of me, and I am of them"? (Azdi, *Mawṣil*, pp. 219ff.). Presumably it was statements of this kind that prompted Goldziher to trace the origins of the 'aṣabiyya between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen to rivalry between Quraysh and the Anṣār (cf. above, note 8).

³⁰⁰) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1501, 1937 (= Williams, p. 48).

taken literally. The faction undoubtedly played a role in the 'Abbāsīd or (more properly) Hāshimīte Revolution³⁰¹: the inner core of the *da'wa* was dominated by Yemenis; Abū Muslim briefly allied himself with al-Kirmānī's Yemeni faction; and numerous Yemenis in both Iraq and Syria defected to the Hāshimīte troops. But the Hāshimīte *dawla* was not a Yemeni revolution in the sense that most of its participants were Yemenis, still less in the sense that they were drawn from al-Kirmānī's faction. There is a real problem here, but neither formulaic wisdom nor the assumption that Qays/Muḍar and Yemen were political parties will help us solve it.

³⁰¹) Cf. most recently K. Y. Blankinship, 'The Tribal Factor in the 'Abbāsīd Revolution: the Betrayal of the Imam Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 108 (1988).