

to operationalize; and the difference between the two is for the most part blurred.

In mentioning the need for new and creative theory to deal with a complex topic of the type that is at the center of *Faith and Money*, there are first of all some revisions that could be made to the concept of wealth itself. Weber was especially interested in relating the concept of wealth to the concept of capital; and this would be one way to proceed. Financial assets, for example, may belong to the world of wealth as well as to the world of capital. Given that the United States is the world's leading capitalist power, one would also have liked to find something about the relationship between the dynamics of capitalism and the dynamics of religion in a book of this type.

This last type of comment, however, should not detract from the fact that Keister has produced a very solid and useful book about the relationship between wealth and religion. Anyone who is curious about the role of religion in American society is sure to benefit from reading *Faith and Money*.

African American Civil Rights: Early Activism and the Niagara Movement.
By Angela Jones. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011. Pp. x+281. \$44.95.

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Scholarship of the past two decades has taken a discernible "long turn." Like the "cultural turn" before it, proponents of the "long turn" envision it not only as an intellectual change, of course, but also as a new interpretive arc that opens up previously obscured analytic pathways. Political sociologist Giovanni Arrighi's important book *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (Verso, 1994), for example, employed transnational and transhistorical analysis to direct our attention to the breadth, depth, and cumulative effects of the boom-and-crisis cycles that accompanied the expansion of global capital. Walking a somewhat parallel path, the noted historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall suggests in her widely cited essay, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past" (*Journal of American History* 91 [2005]: 1233–63), that mid-20th-century black insurgency was a distinctive culmination of anti-racist struggles in the United States that spanned decades and generations. Pushing back against standard historiography that gives primacy to the "classical" period of civil rights activism between the years of 1955 and 1965, scholars leaning into the "long turn" draw back the curtain on the black freedom struggles that were both antecedent and subsequent to this decade.

Angela Jones's *African American Civil Rights* sheds light on the implications of this paradigm shift for sociology. In this first sociological ac-

count of the Niagara movement (1905–10), Jones demonstrates that this short-lived organization laid a key cornerstone in the civil rights movement edifice a half century before the pivotal Montgomery bus boycott. The organization drew its name from its inaugural meeting place; conveners assembled on the Canadian bank of Niagara Falls in July 1905 because Jim Crow laws prevented them from securing the necessary lodging and conference venue on the U.S. side. The Niagara group counted prominent figures, including sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois and journalist Ida B. Wells-Barnett, among the ranks of its membership and was a progenitor of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a leading civil rights organization founded in 1910.

The Niagara movement was dedicated to securing black Americans' freedoms: civil liberties, a right to the ballot box, unfettered access to economic mobility, and emancipation from racial terror. The movement found its greatest success with its vigorous challenges to racist incidents, such as the notorious Atlanta riot of 1906, using pamphlets and other publications that highlighted what the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal would later term "an American dilemma" (*An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* [Harper, 1944])—the gaping hypocrisy between the United States' egalitarian ideals and the lived experience of black men and women.

Three significant collective responses to racial inequality—legal tactics, nonviolent direct action, and black-power militancy—are well known and amply documented by social analysts. Jones offers the Niagara movement's efforts to galvanize the "black public" as a necessary prequel to these. But *African American Civil Rights* does not simply stretch our timeline for anti-racist social movement activity, it also advances a different understanding of the strategies employed across the *longue durée* of the black freedom struggle.

The invitation for the initial Niagara conference described its intention to combine politics "with healthful recreation and social intercourse" (p. 155). Jones takes the full range of the group's stated aims seriously. Borrowing from theories of the public sphere and of social networks, interactionism, and the sociology of emotions, she provocatively asserts that sociality and interchange were indeed central to the work of the Niagara movement. Building on this, she argues that discussion and debate were prime drivers of the early civil rights phase.

More specifically, Jones contends that it was discourse within and between two competing "black counterpublics"—an "accommodationist" camp associated with Booker T. Washington of the Tuskegee Institute and an "integrationist" camp in which the Niagara group figured centrally—that was most characteristic of African-American politics during this period. The often-scathing call-and-response between Washington and Du Bois and their respective factions—via books, newspapers, flyers, and correspondence, during a period in which African-American literacy rates grew precipitously—"forced new discourses surrounding a civil rights agenda to

emerge,” Jones writes (p. 2). The Niagara perspective eventually won the day in these debates. This prevailing civil rights discourse was stridently integrationist and surprisingly protofeminist and became “legitimized as a viable political solution to racial inequality” (p. 2). In other words, the emergence of the NAACP, which would become a spearheading force in midcentury civil rights activism, was not the result of an inevitable evolution from the Niagara group; rather it was the outcome of discursive struggle in the black public sphere.

Jones is right to point our attention to dialogue and debate as underappreciated facets of early civil rights activism. She does so compellingly with fine and creative use of primary documents (many of which are reproduced in the text or elaborated in an appendix). The scholarly models that she draws from in the interactionist tradition and the sociology of emotions, however, often rely on close textual analysis of both documents and dialogue and close observation of speech acts. The historical archives used by Jones make it much more difficult to access emotion and conversation in a fulsome way compared to ethnographers, who are able observe affect and who have access to spoken dialogue that can be parsed at a granular level. The challenges of using archives to excavate subaltern histories have been well documented (and, of course, innovatively responded to by many scholars, including Jones herself in this work). While the author’s claims about the import of discourse are credible and valuable, one is left wishing that it could have been more thickly substantiated. Nevertheless, given how important a role discourse would patently come to play in the civil rights activism of later years—think of a song like “We Shall Overcome,” or the fiery testimonies of Fannie Lou Hamer, or the heated debates between Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr.—Jones succeeds in turning social movement scholarship in a promising new direction.

Science vs. Religion: What Scientists Really Think. By Elaine Howard Ecklund. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xii+228. \$27.95.

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Being a nonbeliever is not always easy in northern Florida, the part of the world where I live. For several years, my wife and I hosted the neighborhood Christmas party until it got out that not only did we not go to church but we actually believed in evolution. That was the last time the party was held at our house. As it happens, I am a philosopher, not a scientist, but our detractors were right. I am pretty science friendly and *prima facie* no friend of religion. I write somewhat obsessively about Charles Darwin and his revolution in biology, and I have appeared for the ACLU in court defending the First Amendment separation of church and state, arguing that while one can and should teach evolution in state-