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Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?

Patricia Crone (Cambridge)

In this introduction to vol. xxiv of the Bibliotheca Persica Tabari translation David Powers expresses the view that “Although scholars disagree over whether the terms “Qays” and “Yaman” refer to tribal confederations, political parties, or interest groups, it is generally accepted that the Qays stood for the expansion of the empire and the exclusion of non-Arab clients, while the Yaman criticized the policy of expansion and advocated equal status for Arab Muslims and non-Arab converts to Islam”. One is slightly puzzled by this statement in that Qays and Yemen only stood for the policies in question if they were political parties, which cannot be disputed and generally accepted at the same time. But the thesis to which Powers refers, which is that of Shaban, certainly tends to win general acceptance among undergraduates; whether it has done so among their teachers is more difficult to say, but the fact that a scholar of Powers’ stature should espouse it shows that it has survived better than it deserves – for Shaban’s theory is so faulty that it should have been generally dismissed by now. Since it will not apparently be dismissed without a systematic demonstration of its errors, and since further it is tedious to explain its shortcomings year in and year out to undergraduates, the present article seeks to refute it once and for all.

In quotations from al-Tabari I sometimes follow, sometimes modify and sometimes depart freely from the translation to which reference is made.

1) I should like to thank Dr. G. R. Hawting for the comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1 Islam LXXI, Hett 1
The problem

The problem to which Shaban addresses himself is the relationship between two apparently tribal groups in the Umayyad period. The genealogists divide the Arabs into sons of Isma'il and sons of Qahtân, who are northerners and southerners respectively; and according to the historians, this division was of acute importance in the later Umayyad period, in which the two descent groups would behave as rivals and engage in 'asabiyya, 'partisan behaviour'.

The historical sources usually refer to the two descent groups by different names, however. The label Qahtân does occur, but the most common designation for the southerners is (ahl) al-Yaman or al-Yamāniyya, 'Yemenis'. The northerners, on the other hand, are never referred to as 'sons of Isma'il', possibly because this term tends to mean 'Arabs' tent court (the separate descent of the southerners notwithstanding) and possibly because the northerners do not start branching out until we reach a certain Adnān, so that they are adequately described as '(descendants of) Adnān'.

But since the only son of Adnān to have descendants relevant to the Umayyad period was Nizār, they were also subsumed as 'Nizār' (or 'Nizāriyya'). More commonly, however, they were known as 'Mudjar' (or 'Mudjarīyya'), Mudjar being one of Nizār's sons, or as 'Qays' (or 'Qaysiyyya'), Qays being a descendant of Mudjar. Even the more inclusive term Mudjar excluded some northerners, however, for Nizār was the father not only of Mudjar (and thus of Qays), but also of Rabī'ah, the tribes of eastern Arabia. But the Rabī'ah were a special case in that their allegiances went now to the northerners and now to the southerners, their Nizāriyya being an exception, so that when the sources speak of Qays or Mudjar (henceforth Qays/Mudjar) versus Yemen, they usually mean, and sometimes actually say, Qays/Mudjar and Rabī'ah versus Yemen, or Qays/Mudjar versus Yemen and Rabī'ah.

What then was the rivalry about? In 1861 Dozy presented it as a carry-over from pre-Islamic Arabia, not only in the sense that the Arabs were unlikely to have shed their propensity to clanishness and feuding immediately after their adoption of Islam, but also in the sense that there had been hostili-

8) Wellhausen, Königdom (first published Berlin 1902), pp. 180f, 209f. Goldziher had earlier proposed that the antagonism developed out of rivalry between Quraysh and the Ansār (Mudjar Studies, p. 99), but this hypothesis has rightly been ignored.
9) In 'A. I. al-Khärbūṭī, Tārikh al-`Irāq fi ʿill al-`Ishā'īn al-Umawīs, Cairo 1959, pp. 246ff, however, the antagonism starts in the days of the Rāshīdūn.
10) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 120.
thing new had intervened to keep the hostility going, and indeed to change its nature, for the intensity of the ‘asabiyya increased in direct proportion to the Arab loss of tribal ties. By the 740’s the Arab had lived in the complex society of the Middle East for three generations, adapted to life in provinces of very different types, taken up careers as traders, scholars, soldiers and even peasants, admitted a huge number of non-Arab converts to their increasingly differentiated social, economic and cultural ranks, and adopted a wide variety of conflicting values and beliefs in the process. Neither subtribes nor tribes could act as units any more, still less could the larger descent groups of which they formed part. An Iraqi scholar of Sa’d/Tamim/Mudar, for example, would not feel obliged to side with a Sa’di soldier in Iraq on the basis of common descent, still less with one in Khurasan, or with all Tamims, for the simple reason that there were no longer any common interests for the joint descent to articulate. Yet it is precisely in the 740’s that the ‘asabiyya between Qays/Mudar and Yemen culminates.

Shaban’s solution

Shaban, then, puts his finger on a genuine problem. He solves it by postulating that the originally tribal labels of Qays/Mudar and Yemen came to stand for political parties in the Marwānid period (684–750 A.D.). Those who pledged their allegiance to Qays were committing themselves to a programme of continued military expansion on the one hand and segregation of Arab and non-Arab Muslims on the other, the ultimate aim of both policies being the preservation of Arab privileges; by contrast, those who pledged their allegiances to the Yemen were committing themselves to the end of expansion and the assimilation of non-Arab converts, their ultimate aim being the creation of a Muslim community in which Arabs and non-Arabs enjoyed the same position11). The foremost, representative, indeed founder, of the Qaysi party was al-Hājib b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafi, who served as governor of Iraq for ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I; but the majority of Umayyad caliphs opted for Qaysi governors, the notable exceptions being Sulaymān and ‘Umar II, though there was also a Yemeni interlude under Hishām. Eventually, the conflict engendered civil war, for the Yemenis staged a coup against al-Walid II in 744 and raised Yazid III to the throne; and though they were defeated by Marwān II, the last exponent of Qaysism, they won again at the hands of the ‘Abbāsid, whose revolution brought about the complete assimilation of Arabs and non-Arabs in Islam.

It is easy to see why undergraduates respond warmly to this theory. The Qaysis stood for the imperialist and racist policies practised by our colonial ancestors while the Yemenis subscribed to the liberal views which we ourselves espouse and which, we happily note, won out among the Muslims too. But unfortunately the theory does not work.

Parties rather than descent groups?

Shaban postulates that membership of Qays/Mudar and Yemen was based on political conviction rather than descent: “Certainly these words are the names of actual tribal groupings, but in this context they were used to indicate Arab groups who had common interests which had nothing to do with tribal divisions12). If the common interests had nothing to do with tribal divisions, the tribal origins of those who pursued them should be random: we should find Kindis, Azdis, Khuzā’is, Kalbis and other Yemenis by descent supporting Qaysi policies and conversely ‘Uqaylīs, Kilābīs, Kinānis and other Qaysis/Mudaris by descent espousing Yemeni views. Shaban does assert that this is the case. But of the fifty men known to have been members of Yazid III’s Yamāniyya, no less than forty-five were Yemenis in terms of descent13); and of the thirty-eight men known to have supported Marwān II’s Qaysiyah, at least thirty-two, possibly thirty-four, were of Qays/Mudar and Rabī’14). In other words, practically all belonged to the party to which their visības assigned them; membership to the supposed political parties was overwhelmingly determined by descent. What is more, exceptions are hard to come by before the Civil War: in ‘asabiyya on behalf of, or between, Qays/Mudar and Yemen before 744, the protagonists seem always to have sided with the party to which they belonged by descent15).

11) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 120.
12) P. Crone, Slaves on Horses, the Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge 1980, p. 42 and note 307 thereto, and appendix IV, nos 1–46 (where 49 men are covered; add Bishr b. Ḥalib al-Kalbi, one of the killers of al-Walid II, Ibn ‘Asakir, Taʾrirīk Madinaṭ Dimashq, vol. x, ed. M. A. Dahmān, Damaskus n.d., p. 134). Four members of the Yamāniyya were of Qays/Mudar (nos. 2, 12, 22) and one is of uncertain background (no. 37).
13) Crone, Slaves, appendix IV, nos. 47–85. The four certain Yemenis are nos. 78–9, 83–4, the two possible ones are nos. 77, 82.
14) Shaban thinks it accidental that the fighting at Bariqan was between Mudar and Yemen (‘Abbāsid Revolution, pp. 103f). Would he also claim that the prisoner freed by Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen was regarded as regards the Yamāniyya merely happened to be of Khuzā’/Yemen (al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrirīk al-rasūl wa l-mudīth, ed. M. J. de Goeje and others, Leiden 1879–1901, ser. ii, p. 119 = M. Hinds (tr.), The History of al-Ṭabarī, vol. xxiii, Albany 1990, pp. 63f), that the Syrian...
(as they seem to have done after 750, too, though there was far less of it by then16.) Shaban implicitly concedes this point, for all the men he singles out as exponents of Qaysi and Yemeni policies happen to be Qaysis and Yemenis in terms of descent as well. The founding father of the Qaysi party was a Qaysi, that is al-Hajāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafi, and one assumes this to be why the policies came to be known as Qaysi in the first place. But there is no tensity thereafter for political views to be dissociated from the tribal groups which had engendered them, for the main representatives of Qaysi policies from al-Hajāj to the fall of the Umayyads were Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bahili/Qays, ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazari/Qays and Yūsuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays, while the foremost leaders of the Yemeni political party were Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-‘Azdi/Yemen, Khalid and Asad al-Quari/Yemen and Juday b. ‘Ali al-Kirmānī al-‘Azdi/Yemen. There can thus be no question of arguing that Qays/Mudar and Yemen were political parties rather than descent groups: they can only have been political parties based on descent groups. The exceptions notwithstanding15, the scarce sources leave no doubt that one was born into these parties; one did not choose to join them.

There is nothing implausible about the proposition that two large descent groups should have developed different political aspirations. It is sometimes said that the Yemenis were mainly settled people by origin whereas the Mudaris were mainly bedouin18), and Shaban’s theory seems to be an elaboration of this idea: coming as they did from a settled and fairly complex society, the Yemenis were less warlike and less given to ethnic chauvinism than their crude Mudari counterparts18). At the same time Shaban denies that the issues were related to tribal divisions because he finds the Islamicist interest in such divisions offensive: modern scholars, he says,

despatched by the Yamaniyya to Khurasan along with 500 soldiers in the days of the ‘asabiyya, mostly belonging to a different tribal group from al-Harshī b. Suraj al-Tamimi-Mudar, of whom he was determined to be the killer (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1580), or that pure accident caused the Khurasani feuds on the eve of the ‘Abbasid revolution to involve Tamimi and other Mudari tribesmen versus Azdīs and other Yemenis by descent?


15) For an attempt to explain them, see Crone, Slaves, pp. 47ff.

16) See for example Kharbūṭī, al-Irāq, p. 244. Though Shaban does not cite this work, several of his ideas could have their roots in it.


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sadly underrate Arabs’ ability to groups issues more relevant than those of tribal rivalries and jealousies20). The result is incoherent, but the denial is easily discounted. In short, it could well be that the tribes subsumed under the label of Mudar had developed different political views from those subsumed as Yemen.

Where is the debate?

But if Qays/Mudar and Yemen subscribed to different ideals, why did they never say so? It is not as if the Arabs of the Umayyad period were reluctant to air their views; on the contrary, their culture was highly argumentative. People were for ever debating the rights and wrongs of the participants in the First Civil War, the legitimacy or otherwise of the Umayyads, the nature of the caliphate, the limits of obedience, the status of the sinner, the nature of God, free will versus predestination and much more besides. But of debates about expansion and assimilation between Qays/Mudar and Yemen there is not a trace. The two groups do not in fact seem to have engaged in debates of any kind before their rivalry turned into civil war.

This point has been made before, but without illustrations of how the participants actually talked21, so it may help if some examples are given here.

(a) According to Shaban, the appointment of ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazari/Qays to Iraq in 102/720 marked the return of Qaysi policies after Sulayman and ‘Umar II’s Yemeni interlude22. Ibn Hubayra was indeed conscious of his membership of Qays. “Who is the most eminent man (sayyid) of Qays?”, he once asked his companions, who politely replied that he was; but he disagreed, giving the answer as al-Kawthar b. Zufar al-Khālī/Qays, the son of a famous chief from Qinnasrin, on the grounds that “he only has to sound the bugle at night and twenty thousand men will show up without asking why they have been summoned”. Of himself he merely said that he was always pursuing the best interests of Qays. A Fazari bedouin objected that “if you really had the best interests of Qays in mind, you would not have ordered their horseman par excellence (fariz) to be slain”, with reference to the fact that Ibn Hubayra had given orders for Sa’id al-Harashi/Qays, the recently dismissed governor of Khurasan, to be tortured to death; and Ibn Hubayra duly cancelled the order23. Other Qaysis too, disapproved of the treatment that Ibn Hubayra had meted out to Sa’id: “You have put the horseman of Qays in chains and disgraced him”, Ma’qil b. ‘Urwa al-

20) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 120.
21) Crone, Slaves, p. 42.
22) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 137.
Qushayri/Qays said. But Ibbi Hubayra told Ma'qil of an incident which so enraged the latter that he visited Sa'id in prison in order to pour abuse at him, and this too was felt to be wrong: "you have mistreated your fellow-tribesman and slandered him; therefore God has allowed him to prevail over you", a Kilabi/Qays told Ma'qil after Ibbi Hubayra had been dismissed and Sa'id had regained the upper hand. Qays is plainly a tribal group in all these exchanges; its most eminent man is a chief able to summon 20,000 warriors so loyal that they do not ask questions, and its members are fellow-tribesmen expected to display loyalty towards each other, though in practice they frequently do not. There is no suggestion, explicit or implicit, that the tribal group was associated with political views of its own.

(b) When Yusuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays, another exponent of political Qaysism in Shaban's view, was appointed to Iraq 120/738, he received a list of men eligible for the governorship of Khurasan, all of them Qaysis and Mudaris (one of them by wasta); so he wrote to Hishām "lavishing praise on the Qaysiyas" and mentioning Nasr b. Sayyār al-Laythi/al-Kināni/Mudar last. Hishām wrote back saying "I have understood your letter and your praise of the Qaysiyas; you mentioned Nasr b. Sayyār and the small size of his tribe, but how can it be small when I am his tribe? Rather, you have displayed Qaysi feelings to me (taqayyasa alayya), but I am going to display Khidif feelings to you (wa-ana mutakhadjil alayka), so despatch Nasr's appointment... Besides, Tamim [Mudar] are the bulk of the troops of Khurasan". Now one might have expected correspondence between the caliph and a Qaysi leader regarding the appointment of Nasr, supposedly a confirmed imperialist from the right-wing Mudar, to be a context in which the political overtones of the terms Qays and Mudar would be revealed. But once again Qays is simply a tribal group, this time contrasted with Mudar, or more precisely with Khidif, the ancestor of Tamim, Kināna and other Mudari tribes; and Nasr's suitability turns on his tribal status, not on his political persuasions: Yusuf tried to eliminate him with reference to the small number of Kinānis in Khurasan, not on the grounds that he was too right-wing or left-wing for the job, while Hishām insisted on appointing him with reference partly to the caliphal backing he would receive and partly to his acceptability to Tamim, who were also Mudaris and who constituted the majority of the Khurasani troops.

(c) In 100/718 Jarrāh b. 'Abdallah al-Hakami/Yemen was described to 'Umar II as a crude 'aqabi, and if we follow Shaban, he must have been an 'aqabi on behalf of his political party. Since he was a Yemeni by descent, yet associated with al-Hajjāj, the reader wonders which party he had sided with, but the speech reported in illustration of his 'aqabiyya merely has him tell the Khurasanis that "I came to you with solicitude [for all of you], but now I am partisan ('aqabi); by God, one man from my people (quwam) is dearer to me than hundred others". This is plainly a declaration of partiality for his Yemeni descent group. Shaban nonetheless has Jarrāh declare himself biased in favour of the Ardabīs, the statement being a declaration of support for the anti-essentialist policies of al-Hajjāj's party. When Asad al-Qasri/Yemen transferred the troops from Baraqan to Balkh, somebody warned him that they would engage in partisan behaviour (yaisq 'aqabīn) if they were settled in fifth (the tribal units in which the Khurasan army was divided), to which Asad reacted by settling them in a mixed pattern instead. Even Shaban would hardly construe this as a warning that the troops would engage in debates over the desirability of assimilation if they were settled in tribal units, a prospect so disagreeable to Asad that he settled them otherwise.

(d) In 109/727 Asad was himself accused of stirring up 'aqabiyya, for which he was dismissed and of which the following is given as an example: "Asad took partisan action against 'taqabta alay Nasr b. Sayyār [al-Kināni/Mudar] and some Mudaris who were with him and had them lashed. He [also] made an oration one Friday in which he said, 'may God blacken these faces, the faces of people of dissension, hypocrisy, disturbance and corruption. Oh God, separate me from them and take me to my place of hijra and fatherland. Few are those who covet what is in my hands or who speak up, [for] the Commander of the Faithful is my maternal uncle, Khālid b. 'Abdallah is my brother, and with me I have twelve thousand Yemeni swords". To Shaban, this means that Asad punished Nasr and other Arab

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23 Powers, pp. 186f. (p. 186f. Ibn 'a'mm must mean 'fellow-tribesman' here).
25 Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1682f. The manāla on the list was Yūnus b. 'Abf Rabbīh (cf. Crone, Slaves, p. 33).
26 Shaban, Islamic History, p. 143.
27 Wellhausen takes Hishām to have appointed Nasr because his tribes was small (Kings, pp. 474f.). But this seems to be contradicted by the reference to his kinship with Tamim.
leaders for their opposition to his projected alliance with the Heptalites, the impractically of this alliance being the real reason why he was dismissed[32].

(c) In 744 the Yemenis murdered al-Walid II, who was alleged to have vented his pro-Qaysi feelings in poetry such as this: “...We are those who rule men by force...We have trampled on the Ash’aris [Yemen] with the might of Qays... Behold Khalid [al-Qasri/Yemen] a prisoner in our midst! Would they not have defended him if they had been men?... As for Kinda and Sakkān [Yemen], they have never risen up again...”[33]. One Yemeni poet retorted that “We gave long battle-days to the tribes of Nizār on the morning of Marj [Rahit]... Whenever you confront Sakkān and Kalb [Yemen] with the ‘Abs (var. Qays), you may be sure that [the latter’s] sovereignty is at an end...”[34]. Another boasted that al-Walid had been killed by Kalb/Yemen and Madhībi/Yemen[35]; yet another rhetorically asked whether “a single soul from Mu’ād came to his defence?”[36] The poems are replete with tribal names; Yemeni martyrs such as Ibn al-Ash‘ath, the Muhallabids and Khalid al-Qasri are defended against charges of ignominy, the argument being that they were noble warriors and that “Khālid used to provide shrouds for the dead of Nizār”[37], not that these people had fallen in a good cause. One would hardly infer from all this that the Yemenis had joined the Yamānīyya “regardless of their nominal tribal affiliations” or that the Yamānīyya was a party advocating “practical measures to meet rapidly changing social conditions”[38].

That the participants should have been abusive is not surprising; participants in religious debates were not invariably polite. But the abuse never takes the form of ‘you are foolish/corrupt/rebellious in adhering to such and such views’, always ‘you are not my people and therefore weak and

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34) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1782 = Hillenbrand, p. 134, where mūta‘atalqa ‘l-Sakīn wa-talqa Kalb’ bi-‘Abs has been taken to mean “when[ever] you confront the Sakīn and the Kalb and the ‘Abs”.
35) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1822, ult. = Hillenbrand, p. 178, where asbāb Madhībi has been taken to mean ‘the forefathers of Madhībi’ rather than ‘the Madhībi competitors’ (trying to kill al-Walid before the Kalbis did). The forefathers were obviously not in a position to participate.
38) Shaban, Islamic History, pp. 124, 155.

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Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties? 11 ignoble’. It is of course for this reason that the sources identify the antagonism as ‘asabīyya: the protagonists defended their people, right or wrong, not their party with reference to its rectitude.

The parties in action

Though Qays/Mu‘ād and Yemen never identify their political convictions in words, they could still display them in action; but their supposed convictions are not reflected in their behaviour either, as the following examination of the Marwānīd period should suffice to show.


According to Shaban, ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I were supporters of Qays. Let us start, then, by reviewing the governors they appointed to their main provinces.

Egypt:
‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Marwān/Umayyad[39]
‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al Malik/Umayyad[40]
Quorra b. Sharik al-‘Absi/Qays[41].

North Africa:
Zuhayr b. Qays al-Balawi/Yemen
Hassān b. al-Nu‘mān al-Ghassānī/Yemen[42]
Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, mu‘aṣir of Lakhmi/Yemen and/or the Umayyads; also claimed as a genuine Lakhmi/Yemeni or Balawi/Yemeni or Bakri/Rabī[43].

Iraq:
Bishr b. Marwān/Umayyad
al-Haḍṭī b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī/Qays[44].

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[39]EI2, s.v.
[41]EI2, s.v.
[44]EI2, s.vv.
Khurasan:

Umayyā b. ‘Abdallāh/Umayyad (46)
al-Muhallab b. Abī Su‘rā al-Azāzi/Yemen (46)
Ya‘zīd b. al-Muhallab al-Azāzi/Yemen (46)
Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili/Qays (47).

There is no systematic preference for men of Qaysi/Mudar descent here. More strikingly, there is no such preference in the appointments made by al-Hajjāj, the Qaysi governor of the East for ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid: of the forty-eight men known to have received appointments from him, twenty-five were of Qaysi/Mudar, nineteen of Yemen and four of Pabīsa (48). One would infer from this that Qaysi/Mudar and Yemen had not yet come to be associated with rival political views.

This is corroborated when we turn to the policies pursued under ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid. Both caliphs certainly supported a programme of expansion; it was in their reigns that Qutayba b. Muslim began the conquest of Central Asia, that Musāb b. Nuṣayr occupied Spain and that Muhammad b. al-Qāsim embarked on the conquest of India (49). But Musāb b. Nuṣayr was a Yemeni (by wala‘), while al-Muhallab, ‘Abd al-Malik’s Yemeni governor of Khurasan, had spent his entire military career fighting wars of conquest before taking on the Azraqite campaigns for which he was rewarded with the governorship of Khurasan, so one must conclude that Yemen still had not come to be associated with a policy of non-expansion.

Nor does the evidence suggest that Qaysi/Mudar had come to stand for a policy of apartheid. The bureaucracy was headed by muwālāt, which was not particularly remarkable since it had always been dominated by non-Arabs (50).

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46) Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 421f.
47) E2, s.v. ‘al-Muhallab’, ‘Muhallabids’.
48) E2, s.v. ‘al-Mu‘awwād, ‘Muhallabid’.
49) E3, s.v. ‘al-Mu‘awwād, ‘Muhallabids’.
51) Musāb b. Nuṣayr was in charge of the kharejī of Baṣra in the time of ‘Abd al-Malik until he was found to have embezzled money and fled to ‘Abd al-Azīz in Egypt, whence he was appointed to North Africa (thus Ibn ‘Idhārī, Bayān, vol. i, pp. 39ff.; cf. also Ibn Qutayba (attr.), al-‘Imāma wa‘l-siyasa, Cairo 1969, vol. ii, pp. 59ff.); ‘Abdallāh b. Hurmōs, a muwālā of the Sufyānids, was in charge of the dinār al-jinnd in the time of al-Hajjāj; he was succeeded by his sons and his family was both rich and highly influential in Basra (al-Baladhuri, Ansāb al-asārīf, vol. ivb, ed. M. Schlossinger, Jerusalem 1938, p. 129); Ya‘zīd b. Abī Muslim, a muwālā of Tha‘īf, but the first appointment of a muwālā to a judgeship in Iraq was allegedly made by al-Hajjāj: the Iraqis were so outraged by the appointment that the muwālā did not take it up (51). As regards military positions, ‘Abd al-Malik (or his brother ‘Abd al-Azīz) appointed the client Musāb b. Nuṣayr to North Africa, and Musāb in his turn appointed his client Tāriq to Spain (52). This is perhaps not remarkable either given that the first muwālā of the governor of North Africa had been appointed in the time of Mu‘awiya (53). When ‘Abd al-Malik appointed a client to a military command against the Byzantines (54), he was once more following a precedent set in the time of Mu‘awiya (55). But he also appointed a client to the governorship of Qinnasrin (56), and yet another to Medina (57), while al-Hajjāj is said (probably wrongly) to have appointed a

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51) Thus al-Mubarrad, al-Kamil, ed. W. Wright, Leipzig 1864–92, p. 285, on Sa‘di b. Juhayr. This passage was first adduced by S. A. al-Ali, Al-Fa‘izīt al-sī‘a al-‘aṣārīf wa‘l-‘awwal al-‘awwal, Beirut 1969, p. 96n; at al-Hajjāj is said to have also appointed the muwālā at-Tābi‘ī to the judgeship of Kufa (followed by Crone in E2, s.v. ‘muwālā’. But though al-Hajjāj did make Ibn Juhayr assistant to the qādī (al-A’zam, al-Hajjāj, pp. 316, 401), one wonders whether he had really intended him for the qādī’s own seat, and he certainly did not appoint Ibn Darrāj. The context in which Ibn Darrāj is mentioned (Mubarrad, Kitāb al-ta‘dīb, pp. 288; Ibn ‘Abd Rabī‘, al-Tāriq al-‘aṣārīf, ed. A. Amin and others, Cairo 1940–9, vol. iii, p. 417) does suggest that he was a contemporary of al-Hajjāj; but the verse describes al-Hajjāj as dead, and Ibn Darrāj was in fact judge of Kufa under Harūn; he died in 182 (Waki‘, Ahkām al-qudūs, ed. S. A. al-Marāghī, Cairo 1947–50, vol. i, pp. 182ff.; Ibn Juhayr, Tadhkīr, Hyderabad 1325–27, vol. x, pp. 408f.).
52) Baladhuri, Futūh, pp. 230ff.
55) Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, Ta‘rikh, ed. S. Zakkār, Damascus 1907–8, p. 198, cf. 102, on ‘Ubaydallāh b. Rabī‘, whose father was a prisoner-of-war from ‘Ayyūn captured together with the father of Musāb b. Nuṣayr. Al-A‘zam is mistaken when he claims that the first mention of a muwālā commanding an army refers to the revolt of al-Mukhtar (Ta‘rikh, p. 97n).
client of his to the ʿshūrā in Iraq). It is also under ʿAbd al-Malik and al-Walid that clients begin routinely to appear in the army, not just as servants accompanying their masters in the field (a role in which one continues to find them), but also as regular soldiers, be it in Syria, Egypt, Iraq or Khurasan. We are told that there were 7,000 mawāli soldiers in Khurasan under Qutayba, where they outnumbered ʿAbd al-Qays (4,000) and were numerically on a par with Bakr b. Wāʾil (7,000), though they were outnumbered by Qays and other Ahl al-Aliya (9,000), by Tamim (10,000) and by the Azi (10,000).

Shaban presumably credits al-Hajjāj and his caliphal employers with a policy of discrimination because the former repatriated fugitive peasants. Peasants fled in a variety of directions, but many headed for the garrison cities where they claimed to be converts in the hope of escaping their taxes and receiving membership of the ādūn. Al-Hajjāj did not accept their conversion and sent them back to their villages, where they continued to be liable for the taxes they had tried to escape, a policy for which he doubtless had caliphal support and which the sources condemn as “putting poll-tax on Muslims.” This was certainly a distinctive policy, but it was not a policy towards mawāli. Clients were non-Arabs who had been accepted as members of Muslim society, usually with and occasionally without conversion, and who had proof of their membership in the form of their patrons. But the

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61) Crone, Slaves, p. 38 and the notes thereto.


64) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1122 = Hindi, p. 67; Baladhuri, Anṣab, vol. xi, pp. 336f. (al-Hajjāj’s fiscal agents wrote that the kharjāt was in arrears, the dhimmīs having converted and gone to the āmār; so he wrote to Basra and elsewhere ordering them to be returned to their villages); Muḥarrm, Kâmil, p. 286; Ibn ʿAbd Ṭabbâh, ʿIṣâṣ, vol. iii, p. 416, citing Jāḥîz (converts participated in Ibn ʿAbd al-Aswāṭ’s revolt, al-Hajjāj told them antum suʿīn wa-ʿam wa-qurayshum wa-ḥayran, etc.); Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūb Miṣr wa-ахkhâr al-ʿArâb, ed. C. C. Torrey, New Haven 1932, pp. 155f (the first to collect poll-tax from converts was al-Hajjāj in Iraq; ʿAbd al-Malik wanted the same to be done in Egypt, but his brother and governor there was allegedly dissuaded). Cf. also D. Dennett, Conversion and the Poll Tax in early Islam, Cambridge Mass. 1950, pp. 38, 82f.

65) Cf. EI², s. v. ‘mawāla’; P. Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, Cambridge 1987, pp. 35f., 90.

66) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1435 = Powers, p. 165; Jama′īyār, Wuzūrā’, p. 57, on Yazid b. Abi Muslim [cf. above, note 50], Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 231; and Ibn ʿIdhârî, Bayân, vol. i, p. 48, give a different reason for his assassination.

67) al-ʾAṣām, al-Hajjāj, p. 348, citing the Cairo manuscript of Baladhuri’s Anṣab.


69) EI², s. v. ‘mawāla’, vol. 879a.

70) Shaban, ‘Abbasid revolution, p. 73; id., Islamic History, p. 175.
Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties? 17

made them more tolerant of non-Arabs than their northern counterparts is not in fact persuasive. For one thing, the sons of Qāhtān included numerous tribesmen such as the Kalb who did not come from settled South Arabia at all, but rather acquired their southern genealogy in the course of the Umayyad period and who had been (and indeed continued to be) bedouin on a par with the Qays. For another thing, settled tribes are no less tribal than nomadic ones, and the modern tribesmen of South Arabia can hardly be said to be noted for their tolerance of non-tribesmen, who form (or until recently formed) un armed groups under tribal protection on such a scale that South Arabia is sometimes loosely described as a caste society. One is hardly surprised, then, to find that no Yemeni governor is described as having complained of, or tried to change, the separate organization of the mawālī in the army. (What the clients themselves felt about it is not recorded.)

In short, ‘Abd al-Malik, al-Walid and their governors did not systematically prefer governors of Qays/Mudar nor did they pursue a policy of discrimination against clients, however prejudiced they may have been against them. They did pursue a policy of expansion, and they did refuse to admit non-Arab peasants seeking membership of the Muslim community, but neither policy was peculiar to Qays/Mudar or unacceptable to Yemen at this stage.

(ii) Sulaymān and ‘Umar II (715–21)

This takes us to the two reigns which constituted a Yemeni interlude according to Shaban. Once again, we may start with the governors.

Egypt:

‘Umar II: Ayyub b. Shurabbī al-Aṣbaḥī/Yemen

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71) Jūda, al-ʿArab, pp. 188f. (on the Kufan sevenths); al-ʿAli, Tanẓīmāt, pp. 53ff. (the Basran fifths); Crane, Slaves, pp. 30f.
73) Cf. Ẓabari, ser. ii, pp. 1856, 1933. The mawālū units seem to have been subdivided on the basis of wazīlā in Egypt, we incidentally learn that the mawālī of Tujib/Kinda/Yemen had an ʿarf of their own (Kindi, Governors, p. 51, with reference to the Second Civil War; cf. Yaḥyā, Mu‘jam al-baladān, ed. F. Wüstefeld, Leipzig 1866–73, vol. i, p. 734, s.v. ‘Balhib’, for a similar account set in the First Civil War).
75) Cf. below, pp. 47, 53 and note 254, 282 thereto.
North Africa:
Sulaymān: Muhammad b. Yazid, mawlā of Quraysh or Ansār
‘Umar II: ‘Abdallāh b. Muhājir, mawlā of Ansār
Ismā‘īl b. ‘Ubaydallāh b. Abī ‘1-Muhājir, mawlā of Quraysh
Iraq:
Sulaymān: Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen
‘Umar II: (Basra) Abī b. Artāh al-Fazārī/Qays
(Kufa) Abī al-łamid b. Abī al-Raḥmān/Quraysh
Khurasan:
Sulaymān: Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen
‘Umar II: Jarrāh b. ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥakami/Yemen
(military) Abī al-Raḥmān b. Nu‘aym al-Ghāmīdī/Yemen
(fiscal) Abī al-Raḥmān b. ‘Abdallāh al-Qushayrī/Qays
(fiscal) Uqba b. Zūr‘a al-Ta‘ī/Yemen

Sulaymān dismissed most of his predecessor’s governors, appointing a client to North Africa, a Yemeni to Iraq and Khurasan, and confirming a Qaysi in office in Egypt. We do not know what he would have done if he had ruled for twenty years instead of two and a half, but as Eisener notes, one cannot credit him with a clear preference for Yemenis. Of the seventeen men known to have received appointment from Yazid b. al-Muhallab in Iraq and Khurasan, however, only one was a Qaysi, fourteen being Yemenis and one a Rabi‘ī. This does suggest incipient polarization between Qaysī/ Mudar and Yemen, if only at a provincial level, so can they be shown to stand for rival policies by now?

Yemen certainly had not come to stand for the end of expansion if the behaviour of Sulaymān (at a metropolitan level) is anything to go by, for apart from the fact that the conquest of Spain continued in his reign, he mounted the greatest assault ever made by the Arabs on Constantinople, expending vast sums on the enterprise and swearing not to leave his camp at Dābiq in northern Syria until it had been crowned with success. To Shaban, this was an anti-expansionist measure in disguise in that it was meant to “end the ceaseless and exhausting campaigns along the Byzantine front.” No doubt one could have said the same if Sulaymān had sworn to conquer dār al-harb in its entirety, the simplest way of eliminating frontier warfare being the elimination of frontiers altogether. Shaban does unhappily note that “in some respects” Sulaymān’s foreign policy “seemed to be an intensification of previous policies” or “almost an extension of Hajjāj’s policy,” but on what does be base the qualification? Sulaymān continued Hajjāj’s attempt to conquer western India too, the Syrian troops in Hind (like those in Anatolia) being told to feed themselves by cultivating the land until they had completed the job: “no Syria for you”, as he put it in his letter. And (at a provincial level) Yazid b. al-Muhallab likewise pursued an expansionist policy in Khurasan. According to Shaban, he merely aimed at consolidation already made (pursuing an anti-imperialist policy for which he brought some 60,000 Syrian troops to Khurasan): “He is reported to have objected to Qutayba’s policy of furthering the Arab conquests in central Asia while leaving behind him, in Gurgān and Tabaristān, hostile territory which might threaten his line of communication in Iraq”, Shaban says. This is correct, but it wholly fails to convey the spirit in which the objection was made: according to the passage cited, Sulaymān and Yazid were envisaged of Qutayba’s conquests and wanted to do better. “Don’t you see what God is accomplishing through Qutayba?”, Sulaymān would ask, to which Yazid would haughtily reply that “they are nothing, Jurjān is what counts”, adding the point made by Shaban. When Yazid became governor, “his sole ambition was to conquer Jurjān”. In Tabaristān he initially refused an offer of peace because he wanted to acquire it by conquest; in Jurjān he swore that “he would neither loosen his hold on them nor raise the sword from them until he had mixed their blood into wheat, made bread of the mixture and

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87 Wellhausen, Königdom, pp. 259ff., 269. Quraysh were usually regarded as a neutral group, cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 890, where this view is explicit; cf. also Azdī, Mawṣīl, p. 219, line 9.
90 Eisener, Sulaymān, p. 139.
91 Crone, Slaves, Appendix III, nos. 48–64.
eaten the bread\textsuperscript{92} ); and having conquered Jurlan and fulfilled his oath, he wrote to Sulayman boasting that he had accomplished something which the Sasanid emperors Shapur II, Khusraw I and Khusraw II had been unable to achieve and which had likewise proved too difficult for 'Umar, 'Uthman and subsequent caliphs of God\textsuperscript{93}. One would infer that Yazid was out to prove himself a greater conqueror than anyone else, not that he felt expansion to be undesirable.

There is of course no guarantee that Yazid b. al-Muhallab ever said anything of the kind, all we have being statements of what he must or ought or could have said in the eyes of later historians. (\textit{Mutatis mutandis} this is true of all the evidence discussed in this article.) But Shaban does not argue that the sources misrepresent Yazid, that the statements credited to him must be rejected, that there is evidence of an altogether different Yazid behind the façade, or the like; he does not engage in source critical analysis of any kind. What he does is rather to adduce sources saying A in support of the contention that they mean B, on the grounds that if you ignore their general import and supply an alternative message yourself, then some of the words they use would fit the alternative message too. It is for the reason that Hawting characterizes his theories as “only loosely related to the sources” and that Eisener repeatedly dismisses them as “pure speculation”\textsuperscript{94}. Shaban in fact treats the sources as traditional Muslims scholars treated their \textit{usul}, that is to say as so many pegs on which to hang theories of contemporary inspiration, not as sources properly speaking; his concern is with the message one can read into them rather than what one can deduce from them by immersing oneself in their bygone modes of thought. This is the fundamental reason why his work must be rejected.

But let us return to the survey. As regards \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}}, there is not much evidence that Sulayman had special policies towards them, and Shaban adduces none. “On balance he continue the same imperial policy as his immediate predecessors, only softening it by trying to bring in the non-Arabs into this structure”, he claims\textsuperscript{95}, now conceding that there was no change in foreign policy; but who are the non-Arabs in question? Sulayman appointed a \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}} to North Africa, but so did his predecessor; he was hostile to the \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}} appointed by his predecessor, i.e. Musa b. Nu\^{a}y\^{a}, but obviously not because the latter was a \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}} or (in Shaban’s view) an assimilationist\textsuperscript{96}; Musa’s ethnic origin were as irrelevant to his downfall as were his policies towards the Berbers\textsuperscript{97}. According to an Egyptian traditionist, Sulayman raised the stipends of \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}} from twenty to twenty five (dinars); but since the same source informs us that ‘Abd al-Malik had previously raised it from fifteen to twenty and that Hisham was later to raise it from twenty five to thirty, the measure obviously is not envisaged as a change of policy\textsuperscript{98}.

Sulayman’s views on runaway \textit{dhimmis} are also badly attested. One source claims that he put right what al-\textit{Ha\^{a}jaj\textsuperscript{i}} had destroyed and “redressed grievances, released prisoners and \textit{radda ‘1-l-manqiftin}, i.e. allowed exiles to come back\textsuperscript{99}”. This is hardly a reference to the return of exiled peasant converts\textsuperscript{100}. But another version of the same passage states that Sulayman released prisoners and \textit{radda ‘1-l-manqiftin}, i.e. allowed back the Bas\^{a}r converts that al-\textit{Ha\^{a}jaj\textsuperscript{i}} had repatriated in the aftermath of Ibn al-\textit{Ash‘ath\textsuperscript{i}}’s revolt after branding the names of their villages on their hands\textsuperscript{101}. This version adds that al-\textit{Ha\^{a}jaj\textsuperscript{i}} wished to oust the \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}} from their position of

\textsuperscript{94} From the very beginning of the conquest the Berbers… were granted equal status with the Arab tribesmen as long as they accepted Islam and joined the Arab armies” (Shaban, \textit{Islamic History}, p. 150), a statement in which M\^{u}\^{a}b’s policies must be included.

\textsuperscript{95} Like so many other governors, M\^{u}\^{a}b kept getting into trouble over money. In Iraq he had embezzled funds which he later repaid with the help of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Marwan (thus Ibn ‘Idh\^{a}ri, \textit{Bayan}, vol. i, pp. 391f.; cf. above, note 50). Having embarked on the conquest of Spain, he was recalled by al-Walid, but the latter had died by the time he arrived in Syria, and it was Sulayman who extorted large sums of money from him (LaFauce, \textit{Ajbar}, pp. 19, 29f.; compare Ibn Quiyabha, \textit{Insana\textsuperscript{i}}, vol. ii, pp. 81ff.). Sulayman also ordered his \textit{mawla\textsuperscript{i}} governor of North Africa to confiscate the wealth of M\^{u}\^{a}b’s family and the latter duly had them tortured and killed (thus Ibn ‘Idh\^{a}ri, \textit{Bayan}, vol. i, p. 47; cf. also Wellhausen, \textit{Kingsdom}, p. 261).

\textsuperscript{96} Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, \textit{‘Iqd}, vol. iv, p. 400. Al-Kharbatli, whose understanding of Sulayman is similar to Shaban’s, nonetheless adduces it as evidence that Sulayman reversed al-\textit{Ha\^{a}jaj\textsuperscript{i}}’s policy towards non-Arab Muslims (al-‘Iraq, p. 179). Eisener queries its reliability (\textit{Sulaim\^{a}n\textsuperscript{i}}, p. 82).

\textsuperscript{97} M. J. de Goeje (ed.), \textit{Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum} Leiden 1871, p. 17. This passage was drawn to my attention by Dr. G. R. Hawting.

\textsuperscript{98} Exile was a common form of punishment in the Umayyad period (cf. Kh. ‘Abh\^{a}ma\textsuperscript{i}, ‘Uq\^{a}bat al-na\^{a}f fi \textit{qad al-Islam wa’t-dawla al-imamiyya}, al-Kar\textit{ma\textsuperscript{i}} 5 (1984); and a caliph as early as ‘Uthman is said to have redressed grievances by allowing exiles to come back (cf. below, note 201).

\textsuperscript{99} Mubarrad, \textit{Kam\^{a}l}, p. 286. Mubarrad does not name an authority for his account, but the parallel (though shorter) version in Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, \textit{‘Iqd}, pp. 246f., is cited from al-‘Ia\^{a}z,Ki\^{a}l al-mawla\textsuperscript{a} wa li-arab, on which see C. Pellat, ‘Ga\^{a}bi\^{a}niana III. Essai d’inventaire de l’oeuvre Ga\^{a}bi\^{a}nienne’, \textit{Arabica} 3 (1956) no. 23.
preeminence in cultural activities, seeing that they had sided with Ibn al-Ash'ath, and so ordered them out of Basra whereas the Arabs were allowed to stay; and back in their villages the converts produced a new generation of children whose language and manners were coarsened to the point that when Sulaymān allowed them back, they seemed to be Nabaṭi migrants. All this is clearly embroidery. For one thing, there were only fifteen years between Ibn al-Ash’ath’s revolt and Sulaymān’s accession (700 and 715 A.D. respectively), which hardly suffices for the transformation of cultural leaders into Nabaṭi peasants. For another, al-Hajjāj only exiled runaway dhimmi, not mawālī in the global sense of non-Arab Muslims. The mawālī who were cultural leaders in Basra were sons of prisoners-of-war and fully-fledged members of Muslim society. There were men such as al-Hasan al-Ḥabr, a soldier who had participated in the conquest of eastern Iran, or Ibn Sirīn, the husband of an Arab woman, not to mention the mawālī in charge of al-Hajjāj’s Basran bureaucracy; and al-Hajjāj did not of course despatch such men to villages. Nor did he despatch a mawālī such as Muslim b. Yāsār, a faqīh of whom we actually know that he participated in Ibn al-Ash’ath’s revolt and who supposedly lived to regret his participation, not because al-Hajjāj retaliated by turning him into a Nabaṭi, but because his prestige among his Basran peers was diminished by it. It could of course still be true that Sulaymān allowed the peasant converts of Basra to come back, but it seems more likely that the whole story was engendered by the mention (in the original version) of exiles being allowed back. Abū Mikhnaf did not remember Sulaymān and Yazīd b. al-Muhallab as fiscal reformers; the appointment of the mawālī Shālīḥ b. ‘Aṣd al-Ḍahbānī to the tax office in Liwā is not a sign of reformist attitudes to clients (the post had previously been held by Yazīd b. Abū Muslim, a client of al-Hajjāj); and peasant converts were still being refused entry when ‘Umar II took over, at least in Egypt and Khurasan.

As Sulaymān had dismissed the governors of al-Walīd, so ‘Umar II dismissed those of Sulaymān, once again without displaying a clear preference for Yemenis. He called a halt to the campaign against Constantinople, which is not significant since it had ended in disaster, allowed the Syrians in Hind to return, which may or may not be significant (given that we do not know whether he replaced them with others), and ordered the second governor of Khurasan to evacuate the Muslims in Sogdiana, which does suggest an unusual policy in that only one apparently minor defeat is on record here. He is also said to have considered the evacuation of Spain. Shaban accordingly has a point when he credits him with anti-imperialist views. But the Khurasanis refused to comply with the evacuation order; ‘Umar II is said to have been pleased by their refusal; and other Khurasanis thought that one could curry favour with him by conducting campaigns, all of which makes sense in view of the fact that a pious caliph must have approved of jiḥād. Contrary to what Wellhausen conjectures, it is unlikely that his reluctance to fight wars of conquest reflects doubts as to whether jiḥād was being fought for the sake of God or booty. For on the one hand, he continued the warfare against the Khazars, though the Qaysi Jazirans, on whom the brunt of the burden fell, are unlikely to have been morally superior to their counterparts in Sogdia or Spain; and on the other hand, his readiness to call a halt to expansion is explicitly said, in the context of Spain, to have arisen from concern for the safety of the Muslims, not from doubts over the purity of their motives. But his readiness to protect the Muslims in Sogdia and Spain by going so far as to evacuate them was certainly unusual, as was his order to the Sogdians, when they refused to move, that no further campaigns should be undertaken. The sources indisputably present ‘Umar II’s policy in respect of expansion as unique. But in what respects was the policy Yemeni? The sources do not of course characterize it as such; it runs counter to the policies of the previous Yemeni governor of Khurasan; and the Yemeni al-Jarrāb appointed by ‘Umar II himself was “one of al-Hajjāj’s swords” and a great general who eventually fell in battle against the Khazars in the Caucasus.

102) fa-tawākala ‘l-qawm hawāka fa-khubhikat laghāt aswādāhū wa-fasadat ūhabū’t uhūm....fa-raja’i’ll fi sāri al-ahādat.
106) For Shālīḥ, see the preceding note; for Yazīd b. Abū Muslim, see above, note 60.
107) For other Qaysi governors of his, see Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 269.
‘Umar’s unusual policy was neither Yemeni nor Qaysi, but rather peculiar to ‘Umar himself.

Whether he had peculiar policies in respect of mawa’il is more difficult to say. He is reputed to have taken a dim view of internmarriage with them, but he employed them in their normal roles, including that of governor of North Africa; and he is credited with ruling that Arab and non-Arab Muslims were to receive the same stipends insofar as the latter were freeborn, that of freedmen continuing to be lower. He certainly reversed al-Hajjāj’s policy in respect of runaway dhimmis, as a clear from his fiscal edict, and several stories showing the policy in action: their conversion was accepted, indeed encouraged, and those desirous of military service were enrolled in the dhīn. Once again, however, one may ask what was Yemeni about this policy? It is not attested for previous Yemeni governors, and was not, according to one story, in accordance with the wishes of the Yemeni Jarrah; and when ‘Umar dismissed him, he chose a Qaysi for the fiscal administration.

Sulaymān, then, did not pursue the policies that Shaban identifies as Yemeni whereas ‘Umar did pursue these policies without there being anything Yemeni about them. The idea that there was continuity between the reigns of Sulaymān and ‘Umar II does have advocates in the sources: one informant even claims that Sulaymān never took any decisions without consulting ‘Umar first, which obviously cannot be right given the latter’s disapproval of Sulaymān’s governors. The alleged continuity seems to be a mere rationalization of Sulaymān’s unexpected choice of ‘Umar as his successor, and this is certainly what it is in Shaban. Shaban effectively concedes that Sulaymān was a Yemeni only in the sense that he dismissed two Qaysis by descent and replaced them with an Azdī; the policies were unchanged or, as Shaban puts it, Sulaymān is an “ambiguous figure”. But, he says, Sulaymān’s choice of ‘Umar II as his heir “strongly tempts us to view him as a very cautious Yemeni supporter.” Why so? ‘Umar II’s first act was to jail Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azīz, “an acknowledged leader of the Yemeni”, but this, we are told, was really a Yemeni act in disguise because his own Yemeni policies were so radical that even Yazid might not go along with them: Yazid’s arrest was “a precautionary measure”. ‘Umar II also replaced Yazid with a Yemeni belonging to the school of al-Hajjāj, but this too was really a declaration of anti-Hajjājite policies in disguise, for in order to implement his Yemeni vision he was prepared to appoint men of that school when they possessed the right qualities. Shaban’s reasoning, then, is that (a) Sulaymān’s traditional policies must have been unusual because he is qualified ‘Umar II as his successor; (b) ‘Umar II’s unusual policies must have been Yemeni because Sulaymān had relied on an Azdī; (c) therefore both must have pursued a Yemeni policy that had nothing to do with tribal groups; (d) all contradictory evidence can be explained away with a bit of imaginative effort.

Shaban’s imaginative efforts are visible on every page on his books, but his treatment of Yazid b. al-Muhallab is as good an illustration as any of his method. Yazid’s father, al-Muhallab, was a participant in the early conquests who supported Ibn al-Zubayr in the Second Civil War, assumed command of the campaigns against the Azarqā, switched to the Umayyads when the Zubayrids were defeated, suppressed the Azārqi on behalf of ‘Abd al-Malik and was rewarded with the governorship of Khurasan, where he died and was succeeded by Yazid. Yazid thus rose in the service of al-Hajjāj, who was married to one of his sisters. The amicable relations between them came to an end when al-Hajjāj dismissed Yazid from Khurasan and relatives of his from other offices in the East for reasons unknown: the sources conjecture that Yazid had made himself unpopular in Khurasan, even among his own Azdī, or that he has behaved in an ‘ṣulṭān fashion by only sending the Mudārī captives from Ibn al-Ash‘ath’s revolt to al-Hajjāj, setting free the Yemenis, or that he had embezzled money or that al-Hajjāj was acting on a premonition. According to Shaban, Yazid was dis-
missed because he was "a well-known leader of the Yaman" in the political sense of that word, for all that Yazid had never said or done anything to suggest that he had anti-expansionist or pro-assimilationist views. Dismissal in the Marwânîd period customarily meant imprisonment, demands for the return of wealth embezzled and torture to facilitate repayment; this was the treatment that al-Hajjâj meted out to Yazid, divorcing his Muhallabid wife in the process. Yazid, however, managed to escape from jail and flee to Palestine, which had a substantial Azdî population and which was governed by Sulaymân, the heir-apparent. Through his Azdî connections he could get to Sulaymân and through Sulaymân he could get to the caliph. This is how things worked out: Sulaymân persuaded al-Walid to grant Yazid amân from al-Hajjâj. He was safe as long as Sulaymân could protect him.

Now al-Walid I wanted to designate his own son as successor at the expense of Sulaymân and received support for this enterprise from his governors al-Hajjâj and Qutayba. Sulaymân and Yazid thus acquired common enemies: if Sulaymân succeeded, al-Hajjâj and Qutayba were bound to be dismissed and Yazid was bound to replace them. Since al-Walid I died prematurely, Sulaymân did succeed. Al-Hajjâj had died in the meantime and Qutayba was killed when he tried to rebel, but al-Hajjâj’s relations were rounded up and subjected to torture by Sâlih b. ‘Abd al-Rahmân, the mawla who was appointed to the fiscal administration and whose treatment of al-Hajjâj’s family comes across to Shaban as “a close study of the financial policy of al-Hajjâj.” His vengeance accomplished, Yazid went off to display his supposedly anti-imperialist persuasion by conquering Jurfân.

As far as the sources are concerned, then, the Muhallabids and al-Hajjâj’s family fell out over the governorship of Khurasan and ended up on different sides in the network of kinship, friends and other allies which formed around two rival claimants to the throne. The leading men of the two networks were playing for control of the lucrative provinces held at the time by al-Hajjâj and Qutayba, and indeed for their lives: had Sulaymân not acceded, al-Hajjâj’s network would have stayed in power and the Muhallabids would have been back on the rack; conversely, Sulaymân’s accession meant that the network in power was ousted and its members subjected to torture, in some cases to death. Shaban is right that the rivalry cannot be described as a “tribal squabble”, but it has not in fact been described as such for over a hundred years. Wellhausen explicitly rejects Dozy’s contention that al-Walid was allied with the Qaysi tribes and Sulaymân with the Yemenis, a theory that Shaban has now revived with the modification that Qays and Yemen were political parties; and Wellhausen further points out that Sulaymân’s policies were no different from al-Walid’s, thereby anticipating Shaban’s modification as well. To Shaban, the only alternative to a tribal squabble is a conflict over policies, but there are other possibilities, and the most appropriate word for the phenomenon would be factionalism. The fact that Marwânîd politics were dominated by such factions in no way means that the Arabs were less able to grasp political issues than anyone else in the past, or for that matter in the present.

The Muhallabids were favourites of Sulaymân, but not of ‘Umâr II, who is said to have disapproved of Yazid’s appointment and to have disliked his entire family. This too is probably mere rationalization of later events, but at least the events in question are clear: Yazid was once more dismissed, jailed and asked to pay up, and though he was apparently spared the torture this time round, he was paraded on a donkey and threatened with exile to Dahliak. When ‘Umâr died, he escaped from jail, not because he disapproved of Yazid II’s Qaysi policies, as Shaban would have it, but because the new caliph was a kinsman of al-Hajjâj’s and therefore bound to exact vengeance for the torture that the Muhallabid had inflicted on the latter’s family. Yazid b. al-Muhallab went to Baṣra and raised a revolt, but did he call for the end of expansion and equal treatment of mawla? Of course not. He demanded kâtab Allah wa-sawmat al-nabi from the Umayyads, spelling it out as a demand for Islamic participation in decision making, the departure of the Syrian troops from Iraq and a promise that

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122) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 128. Yazid is also depicted as an assimilationist in al-Kharbûjî, al-‘Iraq, pp. 178ff.
123) Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 449ff.; Crone, Slaves, p. 44.
130) Cf. Eisener, Sulaimân, pp. 21ff., on stories in which Sulaymân is used as a foil for ‘Umâr II’s piety.
131) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1351 = Powers, pp. 80ff. Eisener suggests that Yazid was jailed as a kind of hostage because the Muhallabids had grown in power and ‘Umâr II could not take their loyalty for granted (Sulaimân, p. 114).
133) Eisener proposes conjectures of his own (Sulaimân, p. 114 and note 410 thereto).
134) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1391ff., 1398 = Powers, pp. 123, 131, with the spelling out at p. 1400 = 132, where Yazid asks his followers, “Do you really believe that the Umayyads will act in accordance with the Book and the sunna...? They don’t tell you ‘we accept your conditions’ with the intention of only exercising their authority
al-Hajjaj’s policy would not be reimposed on the Iraqis. In other words, he adopted an Iraqi cause that he had displayed no interest in so far, having been keen enough on the Umayyads when they gave him appointments and keen enough on Syrian troops as well, having been accused of favouritism towards them when he was governor of Khurasan for Sulayman. His revolt was opportunistic, but more importantly, the cause he took up was provincial autonomy, not frontier policies or racial issues, though Shaban of course finds it easy enough to blur the distinction. Shaban is right that the revolt cannot be interpreted as “a more tribal struggle between Yaman and Qays”, but he is once more bashing on open doors, for the sources do not present it as such and the only modern author to see it as a struggle between Qays-Mu‘add and Yemen is Shaban himself. The Muhallabids did come to be regarded as Yemeni martyrs after their defeat, but it was as Azdīs, not as sponsors of ‘Yemeni policies’, that later Yemenis wished to avenge them.

(iii) Yazid II, Hishām, al-Walid II (721–44).

Little is left of Shaban’s theory by now, but for the sake of completeness we may continue the survey down to the Third Civil War.

Egypt

Yazid II: Bishr b. Šafwān al-Kalbī/Yemen
Hanzala b. Šafwān al-Kalbī/Yemen
Hishām: Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Malik/Umayyad
al-Hurr b. Yūsuf/Umayyad
Hafs b. al-Walid al-Hadrami/Yemen
‘Abd al-Malik b. Rifa‘a al-Fahmi/Qays
al-Walid b. Rifa‘a al-Fahmi/Qays

in accordance with your orders and instructions; rather, they [say it] with the intention of appeasing you until they can engage in treachery. (Powers’ translation is not satisfactory here.)

Shaban ‘Abbāsid Revolution, p. 94; id., Islamic History, p. 136.
Shaban, Islamic History, p. 136.

Wellhausen can perhaps be accused of schematizing the tribal alignments (Kingsdom, p. 314). But unlike Shaban, he does not present the revolt as being about, or triggered by, the conflict between Qays/Mu‘add and Yemen.


North Africa

Yazid II: Yazid b. Abī Muhammad, muṣāla of al-Hajjaj/Qays
Bishr b. Šafwān al-Kalbī/Yemen
Hishām: Bishr b. Šafwān al-Kalbī/Yemen
Ubaydah b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulami/Qays
Ubaydallāh b. al-Habīb, muṣāla of B. Sulaim/Qays
Kalāthmī b. Ḥyād al-Qushayri/Qays
Hanzala b. Šafwān al-Kalbī/Yemen

al-Walid II: none

Iraq

Yazid II: ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays
Hishām: Khalid al-Qasrī/Yemen

\[150\] Kindi, Governors, pp. 69–82.
[154] Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 231; id., Ansāb al-ašrīf, vol. v, ed. S. D. F. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936, p. 142 (he engaged in ‘asabīyya against Kalb); Ibn ‘Idhāri, Bayān, vol. i, pp. 50ff.; Yaqūt, Buldān, vol. i, p. 326, s.v. ‘Irīqiyya’ (he was a nephew of Abū ‘l-Awar al-Sulami, i.e. a Syrian); Abū ‘l-Faraq al-Iṣbahānī, Kūh al-ṣagāhīnī, Cairo 1927–74, vol. ix, p. 318 (he had previously been governor of Urudn).
[159] El, s.v.
Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties? on the advice of a client of B. Shaybān/Rabi‘a\(^{166}\), appointed a client of the Umayyads to Shābāh\(^{165}\), a client of his own to (apparently) Nishapur\(^{168}\), a client of Layth/Muḍār to his ḥarās\(^{169}\), and bestowed favours on a runaway peasant convert he had picked up in the infantry\(^{170}\); two clients of his fought for him against al-Hārith b. Surayj, one of them a secretary of his who was accompanied by his own shakīriyya, or armed retinue\(^{171}\); another client of his fought for him against Abū Muslim\(^{172}\); Sa‘d al-Saghīr, a famous horseman and masūla of Bāhila/Qays, likewise supported Nasr\(^{173}\), as did a client of Layth/Muḍār in charge of the coinage in Iraq who brought him vital information about events in that province\(^{174}\).

There was however a change of policy towards runaway peasants in Khurasan, for Asbras al-Sulami/Qays encouraged the dhimmis of Sogdia to convert with promises that their conversion would be accepted; and though he went back on his word when he saw the fiscal implications, the tax system was eventually reformed along ‘Umar II’s lines by Nasr b. Sayyār\(^{175}\). Given that both governors were members of Qaysi/Muḍār, while the Yemeni Azad al-Qasri is explicitly said to have penalized converts in Bukhārā (at the request of the local ruler) and to have ‘sealed the necks’ of converts in Marw\(^{176}\), the intensification of the conflict between Qaysi/Muḍār and Yemen in Khurasan could hardly reflect disagreement over the admission of converts, unless we are to take it that the parties had switched stances.

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166] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1661; Jaššiyāri, Wizarat, pp. 66ff. (adds that the masūla later became Nasr’s secretary and was killed by Abū Muslim).
169] Cf. below, note 196.
173] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1920 = Williams, p. 32, where he returns to Marw with farsān, along with other Muḍāris supporters of Nasr; cf. ii, p. 1599 (masūla of Bāhila, farsān).
176] For the governors of Iraq, see Crone, Slaves, appendix III, nos. 65–122. For illustrative examples relating to Khurasan, see Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1529, 1604.
196] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1458 = Powers, p. 188.
Non-militant Khurasanis?

In general, it must be said that Shaban’s anti-imperialism is an implausible ideal in a society so unashamedly militant as that of the early Muslims. Expansion was divinely enjoined *jihād*\(^{177}\), death in battle against infidels was martydom rewarded by Paradise\(^{178}\), and the attributes of warriors were greatly admired whether people had their minds on Paradise or not. Men were praised as “youths who grew up amidst the fires of war and accomplished noble deeds before their beards began to grow”\(^{179}\); boasting took the form of “the Qaḥṭān were smiting the head of every full-armed warrior”\(^{180}\); and when someone gave the poet al-Parazdaq a blunt sword so that he failed to cut off the head of a Byzantine prisoner despite repeated attempts, everyone laughed, except presumably the prisoner\(^{181}\). It was not a culture in which one would expect to encounter a pacifist ideal, and if such an ideal had in fact been conceived, it would have required a great deal of thought for its justification; but of such thought there is no trace.

The pacifist vision is particularly implausible in a Khurasan setting, for one would hardly expect non-militannya to flourish in a frontier province under constant threat of invasion; and in fact, Shaban’s presentation rests on high-handed treatment of the sources. When Qutayba presented himself in the best of lights to his troops in order to persuade them to rebel with him, he reminded them of how little interest his predecessors had taken in campaigns, obviously expecting them to find his own very different behaviour as laudable as his regular payment of stipends, of which he reminded them too. Shaban nonetheless claims that it was for his ceaseless campaigning that he was killed\(^{182}\). When Yazid II appointed the Umayyad Sa’id b. ‘Abd al-Aziz to Khurasan, the troops found him to be “a soft and easy man who lived in comfort and luxury” and nicknamed him Khudhayna, loosely translatable as ‘housewife’\(^{183}\); they taunted him as “the effeminate one of Quraysh” and satirized him in poetry as a woman equipped with mirror, comb, kohl containers, incense burners and musical instruments, as opposed to “a full coat of mail composed of double rings and a sharp sword fashioned to cut”; they also complained directly of his inactivity, telling him that “the fact that you are no longer carrying out military expeditions has allowed the Turks to take the offensive and caused the Sogdians to renounce Islam”\(^{184}\). In Shaban’s summary all this comes out as “Sa’id Khudhayna does not seem to have deviated much from the policy of ‘Umar II...his campaigning policy...was certainly not expansionist”\(^{185}\). The supposedly pacifist Khurasanis also accused their next governor, Sa’id al-Harashi/Qays, of cowardice, this time because he rejected a *mawlla*’s advice to attack the Sogdians at Khujand\(^{186}\); and when his successor, Muslim b. Sa’id al-Kilabī/Qays sent a delegation of Khurasanis to Iraq in connection with a dispute over money, the Khurasani spokesman Mishazm b. Jābir (presumably a *mawlla*) told the governor ‘Umar b. Hubayrā al-Fazārī/Qays that “We live on a frontier where we fight against an enemy that is constantly at war. We wear iron so often that rust sticks to our skin; indeed, the smell of iron causes a female servant to turn her face away from her master and from other men that she serves. You, on the other hand, stay at home, adorning yourselves in fine clothes dyed with saffron”, meaning that Ibn Hubayrā lived too soft a life to appreciate the needs of warriors, not that the warriors resented his Qaysi policy of expansion\(^{187}\). Twelve years later, according to Shaban, Hishām nonetheless decided to “yield to the forces of assimilation” and to drop about half of the war-weary Khurasanis from the *dawān*, supposedly telling his governor Junayd al-Murri/Qays to “enlist [only] 15,000 men because enlistmen is purposeless to you”, a strange statement. What he actually said was *fa-‘arfā fidāli gāhiyata taka fi ‘l-fardī li-khamasa‘a ‘ashâra asfan*, which obviously means “recruit; there is no limit for you in the recruitmen of 15,000 [men]”, or in other words “you may recruit 15,000 men or more”. Shaban has taken *gāhiya* to mean ‘purpose’ rather than

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\(^{177}\) Cf. al-Parazdaq on events in Khurasan in 96: “Men for Islam who, as soon as they fought for religion, caused it to spread in every place” (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1303 = Powers, p. 25).

\(^{178}\) For Khurasani commanders reminding their troops of this, see Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1422, 1424 = Powers, pp. 153, 155.

\(^{179}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1386 = Powers, p. 128 (al-Parazdaq).

\(^{180}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1303 = Powers, p. 27. Al-Tabari’s chronicle abounds in poetry of this kind.

\(^{181}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1338 = Powers, pp. 63f.

\(^{182}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1287 = Powers, p. 9; cf. 1288 = 12 (“God has conquered the lands for you and made your roads secure”); Shaban, *Islamic History*, p. 128.


\(^{185}\) Shaban, *‘Abbasid Revolution*, p. 99.

\(^{186}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1443 = Powers, pp. 173f. The *mawlla* was al-Fadl b. Basam, on whom see below, note 196.

Hayyān was an advocate of constant campaigning who realized that “the continuation of ‘Umar II’s policy...was going to lead eventually to the destruction of his own class”\(^{190}\). Hayyān was in fact a prisoner-of-war from Daylam (though some did hold him to be from Khurasan\(^{191}\), a devout Muslim in so far as one can tell\(^{192}\), and the father of a religious scholar\(^{193}\) who converted infidels at Kabul after fleeing there from Abū Muslim\(^{194}\). The mawla who advised Sa‘īd al-Ḥarashi to attack should presumably also be construed as a representative of the ḍiḥqān of Marw in Shaban’s opinion, though his father was in fact a prisoner-of-war from Sistān\(^{195}\), while he and his various relatives and clients were highly respected members of the Khurasani army in the period from Qutayba to Naṣr b. Syyār\(^{196}\), whom they eventually deserted to fight on Abū Muslim’s side in the revolution\(^{197}\). If anybody was in league with ḍiḥqān it was Asad al-Qaeri, Shaban’s Yemeni hero of whom we are explicitly told that the dahāqīn of Khurasan escorted

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\(^{192}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1291 (where his pious articulates selfish interests), 1430 (where it does not) = Powers, pp. 15, 100.


\(^{194}\) Ibn Hajār, Tahdīḥ, vol. x, p. 278; compare Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1998 = Williams, p. 105, where he leads the resistance against the Mawālī. He had also been an opponent of al-Kirmānī (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1930 = Williams, p. 41).


\(^{196}\) Ibn Bassām al-Laythi was in Qutayba’s service (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1222 = Hinds, p. 168); al-Fadl b. Bassām, possibly the same man and possibly a brother, at all events the man whose advice was ignored by al-Ḥarashi (above, note 180), was among the mawālī known for their insight into Khurasani warfare (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1544); the family had mawālī of their own, at least one of whom also rose to prominence (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1444 = Powers, p. 174). Ubaydallāh b. Bassām was a friend of Naṣr b. Syyār, of whose harasa he was in charge and on whose side he fought against al-Ḥarīth b. Surayj (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1723ff., 1859, 1923 = Hillenbrand, pp. 63, 208, 229; Williams, p. 34); Ibrāhīm b. Bassām commanded 10,000 men under Junayd al-Murri (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1532) and fought with Naṣr against al-Ḥarīth as late as 128/745ff. (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1927 = Williams, p. 38).

him to Iraq on his dismissal for ‘asabiyya in 109 A.H. 198; but naturally Shaban knows better: the daḥaqaq mentioned here were not daḥaqaq, but rather Heptalite princes with whom Asad had sought an alliance in order to promote his pacifist vision and for the failure of which he had been dismissed 199.

The only evidence Shaban adduces in support of Khurasani and other war-wearyness is complaints of ta’jamir, keeping the troops too long in the field, and takhalluf, failure to appear when called up. No soldiers liked being kept away from their homes for too long, whatever too long might be: presumably keeping the troops in the field beyond the summer months was ta’jamir; whoever ordered the troops to cultivate was certainly guilty of it, this being the order issued by al-Ḥajjaj to his Peacock Army in Sīstān and by Sulaymān to his troops in India and Anatolia 200. At all events, ta’jamir was certainly an issue in the Umayyad period; even the rebels against ʿUthmān are alleged to have complained of it 201; indeed, ʿUmar I foresaw the problem and warned against it 202. The complaint does not seem to be encountered in a Khurasani context, but this could well be accidental. It should however be obvious that those who made it, wherever and whenever they may have been, did not thereby protest against expansion, only against the

but defected on Abū Muslim’s ḥukūr (al-Baladhurī, Anṣāb al-ṣadrāj, vol. iii, ed. ‘A.-‘A. al-Dārī, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 171), joined ʿAbd al-Rabb, his army and participated in the conquest of Syria (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1959, 1966f.; ser. iii, pp. 18, 21, 48 = Williams, pp. 70, 104, 140, 143, 147; de Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 106; Abūdār al-dawla, pp. 321f., 351; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 591 [here Ibrāhīm b. Bāṣṣam, a common inversion]; his brothers ʿAbdallāh, ʿĀṣam, Hisham and al-Haytham fought along with him (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 17, 18, 28, 48 = Williams, pp. 139, 140, 151, 172; Yaʾqūb, Taʾrīkh, vol. ii, p. 418); he himself was one of furā’ān ahī Khurāsān, but he rebelled and was killed in 134 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 70ff.; Baladhurī, Anṣāb, vol. iii, p. 171).


199 For Sulaymān, see above, note 88; for al-Ḥajjaj, see Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1053, cf. 1054 = Hinds, p. 4, cf. pp. 5f., where this is explicitly characterized as ta’jamir.

200 Cf. ‘Uthmān’s letter to the Egyptians in Baladhurī, Anṣāb, vol. v, p. 64: he promises to act in accordance with Kitāb and adhama, to recall exiles, to make jayy abundant, not to deprive anyone of stipends and not to keep anyone in the field for too long, etc. (all of which could be taken to suggest that ʿUthmān had followed the sīra of al-Ḥajjaj). ʿAzīz b. Abī Hung similarly promised not to deprive anyone of stipends and not to keep troops in the field for too long (Baladhurī, Anṣāb, vol. iv, p. 173; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 75; so too did Yaʿqūb III (below, note 220).


202) See for example Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 902f. = Rowson, p. 54, where a thousand men are called up from each of the quarters in Kufa; cf. also ibid., p. 856 = Rowson, p. 4, where al-Muhallab is allowed to pick the best Kufans for his troops.

203 Under ʿAzīz b. Abī Hung, the Kufans were called up every year or every second year, depending on where they were registered for service (Juda, al-ʿArab, p. 221, citing a somewhat enigmatic passage in Baladhurī, Anṣāb, vol. iv, p. 173); but one does not get the impression that the Iraqis (let alone the Medinees) were called up with such regularity under the Marwānids.

204) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 303, cited by Juda, al-ʿArab, p. 229 (on Salm b. ʿAzīz’s appointment to Khurasan in 61).


206 Differentely the caliph Hishām, who was allegedly so fussy about restricting stipends to combatants that he would hand his own stipends plus an extra dinar to the client who acted as his substitute on campaigns (thus Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1752 = Hillenbrand, p. 74).

207 Kanutu-fir-man uktasība ṣumma mabawutu ismi, as a Medineese informs us with reference to the campaign against Abū Ḥamza al-Khāriji in 129 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1973 = Williams, p. 92, where the translation “then his name was erased” fails to convey the message; Azdī, Mawṣūl, p. 103). Juda takes this passage to mean that frontier service was voluntary when there was no emergency, (al-ʿArab, p. 229). But leaving aside the facts that Medine was not a frontier and that Abū Ḥamza’s revolt was indeed an emergency, service was voluntary only in the sense that one did not have to be a member of the diwan. Since this man was called up, he must have been registered and thus obliged to serve when mobilized.
of the time of Mu‘awiya or the Second Civil War onwards in Syria, Iraq, Medina and Khurasan. Even the pre-Islamic Meccans are supposed to have engaged in the practice of sending substitutes. The Muslim habit

209 Bonner, ‘Ja‘ā’il’, pp. 47f., citing T. Nöldeke (ed.), Delectus Carminum Arabicorum, Wiesbaden 1933, p. 77, and other sources for a poem by a Syrian shaqiq, Sulayk al-Asadi called up for a campaign in Khurasan in the 50’s. Elsewhere, however, the story is set in the reign of Abd-al-Malik (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1029, on Shaqiq b. Sallik al-Asadi). In the Second Civil War al-Hajjaj repeatedly burned the houses of Syrians who failed to turn up for a campaign against Mus’ab (Ibn ‘Abd Rabbib, ‘Iṣb, vol. iv, p. 410). In 69 the Syrians takhallus ‘an al-ghazwa, so ‘Abd al-Malik deducted a fifth of their property from their stipends in 70 (Khafiya, Ta‘rikh, pp. 336, 337). Hishāb did not pay stipends to the Marioyids unless they actually fought, so some fought, some performed non-military services in the diwān and some sent substitutes (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1572 = hist. ann., p. 74).


211 An army raised by al-Asdq, apparently in Medina, in the reign of Yazid I for an expedition against Ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca consisted mostly of būdālī abī al-‘atā‘ and sympathizers of Ibn al-Zubayr (Baladhuri, Asāb, vol. iv, p. 24, line 14; wrongly placed in the reign of ‘Uthmān in Bonner, ‘Ja‘ā’il’, p. 47); or the army had been raised in Syria and consisted largely of clients of the Umayyads and people who were not members of the diwān (Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 25, line 16; cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 224). When 2900 Medinese were mobilized in 88, they ụjah al-nūn and set 1500, while 500 stayed behind (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1192 = Hindi, p. 141). In 106 Hishāb raised troops during his pilgrimage for a summer campaign against the Byzantines in 107, fa-qubimun... ala‘ ụjah al- )); Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1487f.). Cf. also above, note 208.


214 Shaban, ‘Abhāsid Revolution, p. 103

215 Baladhuri, Asāb, MS, vol. ii, pp. 88f. (wa-qad kāna insamku naqafat min al-dīwān ụla-kuthrib khaybatīh wa-takhallufīh ụla‘ al-lī‘irād ‘alā‘ l-l‘urrūt; ‘Amad’s understanding of this episode does not tally with the text available to me, cf. al-Hajjaj, p. 413, with reference to the Cairo manuscript of Baladhuri’s Asāb). The story of Shaban’s attempt to (re)gain membership of the diwān is also told in Ibn A‘tham, Fa‘āl, vol. vii, pp. 84f., but in a somewhat embellished fashion and without reference to his previous membership. However, compare Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 853 = Rowson, p. 44, where Shaban is said to have met Salams b. Sayyār tā‘ah kāna fa‘ ụlah dīwān wa-a‘l-maghāzī.

216 Ibn Hamdūn, Tadhkirat, vol. i, p. 437. An old man asked to be excused with references to his infirmity, claiming to have been granted exemption by Bishr and to have returned his stipends to the treasury; but al-Hajjaj had him executed even so (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 873 = Rowson, p. 23 and the references in note 103 thereto; add Ibn Abī ‘l-Hadd, Sharh nāḥij al-balāgha, ed. M. A. F. Ibrahim, Cairo 1965–67, vol. iv, pp. 183f.).

217 Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1473.
Muhallab, acting on behalf of his father during the Azra'ite campaigns, threatened to remove the names of defaulers from the divān, he obviously meant it as a dire punishment; so too did Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh, briefly governor of Iraq, when he threatened deserters from the Azra'ite campaigns with not only loss of their stipends, but also confiscation of their property and exile; and when a deserter from al-Muhallab's army came back to find that the serib had removed his name from the divān, he reacted like Shabāb by trying to have himself reinstated (successfully in his case), not by praising himself lucky to have been dropped. All non-Khārijites were agreed on the desirability of suppressing the ʿAzāriqa, yet it is above all in connection with the Azra'ite campaigns that desertion and defauling are attested: to stay away was to shirk one's duty, not to act on a conviction. Shabāb presents the Khurasan defaulers as hapless victims of an imperialist organization that would not allow their names to be removed from the army lists, until Ḥishām 'yielded to the forces of assimilation', but one did not have to be a member of the divān if one did not want to. Many Arabs were not; and those who wished to drop out, be it for political or other reasons, were perfectly free to do so. It should however be obvious that membership of the divān was a privilege which people would go to great lengths to acquire, recover or preserve whether they intended to perform the services for which the payment was meant or not. And as might be expected, defaulting was combated by Yemeni governors no less than by Muḍar one: Yazīd b. al-Muhallab's reaction to Iraqi takhāltuṭ was as draconian as that of al-Ḥajjāj; and it was Asūd al-Qasī/Yemen who wanted the soldiers of Khurasan to swear that their wives would be divorced if they were to respond to their mobilisation orders by placing substitutes or failing to turn up.

**The Third Civil War**

The only suggestion that Qays/Muḍar and Yemen might be associated with different political visions comes in the Third Civil War, more precisely in the enthronization speech of Yazīd III, the candidate of the ʿYamanīyya. Yazīd III promised not to engage in building programmes or the digging of canals, not to accumulate wealth on behalf of his wives and children, not to transfer money from one province to another unless there was a surplus, and then only to provinces in need, not to keep troops in the fields for too long, not to deprive his subjects of his attention, not to overtax their jizya-payers to the point where they would flee from the land, but on the contrary to pay stipends regularly whether the recipients be far away or at one’s reach, and to step down if he failed to abide by his promise or a better candidate was found. To Shabāb, this was an anti-expansionist and pro-assimilationist programme. But Yazīd said nothing whatever about the end of expansion, only about the end of taqāmīr. Nor did he say anything about relations between Arabs and rawaḥi: his promise to pay stipends regularly to subjects far and wide obviously was not a promise to pay them to Arabs and non-Arabs alike. And his abolition of the pay rise granted by al-Walīd II to the Syrian obviously did not signal an intention to end the Syrian privilege/duty to provide imperial troops. Who was he going to use in that role? Shabāb’s idea that the provinces could be left to police themselves is strangely naive and all the odder in that he surely must have noticed that his ‘Yemeni’ ‘Abbasids merely replaced the Syrians with Khurasanis.

It is nonetheless a fact that there is a political programme in Yazīd’s speech, as there is in his letter to the Iraqis promising government in according with kitāb and sunna and referring to his own election by

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221) The troops were well aware of this. When the Khurasanī troops heard that their governor had been dismissed, they gleefully inferred that inyān 'alā mā takhalluṭ al-ʿām maṣyīya, with the result that 4,000 men stayed behind (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1478). See also the sensible account in Jūda, al-ʿArab, p. 214.
223) This is taken for granted in traditions recommending non-membership of the divān: al-Zubayr supposedly erased his name when ʿUmar was killed, for example; Ibn al-Zubayr supposedly did the same when ʿUthmān was killed (ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. Hammām al-Ṣanʿānī, al-Musannaf, ed. H.-R. al-ʿAzārī, Beirut 1970–2, vol. xi, nos. 29043f.; cf. also no. 29042, where Māmīn b. Mihrān declines Muhammad b. Mawrān’s offer to inscribe him). One could obviously describe these people as conscientious objects (though not to imperialist policies), but they objected by refusing to take money, not by taking it and refusing to serve.

224) Haring announced that he would erase the names of defaulters from the divān, he proceeded to give orders for their heads to be cut off (cf. the reference given above, note 218). Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kālābī/Qays similarly ordered Naṣr to kill defaulers (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1477f.).
225) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1482.
227) Shabāb, Islamic History, pp. 155f.
The programme is directed against imperialism in the sense of absolutism, not that of expansionism or racialism: the stress is on fairness, consultation and deference to the wishes of the community. But the programme is more likely to reflect Yazid III’s Qadarite convictions than his Yemeni associations, and this is the one and only occasion on which a convergence between Qadarism and Yemenism is attested. The Yamaniyya needed a programme for the obvious reason that one could not start killing caliphs without offering a reasoned account of what one was doing and why; and Yazid’s ideas must have made sense to them, and indeed to many others as well. But the Yamaniyya did not refer to these ideas in the poetry with which they celebrated their victory, nor did they use them as programmatic statements or slogans in their subsequent battles with Marwan’s Qaysiyya, and one certainly cannot use them as the key to the antagonism between Qays/Mudar and Yemen from beginning to end.

Starting again: the premises

All in all, then, Shaban’s thesis is implausible and based on a remarkably tendentious reading of the sources. What then can be said about the phenomenon in positive terms? We may start with three basic observations.

First, the antagonism between Qays/Mudar and Yemen was a military phenomenon. We hear of it in connection with governors, generals, soldiers and their diverse appointees, not in connection with traders, craftsmen or peasants. The rivalry divided ahl al-Shām, ahl al-Khurāsān and so on in the sense of the Syrian and Khurasani troops, not the populations of Syria or Khurasan in general. Now as mentioned already, it was difficult for tribal groups such as Sa’d or Huddah, let alone larger units such as Tamim or Azd, to take collective action because they were widely dispersed over the Islamic lands and highly differentiated even within a single province; the tribal organization of the conquerors had been subject to a process of erosion from the moment they settled in the conquered lands. But it was not impossible for such groups within the same army to behave as units, or for such groups within different armies to act together when they came in contact with each other, as they did wherever the Syrians had to cooperate


\[230\] Powers brings this out well by consistently translating ahl as ‘troops’ in military contexts.

The Sufyanid background

As regards the Sufyanid period, there seems to be general agreement on two points: first, politics were genuinely tribal; and secondly, the tribal alignments were different from those we encounter in the Marwanid period.

That Sufyanid politics were tribal obviously does not mean that they were about nothing (as Shaban’s expression “tribal squabble” might be taken to suggest). A tribe is simply a group of a particular kind, and politics are tribal when people pursue their interests through groups of this kind rather than others, such as factions, political parties, churches, classes, nations or whatever. In Sufyanid Syria the interest of the tribes lay in gaining access to, and influence with, the caliph, the ultimate decision-maker, and the story of their competition for this access is well known235. Mu‘āwiya was allied with the Syrian tribe known as Kahl, which in its turn was allied with many other Syrian tribes; and all the allies, who were collectively known as the Qudā‘a, achieved a highly privileged position. The chief of the Kahl, who was also the chief of the Qudā‘a, had extracted a promise from Mu‘āwiya (endorsed by Yazid I) that in return for his cooperation he and other Qudā‘a is should be consulted in all decisions made by the caliph, that they should have the right to propose and veto measures, and that 2000 members of the confederacy should receive stipends of 2000 dinars a year (i.e. šaraf al-ʿajāʿ).236. Members of this chiefly house were appointed to high office in Syria under Mu‘awiya and Yazid, the son of the Kalbi woman that Mu‘awiya married by way of sealing the alliance231. The non-Qudā‘a tribes of Syria were thus left with the choice between trying to gain membership of Qudā‘a and trying to oust them, and the period was marked by intense suspicion of possible genealogical alignments among tribes such as Judhám235, ‘Amila230 and

235 See for example Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, pp. 83ff.


238 The Syrian tribe of Judhám was held by some to be sons of Qanas b. Ma‘add, by others to be sons of Asada b. Khuzyama (brother of Asad, a descendent of Nizar b. Ma‘add), and by most to be of Qudhān (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Al-Jahān ‘alā qabā‘ il-l-rwāh, Cairo 1350, pp. 164ff.). In the Sufyanid period, Rawb b. Zinbā‘ al-Judhámī supported the affiliation of his tribe to Asad (Asada!) (al-Baladhuri, Ansāb al-ashraf, vol. i, ed. M. Hamadhīlīb, 1959, pp. 36ff.), or he supported its affiliation to Ma‘add, telling Yazid that they were a Syrian rather than a Yemeni tribe and ought to be joined to their Ma‘addī brothers, i.e. Qudā‘a (thus Aghānī, vol. ix, p. 314; note

(apparently) Kinda237). Himṣ was the centre of genuine South Arabian tribes (i.e. tribes which indisputably lived in South Arabia before the conquest, as opposed to tribes which merely claimed to have done so after adopting Yemeni descent), notably Himyar and Hamdān; and these tribes identified themselves as Yemenis in opposition to the Qudā‘a. According to Caskel, the collective name of Qaṭṭān was first adopted by them, though this is somewhat conjectural238. At all events, northern Syria and the Jazira were meanwhile filling up with immigrants from North Arabia who went together under the name of Qays and who became so numerous that Qinnasrin was detached from Himṣ to become a jund of its own239, the Jazira being detached from Qinnasrin soon thereafter240; and these tribesmen were also keen to oust the Qudā‘a from their privileged position: “we will never pay allegiance to the son of a Kalbi woman”, as they said when Mu‘awiya arranged for the succession of Yazid I241. When Yazid died prematurely in 683, the Qays supported the candidature of Ibn al-Zubayr, or more precisely Ibn al-Zubayr’s Syrian representative al-Jahhāb b. Qays al-Fihri. Genuine SouthArabians such as the Himyarites in Himṣ also opted for Ibn al-Zubayr, as did more recent members of the Yemeni bloc such as the Ansār in Himṣ and the Judhám in Palestine242 along with “the majority that two Asads are enumerated along with Ma‘add and Nizar in the Namara inscription, cf. I. Shahid, Byzantines and the Arabs in the Fourth Century, Washington 1984, pp. 83ff.). His rival, Nāṭī b. Qays al-Judhāmī, backed the ultimately dominant affiliation to Qaṭṭān (Crone, Slaves, p. 34; Caskel, Gānhara, vol. pp. 53ff., where Caskel ignores his own view that the Qudā‘a were Ma‘addīs at the time; cf. also H. Lammens, ‘Le Caliphat de Yazid (suite)’, Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l’Université de Saint-Joseph 5 (1912), pp. 826ff.).

239 The ‘Amila and Lakhm counted as brothers of Judhám and thus acquired the same Qaṭṭānī genealogy (cf. Caskel, Gānhara, vol. ii, pp. 55ff.; but the ‘Amila are said by some to have been descendants of Qudā‘a (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Inbāb, p. 103).”

240 For Kinda’s Ma‘addī genealogy, see Crone, Slaves, note 243.

241 Caskel, Gānhara, vol. i, p. 34.

242 According to Sayf b. ‘Umar, the jund of Qinnasrin was established by Mu‘awiya in response to the influx of refugees from ‘Alī’s Iraq (Tabari, ser. i, p. 2673); according to Baladhur, Futuh, p. 132, it was established by Yazid I; and according to the Andalusian Akhrār majnū‘a, it was established some time after al-Mukhār’s revolt (Lafuent, Ajhar, p. 56). It is the second claim that I assume to be correct.

243 El‘ī, s.v. ‘Djazīra’.


of the Yemenis in Damascus\(^{243}\); and the Kinda very nearly did\(^{241}\). But the Qudā'ā naturally wanted the Umayyad dynasty to continue and eventually settled for Marwān, on condition that he granted them the same privileges that they had enjoyed under the Sufyānids\(^{246}\); and when the two parties met in battle at Marj Rāḥiṭ in 684, the Quḍā’ā and their Kinda allies defeated the Qays and Qaḥṭān despite the latter’s numerical superiority.

Once more, then, the throne was occupied by an Umayyad caliph allied with the Quḍā’ā. But the restoration was accompanied by a major genealogical reshuffle, for shortly after the battle of Marj Rāḥiṭ, the Quḍā’ā joined the Qaḥṭānī confederacy, thereby generating the Yemeni group that we encounter in Marwānīd times.

The Quḍā’ā counted as sons of Ma‘ādh in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times\(^{248}\). Ma‘ādh was a northern tribe which is mentioned in the Nemara inscription and Greek sources\(^{277}\); and the Kalb, the leading tribe of the Quḍā’ā, had lived in the Syrian desert for so long before the Arab conquests that it seems pointless to speculate where they may originally have come from. When genealogists were called in to divide the Kufan population into sevenths in 17 AH, they assigned the Quḍā’ā to the same seventh as the Ḥadramawt and other South Arabian tribes, suggesting that the Quḍā’ī group was remembered to have South Arabian links\(^{248}\). The Kufan genealogists did not however assign the Quḍā’ā to the same seventh as the Ḥimyar, the tribe with which the Syrian Quḍā’ī were is eventually to merge.

\(^{241}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 574. Note also that ‘Abdallāh b. Yazid al-Bajali, the father of Khalīl al-Quārī, is here said to have fought on Ibn al-Zubayr’s side at Marj Rāḥiṭ (ibid., p. 794), though he figures on Marwān’s side in Ibn Habīb, Kītāb al-muḥaddabbar, ed. I. Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942, p. 262.

\(^{242}\) Husayn b. Numayr b. Sākini, who was in charge of the expedition against Ibn al-Zubayr at the time of Yazid’s death, offered Ibn al-Zubayr his allegiance when he heard that Yazid had died, on condition that he come to Syria; but Ibn al-Zubayr refused to leave (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 430ff.; Wellhausen, König, pp. 166ff.). Thereafter the Sākini favored Yazid’s son Khalīl (Baladhuri, Anṣāb, vol. v, p. 134). For the privileges they demanded in return for supporting Marwān, see ibid., pp. 149ff.; Mas‘ūdi, Marāqī, vol. v, pp. 200ff. (ed. Pellat, §1934).

\(^{243}\) Mas‘ūdī, above, note 233.


\(^{245}\) Shāhīd, Byzantium and the Arabs, p. 43.

\(^{246}\) Tabari, ser. i, p. 2495, where the seventh in question consists of Quḍā’ā, Ghassān b. Sibām who were part of the Quḍā’ā in those days, Bajila, Khath‘ān, Kinda, Ḥadramawd and Aṣz (Ṣarāṭ).
by a Kalbi woman, is said to have encouraged it in the hope of withdrawing tribal support from the Marwanids\textsuperscript{266).} Thereafter, we are told, the alliance was clinched by Maslama b. ‘Abd-al-Malik’s partisan behaviour in favour of Qays during the siege of Constantinople, and supported by Khālid al-Qasri, who lavished a great deal of money on his attempt to ‘spoil’ the genealogies of the Qudā‘a and Bajila (his own tribe)\textsuperscript{287).} His efforts were reprehensible in the eyes of those who regarded the Qudā‘a’s reputation of their ancestor Ma‘ add as unlawful\textsuperscript{288),} and the issue generated such passion that the Prophet was invoked in support of both sides\textsuperscript{289),} while at the same time ingenious harmonizations between the Ma‘ addi and Himyar genealogies were proposed\textsuperscript{290).} But though the descent of the Qudā‘a continue to be disputed by scholars, the political alliance was a fact. It resulted in a neat genealogical division between Syria proper and Syro-Jazira: Syria was overwhelmingly Yemeni in the four southern jund of Fīlaṣṭīn, Urdunn, Dimashq and Ḥims\textsuperscript{291),} overwhelmingly Qaysi in Qinnasrin and the Jazira\textsuperscript{292).}

The sources on Sufyānid history abound in schematized accounts of tribal relationships in which the Qudā‘a are anachronistically subsumed under the label of Yemen. For example, we are told that the Yāmāniyya supported the Umayyads in the Second Civil War, whereas the Qaysiyya supported the Zubayrids\textsuperscript{293),} or that Ḥassan b. Ǧaḥdāl al-Kalbi was the chief of Qaṭṭān\textsuperscript{294),} or that originally Ma‘ āwīya only gave stipends to the Yemen, but later he recruited 4,000 Qays and used the Yemenis for campaigns by sea, the Qaysi for campaigns by land (which is incorrect even if


\textsuperscript{4} Islam LXXI, Heft 1
But why _should_ they have wished to identify themselves in such terms? Obviously, once the Marwânids, were in power they had to conciliate the disgruntled Qays of Syro-Jazira. The latter remained in a state of opposition for several years after Marj Râthî, conducting feuds with the Kalb and eventually also with Taghlibh, a Jaziran tribe on whose territories they had encroached, and doing their best to obstruct the Marwânid attempt to reconquer the rest of the Islamic world from the Zubayrids.273) ʿAbd al-Malik allegedly refused to hear poetry composed by Mudasir with reference to their Zubayrid sympathies;273) but he nonetheless spent a great deal of time trying to win them over and eventually established marriage alliances with them: his two heir-apparents al-Walid and Sulaymân were both sons of an ʿAbdi woman from a chiefly house in Qimsarin.273) So despite the privileges that the Qudâʾâ had wrung from Marwân, they never regained their former predominance, and they are said to have resented this fact.274) But the feuds died down, and something else must have intervened to shape the subsequent evolution.

The operative factor is presumably to be sought in military developments. In the course of the Marwânid period the old citizen militia began to give way to professional armies,275) with the result that governors increasingly had to be chosen from among generals capable of running the army, whatever their tribal background might be. Previously, practically all top governors had been chosen from among kinsmen of the caliph, that is to say from among men distinguished by their loyalty towards their own caliphal family on the one hand and by their neutrality in the tribal rivalries on the other. This was also how ʿAbd al-Malik began; but as has been seen, it was not how he continued.276)

A general appointed to Iraq and/or Khurasan controlled a huge number of military and administrative sub-governorships for which he had to find trustworthy men. On whom then was he going to rely? There was no short-

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276) Cf. Crone, *Slaves*, pp. 32, 39. ʿAbd al-Malik’s initial reliance on kinsman was in fact even more systematic than that of the Sulaymânis (as Wellhausen rightly observes, *Kingdom*, pp. 221ff.).
into an 'asabiyya on behalf of his Yemeni people in Khurasan, clearly because his troops were too partisan for neutrality to be possible; 
other governors responded by trying to manipulate tribal genealogies so as to strengthen their own factional support; and the troops who ganged up under the names of Qays/Mudar and Yemen found the behavior rewarding, for all provincial appointments went to their own faction when the governor was one of theirs. Given that there was only one top-governor in each province, there was only room for two competing groups, one in and one out, so the polarization would presumably have taken place even without the Yazid-Sulaymān episode. But this episode undoubtedly had a triggering effect.

That the antagonism had a bearing on appointments is explicit in the sources. "Never did I see such 'asabiyya", a Syrian Yemeni exclaimed when he heard of Nasr b. Sayyār's uniformly Mudari appointments, only to be reassured that previous 'asabiyya had been just as bad (presumably a reference to the Yemeni appointments under Asad al-Qasri). When Yūsuf b. Ḥunayn al-Thaqafi/Qays, one of the governor of Iraq, tried to withdraw Qaysi support from Nasr b. Sayyār in Khurasan, he "promised that if Maghārā b. Ḥunayn al-Thaqafi/Qays would impugn Nasr's reputation in front of the people, he would make him governor of Sind". Maghārā's acceptance of the offer was treacherous, for Nasr had favoured him, among other things by appointing Maghārā's nephew to Juljān and putting him in charge of the fifth known as the Aḥl al-ʿāliya (to which the Qaysi belonged). When the Yemenis murdered al-Walid II in Syria and appointed their own governor to Khurasan, Nasr b. Sayyār reacted by trying to unite the factions around him: "the Azd in Khurasan caused turmoil by spreading false rumours that Manṣūr b.

277 See the reference given above, note 28.
278 The sons of Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bahili/Qays had tried to present Bāhila as part of Taghlib/Rabi'a's, which was resisted by the Bakr/Rabi'a's who feared that Taghlib might become too numerous thereby (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1473 ff., where the Taghlib invoke this genealogy to make a descendent of Qutayba cooperate with them; the Ma' or Azd/Yemen had also claimed the Bāhila as theirs). Khalid al-Qasri successfully endeavoured to strengthen the Yemeni descent of Bāhila and Qudā'a (cf. the reference given above, note 257). Bahr b. Sāwān al-Bahili requested and received permission from Yazid II to turn the Qudā'a into a military unit of their own in Egypt (Kindi, Governors, pp. 79 ff.). (The future) Marwan II restored the Aan-
di genealogy of Judhām, obviously in the hope of turning a troublesome Yemeni group into a Mudari one, but without success (Bailhurt, Aswāb, vol. i, p. 36 ff.; cf. Crone, Slaves, p. 161, on his troubles with Thābit b. Nuṣaym al-Judhām). The claim that the generals took no interest in genealogy for purposes other than abuse now strikes me as odd (Crone, Slaves, note 312).

Jumhūr [al-Kalbi/Yemen, the new governor] was coming there. Nasr preached a sermon... Nasr appointed governors from Rabi'a and the Yamānīyya.

The faction could of course have had a bearing on appointments without being actually generated by them, but it was only in the context of military competition for office that the supposed descent groups held together. The civilian South Arabs of Hims loathed the Qudā'a soldiers with whom they were assumed to be allied, dismissing them as despicable bedouins and rebelling against them when the latter took control of Hims as members of Yazid III's Yamānīyya. The Syrian soldiers of Qudā'a in their turn were happy enough to fight against Yazid b. al-Mu'llah al-Azdi/Yemen when the latter rebelled, writing him off as an Iraqi munāfiq. But when the Syrian Qudā'a sent Manṣūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbi/Yemen as governor to Khurasan, they nonetheless generated immense excitement among the Azdīs there, because a Syrian Yemeni was bound to appoint North Yemenis to office; hence Nasr b. Sayyār was forced to give appointments to their faction.

Governorship generated intense competition because they were positions of power, prestige and above all wealth, not only in that they were salaried, but also in that all governors from the highest to the lowest would divert part of the tax revenues into their own pockets, almost as of right: everyone knew that they would do so, and they were rarely called to account before the top governor was dismissed, which normally meant that all of his sub-governors were dismissed as well. This is why governors of the Marwānīd period were usually jilted and subjected to torture when their appointments came to an end; termination of office meant forcible rejugitation of spoils. Appointment was thus immensely lucrative, while dismissal meant loss of power and wealth alike, possibly of health as well and not infrequently of life. In other words, the participants in the competition played for high stakes, and this intensified the antagonism between the competitors. When a new top-governor was appointed, he would start by maltreating his

281 Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1847 (wa-walla' Naṣr Rabi'a wa-l-Yaman) = Hillenbrand, p. 209 (where this is wrongly translated "Nasr appointed [governor] over the Banū Rabi'a and the Yamānīyya").
284 qatalna Yamānīyya bsa'la'ul-Mu'llalah... wa-rāya hāna min al-ilāha' 'al-irāq munāfiq al-dīn illā min Qudā'a'at qātibah (al-Mas'ūdī, Kita'ab al-tanāb wa-l-ishrāf, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden 1894, p. 321).
predecessor and/or his appointees, only to be subjected to worse treatment when he and his appointees were dismissed in their turn, the faction which ousted him being now bent not just on the extraction of money, but also on revenge. One ex-governor committed suicide when he was caught by the rival faction. When the new governor belonged to the same descent group as his predecessor, factional loyalties were strained, and the behaviour of Yusuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays suggests that the eastern Qays/Mudur faction was close to splitting into two in response to the apparent elimination of the Yemenis.

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The faction was a purely provincial phenomenon down to the Third Civil War because it was only in the provinces that the generals took over as governors, Syria continuing to be ruled by old-fashioned kinsmen of the caliph and tribal nobles. In the Third Civil War, however, the generals took over Syria as well.

The key to the coup of 744 is presumably to be sought in the Marwanid tendency to rely on men of Qaysi/Mudur for the governorship of the eastern provinces, especially Khurasan, which in its turn is in need of explanation. The fact that the Marwanids intermarried with the Qays of Syro-Jazira did not prevent them from relying preponderantly on Yemenis in the western provinces, where the local tribes were overwhelmingly Yemenis too. Possibly, they preferred governors of Qaysi/Mudur in Khurasan because the Khurasani troops had come to be dominated Mudaris. The figures given for the fifth in Qutayba's army do not support this conjecture, but several armies had been despatched from Iraq since Qutayba's time, and as has been

286 Cf. Crone, Slaves, p. 44.
288 In Khurasan the Unayyad Sa'id Khudhayna arrested the governors of 'Abd al-Rehman b. Abdallah al-Qashqayri/Qays, appointed by 'Umar II, but not apparently 'Abd al-Rehman himself; however an Unayyad did not really count as a Qaysi (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1419 = Powers, p. 150). The Qaysi Sa'id al-Maraashi is explicitly said to have left Khudhayna's governor alone, suggesting that this was unusual (ibid., p. 1437 = Powers, p. 187). Sa'id himself was eventually despatched (presumably by his Kilani/Qaysi successor) to 'Umar b. Habaybiya al-Fazari/Qays in Iraq, where he narrowly avoided being tortured to death (ibid., pp. 1433ff. = Powers, pp. 383ff.). We are not told how Junayd al-Murri/Qays treated the governors of Asyra al-Sulami/Qays, but Junayd's own governors were jailed and tortured by 'Asim b. Abdallah al-Hilali/Qays, who would presumably have done the same to Junayd if he had not died (ibid., pp. 1565).
289 Crone, Slaves, p. 40 and appendix II thereto.

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seen, Hishâm is credited with the view that most of the Khurasani troops were 'Tamimis'. In addition, however, the Qays of Syro-Jazira were frontier-troops and thus better suited than their Yemeni counterparts to the frontier warfare of Khurasan. Possibly, they were also better horsemen. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih has it that most of Marwan's Quds'i troops at Marj Rah'it were infantry, whereas most of Dhabbak's Qaysiyaya were cavalrymen, and infinitely more numerous to boot. This is late information of dubious value, but the Mesopotamian desert must in fact have been better suited to horse-rearing than its Syrian counterpart.

At all events, as far as control of the most lucrative and prestigious provinces of the caliphate were concerned, that is Iraq and Khurasan, the Syrian Yemenis were doing badly in the competition; and since local troops related to their Syrian governors on the basis of descent, the Yemenis of Iraq and Khurasan were doing badly too. The Syrian Yemenis were responsible for garrison duties all over the empire, and above all in Iraq. Pace Shaban, there is no evidence that they resented this duty, what they resented being rather that they did not have undisputed control of this province. They did rule Iraq for a full fifteen years under Khalid al-Qasri (a very long time in view of the short tenures that most governors enjoyed), but they lost control of it again when Khalid was dismissed in favour of yet another member of al-Hajjaj's family, who was unwise allowed by al-Walid II to torture Khalid al-Qasri to death. It was against this background that the Yamaniyya planned their coup, which obviously was not meant to end their role as imperial troops, but rather to give them control of the Syrian metropolis in which the highest decisions, including those affecting the allocation of Iraq, were made. Whatever their intentions, there certainly is no doubt that the events of 744 amounted to a military coup. The generals who had so far governed the provinces now took over the capital as well, and though the Yamaniyya were to be ousted, first by Marwan II and next by the Hashimiyya, the men who ousted them were generals too.

The Marwanid period generated its own space of schematizing statements regarding tribal relationships. Thus Mu'tawiya, who only gave stipends to Yemenis according to one piece of wisdom, recommended governors of Mudur according to another, allegedly instructing his governor of Iraq to honour the Yemenis in public but to stay aloof from them in private.

289 Above, p. 8.
290 Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, Jami', vol. iv, p. 396. Marwan allegedly had 13,000 men, mostly footsoldiers, whereas Dhabbak had 60,000 men, mostly mounted. Elsewhere we are told that Marwan had 7,000 men against Dhabbak's 30,000 (Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 175).
291 Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 326ff., 358f.
no doubt because he had foreseen their murder of al-Walid or the ‘Abbásid revolution’\(^{292}\). An Iraqi of the Second Civil War supposedly opined that whether the Marwānids or the Zubayrids were going to win, their allegiances would be with Qays, a remarkable display of foresight given that the Marwānids were at odds with Qays at the time\(^{293}\). Qays were ‘Uthmānīs and affines of kings, al-Jāḥiz informs us with bittersweet regard for the fact that Qays were nothing of the kind before ‘Abd al-Malik\(^{294}\); but this being the Qaysi image, Yazid III allegedly opined that the strength of Qays was achieved at the expense of Islam, which is very much what Shaban tells us too\(^{295}\). But Yazid III’s thesis was problematic in that the Prophet, the Ḥāshimites and the Rashīdun were all of Qays/Mudār, so others held that the Jāhiliyya belonged to Yemen, Islam to Mudār and fītna to Rabi’\(^{a}\)\(^{296}\). The Rabi’\(^{a}\) were given to fītna because they were angry with God for sending prophet of Mudār, and this is why they were Khaṭā‘ītes\(^{297}\). Or maybe it was the Yemenis who were given to fītna, for they killed ‘Uthmān, renounced obedience to ‘Abd al-Malik (under Ibn al-Ash‘ash) and rebelled again under Yazid b. al-Muhallab\(^{298}\). But there was also a case for the view that the real troublemakers were Mudār, for they killed the Prophet’s family (i.e. al-Husayn), supported the Umayyads and oppressed the Khurāsānis, which is again a view close to Shaban’s\(^{299}\). The organizers of the Ḥāshimite da‘wa in Khurāsān supposedly told their missionaries to reside among Yemenis and conciliate Mudār, or to honour the Yemen, be wary of Rabi’\(^{a}\) and slay the Mudāris, one way or another reversing Mu‘awiya’s advice\(^{300}\). And so one could go on. It should be obvious that tropes of this kind are not to be


\(^{293}\) Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 318, line 13.


\(^{295}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1837 = Hillenbrand, p. 197.

\(^{296}\) Thus Daghfīl the genealogist in Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, ‘Iqd, vol. iii, p. 329.


\(^{298}\) Thus a Tamīmī to Khālid al-Qasrī in Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1468.

\(^{299}\) Thus a Sulami (i.e. Qaysi) nṣīb of the Hashimiyah, Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1886 = Williams, pp. 94f. Al-Mansūr allegedly went further than that: Mudār had no right at all to claim the Prophet as one of theirs, for they (= Quraysh) had rejected him, whereas the Yemen (= Anṣār) had accepted him, and did he not say “Azd and the Ash‘arīs and Kinda are of me, and I am of them”? (Azdi, Manuel, pp. 219ff). Presumably it was statements of this kind that prompted Goldziher to trace the origins of the ʿaqabīyya between Qays/Mudār and Yemen to rivalry between Quraysh and the Anṣār (cf. above, note 8).

\(^{300}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1501, 1937 (= Williams, p. 48).

taken literally. The faction undoubtedly played a role in the ‘Abbásid or (more properly) Ḥāshimi Revolution\(^{301}\); the inner core of the da‘wa was dominated by Yemenis; Abū Muslim briefly allied himself with al-Kirmānī’s Yemeni faction; and numerous Yemenis in both Iraq and Syria defected to the Ḥāshimi troops. But the Ḥāshimi da‘wa was not a Yemeni revolution in the sense that most of its participants were Yemenis, still less in the sense that they were drawn from al-Kirmānī’s faction. There is a real problem here, but neither formulaic wisdom nor the assumption that Qays/Mudār and Yemen were political parties will help us solve it.