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THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSMIGRATION OF SOUL
ACCORDING TO SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-SUHRAWARDĪ
(KILLED 587/1191) AND HIS FOLLOWERS

RÉSUMÉ

La doctrine de la transmigration de l’âme selon Suhrawardi et ses successeurs.
L’article concerne l’attitude des philosophes illuminationistes à l’égard de la métémpsychose. Y sont analysées les positions de Suhrawardi (exécuté en 587/1191) dans sa Ḥikmat al-īshrāq, de Shahrazūrī (m. après 688/1288) dans sa al-Shajara al-ilāḥīyya et d’Ibn Abī Jumhūr (m. après 906/1501) dans son Kitāb al-Muḫīli. Alors que ces penseurs professent l’origine temporelle de l’âme, d’autres, en l’occurrence le philosophe juif Ibn Kamiṁūnā (m. 1284) et l’imamite Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (m. 710/1311 ou 716/1316), croient à sa pré-éternité. Leurs attitudes envers la métémpsychose s’en trouvent ainsi modifiées par rapport aux premiers.

Mots-clés : métémpsychose ; transmigration de l’âme ; Illuminationistes/Ishrāqīs ; réincarnation.

SUMMARY

This paper investigates the attitudes of the Illuminationists towards metempsychosis. It considers Shihab Al-Din Al-Suhrawardi’s (executed 587/1191) treatment of issue in his Ḥikmat al-īshrāq, Muhammad b. Maḥmūd Al-Shahrazūrī’s (d. after 688/1288) notion of metempsychosis in his Shajara al-ilāḥīyya and Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsā’ī’s (d. after 906/1501) concept of transmigration in his Kitāb al-Muḫīli. Whereas the aforementioned thinkers adhered to the temporal origin of the soul, other Illuminationists, namely the Jewish philosopher Sa’d al-Din Mansūr b. Kamiṁūnā (d. 1284) and the Imamite Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311 or 716/1316) believed in the pre-eternity of the soul. Their notion of metempsychosis therefore necessarily differs from the concept of Suhrawardi, Shahrazūrī and Ibn Abī Jumhūr.

Keywords: Metempsychosis; transmigration of soul; Illuminationists/Ishrāqīs; reincarnation.

1 Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the 19th Congress of the Union européenne des arabisants et islamisants in Halle (Saale), August 30 - September 3, 1998 and the World Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā in Tehran, May 23-27, 1999.
Shihâb al-Din al-Suhrawardi (killed 587/1191) and later representatives of his philosophy of illumination (hikmat al-ishrâq) considered themselves true followers of what they called ancient wisdom (hikmat al-‘atiq). In order to demonstrate the eternal truth shared by all divinely revealed religions, they sought to synthesize various traditions such as those of the ancient Egyptians (Hermes, Agathodaemon), Persians (Jâmasf, Farshâwashtar, Buzurjmihr), and Greeks (Empedocles, Pythagoras, and in particular Plato). Many of these sages were well known to have maintained various doctrines of metempsychosis. In his detailed account of the Hindu beliefs of the transmigration of the souls al-Birûnî, for instance, also quotes those passages of the Phaedo which are relevant for Plato’s doctrine of reincarnation. Suhrawardî and his followers accordingly had to reconsider this controversial issue which was in disagreement with orthodox Islam.

Most Islamic philosophers before Suhrawardî either ignored what had been transmitted about the views of Plato and other earlier philosophers on

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transmigration of soul, such as al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) or al-‘Āmirī (d. 381/992), or rejected this doctrine categorically. Ibn Sinā (d. 428/1037), for instance, based his standard explanation of why transmigration is untenable on the assumption of the temporal origin of the soul. Every body with the proper temperament of its elements requires a particular soul to govern it. The emanation of the souls from the Active Intellect is necessitated by the readiness of the bodies which are thus their accidental causes (‘illa bi-l-‘araḍī ‘illa ‘araḍīyya). If a soul were to transmigrate from one body into another, the second body will have two souls - one its own particular soul and the other transmigrated into it from another body. This is absurd since every living being experiences itself to be governed by one soul only.

This argument was directed both against the doctrine of transmigration of souls within the same species and against the doctrine of transmigration - both ascending and descending - between different species.

In his various works, Suhrawardi maintains different views on metempsychosis, ranging from outright rejection in the majority of his writings to evident sympathy towards, possibly even support of this doctrine in his Ḥikmat al-īshrāq. In most of his writings, Suhrawardi argues like Ibn Sinā that since every suitable body necessitates the emanation of a new soul, reincarnation would imply that some bodies

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would have two souls - one natural to it and another of foreign origin. He furthermore argues that there exist more animals than men and even more plants than animals. Thus both the descent of souls from human bodies into animals or plants and the ascent of souls from animal bodies or plants into human bodies is impossible. This second argument is exclusively directed against the possibility of ascending and descending transfer of souls between bodies of various species. In his *Talwiḥāt*, Suhrawardi deals with a different concept of metempsychosis which he also repudiates outright. According to this notion only plants are prepared to receive souls through emanation. From here, the souls ascend first into the bodies of animals and subsequently into human bodies.

In his *Hikmat al-ishrāq* Suhrawardi’s approach towards metempsychosis significantly differs from his discussion of this issue in his other works. Here, his intention is not to refute but to “clarify the issue of metempsychosis.” Instead of recounting arguments against the notion of the transmigration of souls or even refuting it outright, he reviews in detail the respective views and arguments of the various proponents of this doctrine. After stating in Illuminationist terms his belief in the temporal origin of the soul, he describes a notion of metempsychosis which he ascribes to a certain Būdhāsaf (or: Būdhāsf) “and other Oriental sages prior

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to him” (wa-man qablahu min al-hukamā’ al-mushriqiyyin). In their view, only human bodies are prepared to receive a managing rational soul or, in Illuminationist terminology, commanding light (al-nūr al-isfahbad), emanating directly from the separate intellect or the triumphal light (al-nūr al-qāhir); silent bodies (ṣayṣyya ṣāmīta), that is animals, by contrast, receive only imperfect human souls which are reincarnated in the bodies of animals corresponding to their moral traits and acts for the purpose of purification. The possibility of transmigration of souls within the human species and from animal bodies into human bodies is explicitly excluded. Suhrawardi assumes that the adherents of this doctrine maintain that souls can also transmigrate within the animal species as long as this does not lead to a situation in which an animal body is managed by two souls. This notion of reincarnation neatly avoids the main Peripatetic objection against metempsychosis. Since reincarnated souls can only descend into a subhuman species and since subhuman species cannot receive emanated souls directly, a body (human or animal) would not have two souls. Suhrawardi also relates other possible objections against this notion of metempsychosis together with the replies of the adherents of this doctrine. He furthermore names Plato “and the philosophers prior to him” (Afštūn wa-min qablahu min al-hukamā’) as proponents of transfer of souls and quotes the various verses of the Qurʾān in which the transformation of man into animal (maskh) is described, remarking that “some Muslims“ (ba’d al-islāmiyyin) whom he does not identify further relied on them in their belief in metempsychosis. He also points out that


the majority of the philosophers (akhar al-ḥukamā‘) who all agreed that the perfect souls at death immediately escape to the World of Lights (‘ālam al-nūr) inclined to the doctrine of transmigration of imperfect souls. Suhrawardī avoids, by contrast, giving a detailed account of the opponents of this doctrine and their arguments. Only very briefly, he alludes to the standard Peripatetic argument against metempsychosis when he recounts that, according to the Peripatetics, human and animal bodies are both prepared to receive managing souls immediately from the separate intellect. Thus, what Būḍhāsaf is said to have stipulated regarding the impossibility of metempsychosis within the human species applies in their view to all species. Suhrawardī’s detailed review of the various notions of and arguments for metempsychosis with only a very brief allusion to the opposing views of the Peripatetics seems to indicate his support for the idea of metempsychosis.

Notwithstanding his sympathetic attitude towards this concept in general and the specific doctrine ascribed to Būḍhāsaf in particular, Suhrawardī refrains, however, from explicitly professing the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. In a section entitled “On the Status of the Human Soul After its Departure from the Body” he states that the arguments both for and against transmigration of souls are weak and that, irrespective of whether transmigration takes place or not, these souls will eventually be freed from terrestrial bodies and ascend into the World of Suspended Images (‘ālam al-muthul al-mu‘allaqa) where they will receive shadows of suspended forms (zilāl min al-ṣuwar al-mu‘allaqa) corresponding to their evil traits and morals. This statement suggests either that Suhrawardī was undecided about the veracity of metempsychosis or that he was careful to hide his approval of this controversial doctrine. As all imperfect souls will eventually be disembodied and will ascend into the World of Suspended Images, Suhrawardī’s reluctance to state his view on whether the souls will be subject to a process of transmigration or not prior to their escape from the physical world was of little significance, since it did not entail any modifications on his notion of the eventual fate of the imperfect souls.

27 “Hikmat al-īshrāq”, p. 230:6-9: “As for the masters of misery (aṣḥāb al-shaqqāwa) who have gathered around hell - be reincarnation true or not, for the arguments on both sides are weak - once their souls depart from the barrier fortresses (al-ṣayāṣī al-barzakhiyya) [i.e. the corporeal bodies], they will have shadows of the suspended forms in accordance with their character.”
Later representatives of the Illuminationist tradition who wrote commentaries on the Hikmat al-ishrāq concluded that Suhrawardī’s manner of dealing with the issue of metempsychosis in this work indicates his support for this doctrine. Among them, Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. after 688/1288)\(^\text{28}\) is most outspoken in his conviction that Suhrawardī himself endorsed the doctrine of metempsychosis which he ascribed to Būdḥāsaf. He states:

The purpose of this section [i.e. the section entitled “On the Clarification of Metempsychosis" (Fi bayān al-tanāsukh)] is to clarify the states of the rational souls after their separation from the bodies - the states of the happy [souls] to which belong the perfect souls and the souls that are intermediate in perfection, as well as the transmigration of the unhappy souls from human bodies to animal bodies (īntiqāl nufūs al-ashaqiyā’ ‘an al-abdān al-bashariyya īlā l-ajsād al-ḥaywāniyya) corresponding to their moral traits and acts;\(^\text{29}\)

and similarly in another passage:

In this book, the Shaykh related the various doctrines of tanāsukh and chose among them the position of those who maintain the possibility of transmigration of the human soul to an animal body. The transmigration of [souls from] some [animal bodies] into some other [animal bodies] is also possible, [whereas the transmigration of souls] into plants and minerals is excluded.\(^\text{30}\)

With this judgement, Shahrazūrī does not seem to have attached any significance to Suhrawardī’s reserve on the veracity of the transmigration of the soul.\(^\text{31}\) As will be seen later, although being a firm proponent of metempsychosis, Shahrazūrī in fact also expressed doubts concerning the decisive quality of the proofs for the veracity of this doctrine.


\(^{29}\) Shahrazūrī, Shahr, p. 518:10-12.


In his commentary on the *Hikmat al-ishrāq* Qutb al-Din al-Shirāzī (d. 710/1311 or 716/1316) also concludes from the way Suhrwardī arranged his discussion on metempsychosis that he supported this doctrine. However, in contrast to Shahrazūrī, he attaches more significance to Suhrwardī’s apparent irresolution on the veracity of metempsychosis and is thus more careful in his final judgement on Suhrwardī’s position on this issue:

As for the author, judging at least from his outward arrangement [of his account] (‘alā mā yush’iru bihi zāhir taqrīrihi) - even if he does not believe in the veracity of the doctrine, as will become evident - he maintains that the attachment of the souls that are intermediate in happiness is transferred to celestial bodies whereas [the attachment of] the unhappy is transferred to animal bodies, transmigrating from one body to another, but not into minerals and plants.33

While Shahrazūrī does not explicitly indicate his own view on the issue of metempsychosis in his commentary on Suhrwardī’s *Hikmat al-ishrāq*, his support for this doctrine is evident in his independent philosophical work *al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya*. He identifies three principal positions regarding the fate of souls in the hereafter: first, the view of the Peripatetics, who maintain that at death all souls will be separated from the corporeal; secondly, the view of the “Reincarnationists” (tanāsukhiyya), who teach that the cycle of transmigration is eternal, as all souls are corporeal and therefore subject to an infinite process of reincarnation to human and subhuman bodies; thirdly, those who believe that at death the perfect souls and the intermediate in perfection are disembodied, whereas the deficient souls undergo a process of transmigration for the purpose of purification.35 Shahrazūrī refutes the Peripatetic view of the disembodiment of all souls at death and deals critically with their arguments against metempsychosis which fail, in his view, to prove the invalidation of this doctrine.36 He also rejects categorically the position of the “Reincarnationists”. It is exclusively this notion of metempsychosis, he argues, which philosophers have in mind when they repudiate the concept

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34 Metempsychosis is dealt with in the chapter “On the Clarification of the State of the Souls Following the Separation [from the Bodies]” (*Fi bayān hāl al-nufas baʿda l-nufrāqa*), fols. 401r-419r.
36 *Shajara*, fols. 402r:3-403v:11.
of tanāsukh. He states that he was unable to trace names of adherents of this position and assumes that they have died out by his time.  

The proponents of the third position, who hold that at death only the perfect and the intermediate in perfection are disembodied, whereas the imperfect transmigrate from one physical body to another, are in his view the most excellent among the philosophers and people of religion (afāḍil al-ḥukamā’ wa-l-millīyyin).  

He points out that the proponents of metempsychosis differ in their beliefs on the modes and directions of the transmigration of the imperfect human souls and subsequently reviews what he considers to be the two principal notions of metempsychosis. The first notion is maintained by the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-ṣafā’) as well as by some other, anonymous groups. They believe that initially the souls are attached only to the lowest species of bodies, namely atoms, minerals, or plants. From there, they gradually ascend into higher bodies until they reach human bodies. Those souls which attain perfection in human bodies escape the corporeal world at death and rise into the lower spheres of Paradise. The imperfect souls, by contrast, transmigrate once more into bodies of lower, subhuman species suitable to their evil traits, for the purpose of purification. From there they re-ascend gradually into

37 Shajara, fol. 403v:3-10, 404r:2-405v:2; Shahrazūrī, Sharḥ, p. 519:6-16.
38 Shajara, fol. 404r:5. Cf. Ibn Sinā, Epistola, p. 39 where Ibn Sinā also holds the view to be true arguing, however, that it is merely intended metaphorically.
39 Shahrazūrī (Shajara, fol. 404r:6-19; Sharḥ, p. 520:1-5) enumerates four basic positions: transmigration of human souls within the human species only (nasākk); transmigration of human souls to animal bodies only (masākk); transmigration of human souls into animal bodies or plants; transmigration of human souls into any subhuman body, such as animals, plants, minerals, or atoms. The term for transmigration of humans souls into plants in fasākh and the term for transmigration into minerals is rasākh. This enumeration was adopted by later writers, see e.g. Qūḥ al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, Sharḥ, p. 477:11-18; Sadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, Taʿlīqāt, pp. 476ff; transl. Suhravardi, Sagesse, pp. 603-604; H.Y. Makki al-ʿĀmilī, Iḥāl al-tanāsukh, ed. M.K. Makki [under the title al-Īṣām wa-l-tanāsukh], Beirut, 1411/1991, pp. 89-90. For similar enumerations of different modes of transmigration by earlier authors, cf. Ibn Sinā, Epistola, pp. 34-37; Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwainī, K. al-Īsrāhād ilā qawāfī al-adilla fī usūl al-iʿtiqād, eds. M.Y. Mūsā and ʿA. ʿAbd al-Munʿīm ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, 1369/1950, pp. 274-76; Ibn Hazm, al-Fiṣal fī l-milāl wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-nilāḥ, eds. M.I. Naṣīr and ʿA.R. ʿUmaiṣa, Beirut, 1405/1985, 1/165ff.
40 Shajara, fol. 404r:22ff. The ideas of the Brethren of Purity on metempsychosis are laid down particularly in their Rīsāla al-jāmiʿa. The relevant passages have been investigated by Y. Marquet, La philosophie des Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ de dieu à l’homme, Diss. Paris, 1971, pp. 599-636.
41 Shahrazūrī states (Shajara, fol. 405r:6-406v:19) that the adherents of this doctrine differed in their views on the initial body of a particular soul. While some maintained that a particular soul can initially be connected to an atom, a mineral, or a plant and then ascend gradually into higher bodies, others held that all particular souls initially reside in an atom, from which they gradually ascend into higher species.
higher bodies until they again reach human bodies. Once purified, they also escape from the corporeal world.

Shahrazūrī states that a different, second belief of metempsychosis was maintained by the ancient sages of Greece (Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle), Persia, China, India (Būdhāsaf), and Egypt (Agathodaimon, Hermes) as well as by “others from among the most excellent philosophers of the nations“ (wa-ghayrūhum min afādil ḥukamā’ al-umam). By contrast to the first notion, the proponents of this second concept of metempsychosis maintained that only human bodies are prepared to receive souls through direct emanation from the separate intellect. Subhuman bodies, by contrast, receive souls only through transmigration of human souls. Thus, they categorically exclude both the possibility of the transmigration of animal souls into human bodies as well as the possibility of metempsychosis within the human species. For if this were the case, they argue, using a modified version of Ibn Sīnā’s standard argument against metempsychosis, some human bodies would have two souls - one natural to it and another of foreign origin. Souls that have attained purification in animal bodies therefore immediately escape the corporeal world at the death of their animal bodies. According to Shahrazūrī, some representatives of this second concept of transmigration of souls, among them Būdhāsaf, believed that a human rational soul can only transmigrate into animal bodies whereas others allowed its transmigration into any subhuman species - animals, plants, or minerals.

Shahrazūrī (Shajara, fols. 413v:22-414v:15) reviews Plato’s view of metempsychosis and paraphrases relevant passages from the Phaedo indicating transmigration of soul. Shajara, fols. 413v:23-31 corresponds to Phaedo 81 B-E; Shajara, fols. 413v:31-414r:6 corresponds to Phaedo 81 E-82 A. It is not entirely clear what Shajara, fols. 414r:6-18 corresponds to. The content suggests that it corresponds to Phaedo 81 E-82 A. However, Shahrazūrī attributes Shajara, fols. 414r:6-11 to Hermes Trismegistos. He continues with Socrates (Shajara, fols. 414r:11-18) which indicates that this passage corresponds to Phaedo 82 C-D. A comparison of Shahrazūrī’s version of the quotation of the Phaedo with al-Birūnī’s version reveals that al-Birūnī was definitely not Shahrazūrī’s source. Shahrazūrī’s quotations also differ significantly from other Phaedo quotations such as Ibn Abī Uṣaybi’a’s (‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fi tabaqāt al-atibbā’, ed. N. Rida, Beirut, 1965, pp. 73-75).

Shahrazūrī states (Shajara, fols. 409v:5-11; Sharḥ, pp. 529:21-530:2) that Aristotle, who initially was an opponent of the doctrine of metempsychosis, revised his view later and supported this idea.

Shajara, fols. 410v:5ff; Sharḥ, p. 520:8-13.


Sharḥ, p. 521:13-16.

Shajara, fols. 411r:2-7.
Shahrazūrī reveals his own view on the veracity of the doctrine and his preferences on the mode of metempsychosis in his final evaluation of the two concepts.\footnote{Shajara, fols. 409v:22-410v:5, 414v:15-415r:27.} As for the mode of metempsychosis, he severely criticises the views of the first group. He particularly repudiates the possibility of metempsychosis of human rational souls in subhuman species other than animals \footnote{Shajara, fols. 409v:31-410r:23.} as well as their belief that all species of bodies, i.e. atoms, minerals, plants, and animal and human bodies, receive souls through direct emanation.\footnote{Shajara, fols. 410r:30-410v:3.} He shows much more sympathy for the second notion of metempsychosis and particularly supports the doctrine which he ascribes to Būdhāsaf, according to which only human bodies are prepared to receive souls through direct emanation from the separate intellect, whereas animal bodies only receive transmigrated human souls, either directly or indirectly.\footnote{Cf. also Shajara, fol. 402r:26-31 where he states that those philosophers who hold that only human bodies are prepared to receive rational souls through direct emanation are the most excellent (afādil al-hukamā’).} Shahrazūrī explicitly repudiates the possibility of the transmigration of souls into bodies of plants and minerals.\footnote{Shajara, fols. 409v:31-410r:10; Sharḥ, p. 520:8-9.} Whereas at death the perfect in happiness immediately escape to the World of Light, and the intermediate in happiness ascend to the World of Suspended Images, the perfect in misery transmigrate to animal bodies for the purpose of purification from evil traits. The duration of this process of metempsychosis differs according to the quantity of the evil traits of a respective soul, depending on how often it needs to be transferred into further animal bodies and on the required duration of its stay in the respective animal bodies. Once purified, the soul ascends into the lower spheres of the World of Suspended Images. Souls which are unsuccessful in attaining purification do not remain eternally attached to animal bodies, but are eventually also separated from the bodies and ascend into the World of Images where they become, in accordance with their evil traits, attached to shadows of suspended forms.

In the course of his review of the various doctrines and in his final evaluation of the arguments of the various groups for the veracity of the doctrine of metempsychosis, Shahrazūrī leaves no doubt that he himself supports this doctrine. He concludes that, in general, the claim of the veracity of transmigration is valid (ṣaḥīḥ).\footnote{Shajara, fol. 409v:20-23.} Evaluating the respective proofs in detail, however, he expresses doubts that they are decisive. He states, that, whereas the proofs for the invalidation (ibṭāl) of met-
emspsyschosis are not decisive, the proofs for the veracity of metempsychosis and reincarnation are also not decisive (burhānīyya) and only rhetorically convincing (iqnā’iyya). However, since intuition (ḥads), inspiration (ilḥām) and spiritual exercise (riyāḍa) also indicate the veracity of this doctrine, the proofs become decisive. To support the doctrine, he moreover points out that there is no nation and no people with whom the [doctrine of] metempsychosis has not got a strong hold, even if they differ regarding its modalities, details and directions, since this does not concern the affirmation of metempsychosis and quotes those Qur'ānic verses and traditions of the Prophet that indicate the veracity of metempsychosis and the necessity of its occurrence. All this, Shahrazūrī concludes, are signs (ishārāt) and hints (rumūz) that indicate its veracity.

Despite his evident support for the doctrine of metempsychosis, Shahrazūrī nevertheless retains a certain reserve toward it. When dealing with the fate of the unhappy souls, Shahrazūrī states that they either ascend immediately into the lower ranks of the World of Images - if transmigration of human souls in animal bodies is not true - or that they ascend into the World of Images only after having been transferred into animal bodies - if transmigration of human souls into animal bodies is true.

Sa’d b. Maṣṣûr b. Kammūna (d. 1284), another prominent follower of Suhrawardi, also shows his sympathy towards metempsychosis when he severely criticises in his commentary on Suhrawardi’s Talwiḥāt the latter’s arguments against this doctrine. Like Suhrawardi in his Hikmat al-īshrāq

56 Shajara, fols. 409v:19-21, 414v:15ff.
57 Shajara, fol. 414v:15-22.
58 Shajara, fol. 408r:24-27.
59 Shajara, fol. 415r:20-21. At various places within this chapter on the fate of the soul after its separation from the body, Shahrazūrī states his view on a number of details in a way that clearly indicates his support for the doctrine of metempsychosis. Discussing, for instance, whether the imperfect soul may remain disembodied after the separation from the initial body and prior to its being reincarnated in a new body, Shahrazūrī holds this to be impossible; cf. Shajara, fols. 405r:25-405v:3.
62 Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-talwiḥāt, ms. London, British Museum OR 7728, fols. 347r-353r; see also his Sharḥ al-īshrārāt, ms. London, India Office 484, fols. 154r:23ff where he also severely criticises Ibn Sinā’s arguments against metempsychosis. Here, he also concludes (fol. 155v:9-10) that neither the arguments against nor those for the veracity of metempsychosis are decisive (burhān).
and Shahrazūrī in his Shajara al-ilāhiyya, Ibn Kammūna concludes that the arguments both for the veracity of the doctrine of metempsychosis as well as for its invalidation are weak (da‘if); just as there is, in his view, no decisive proof invalidating the doctrine of metempsychosis, the arguments of the proponents of this doctrine are convincing without, however, proving its certainty (iqnā‘īyyāt lā yuftid al-yaqīn). However, since Ibn Kammūna believed in the pre-eternity of the souls, it can safely be concluded that he must have maintained some notion of metempsychosis. Here he disagreed with Suhrawardī and Shahrazūrī, who both believed in the temporal origin of the souls. Although Ibn Kammūna does not indicate in his extant works which doctrine of metempsychosis he favoured, his notion of the pre-eternity of the souls indicates that his concept of metempsychosis must have differed from that favoured by Suhrawardī and Shahrazūrī; their preferred concept of metempsychosis is incompatible with the pre-existence of the human soul, as it presumes a newly emanated soul for each human formation and excludes the possibility that a soul passes from a human or animal body into another human body.

The teachings of the Illuminationists significantly influenced later Twelvershī‘ite thinkers. The Imāmī Illuminationist philosopher Qūtb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī was familiar with the works of both Ibn Kammūna and Shahrazūrī. Like the earlier Illuminationists, he held the transmigration of imperfect human souls to be probable but not proven as the arguments on both sides are inconclusive. Possibly under the influence of Ibn

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65 Qūtb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī was familiar with Ibn Kammūna’s Sharh al-talwihāt. He made a copy of this work which is extant. Cf. Suhrawardī, Œuvres philosophiques et mystiques. Tome I. Prolégomènes, p. lxiv. He was also well acquainted with Shahrazūrī’s commentary on Suhrawardī’s “Ḥikmat al-īshrāq”, which largely influenced his own commentary on this work. On Qūtb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, see J. Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights. Qūtb al-Dīn Shirāzi and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass., 1992.
66 Cf. Qūtb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, “Risāla fi tāḥqīq ‘ālam al-mithl al-ajwibat as’ilat ba’d al-fudalā‘”, in: Walbridge, Science, p. 257 (text), p. 219 (translation), where Qūtb al-Dīn in fact repeats Suhrawardī’s statement in his “Ḥikmat al-īshrāq” (p. 230:6-9): “The fifth class are those deficient in knowledge and practice ... When they are delivered from the bodies of animals, if metempsychosis is true, or from human bodies, if it is false (for the proofs of both extremes of the contradiction are weak), these souls have imaginal shadows, forms of the imagination suspended without locus in accordance with their traits corresponding to them.” See also Walbridge, Science, pp. 148, 157.
Kammūna, he also maintained the doctrine of the pre-eternity of souls but refrained from fully elaborating his preferred mode of metempsychosis, which, as in the case of Ibn Kammūna, must have differed at least in some ways from the mode favoured by Suhrawardī and Shahrazūrī.68

The Imāmi thinker Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī (d. after 906/1501) who in his K. al-Mujīl 69 sought to create a synthesis of kalām, mysticism, Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy, was significantly influenced by Shahrazūrī’s al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya; throughout the Mujīl, Ibn Abī Jumhūr quotes extensively from this work without, however, ever indicating his source.70 The same applies to his elaborations on the fate of the soul after death.71 Ibn Abī Jumhūr’s selection and arrangement of passages from Shahrazūrī’s Shajara indicate to which extent he follows Shahrazūrī’s supportive attitude towards metempsychosis and where he deviates from


68 Although Qūh al-Dīn’s view on the fate of imperfect human souls as put forth in his “Risāla fi taḥqīq ‘alām al-mithāl” (pp. 219ff, 257ff) is identical with the concept of metempsychosis supported by Suhrawardī and Shahrazūrī, he refrains from indicating how this concept is to be reconciled with his belief in the pre-eternity of the souls; cf. Walbridge, Science, pp. 156-58.


71 In the first part of this section (Mujīl, pp. 491:21-500:4), Ibn Abī Jumhūr discusses the various theological views on the nature of passing away and restoration. In the second part (Mujīl, pp. 500:4-508:27), he relates the views of the philosophers on the fate of the soul after death defending them, inter alia, against the allegedly unjustified accusation that they denied both God’s annihilating the material world and its subsequent restoration.
his views.\textsuperscript{72} He follows Shahrazûrî’s belief that imperfect human souls are transferred at death into animal bodies corresponding to their moral traits. According to their progress in purification they ascend into bodies of more noble animals until they are sufficiently purified to escape to the lower ranks of paradise. Souls that remain unsuccessful in attaining purification are eventually also transferred in animal bodies within the World of Images.\textsuperscript{73} In contrast to Shahrazûrî, however, Ibn Abi Jumhûr adheres to the orthodox belief that God will restore the flesh and bones of the dead for the Judgement following his annihilation of the physical structure and order of the world. In order to harmonize this belief with the notion of metempsychosis, he adopts some elements of one of the anonymous views related by Shahrazûrî in his \textit{Shajara} in his account on the first concept of metempsychosis, whose adherents believed both in metempsychosis and the resurrection of the material world.\textsuperscript{74} Like the proponents of this doctrine, Ibn Abi Jumhûr differentiates between the minor resurrection (\textit{al-qiyâma al-şughrā}), which consists in the disembodiment of the particular soul, and the major resurrection (\textit{al-qiyâma al-kubrā}), that is, the eventual restoration of the material world which follows its prior annihilation.\textsuperscript{75}

The Illuminationists’ adherence to the doctrine of metempsychosis was without lasting impact. Ibn Abi Jumhûr was apparently the last Islamic philosopher who adhered to the Illuminationists’ supportive attitude towards this doctrine. Later Islamic philosophers who were otherwise significantly influenced by the Illuminationist tradition, such as Šadr al-Dîn al-Shirâzî (Mullâ Šadrâ) (d. 1050/1640) repudiated this doctrine outright.\textsuperscript{76}


\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Shajara}, fols. 405v:26-406r:16.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Mujûlî}, pp. 505:24-507:14.


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