

Copy for Dr. Oppenheimer

*Earle
Summary
Food Fr*

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK

522 Fifth Avenue

New York 18, N.Y.

February 23, 1951

Edward M. Earle, Esq.
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Ed:

Thanks for your good letter of February 14
and for the accompanying report on the Seminar on Modern
France which you may be sure I will study with great interest.
I wish all our enterprises were under such careful direction
and turned out so well.

With warm good wishes,

Sincerely,

Chuck [Dollard]

7
Earle Mead
M. F.
157

December 9, 1950

Dear Mr. Lester:

Thank you very much for your good letter of November 30th. We are delighted to learn that the Corporation has made available to us funds for the further support of the Conference on Modern France. On behalf of the Institute and of those members who have been and will be involved in this work, I should like to thank you. As we have need of the funds, we shall communicate with you.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Oppenheimer

Mr. Robert M. Lester
Carnegie Corporation of New York
522 Fifth Avenue
New York 18, N. Y.

Copy to Professor Earle
Miss Trinterud

Prof Earle

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK
522 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

ROBERT M. LESTER
SECRETARY

November 30, 1950

J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Oppenheimer

We are glad to be able to tell you that the Corporation has made available to the Institute for Advanced Study the sum of eight thousand dollars (\$8,000), or so much thereof as may be necessary, toward support of a conference on Modern France.

This grant is based upon Mr. Earle's letter to Mr. Dollard, dated November 28, 1950. It does not carry with it any commitment expressed or implied as to renewal or supplement.

We shall be very glad to have from you and Mr. Earle a suggested schedule of payments.

Sincerely yours

Robert M. Lester

Secretary

RML:df
CC: Edward Mead Earle

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Princeton, N. J.

School of Historical Studies

Members of Seminar on Modern France, 1950

Raymond Aron	Lecturer in the Institut d'Études Politiques and in the École Nationale d'Administration, University of Paris. Docteur ès lettres, Paris 1938.
J. P. T. Bury	Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. B.A. Cambridge, 1930; M.A. 1933.
Robert F. Byrnes	Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers University. B.A. Amherst 1939; M.A. Harvard 1940; Ph.D. 1947.
Richard D. Challener	Instructor in History, Princeton University. A.B. Princeton 1943; A.M. Columbia 1948.
Jean-Jacques Chevallier	Professor in the Faculty of Law and in the Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris. Docteur en Droit sciences politiques, University of Paris 1924; Docteur en Droit sciences juridiques 1925.
Gilbert Chinard	Meredith Howland Pyne Professor of French Literature (emeritus), Princeton University. B.L. Poitier 1899; Licencié ès lettres 1902; LL.D. St. John's College 1934.
Laing Gray Cowan	Assistant Professor of Government, and Administrative Assistant to the Director of the School of International Affairs, Columbia University. A.B. Toronto 1943; A.M. Columbia 1944; Ph.D. 1950.
Edward Mead Earle	Professor in the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study. B.S. Columbia 1917; Ph.D. 1923; LL.D. Princeton 1947.

William Ebenstein	Professor of Politics, Princeton University. LL.B. Vienna 1934; Ph.D. Wisconsin 1938.
Henry W. Ehrmann	Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado. LL.B. Berlin; Dr. Juris. Freiburg.
Paul Farmer	Associate Professor of History, University of Wisconsin. A.B. Amherst 1939; M.A. Columbia 1940; Ph.D. 1942.
Edward W. Fox	Associate Professor of History, Cornell University. A.B. Harvard 1935; Ph.D. 1942.
*Edgar S. Furniss	Assistant Professor of Politics, and John Witherspoon Preceptor, Princeton University. B.A. Yale 1940; M.A. 1945; Ph.D. 1947.
Jean Gottmann	Maitre de Conférences, Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris, and Chargé de Recherches, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique. Litt. Lic. Paris 1936.
H. Stuart Hughes	Assistant Professor of History, Harvard University. A.B. Amherst 1937; Ph.D. Harvard 1940.
Joseph Kraft	Assistant, Institute for Advanced Study. A.B. Columbia 1947; M.A. Princeton 1949.
*Daniel Marx, Jr.	Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College. A.B. Dartmouth 1929; Ph.D. California 1946.
*Robert R. Palmer	Professor of History, Princeton University. Ph.B. Chicago 1931; Ph.D. Cornell 1934.
David Thomson	Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. B.A. Cambridge 1934; Ph.D. 1938.

-3-

E. L. Woodward

Fellow of Worcester College, and
Professor of Modern History,
University of Oxford. A.B. Oxford
1913; Litt. D. Princeton 1946.

Gordon Wright

Associate Professor of History,
University of Oregon. A.B. Whitman
College 1933; A.M. Stanford 1936;
Ph.D. 1939.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

*F
Earle Seminar*

November 13, 1950

To Members of the Seminar on Modern France:

It is clear that at the rate we are now proceeding, we cannot hope to cover all of the ground remaining in the memorandum prepared by Mr. Thomson's task force. Several members of the seminar have suggested that we ought to have at least one unscheduled session, and perhaps two. After making an informal canvass, I have come to the conclusion that almost everyone would be greatly disappointed if we were not to have adequate opportunity to discuss the remaining major points in the Thomson memorandum, as well as sufficient time to weigh general conclusions or--to change the metaphor--to see the forest instead of the trees.

I am taking the liberty, therefore, of suggesting that we have two additional sessions, one on Friday afternoon, December 1, and the second on Friday afternoon, December 8, both at the usual hour 3:30 to 6. I am aware, of course, that this may cause some individual inconvenience, but I am hopeful that the additional expenditure of time and effort will more than justify itself.

Even with two additional sessions, we shall have to be highly selective in our discussion of pages 14-25 of the Thomson memorandum. Would it not be best, therefore, to devote our November 16 discussion to pages 20-23, dealing with the international relations of modern France, and our November 30 discussion to pages 23-25, dealing with the position of France in Europe? (Because of Thanksgiving Day, there will be no session on November 23.)

If we find, after covering pages 20-25, that there is more time at our disposal than we now anticipate, we can retrace our steps to page 14. The omission of the material in pages 14-20 will not be too serious, since some of it is purely factual and some susceptible of subjective interpretation. Our discussions in the latter category have been great fun, but it would be a shame to have the cake of pages 14-20 without the bread of pages 20-25.

If you have comments concerning the foregoing suggestions, I shall, of course, be glad to have them.

Edward M. Earle

Do you want to approve Earle's request?

Yes
C. W. C. 4
Approved

Yes
Approved

COPY

October 5, 1950

Professor Edward Earle
The Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, N. J.

Dear Ed:

In reply to your memorandum of October 4th, I should say that since the visitors whom you are mentioning are coming to attend your seminar their expenses should be chargeable to the Visitors' Fund of the School; but I presume that the decision in such matters rests with the Director.

Yours,

/s/ Harold Cherniss

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Founded by Mr. Louis Bamberger and Mrs. Felix Fuld

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

ZM

October 4, 1950

Memorandum to: Professor Gherniss

From: E. M. Earle

From time to time during the autumn we shall be having visitors at my seminar—for example, Professor Donald C. McKey, Chairman of the Committee on International and Regional Studies at Harvard, will be here on Thursday, November 2, and will stay over night. I have also invited Guerlac of Cornell, Kent of Yale, Sawyer of Harvard, and several others.

May I safely presume that expenses for such visitors are properly chargeable to the Visitors Fund of the School of Historical Studies? My understanding of the discussion we had at our last School meeting would lead me to believe that such expenses are so chargeable. Am I correct?

(Copy to Dr. Oppenheimer)

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Just for your information.

E. M. Earle

*For
Earle Sammons
Mrs. Francis*

October 2, 1950

To Members of the Seminar on Modern France

It is hoped that hereafter we shall be able to put into your hands several days in advance of the Thursday session the material presented for discussion by the "task forces". As you know, the first task force had to work under very great pressure and the secretarial staff had to work over-time to get the first memorandum into mimeographed form. As a general rule, however, we hope to have a little more elbow room.

The sessions of the seminar should be devoted, of course, to surveying the forest and not the trees. Comments on phraseology and other relatively minor points should be submitted directly to Mr. Kraft, secretary of the seminar, who will see that they are referred to the interested person or persons on the task force. Disagreement on fundamental points should, of course, be submitted in the form of brief memoranda for the use of the task force. If necessary, the task force will prepare supplementary memoranda for discussion in advance of the meeting.

Of course we shall learn by doing and our operational procedures will, therefore, develop as we go along. In general, however, we wish to keep the discussions of the seminar itself on the highest possible plane, leaving to committee work between sessions as much as possible of the lesser or more routine comment and criticism.

Edward Mead Earle

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

7
Earle
Seminar
September 25, 1950

The Seminar on Modern France will meet regularly hereafter on Thursday afternoons, in Room 102 Building D at the Institute for Advanced Study, from 3:30 to 6 (with an interval for tea).

Edward M. Earle

April 6, 1950

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE:

RE: EBERSTEIN, WILLIAM

In checking on Institute grants for income tax purposes it was found that William Eberstein was paid \$1,000. in connection with his services during Professor Earle's Conference on Modern France. Through an error this tax was not withheld on this amount. The Director instructed the Business Office that it should be considered taxable. Professor Eberstein was so informed. He had considered it a taxable salary.

*MAE
Earle Seminars
France*

CONFERENCE ON MODERN FRANCE

The Princeton Inn, Princeton, New Jersey

February 1-4, 1950

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN FRANCE

- The French Social Structure and the French State
John E. Sawyer, Harvard University
- The Bourgeoisie: The French Entrepreneur
David Landis, Harvard University
- The French Intellectual Class: Its Role and Present Plight
Kenneth Douglas, Yale University

THE DECLINE OF THE FRENCH ÉLAN VITAL

- Papers by:
- John B. Wolf, University of Minnesota
 - John Bowditch, University of Minnesota
 - John Christopher, University of Rochester

FRENCH POLITICS: THE SHIFTING COALITION OF THE CENTER

- The "Third Force", 1870-1896
L. A. Minnich, Jr., Lafayette College
- The "Third Force", 1896-1939
Edward W. Fox, Cornell University
- The "Third Force" in the Fourth Republic
Charles A. Micaud, University of Virginia
- Christian Democracy and the "Third Force"
Robert Byrnes, Rutgers University

FRENCH POLITICS: THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT

- The Struggle for Political Control of the French Working Class
Decline of the Socialist Party
Henry W. Ehrmann, University of Colorado
- Sorel and Sorelism
Scott Lytle, University of Washington
- The Communist Party
The Communists and French Foreign Policy
Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa
- The Peasantry and the Communist Party
Gordon Wright, University of Oregon

- De Gaulle and Gaullism
H. Stuart Hughes, Harvard University

Princeton, New Jersey
February 1-4, 1950

7
Earle
Seminar

A conference on problems of modern France will be held at Princeton, New Jersey, February 1-4, 1950. The character of the conference will conform, in general, to the annual meetings of the learned societies -- that is to say, carefully prepared papers will be read, criticized, and discussed. Unlike the meetings of the learned societies, however, attendance will be by invitation, and members of the conference will be chosen from more than one academic discipline (those invited will include historians, economists, political scientists, students of literature, and perhaps others). Railway and pullman fares and hotel expenses in Princeton of those who read papers will be paid by the conference, and it is hoped that similar arrangements will be made for the other conference participants.

The sponsors of the conference are:

Committee on International and Regional Studies

Harvard University

Institute of International Studies

Yale University

School of International Affairs

Columbia University

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Princeton University

School of Economics and Politics

Institute for Advanced Study

The general purposes of the conference are to bring together American scholars professionally interested in problems of modern France -- the France, say, of the Third and Fourth French Republics -- to take stock of and to appraise work on France currently under way in American colleges and universities, and to consider ways and means for the further development of French studies in the United States. It is likewise intended that the program, to consist of papers read by the relatively younger scholars in the field, will be of sufficient merit in itself to justify the holding of the conference; unless unforeseen obstacles arise, the several papers read will be published in book form. The subjects being proposed for papers constitute a coherent, if not quite comprehensive, treatment of the history, politics, and economics of France since 1870. The program and a tentative list of about fifty participants for the conference was agreed upon at a meeting of the sponsoring institutions held in New York on Saturday, 24th September. At this meeting it was agreed that, whereas the formal papers would largely be offered by younger scholars, the "elder statesmen" in the field would be asked to attend as critics, counselors, and friends. It is believed that bringing this varied group together will make the conference of unique significance to the furtherance in the United States of studies of modern France.

The temporary officers of the conference are:

Edward Mead Earle, Chairman	Schuyler C. Wallace (Columbia)
Institute for Advanced Study	Donald C. McKay (Harvard)
Princeton, New Jersey	Frederick S. Dunn (Yale)
William Ebenstein, Secretary	Joseph R. Strayer (Princeton)
Princeton University	William W. Lockwood (Princeton)

Members of the Executive Committee

It is hoped that the program and a list of participants will be available for distribution in mid-October or shortly thereafter.

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK
522 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

ROBERT M. LESTER
SECRETARY

7 Earle
Return to her office
We have copy
Thank you m.s.f.
October 14, 1949

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Dr. Oppenheimer

We are glad to be able to tell you that the Corporation has made available to the Institute for Advanced Study the sum of three thousand dollars (\$3,000) toward support of a conference on Modern France.

This grant is based upon a proposal made by Mr. Edward M. Earle in a letter to Mr. Gardner, dated September 29, 1949. It does not carry with it any commitment expressed or implied as to renewal or supplement.

Our Treasurer is being authorized to make payment of this amount within the next few days.

We shall look forward with interest to developments under this grant.

Sincerely yours

Florence Anderson
Assistant Secretary

FA:df
cc: Mr. Edward M. Earle

February 15, 1951

Mr. John Gardner, Vice President
Carnegie Corporation of New York
New York, New York

Dear John:

The enclosed report on the French seminar looks pretty formidable. But I thought it best to tell the story in fairly complete detail, in the hope that the report and its appendices may be useful within your organization. For formal purposes the report is addressed to Mr. Dollard, but I hope it will serve the purposes of the document which Mr. Lester usually requests at about this time of year.

There is one major item not included in the report-- an expression of my very great appreciation of the many kindnesses you have shown me during the past three years. You have always been generous of your time, have been a wise adviser, and, I am happy to say, an increasingly generous friend. I think you know how grateful I am to you for all the things you have done and for all the things you are.

Always yours,

Edward Mead Earle

EME:jml
Encs.

February 15, 1951

Mr. Charles Dollard, President
The Carnegie Corporation of New York
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Dollard:

It is with great pleasure that I submit herewith a report on the seminar on modern France conducted at the Institute for Advanced Study during the autumn of 1950. The seminar was the most recent in a series which have been made possible by a grant of \$55,000 from the Carnegie Corporation, 20th March 1947. Previous reports on activities under this grant were submitted in February 1950, February 1949, and May 1948.

In a letter of 8th May 1946—concerning a grant in support of our seminars in history and international relations—I assured the Corporation that "The Institute for Advanced Study would supplement the proposed grant from the Corporation by allotting to the same general purposes a portion of the funds it provides annually for stipends in the School of Economics and Politics (now incorporated in the School of Historical Studies). In addition, the Institute will contribute administrative services in the form of office space, library facilities, maps, and the like, as well as some secretarial assistance." You will note from the financial statements attached (Appendices I and J) that the Institute contributed something like four-fifths of the expenses of the seminar on modern France incurred during the periods June-December 1950, aside from unspecified amounts in the form of overhead expenses such as telephone, telegraph, postage, office supplies, and the like.

Because of the generous cooperation of the Director of the Institute and of my colleagues in the School of Historical Studies—particularly as regards the award of Institute stipends to members of my seminars—the funds generously made available to us by the Corporation for these seminars will serve the purposes of the grant for a longer period of time than was originally thought possible. And since the Corporation has agreed to allow unexpended funds to be carried forward into the future, the life of the seminars is assured beyond the three years during which the funds were made available (1947-1950).

May I mention, too, the support which the seminar on modern France has received from other sources. Two members of the

Mr. Dollard - 2

seminar held Social Science Research Council Fellowships, one a Guggenheim Fellowship. Two of the French members received Fulbright grants to cover the costs of transatlantic travel. One of the auditors, M. Cellier, had his travel expenses to and from the United States defrayed by the Cultural Relations section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nine members received leave of absence with full salary from their universities for the purpose of enabling them to participate in the seminar. Although no tabulation has been made of this further assistance in terms of dollars and cents, it obviously is very considerable.

A considerable measure of the success of the seminar was the result of the long-range planning involved. It took a great deal of time and effort, as well as an appreciable expenditure on travel, to assemble this group of American and European scholars and to obtain support for their participation in the seminar. Future seminars will require similar long-range, patient planning because of the difficulties in having key men released from their teaching obligations. But it is probable that in the future the favorable reputation which these seminars now enjoy in Great Britain, France, and the United States will, in the nature of things, reduce the seriousness of these difficulties and thus make available to us a pool of first-rate ability.

The mounting tension in world affairs—a state of near-war—may raise obstacles of its own to the execution of our plans for the future. But the very existence of a state of near-war makes the continuance of these seminars a matter of more than academic concern. In any case, we shall proceed on the assumption that what ought to be done can be done.

This written report has been supplemented from time to time by talks I have had with Mr. John Gardner concerning progress and plans, so that the Corporation has been kept continuously informed of the purposes to which the grant of \$55,000 has been put. If, however, there are questions you would like to ask, or further information you would like to have, I am entirely at your command.

May I say, in closing, how very much I appreciate the assistance of the Carnegie Corporation in my work at the Institute. It has been gratifying to me to have this moral and material support, without which I should have accomplished much less over the past ten years or so. From time to time in the past, too, scholars from abroad who have profited from the Corporation's grants, directly or indirectly, have expressed their appreciation to you and to us of the period of residence at the Institute which the grant has afforded. It would be almost impossible, too, to measure the satisfaction and profit which the younger members of the seminar have gained from their residence at the Institute and their active participation in its work. I am convinced that they

Mr. Dollard - 3

will return to their own institutions enriched in scholarship and
revivified as teachers. I hope that during the remaining life of
the grant we can make the very best use of the opportunities which
it offers the faculty and members of the Institute and of Princeton
University.

Faithfully yours,

Edward Mead Earle

EME:jml
Encs.

Report to the Carnegie Corporation of New York

on the

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Autumn Term - 1950

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Autumn Term - 1950

List of Appendices

- A. Members, Auditors, and Visitors
Supplement. Biographical Material on European Members
- B. "The French Crisis, 1918-1939"
- C. "The French Crisis, 1940-1950"
- D. "French Catholic Groups"
- E. "The French Peasantry, 1918-1939"
- F. "The French Middle Class, 1919-1939," by John B. Christopher
- G. Critique by Members of the Seminar
- H. Minutes of the Paris Meeting, May 1950
- I. Expenditures to December 31, 1950
- J. Expenditures June to December 1950

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

The Institute for Advanced Study

School of Historical Studies

Autumn Term - 1950

The seminar on modern France at the Institute for Advanced Study during the autumn term of 1950 was the most recent in a series of similar seminars in modern history and international relations which have been conducted since 1939 by Professor Edward Mead Earle. The seminars have been generously supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, to which the Institute makes grateful acknowledgment.

I

By any objective standards, the seminar on modern France was unusually successful. It was composed of an extraordinarily competent and enthusiastic group of members.¹ New working techniques enabled the seminar to complete an exceptionally large amount of work during the relatively brief period of a single academic term. As a result of long preliminary planning and especially careful selection of personnel, the work got under way in September 1950 without any of the initial delays which sometimes occur in an enterprise of this sort.

A word about working techniques: Since this particular seminar had an unusually large and a particularly outstanding membership, it was obvious from the start that it would have to be divided into working subcommittees or task forces which could do necessary pick-and-shovel work during the intervals

1. See Appendix A.

between plenary sessions. There were two principal task forces—one under the chairmanship of Mr. J. P. T. Bury of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and the other under Dr. David Thomson of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. Each of these groups was charged with formulating and exploring in detail the more important phases of the general subject which the seminar was convened to discuss—namely, "The Enduring Crisis in France, 1919-1950." Mr. Bury's group dealt, more particularly, with the period 1919-1939, and Mr. Thomson's with the decade 1940-1950. The terms of reference of these two groups were governed, however, by other than merely chronological considerations. The Bury task force not only concerned itself with developments in France during the two decades it had under consideration, but also kept constantly to the fore a comparison of developments in the French Republic during the inter-war period with simultaneous developments in the rest of Europe and, more particularly, in Great Britain. Mr. Thomson's group dealt with a period in which the course of French history and politics offered fewer profitable opportunities for contrast with the rest of Europe, but its memorandum was a notable analysis of French problems during and after defeat, occupation, and liberation. Each of the task forces prepared a lengthy memorandum setting forth the results of its discussions. These memoranda were discussed in great detail at plenary sessions of the group and were subsequently revised and re-issued in the light of comments and criticisms.²

In addition to the work of the task forces—in which all members of the seminar actively participated—there were ad hoc committees appointed from time to time to discuss problems of detail to which, for one reason or another, the task forces had been unable to give adequate consideration. A typical example

2. Appendices B and C are the final revised versions of the memoranda of the Bury and Thomson task forces.

was the memorandum prepared by a subcommittee under the chairmanship of Professor Robert F. Byrnes of Rutgers on the political orientation of Catholic groups in France.³ Occasionally, too, individual members of the seminar submitted statements which either amplified or amended views advanced by the task forces or at the plenary sessions. A typical instance is a memorandum by Professor Gordon Wright of the University of Oregon concerning the French "peasants."⁴ Occasionally, furthermore, experts who were not members of the seminar were asked to prepare memoranda concerning particular problems which the task forces regarded as requiring further competent opinion. For example, Professor John E. Christopher of the University of Rochester prepared a brief outline on the French middle classes⁵ and attended a meeting of the seminar at which his memorandum was discussed.

From time to time the seminar specially invited as guests scholars who were particularly well-informed concerning topics under discussion. Mention should be made in this connection of M. Raymond Aron of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Paris. He took a leading part at one of the regular sessions in a discussion of the role which the *élite* play and might play in French politics. And at a special evening meeting he gave a brilliant talk on the inability of French statesmen during the inter-war period to deal with economic problems—especially devaluation of the franc—in an economic, rather than a political, context. Mr. David Landes, a Junior Fellow at Harvard and a leading authority on the history of French business enterprise, was an exceedingly useful participant in a session devoted to the political orientation

3. Appendix D.

4. Appendix E. Professor Wright pointed out, among other things, that the term "peasant"—a convenient but inexact translation of "paysan"—needed to be used with a clear indication of what it meant in terms of French politics and French social groupings.

5. Appendix F.

of the French middle classes. In addition to members and occasional visitors, the seminar had a group of auditors who attended regularly but took a less active part in the discussions. Among these auditors were four Procter Fellows in the Graduate School of Princeton University. Of these, three were British and the fourth French, so that they were rather better informed than American students might have been concerning recent European history and international relations. They have all expressed warm appreciation of the opportunity to attend the seminar, and one has written, "The seminar was quite the most rewarding intellectual event since I came to Princeton [two years ago]."⁶

II

Although the members of the seminar gave a very considerable portion of their time to the work of the task forces as well as to smaller committee meetings and informal conferences, each of them had his independent research work in progress. This research was concerned, of course, with some phase of the history or politics of the French Republic and therefore fitted admirably into the larger scheme of things. The members have reported that freedom from teaching and other routine academic responsibilities enabled them to make notable progress in independent work; in addition, they have said that they profited greatly from discussion and criticism of their own work by fellow members of the seminar. It is unnecessary to comment at length upon individual research projects which were being carried on collaterally with the work of the seminar. It might perhaps be worth while, however, to mention two instances: the studies which Professor Gordon Wright has been making of the French peasantry, and Professor Henry Ehrmann's study of trends toward industrial democracy in the Fourth Republic.

6. For a complete list of auditors and visitors, see Appendix A.

The results of the seminar will be projected into the future not only by the aforementioned research studies in France, Britain and the United States,⁷ but also in a volume based upon the proceedings of the seminar which is now being written by Professor Edward W. Fox of Cornell, and which we hope will be published about a year hence. This volume will be Professor Fox's own work, not merely a rapporteur's report of seminar discussions. But it will, of course, profit enormously from those discussions, as well as from the many informal conferences which grew out of them. It is planned, too, to submit all or the greater part of Professor Fox's manuscript to the members of the seminar for comments and suggestions.

An intangible but invaluable by-product of the work of the seminar was the very warm personal and professional friendships established as among the members, and more particularly as between the younger American scholars, on the one hand, and the British and French scholars, on the other. Some members, indeed, thought that these friendships might prove to be the most enduring achievement of the seminar, valuable as they regarded its more measurable academic achievements.⁸

III

Over two years of planning paved the way for the seminar on modern France. Beginning in the winter of 1948 Professor Earle began a survey of the younger scholars in the United States and abroad who should be considered for membership. He interviewed all the men under consideration and in most cases discussed with the responsible officers of their respective institutions

-
7. Professors Wright and Farmer left for France in December 1950 to continue their work, and Professors Hughes and Fox plan to go to France in the near future to utilize the resources of French libraries. These periods of residence in France were planned from the beginning as complementary to participation in the seminar.
 8. For typical comments on the seminar by its members, see Appendix G.

the possibility of their receiving the necessary leaves of absence. A conference on modern France held in Princeton, February 1950, was, in a sense, preliminary to the seminar of the following autumn since all of the American members of the seminar took part in the February conference.⁹

Those finally invited to become members of the seminar included some of the ablest scholars now engaged in French studies in American, British, and French universities. The Americans, in a relatively young age group, came from universities as far removed as Harvard, Cornell, Columbia, and Rutgers in the East, and Oregon, Colorado, and Wisconsin in the West. Two of the Englishmen came from Cambridge, one from Oxford. The French members came from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris. Although not consciously planned that way, the membership of the seminar represented several disciplines—history, geography, political science, economics—and the seminar discussions were a good example of unpremeditated, but effective, interdisciplinary cooperation. Two members held Social Science Research Council fellowships, one a Guggenheim fellowship; two received Fulbright grants to cover transatlantic travel; all received financial support from their universities and, in addition, stipends from the Institute for Advanced Study. David Thomson of Cambridge came to the United States under the joint auspices of the seminar and the School of International Affairs of Columbia University. The cultural relations section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the American Embassy in Paris were of the greatest assistance as regards the participation of French scholars. Financial support and other encouragement from the Carnegie Corporation of New York were indispensable to the entire enterprise from its very inception. In

9. The February conference was sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Study, and international relations groups at Princeton, Yale, Harvard, and Columbia Universities. The Carnegie Corporation made a generous grant in support of the conference, the proceedings of which were published in 1951 by Princeton University Press under the title Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics.

- 7 -

short, the seminar was made possible by a good deal of inter-institutional cooperation.

The only major disappointment encountered in connection with the seminar was our inability to obtain additional members from France. Three French scholars who agreed to come—J. B. Duroselle (an historian), Louis Chevalier (a demographer), and Raymond Aron (an economist and political scientist)—were obliged to withdraw almost at the last moment. Two other outstanding younger French civil servants—Jacques Devabres (of the Ministry of Justice) and François Goguel (of the Conseil de la République)—could not be spared from their duties, although they were very helpful in the organization and planning of the seminar. Had it been possible to include all, or the majority, of the foregoing, the seminar would have been stronger in the presentation of French points of view and would have been re-enforced by a notable group of economists and political scientists.

An important preliminary to the work of the seminar was a meeting of the European members in Paris over the weekend of May 20-21, 1950. This meeting proved to be an indispensable first step in the formulation of an agenda and served the additional purpose of introducing the British and French members to one another. Although the program suggested at the Paris meeting was not altogether accepted by the whole seminar, the preliminary statement formulated at that time enabled the work of the group to get under way in September much more effectively than otherwise would have been the case.¹⁰

IV

Seminars in modern history and international relations at the Institute for Advanced Study differ from those conducted in graduate schools since their

10. Minutes of the Paris meeting are attached as Appendix H.

purpose is not instruction (membership in the Institute presupposes the doctor's degree). They are designed, rather, to deal with and, if possible, to solve historical and political problems; to clarify and amplify available data concerning such problems and to explore new sources of relevant materials; to submit to critical re-examination some of the more generally accepted, although not necessarily valid, theories of domestic politics and international relations. They are designed to give outstanding young scholars opportunities to advance their research, as well as to engage in regular and systematic exchange of views with colleagues of similar interests and comparable achievement. In short, they seek to extend the frontiers of knowledge and, while so doing, to further the intellectual development of the scholars who participate in them.

It is believed that the seminar on modern France made notable contributions to an understanding of French politics since the First World War and, simultaneously, accelerated the development as scholars and teachers of those who participated in it. The members themselves have testified that they will return to their respective universities with expanded intellectual horizons and with fresh points of view.¹¹ The seminar thus has served the dual purpose of advancing scholarship and of fostering an enlightened public opinion concerning France, which of necessity plays a critical role in survival of the Western World.

11. See Appendix G.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Critique by Members of the Seminar

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Comment by Arnold Toynbee

As you very kindly gave me an opportunity to take part in your seminar on France, held here this Fall, I should like, before sailing, to give you a note of my personal impressions of the results of our work.

My first impression is that you made a very happy choice of personnel. To dissect the present state of one country in a forum in which people from other countries are taking part is obviously a delicate undertaking which could not succeed unless all concerned showed a thoroughly objective and non-partisan spirit, and I was struck by the seminar's success in maintaining this spirit. For this, the chief credit is clearly due to our French colleagues, who had the most difficult part to play; but the atmosphere could not have been as admirable as it was if the whole membership of the seminar had not shown the same good feeling and the same genuine wish to arrive at the facts.

Owing to the excellence of the atmosphere, I think we did secure the good results that one might hope to obtain from a discussion in which France was examined from an American and a British, as well as from a French standpoint. We learnt a great deal about France; and, in the process, I think we also learnt much about the present state of the Western community as a whole.

When one is investigating controversial current questions, without the aid of the perspective that is automatically given by the passage of time, my own experience is that the best practical way of obtaining a stereoscopic view is to focus a number of lights, from a number of different angles, on the object under study.

I feel that, under your chairmanship, we did succeed in doing that in this seminar.

I look forward to the publication of the book that Dr. Fox is going to write in the light of the papers that have come out of the seminar's proceedings.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Comment by E. L. Woodward

I am sure the seminar was a success—everyone else agreed with me in feeling that collectively we had really done something, and that individually we had learned a great many things which we had not previously known, not only new facts but new points of view. Gordon Wright said to me after one session how much it meant to him—coming from a place where it was difficult to find people with whom he could discuss his subject—to "sit in" for a whole afternoon, week after week, with a room full of experts. I know that others felt the same, and I believe the seminar would have been worth while even if this had been its sole purpose and function. I think that we shall produce a "collective" result, in the form of the book which Fox is writing for us, over and above the sum of the "individual" results. Fox has not an easy job. He will have to keep what I might call the "multiplicity of points of view" and avoid taking a middle line all the time, but I think he will manage it alright.

I may add that, in my opinion, a great deal of the success of the seminar turned on your choice of the members, and on your method of handling the sessions. It was all important that we held our meeting in Paris in the spring, and thus had four months in which to be ready and thinking on the lines which our discussions would follow; but the main thing has been the remarkable way in which we settled down to work—and continued to work—as a unit. I must confess I was nervous, before we met, about the size of the seminar. I was afraid we might get tied up in argument, or that one or two people might wreck the proceedings by obstruction or over-assertion. Nothing of this kind happened.

However much trouble one takes there must always be something of a gamble about a large seminar of this kind. The gamble came off 100 per cent, and as you can never do better than this, I should hesitate before trying it again—but I am over-timorous in these matters.

Anyhow I am most grateful to you and to all our sponsors and colleagues for so valuable—and so enjoyable—a time.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Critique by David Thomson

It seemed to me that, apart from the great personal benefits of a chance to work quietly in congenial surroundings in the U. S. for a few months—which are very great indeed—the activities more specifically connected with the seminar proper fall into three categories:

1. The personal contacts and friendships, and the informal tete-à-tete or group discussions which took place naturally amongst people who have common interests of study.
2. The more systematic group discussions which took place in the "Task Forces", which in the end met on an average of once a week.
3. The more formal and general discussions of the full seminar.

1. Although the first is the least tangible in its value, I believe it should rank almost highest in its ultimate value. Having students of three or more nationalities "on tap" for a long period, each specially well informed about some aspect of modern France, both permits and stimulates prolonged reflection on one's work. In this respect, I believe the seminar did create most successfully a real "community of scholars"; and through the friendly personal relationships established it is likely to project its benefits far into the future.

2. The Task Force discussions were closely akin to the above, with the added factor that discussion had to be directed to specific problems, and to the preparation (and later the revision) of a written résumé of the results of the discussion. All such meetings were lively, stimulating, and—in my experience—fruitful. They were also extremely pleasant and enjoyable.

3. The weekly meeting* of the full Seminar seemed to me especially valuable

(a) to focus, and to provide a framework for both these other activities, and without it they would have perhaps lacked cohesion or urgency

(b) to criticise the reports of the "Task Forces", and to indicate issues neglected or under-emphasised by them.

It served these purposes admirably on the whole, which was quite certainly due to skilful Chairmanship. But if I may venture one criticism, I think it could serve these ends better by a more restricted and more constant membership. I was not quite certain that the contributions made by most of the occasional visitors were really worth the "raggedness" which a varying fringe of contemporary visitors almost certainly involved. We often found,

2. David Thomson.

for example, that they naturally raised questions which had been discussed at previous meetings, and they found it difficult to "get the hang" of the discussion as a whole. Total numbers occasionally became rather too large for a coherent discussion with all taking part.

But the three kinds of activity, taken together, seemed to me an ingenious and admirable combination, and each reinforced the other. Behind them all, lay a very careful choice of personalities and aptitudes, and without this none of the three would have been nearly as successful as all three undoubtedly were. I know the great care and hard work which must have gone into the preparations for it, and the problems of gathering together the right combination of people which must have been met with in these preparations. As so often with scholarly matters, it was the "unseen foundations" which most explained the successful outcome.

* During the last two weeks of the term, the seminar met twice a week.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Critique by Jean Gottmann

There could be no doubt, I think, that the Seminar as such was a success for the resident members of it. We all agreed that it was a pleasant and fruitful period for our own work and research on French questions and also that it led to establishing contacts and often developing personal friendships.

The work developed simultaneously on three levels: the weekly and "official" meetings on Thursday afternoons—plenary sessions, the task forces and assimilated group meetings, the completely informal but more frequent contacts and discussions at lunch, tea time, in the lobby, corridors, offices, etc.

In the long run and in so far as personal interests are concerned, the third level, the more restricted and permanent one, will prove probably the most valuable and interesting: that is a specialty of the Institute and is due to the atmosphere which pervades it as well as to the quality of the membership. Then would come the task force level: there was work indeed and clearing of many ideas and problems; sometimes we felt not very competent but in so far as possible we filled up, with the means available and in the amount of available time, we certainly did our best, always considering that what we were learning ourselves in the discussion and the work necessary in writing these things down was more important than the document itself—a basis for discussion, not definite conclusions.

The plenary sessions created another atmosphere: here we had a public and every time a number of visitors. Moreover we were supposed, in an international group (American-British-French) to come to some agreement on questions of one country constantly set against the achievements or problems of some others; the French-British comparison came up naturally, logically, putting often both French and British in delicate situations. We would have agreed to many things on both sides if the meetings had been restricted small meetings—like the task forces—but here there was a public. People would talk about our opinions as stated. It was especially difficult for the French. The plenary sessions got a subtle not political, but "politicized" international taste. I had no personal objections. I felt independent enough, and had some experience of that kind of round-table (though much less than Woodward of course). It compelled Chevallier to be cautious and even Chinard. Happily we had a chairman who conducted the debates in a perfect and most skillful manner. However, I still believe that because of the audience at least half of what might have been said by the British and French members was kept out of the discussions and then we indulged in "semantics". Nevertheless, that level of discussion was important and interesting too, even helpful, especially if its limitations were well realized. I think they were.

The main criticism of the group could be directed against the quality and number of the French members: only three, two of whom had spent more time in the United States than in France during the past ten years. If it

2. Jean Gottmann.

turned out to be so it was certainly not the fault of the organizers of the seminar but by the default of the Frenchmen invited to come. That we did discuss also some questions on which few of us had any outstanding competence? True in a way, but here again the competent people invited had sometimes not come, and moreover the whole thing was intended to enlighten ourselves, formulate a problem, not to solve it or suggest a final opinion as to its nature. It was wise, I think, not to publish the memos as such. If a general book by one of the members comes out later, the aim will be achieved to popularize some of the ideas.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Comment by Robert F. Byrnes

The seminar on Modern France which you conducted at the Institute this fall will surely constitute one of the most pleasant and valuable experiences of my academic life.

I am deeply grateful to you for inviting me to the seminar and for making possible such a splendid opportunity. I find it difficult to imagine a more fruitful and stimulating series of sessions than those which you directed. I am sure that my research, writing, and teaching in the future will always reflect both the information which I acquired and the qualities and temper of mind displayed by the scholars whom you had assembled. The only shortcoming was that the seminar had to end.

At our final session Professors Woodward and Chinard expressed very clearly the sentiments of the members of the seminar. I should only like to add my unqualified admiration for the extraordinary casual skill with which you directed the meetings and for your candor and graciousness, which contributed so much to the high success of the seminar.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Comment by Gordon Wright

The seminar has been concerned with the basic problems of the French nation from about 1918 to the present; and in the course of our discussions I was given an opportunity to fit the peasant problem into general French problems at every point. The experience has been exceptionally broadening and stimulating, and in addition it has given me, for the first time in years, time to read and to think rather than to run from one campus chore to the next. Steady contact with a remarkable group of British, French, and American specialists on France furnished a rare opportunity to try out various hypotheses on men whose knowledge and judgment on things French is very broad. From the French members of the seminar in particular—notably Professor Jean Gottmann, a political geographer—I received invaluable help in analyzing the agrarian structure of France and in selecting areas of varying types for intensive study during the months to come. I have also been able to do enough preliminary work on these areas to enable me to go into them with an adequate background to prevent waste of time when in the field. All in all, I do not believe that this autumn could have been spent more usefully at any other place—France itself not excepted.

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

The Institute for Advanced Study

School of Historical Studies

Autumn Term - 1950

Members

J. P. T. Bury	Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University.
Robert F. Byrnes	Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers University.
Richard D. Challener	Instructor in History, Princeton University.
Jean-Jacques Chevallier	Professor in the Faculty of Law and in the Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris.
Gilbert Chinard	Meredith Howland Pyne Professor of French Literature (emeritus), Princeton University.
Laing Gray Cowan	Assistant Professor of Government, and Administrative Assistant to the Director of the School of International Affairs, Columbia University.
Edward Mead Earle	Professor in the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study.
William Ebenstein	Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
Henry W. Ehrmann	Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado.
Paul Farmer	Associate Professor of History, University of Wisconsin; Social Science Research Council Fellow.
Edward W. Fox	Associate Professor of History, Cornell University.

- 2 -

Jean Gottmann	Professor, Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris.
H. Stuart Hughes	Assistant Professor of History, Harvard University.
George F. Kennan	Counselor, Department of State (on leave)
Joseph Kraft	Assistant, Institute for Advanced Study.
Daniel Marx, Jr.	Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College; Guggenheim Fellow.
David Thomson	Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University.
Arnold J. Toynbee	Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Research Professor of International History on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation, University of London.
Veronica Toynbee	Deputy Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs
E. L. Woodward	Fellow of Worcester College, and Professor of Modern History, University of Oxford.
Gordon Wright	Associate Professor of History, University of Oregon; Social Science Research Council Fellow

Auditors

Claude Cellier	Procter Fellow, Graduate School, Princeton University.
Ruth J. Dean	Professor of French Language and Literature, Mount Holyoke College
Edgar S. Furniss	Assistant Professor of Politics and John Witherspoon Preceptor, Princeton University

- 3 -

A. L. Gabriel	Professor of Old French and History of Mediaeval Education, University of Notre Dame.
Theodore D. Lockwood	Procter Fellow, Graduate School, Princeton University.
Graeme C. Moodie	Commonwealth Fellow, Graduate School, Princeton University.
Robert R. Palmer	Professor of History, Princeton University.
George Placzek	Member, School of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced Study.
J. R. Pole	Procter Fellow, Graduate School, Princeton University.
Marshall H. Stone	Professor of Mathematics, University of Chicago; Member, Institute for Advanced Study, autumn term, 1950.

Visitors

Raymond Aron	Lecturer in the Institut d'Études Politiques and in the École Nationale d'Administration, University of Paris.
Gerald Aylmer	Procter Fellow, Graduate School, Princeton University.
Percy W. Bidwell	Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.
John B. Christopher	Assistant Professor of History, University of Rochester.
Kenneth N. Douglas	Assistant Professor of French, Yale University.
Jacques Freymond	Professor of International Relations, University of Lausanne.
Christian Gauss	Dean Emeritus of the College and Professor Emeritus of Modern Languages, Princeton University.

- 4 -

Leo Gershoy	Professor of History, New York University.
Felix Gilbert	Professor of History, Bryn Mawr College.
Hans Kohn	Professor of History, College of the City of New York.
David S. Landes	Junior Fellow, Harvard University.
Donald C. McKay	Professor of History and Chairman of the Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University.
Jean Marx	Minister Plenipotentiary, Cultural Relations Division, French Foreign Office (retired).
Charles A. Micaud	Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia.
Robert Oppenheimer	Director, Institute for Advanced Study.
Saul K. Padover	Professor, New School for Social Research.
François Puaux	Vice Consul General of France in New York.
Roger Seydoux	Consul General of France in New York; formerly associate director of the Division of Cultural Relations of the French Foreign Office.
Joseph R. Strayer	Professor of History and Chairman of the Department of History, Princeton University.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
School of Historical Studies
Princeton, New Jersey

European Members of Seminar on Modern France
Autumn Term, 1950-1951

*Raymond Aron, Lecturer in the Institut d'Études Politiques and in the École National d'Administration, University of Paris. Born in Paris in 1905, M. Aron was educated at the École Normale Supérieure and at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Paris, from which he received the degree of Docteur ès Lettres in 1938. He has taught at the lycée at Le Havre, at the French academy in Berlin, and at the universities of Toulouse, Cologne, and Paris. During the War he joined General DeGaulle's Free French movement and became editor of La France Libre, published in London. After Liberation he became a member of the editorial staff of Combat and, later, of Figaro, for which he has written principally on international affairs. His principal publications are: La sociologie allemande contemporaine (1935); Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire (1938); L'âge des empires et l'avenir de la France (1946); Le grand schisme (1948).

J. P. T. Bury, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. Now 42 years old, Mr. Bury was educated at Marlborough College and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. During the War, he served in the Ministry of Supply for about five years and in 1945 became chief of the French section of the Research Department of the Foreign Office. He has been secretary of the British Committee of the International Historical Congress and is librarian of Corpus Christi College. Now engaged in editing Volume X of the new Cambridge Modern History, his principal publications are: Gambetta and the National Defence (1936) and France, 1814-1940 (1949); he has contributed chapters to Studies in Anglo-French History, edited by Alfred Coville and H. W. V. Temperley, and to The Opening of an Era, 1848, edited by F. Fetjo. Mr. Bury is a nephew of J. B. Bury, historian of ancient Greece. He is married and will be joined in Princeton by Mrs. Bury later in the term.

Jean-Jacques Chevallier, professor in the Institut d'Études politiques and in the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris. In 1921, at the age of 21, he received his Licence en Droit at the University of Paris; subsequently he was awarded doctoral degrees in law and in political science at the same university. Since his original appointment to the faculty of law at the University of Paris in 1925, Professor Chevallier has taught at the universities of Grenoble and Belgrade. During the war he was captain of Alpine infantry, 1939-1940, and later, in 1945, was a battalion commander in the Sixth [American-French]

* For part of the term only.

Army Group commanded by General Jacob Devers: for these war services he received the Croix de Guerre. Professor Chevallier's principal interest is the history of political ideas. His publications include: L'évolution de l'empire britannique (1930); Mirabeau: un grand destin manqué (1947); Les grandes oeuvres politiques de Machiavel à nos jours (1949). He is now completing a work on the history of political ideas from Plato to our time. Professor Chevallier is married, but his wife has not accompanied him to America.

Jean Gottmann, Maître de Conférences, Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris, and Chargé de Recherches, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Although only 35 years old, Dr. Gottmann is generally recognized as one of the world's leading political geographers. Trained at the Institute of Geography at the Sorbonne, Dr. Gottmann has made extensive studies in economic and political geography in Europe, North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caribbean. Before the War he was active in the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, in Paris. He left Vichy France in 1942 and was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, 1942-1944. Dr. Gottmann rendered wartime services to the Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration. During the years 1944-1948 he was assistant professor and associate professor of geography at the Johns Hopkins University. For a time during 1946-1947 he was director of studies and research, Department of Social Affairs, United Nations, Lake Success. He also has lectured at Princeton and Columbia universities in the United States and at the universities of Brussels and Geneva abroad. During the autumn of 1949 he was again a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Dr. Gottmann is the author of Les Relations Commerciales de la France (1942); La Fédération Française (1945); L'Amérique (1945); A Geography of Europe (1950). His essay "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare" (Chapter X of Makers of Modern Strategy) is a valuable contribution to recent military history.

David Thomson, fellow of Sidney Sussex College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. Mr. Thomson obtained his baccalaureate degree from Cambridge in 1934--when he was 22 years old--and his Ph.D. degree in 1938. Although he teaches general courses in European history, his special interest has been France. His book Democracy in France: The Third Republic (1946) was immediately recognized as one of the very best books in its field. On a somewhat similar theme was his The Democratic Ideal in France and Britain (1940). His latest work England in the Nineteenth Century will be published in the very near future. Dr. Thomson is the editor

of Volume XII of the new Cambridge Modern History, dealing with the period since 1900. Dr. Thomson is married and is accompanied by his wife.

E. L. Woodward, Professor of Modern History and fellow of Worcester College, University of Oxford. Now 60 years old, Professor Woodward is one of the deans of British historians. He was educated at the Merchant Taylor's School and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. After service in the British Expeditionary Forces during the First World War, he returned to Oxford and has remained there for the past thirty years. In 1944 Mr. Woodward was named as the first Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford. He resigned in 1947 to accept a newly-created professorship of modern history. Professor Woodward was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study during the first term of the academic year 1946-1947; during his residence at the Institute he participated in the bicentennial conferences of Princeton University and received from the University an honorary degree of Doctor of Letters. He is now engaged in editing the British Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of the Second World War, several volumes of which already have been published. He is a member of the British Academy and of the American Philosophical Society. In addition to his volumes of diplomatic documents, Professor Woodward has published: Three Studies in European Conservatism; War and Peace in Europe, 1815-1870; Great Britain and the German Navy; The Age of Reform (Volume XIII of the Oxford History of England), and other historical works, as well as Short Journey, an autobiography. Mrs. Woodward will accompany her husband to the United States.

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Institute for Advanced Study

Autumn 1950

THE FRENCH CRISIS 1918-1939

(Revised)

The committee charged with the preparation of this report has understood its assignment as an initial attempt to isolate the problems involved in the French crisis during the 1920s and the 1930s and to indicate the character and scope of the French crisis in comparison with the problems of other European countries in the same period and with the problems of France before the First World War. In this report the committee has therefore undertaken (1) to define those problems which involved France as well as other countries or the whole of Europe during the 1920s and 1930s, and (2) to define those problems which were in some sense peculiar to France. In general, it was agreed that those problems could be considered most conveniently under the headings of (1) internal economic and social, (2) internal political and ideological and (3) international relations. They are therefore presented in that order, each being subdivided into two sections dealing (a) with the problem as it affected Europe as a whole and (b) as a factor in the development of France.

I. INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

A. Problems Widespread in Europe, which Affected France

1. An intensified demand for social justice.

Throughout Europe after 1918 a demand, whose origin lies before 1914, for the betterment of social conditions or what was increasingly

termed social justice became more insistent. In particular the Russian Revolution raised new hopes which it was difficult for governments to ignore. In Europe as a whole this involved demands for an amelioration of the condition of peasants as well as urban workingmen. In France no large-scale movement developed during the 1920s and 1930s representing the interests of the peasant. But the demand for reform in the interest of the urban worker became more urgent. It did not issue in a social revolution nor even an abortive insurrection, as happened in some other countries. Nevertheless, the discontent of labor constituted a serious problem in the 1920s as well as after the onset of the depression in the 1930s.

This situation was more serious in France in some respects than in other countries because the French government had not introduced as effective a program of social legislation before the First World War as had, e.g., the British and German governments. The reasons for this French backwardness were many and complex. Among them was the relative slowness of industrial development in France, which meant that France did not have as great national wealth before 1914 as had Britain and Germany nor even as much per capita as Belgium. As a consequence France had fewer economic resources with which to support a program of social reform. Moreover, also, because of the lesser degree of industrialization, the French proletariat comprised a smaller part of the population and had less political power with which to compel satisfaction of its social demands. The French propertied classes, on the one hand, showed much less readiness than the British or the German to satisfy the demands of the labor movement either as a matter of conscience or as insurance against

- 3 -

movement either as a matter of conscience or as insurance against social revolution.

After 1918 the French proletariat, which had borne a large burden of the fighting and seen industry profit heavily from the fighting, vigorously renewed its demand for social reform both through direct negotiations and through social legislation. One important result was the law in 1919 limiting work to an eight-hour day without any reduction of wages. To expand the social program to an extent which would involve a government subsidy was, however, hardly practical at the time because of the heavy cost of the war. Reparations, which were to have covered the costs of reconstruction and the servicing of the war debts, failed to materialize, while the industrial and commercial income of the country did not climb back to its prewar level for some years and never increased sufficiently to meet the increased national obligations. Moreover, there was no indication that the rural voters were prepared to support additional taxation for the benefit of the urban proletariat. Thus, with the need for reform increased and the resources of the nation reduced, it was inevitable that the old cleavages on class lines would reopen and even deepen and that each new problem of postwar adjustment and eventually the economic depression would aggravate these cleavages which were a basic weakness of the national social structure.

2.4. Costs of destruction during the First World War.

All countries which participated in the First World War had in its aftermath to bear the costs of destruction during the war. These included the devastation of farmland, destruction or damage to factories, mines, dwellings, highways, railroads, and bridges, loss

of shipping, diminution of available manpower, and pension charges. Although estimates are available of the money-damage sustained by each of the belligerents, it is impossible to measure the degree of economic and social dislocation sustained by each as a consequence of the war. It is clear, however, that no nation suffered more damage than did France and probably none save Russia sustained nearly as much.

In money-value, the French war losses have been estimated at upwards of 10 milliards of francs (\$2 billion). The damage in the form of destruction of capital installations (factories, mines, etc.) was repaired rather quickly--largely within five years--and likewise the production of coal, iron, and steel regained the prewar level by 1924. However, the loss of manpower, amounting to 2 million men,¹ was a severe and lasting economic handicap to France. It entailed a greater shrinkage in the area under cultivation than did the devastation of farmland as a consequence of fighting and made necessary a still greater dependence upon immigrant labor--Italian, Belgian, Spanish, and Polish--to supplement the native labor force in industrial as well as agricultural pursuits. Besides the loss of manpower, the economic cost of the war had a permanent consequence in the alteration of the position of France in world-investment. Whereas before the war France had had investments abroad to the value of 38 billion francs, after the war she had a net indebtedness of 6 billion francs (reckoned in francs of equal purchasing power). However, it should be noted that to some extent war destruction enabled France to build

1. 1,300,000 dead or missing and the rest permanently maimed. Casualties were particularly heavy during the first few months of the war.

a more modern economic plant, and there was a steady rise in overall production figures between 1920 and 1930. Modernization was particularly effective in the cotton spinning and weaving industries which were concentrated in the Vosges, Meurthe-et-Moselle, and the Nord.

3. The problem of restoring international trade.

France, like other countries, had to deal in the 1920s with the problem of restoring international trade after its disruption and partial blockage during the First World War. This problem became more acute and in turn produced more pernicious consequences because its nature and importance were not understood throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. After the First World War the United States became the principal creditor nation. International trade was thus complicated by the fact that the country with the greatest purchasing power and investment potential was a country with an exportable surplus of agricultural and industrial products and a system of inordinately high tariffs upon imports. One of the now obvious remedies for this situation--an American loan program--was slow in coming because of American domestic preoccupations and also because of the mistaken notion that Germany could be made to pay. After 1924 the Americans at last undertook a loan program, but it was neither systematically organized nor judiciously administered. For France the only possible recourse was a severe currency devaluation, which would build up exports and reduce the burden of interest and pension charges upon the national debt. However, although these charges were reduced and a favorable balance of trade restored by 1926, the devaluation caused strains on banking and treasury operations, which in turn weakened the entire economic system.

4. Social and economic effects of currency devaluation.

In France, as in most European countries, an expansion of currency had been used to cover the inordinately high costs of war and reconstruction, and the increase in business activity. The reserve ratio at the Banque de France fell from 70% in 1913 to roughly 10% in 1924. To avoid the bankruptcy which might have resulted from the continued fall in the gold price of the franc, a currency devaluation became necessary, and the Poincaré government in fact devalued the franc from 20 cents in gold to 4 cents in gold.

The purely economic results of this currency devaluation were, in certain areas, offset by a concomitant inflation in prices. Thus, though peasant debts were wiped out by the depreciation, and though the price for agricultural products rose, this rise was more than matched by the rise in costs. Industrial labor suffered somewhat since the general price index outran the wage level index. But industrial laborers who were debtors profited by the depreciation. However, the price rise did not act as a direct counterpart to the depreciation. People on fixed incomes, and rentiers with non-liquid holdings, suffered greatly, though they were not as thoroughly devastated as the German middle class. Nor, owing to the conservative banking tradition and the general tightness of credit, did France develop the inflationary loan policy that led to industrial combination and eventually to rationalization and cartels in Germany. In general, however, it may be said that the larger business units with extensive borrowing facilities and insulation from the consumer were able to take advantage of the widening spread between wage cost and selling price to better their positions.

There were, moreover, some social and political effects of devaluation and inflation that transcended the economic results. One effect was to embitter sufferers against the state and against the economic system itself; such people were of course particularly susceptible to the fascist and communist argument. In the middle class, the discontented inclined towards fascism. Thus, for example, the Croix de Feu was composed largely of middle class veterans. One of the characteristics of the Croix de Feu, and of fascism in general, has been the denigration of the modern economic system as a whole, the refusal to think in its terms, and a contempt for some of its symbols such as urban society, money, and the Jew. It is possible that the disposition to regard the complex workings of the modern economy as intrinsically iniquitous is partly a product of the bewildered helplessness engendered by the devaluation and inflation.

5. The depression of the 1930s. The world depression of the 1930s, which involved all countries with the possible exception of Soviet Russia, assumed a special and, on the whole, less acute manifestation in France. A basic reason for this was the relatively well-balanced and self-contained character of the French economy. Another was the devaluation of 1926, which made the franc rather cheap in relation to other currencies, so that exports continued at a high level until hit by British devaluation in 1931 and American in 1933. Accordingly the depression only began to affect France seriously in 1933, by which time it had reached the trough elsewhere. Since the French had a large number of small agricultural holdings, the depression as measured in unemployment statistics was less severe in France than elsewhere, for many urban workingmen were able to go back

to the farm. On the other hand, the depression was more strongly affected by agricultural conditions in France than in some other countries. The good harvests of 1932, 1933, and 1934 produced a fall in farm prices which worsened the impact of industrial and commercial depression. The harvests of 1936 and 1937 were short, on the other hand, which contributed to an apparent economic recovery in 1936 and 1937. A more substantial contribution was the devaluation of 1936, when France went off the gold standard; and in 1936-7 the labor reforms of the Popular Front also brought about a measure of recovery in employment. It has been contended that devaluation, which was deferred partly because of the fears engendered by the earlier Poincaré devaluation, would have provided a much greater stimulus and done much to avert a serious economic and political crisis if it had been introduced three years sooner.¹ Yet the real problem, if France were to maintain her position as a leading military power and to support an increasing expenditure upon social welfare, was the level of industrial production. This problem was never solved, and fundamentally its nature was not such as to be capable of resolution simply by the timely application of a monetary measure. Despite an improvement in 1937, 1938 saw a new drop in industrial output.

The failure of France to solve the problems of the depression had important consequences inasmuch as it helped to make many Frenchmen question the adequacy of their political institutions and some the sufficiency of France's economic structure. It likewise helped to produce a spirit of defeatism at a moment when world war impended.

1. R. Aron speaking to the Seminar November 2, 1950.

B. Problems which Affected France in Particular

1. The problem of developing large-scale economic operations.²

Besides those social and economic problems which she faced along with other countries, France had a major problem in the 1920s and 1930s, unlike Germany and Britain, of introducing large-scale, rationalized, economic operations, and thereby improving productivity. This involved not only the modernization of the industrial plant, substituting machine-methods for artisan labor, but also the development of large, integrated units in agricultural and commercial enterprise. Even in 1914 France had been noticeably behind Germany and Britain in the level of economic efficiency, and, despite the postwar modernization of industry in the devastated areas, the problem became more serious in the 1920s and 1930s.

The causes and consequences of the French failure to develop a consistently modern industrial plant are widely ramified and mutually entangled. A basic factor is that agriculture has continued to occupy a large number of people in France, with a majority of these people living on small, backward farms. The prevalence of small peasant ownership has meant a general reliance upon cash rather than checks as a medium of exchange. This in turn has meant that it is easier to levy excise taxes on widely-used products than to collect a direct income tax. The dependence of the government upon excise taxes has

2. These observations are made on the assumption that the indefinite increase of productivity is a goal of modern society. Should this assumption be denied, they would have to be revised. In any case we recognize that smallness is not necessarily a bad thing in itself.

meant that in times of economic stress the government must resort to borrowing to increase its revenue, thus raising questions as to the possible exhaustion of public credit, and limiting the area of government fiscal operation. Apart from contributing to weaken the structure of national finances, the large number of small peasant holdings has acted to restrict the size of the domestic market for goods.

Another partial consequence of the prevalence of peasant proprietorship, and a definite element in the problem of developing higher productivity, is the high incidence of the family firm in French industry. Since the family firm which sometimes represents a conversion of peasant savings into industrial holdings, and more often implies an extension of peasant attitudes towards property, has persisted, the French have not to any great extent developed the competitive mentality and the drive for expansion which has resulted in the devising of the elaborate corporate forms of capital formation so common in England and Germany.

In France borrowing is often considered a sign of bad management, and the industrial unit is regarded as an individual interest which should be allowed to survive rather than as a machine to be superseded. In the absence of corporate structure, on the one hand, the enterprising industrialist who is not averse to borrowing finds it difficult to secure funds necessary for continual readjustment to technological advance, and on the other hand, the investor continues in the old tradition of pushing his capital into government bonds rather than equities; as a result the state continues, in its old tradition, to take a direct role in the stimulation of large industrial enterprise, while private enterprise is characterized by a great number of small firms.

The prevalence of small enterprizes has made it possible for the French to specialize in the production of non-standardized luxury goods, and this concentration in turn presents another obstacle to the introduction of new methods, for in many cases the sentiment of artisanship and the preference of consumers counteract the demonstrable efficiency of technological progress.

Further obstacles to modern industrialism are the scarcity of coking-coal, and the small size of the French domestic market. In addition, monopolistic concentration in certain basic industries, notably iron and steel, aluminum (bauxite), and chemicals has led to a stifling of competition which has resulted in a stagnation of technological advance and a check on production expansion.

On the other hand, the persistence of small-scale economic operations has also had some advantageous consequences for France. Because industrialization has been impeded, a balance has been maintained between urban and rural economies. Hence France has remained nearly self-sufficient in the production of foodstuffs, although some items--sugar, rice, and coffee--must be imported. Moreover, unemployment in time of depression is less serious in France than elsewhere because in time of economic crisis a large proportion of the industrial proletariat has other means of subsistence besides wages. This was especially important in the early 1930s.

2. The problem of population. In respect to population, too, France has had a distinctive problem of some magnitude which had social, economic, political, and military aspects. The slow rate of population growth in France since the early nineteenth century

- 12 -

has perhaps been a factor in slowing down the rate of industrialization. It has also put France at a disadvantage relative to Germany in the number of men available for military service. Moreover, because her population was already relatively small in 1914, the impact of the First World War upon population factors was especially acute for France. The relatively large number of casualties which France sustained in the war seriously reduced the proportion of adult males in the whole population, and the decline in the birth rate during the war years further worsened the relative disadvantage of France in the overall number of population. As a consequence, during the 1920s and 1930s France had to support its population with a relatively small number of native adult males in the labor force. This led to a greater dependence upon large-scale immigration--Italian, Spanish, Polish, and Belgian--¹ to augment the native labor force both in industry and agriculture. During the inter-war period the presence of these immigrants apparently did not produce any notable political problem. However, the dependence upon immigrant labor did mean that in the event of war, which would interrupt immigration, France would feel its shortage of a native labor force. The seriousness of the population problem in other aspects also had political importance during the 1930s, when the prospect of a new war arose, for the French were aware that their population of military age was even more inadequate, relative to the German, than in 1914, and that the consequences of another blood-letting would be even more disastrous for France than before.

1. About 2,300,000 immigrants settled in France during 1920-39.

Concluding Summary

The solution of social questions, already deferred before 1914 for various reasons, was for the most part still further deferred after the 1914-1918 war because of the impoverishment of the state owing to the heavy cost of war and of postwar reconstruction, the change in the balance of payments, and the failure to obtain reparations. The social cleavages to which these questions bore witness thus continued, and in the late 1920s and 1930s they were complicated and intensified by a devaluation which hit the middle class with particular severity, and by the depression which although it came late was prolonged partly perhaps owing to a widespread reluctance to face a further devaluation. Thus the main attempt to satisfy the demands for social justice did not come until 1936 when tensions had been aggravated not only by these economic factors but also by the political and international developments with which we deal in the two following sections. Moreover, compared with her great neighbors, Britain and Germany, France fell still further behind in her relative position as an industrial power. The fundamental handicaps of shortage of raw material and of a shrinking native labor force were enhanced by the continued fidelity to an economic structure characterized by the prevalence of small farms and family firms, and by growing aversion to business risks which hindered the modernization of France's industry and the increase of her production.

II. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

A. Problems Widespread in Europe, which Affected France

1. A decline in the prestige of parliament and politics.

Throughout Europe in the period 1918-39 there was a lessening prestige of parliament as a means of solving political problems. This movement was not simply the obverse of the rise of bolshevism and fascism. In part it represented a disillusionment with liberalism based upon such factors as the cumulative effect of the exposure of corruption and inefficiency in parliamentary regimes and the inglorious record of some of the new republics which were set up in 1918-19. This movement of opinion did not gain universal prevalence, of course. Nor was it new, for the antecedents of bolshevism lie before 1914 and an authoritarian Right--both the remnant of the conservatism of the early nineteenth century and the antecedents of the fascist movements of the twentieth century--was in evidence before 1914.

There was perhaps also a growing doubt during the 1920s and 1930s as to the importance of politics. Though the period saw intense political debate in all countries, this perhaps conceals increasing opinion that the basic questions are not matters of politics but rather--variously--of culture (e.g., "pure" art movements), or economics, or simply military power. The sense of the paramount importance of politics which was so characteristic of the period of 1848--for both liberals and conservatives--was still alive in 1918-19, but it was in decline before 1940, not only in France but throughout Europe. And so, whereas before 1914 liberalism had been gaining electoral ground (although acute observers were beginning to realize that it could no longer provide

effective solutions to rising social problems), after 1918 the movements hostile to parliamentarism surged ahead, and liberalism was forced onto the defensive.

2. Disillusionment as to principles basic to liberalism.

Much of what seemed a breakdown of French morale in the 1920s and 1930s--weariness, pessimism, disillusionment--was not a phenomenon of France alone but was part of the general moral reaction of Europe in the postwar period. Throughout Europe there was a decline of belief in progress and rationalism. In part this was a response to the recurrence of the barbarities and futilities of war, which seemed a refutation of liberal assumptions as to the rationality of man and the perfectibility of human institutions. In part it was also the consequence of developments in intellectual history (e.g., Freud) which were independent of the war.

3. Inadequacies of political leadership. Throughout Europe after 1918--not just in France--there seemed to have been a growing inadequacy of political leadership. Statesmen were unable to solve their problems and attain their purposes, less successful than had been their predecessors of the late nineteenth century. Those who were effective (e.g., Lenin), were not liberal. The reasons are not clear. Perhaps the statesmen were no less capable than their predecessors but their problems more difficult. Perhaps the casualties of the First World War--and the disruption of the careers of those men of promise who survived the war--lowered the level of available political personnel.

France especially lost a high proportion of men who would have been in their fifties about 1935 and would presumably have taken position at that time among the leading political figures. Perhaps

- 16 -

another factor was that the educational systems which prevailed in Europe before 1914 did not afford adequate preparation--e.g., in economics--for the men who had to make decisions in the world of the 1920s and 1930s. Further, a notable phenomenon throughout Europe in the 1920s and 1930s is the partial or total overthrow of an old ruling class and the rise to political power of men of quite another class. This is most obvious in the countries of central and eastern Europe but also noticeable in lesser degree in western Europe. Before 1914 politics had been reserved to a rather small, distinct, and self-conscious class, which enjoyed financial independence and had a sense of metier, whereas after 1918 government was given over in part or whole to men who were less experienced, whether or not less capable or less educated. However, this phenomenon was less novel in France after 1918 than in other countries.

4. The impact of bolshevism. The Soviet regime, product of the first successful socialist revolution, did much to reinvigorate revolutionary Marxism throughout Europe and thus to raise a problem for liberal regimes. In consequence of an evolution during the 1920s and 1930s in the general orientation of bolshevik policy, the impact of bolshevism became especially severe after 1933, when the new Soviet preoccupation in the field of foreign policy, which arose in response to the threat of the fascist countries, Germany and Japan, was translated by the Third International into the general tactics of the United Front (alliance of Socialists and Communists) and the Popular Front (coalition between the working class and the lower middle class). These tactics were much more attractive to non-Communists than had been the earlier, sectarian character of the bolshevist movement, and were particularly effective in France.

5. The impact of fascism. Throughout Europe the example of Italian fascism in the 1920s and of other fascist regimes in the 1930s reinvigorated the authoritarian Right, for the first time affording a realizable alternative to parliamentarism. France was receptive to some aspects of these fascist doctrines because a strong anti-liberal conservatism had endured throughout the nineteenth century and even before 1900 many of the ideas (chauvinism, anti-semitism, corporatism) characteristic of fascism, were already well known there.

B. Problems Which Affected France in Particular

The epoch of the peace treaties of 1919-20 seemed to have consecrated the triumph of parliamentarism throughout Europe. Yet throughout Europe during the 1920s and 1930s parliamentarism weakened or broke down. The primacy of the executive tended, under one form or another, to replace the primacy of the legislative. This crisis occurred in other countries as well as in France, but in France it assumed distinctive shape.

1. Chronic weaknesses in French parliamentarism. Parliamentarism was better established in France after World War I than in most other continental countries. But in France, unlike England, the parliamentary regime had never been wholly accepted nor was it really popular. The Third Republic had attempted to broaden the base of the Orleanist parliamentary tradition, which it had inherited, by incorporating a number of democratic principles, including universal suffrage, in the constitution. Yet since 1875, the date the republican constitution was adopted, a number of political crises, of which the most characteristic and most serious was boulangisme, had developed. From the outset, moreover,

the republican parliamentary regime had been marked, in a country which knew nothing of the two-party system (though it made use in practice of a political system based upon two "tendencies"), by an excessive ministerial instability. However, we must remember that the instability of ministerial formations did not preclude a remarkable stability of ministerial personnel, for the same persons often reappeared in successive ministries. "Ministrables" of the first and second rank made up a recognizable category of political personnel, to which new additions were made only slowly. Moreover, political instability was counter-balanced by administrative stability. Throughout the successive regimes after 1814, the "administrative constitution", which France owed to Bonaparte, remained unchanged in its inner spirit. And the powerful grands corps de l'Etat (e.g., Conseil d'Etat and Inspection des Finances) played a very important part in the governmental life of France under the Third Republic.

2. The impact of the financial problem. During the 1920s and 1930s, the old French parliamentarism, with its distinctive French characteristics, seemed no longer able to respond to the new needs of France. An important factor in this new situation was the financial problem, which reacted directly upon the political problem. Thus the financial problem broke up the majority of the Left which had issued from the elections of 1924, even though eventually Poincaré achieved a provisional solution of the problem and succeeded in temporarily strengthening the regime. After the elections of 1932, which constituted a new victory of the Left, the financial problem reappeared, more acute than before, as a consequence both of the depression and of the victory of the Left itself. Within a short time

- 19 -

it broke up the majority which had been constituted by the Radical-Socialists and the S.F.I.O.--the efforts of the Radical-Socialists were not supported by the Socialists, who refused their participation and even, in difficult moments, their support. Within thirteen months--between the close of 1932, when Herriot, the head of the majority, was overthrown, and the crisis of 6 February 1934--six ministries succeeded one another. It was a massacre of ministries. The same story was repeated after the elections of 1936, which were a triumph for the Left majority known as the Popular Front.

The first Blum ministry, under Socialist direction with Radical participation and Communist support, was at its outset assured of an overwhelming majority (386 against 210). Nevertheless, after that ministry, which lasted a little more than a year (26 June 1937), there occurred the progressive disruption of the Popular Front majority under the pressure of the financial problem, to which was added the pressure of foreign policy (the German rearmament of 1935, the sanctions affair, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Spanish War, Anschluss, Munich). Blum smashed against the mur d'argent; upon the refusal of confidence by the holders of savings, he devalued the franc. This devaluation was followed by a rise in prices, an insufficient rise in pensions and wages, the hostility of the Senate, and the fall of Blum. Thereafter until the outbreak of the war in 1939, there ensued two Chautemps ministries, another Blum ministry, finally Daladier--but the Daladier majority after November 30th was no longer a majority of the Left, for the Socialists and Communists were counted against it. There was no longer a Popular Front. Was there still a parliamentary regime?

3. Resort to decree-laws. Perhaps, but it has a parliamentarism modified by the empirical method of decree-laws, that is, delegations of power by Parliament to the executive. The decree-laws of Doumergue, Laval, Daladier (three times) served as a means of reinforcing the executive, necessary in order to deal with the financial problem as well as the international problem of preparation against the threat of war. It was not a wholly satisfactory means to that purpose. Yet all projects for the reform of parliamentarism, tending notably to introduce the two-party system (Tardieu, Reynaud) or to bring the power of dissolution into operation (Doumergue), broke down in the face of the tradition of ministerial instability and multiple parties, all of which save the communist lacked internal discipline.

4. The impact of new ideologies. Since the close of the era of the Revolution and the Empire in 1815, French politics had been dominated by the cleavage between those who accepted the Revolution and those who did not, among whom were numbered the majority of politically active Catholics and the leaders of the Catholic hierarchy. In the course of the Third Republic, that division had culminated in the Dreyfus affair. But the war of 1914 had seemed to put an end to it. The patriots of the extreme Right--royalists of the Action Française or nationalists in the manner of Barrès--had poured forth their blood at the same time as the anti-militarist instituteurs and Catholic curés. After 1918 anti-clericalism, as a form of defense of the Republic and the Revolution against the anti-republican and counter-revolutionary Church, had ceased to be a really live issue.

It was not dead--it will never die--but it was somnolent. The Radical-Socialist Party, the champion of anti-clericalism, was obliged to change its platform--it campaigned for peace and the League of Nations. Moreover, everyone--even Rightists--acknowledged that France had been saved during the war by a Jacobin, a violent partisan of the Revolution, Georges Clemenceau.

During the 1930s, however, the strengthening of fascism in Italy and the Nazi triumph in Germany revived the hopes and influenced the plans of the authoritarian Right. Historic evolution did not necessarily condemn authoritarian regimes, as the democrats had contended, and if men had been afraid after 1919 that Europe would become bolshevist, they could now hope that she would become fascist. In France, the counter-revolution gained fresh vigor. Its new spirit was expressed not only in the Action Française but also in some very influential and widely-read weeklies such as Candide, Gringoire, and Je Suis Partout. Foreign policy became the chief battleground between democrats and anti-democrats, the anti-democrats or pro-fascists being against the League of Nations, against England, against the Little Entente, for Mussolini and Franco, although not generally for Hitler, because of the traditional hostility of the Right toward Germany.

In the same way, other factors of European scale--the strengthening of bolshevism in Russia, the economic crisis, the changed attitude of Russia toward foreign policy, owing, as has been noted above, to the growth of the fascist danger--encouraged the growth of Stalinist communism among the French working classes and left-wing intellectuals and even a small part of the lower middle class. Adopting a new and more attractive orientation in the period of the Popular Front,

The French Communists came forward as the most energetic defenders of the Revolution of 1789-93, and of democratic France and laid claim to the inheritance of the Jacobin and Boulangist traditions. The alliance with Soviet Russia against Hitlerite Germany was the sole means, so they argued, to guarantee the defence of those traditions. As a consequence the Communists, who were losing ground before 1934, gained considerably between 1934 and 1936. They profited by this to spread the idea among their followers that Stalin is always 100% right--right when he wants France to rearm to resist Hitler (1935), right also when he signs a non-aggression pact and virtual alliance with Hitler (August 1939). Likewise Russian foreign policy was presented by the French Communists as the only peace policy, all others being "imperialistic". But, by reaction, the Right groups tended to say that France must not fight for Stalin and that the real enemy was not Hitler but "the enemy within"--communism and, by extension, democracy, because democracy necessarily leads to communism. Munich marked the sharpest point in this split.

As a consequence of the fascist-communist cleavage, the old political distinction between Paris and the provinces reappeared. Paris--more exactly, the nationalist quarters of Paris--was anti-parliamentary in sympathy, while the suburbs and working-class districts were pro-communist. The provinces remained loyal to parliamentarism and continued to be under the influence of Radical-Socialist committees.

Another long-standing problem which gained new importance as the political cleavages widened in the 1930s was the character of French journalism. Traditionally much of the French press was openly partisan and more given to comment (which was naturally partisan comment)

than to factual reportage. This circumstance perhaps helped to make divergences of opinion still wider. Moreover, the presse de grande information, while making some pretense of objective reportage, was subject to the influence of moneyed interests and pro-fascist groups. An independent press, which might have served to lessen the cleavage on partisan lines, found it difficult to gain a hearing. On the other hand, it is worth noting the courageous attitude of Kerillis in L'Epoque and Bidault in L'Aube during the late 1930s.

Concluding Summary

In the 1920s the parliamentary regime of the Third Republic continued to show the elements both of weakness and of strength which had characterized it from the first. While it is not possible to measure these exactly it seems clear that, in the 1930s, its weaknesses were aggravated as a result of the decline of leadership, the complexity of financial and economic problems, the development of a threatening foreign situation and the impact of foreign ideologies upon a society in which there existed the social cleavages mentioned earlier. But it cannot be said that the weaknesses of the French parliamentary system were alone responsible for the eventual breakdown of the regime.

III. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Problems of Europe as a Whole

1. German aspirations for hegemony. The European scene after 1870 was at first characterized by the armed hegemony of Germany on the mainland. This led to an attempt to reconstruct the balance of power, the division of the continent into two armed camps, and the outbreak of war in 1914. After 1918 the question of Germany's place on the continent remained dominant. It was the crucial issue in the peace settlement and a major one in most international negotiations during the next fifteen years. After the triumph of nazism in 1933 and the acknowledged fact of German rearmament, it was more than ever a central concern.

2. New complications of European international relations. The solution of the problem of the German position in Europe was complicated in the 1920s and 1930s by new phenomena.

One of these was an emotional reaction against the "old diplomacy", based upon balance of power, and a belief that peace, which was perhaps more widely than ever before regarded as the highest desideratum, must and could be preserved by other methods. This reaction, which varied in intensity and was sometimes accompanied by uneasiness concerning responsibility for the 1914-18 war strengthened the hopes placed on the League of Nations and contributed to the mystique of collective security and the vogue of non-aggression and other pacts.

Another new complication was the emergence and isolation of Communist Russia and the political and economic fragmentation of central and eastern Europe into a number of small states, some new and almost all more or less chauvinistic. The exaltation of the principle of

self-determination, combined with the continued existence of national minorities, contributed both to a feeling of injustice and to demands for treaty-revision on the part of the vanquished or of discontented victors and added to the feeling of insecurity among powers whose existence or existing frontiers depended upon recent treaties.

Yet another complication was due to the awareness of the cost of the war in lives and wealth, which led to a growth of pacifism among those victors who had no further territorial ambitions or special national grievances. This coincided with the emergence and triumph in Italy and elsewhere of an opposite attitude--an amoral aggressiveness which scorned international law and glorified force.

These new phenomena--as well as a want of capable statesmanship--led to the failure of collective security and of the attempts to preserve the status quo. By 1933 Europe was once again divided into two armed camps--the "haves" and "have-nots" of popular jargon. But this time there was much less of a balance of power because the breakdown of collective security entailed the collapse of the buttressing system of alliances.

B. Problems of France in Particular

1. The problem of Franco-German relations. While the German problem was always a European problem because of the geographical position of Germany and her size and political importance, it was a problem of special importance for France, both because of France's contiguity with Germany and because France was one of the main exemplars of democracy on the continent. The principal data of the question of Franco-German relations were unchanged since 1871. Since then France

had been increasingly inferior to Germany in manpower and eventually in industrial resources. In 1914-18 her allies had made up for these deficiencies, but after the victory of 1918 the problem was aggravated. If she could not at once achieve an enduring rapprochement--and this was impracticable--then she must secure herself against a recrudescence of German aggression.

On the assumption that Germany represented a continuing danger, France's statesmen proposed to deal with the problem realistically by such means as (a) putting teeth into the League of Nations by endowing it with force, (b) an American and British guarantee of the frontiers of France, and (c) the detachment and permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.

2. The dilemma of French diplomacy. Her failure to obtain these objectives through the peace settlement meant that although France did not abandon all of them, she was obliged to accept second best and turn again to her traditional policy of alliances with east European states. Just as from 1879-90 the one alliance system in Europe was German, so from 1921-36 the one alliance system was French. This fact, particularly in the 1920s, gave a false impression of France's strength, which led Great Britain to encourage German recovery in order to restore her own traditional ideal of a balance of power. The impression was misleading, not only because of France's internal weaknesses, but also because of the changes in the map of eastern and central Europe and the isolation of a suspect Russia. This meant that France's new eastern alliance system with Poland and the Little Entente was more reminiscent of her seventeenth and eighteenth century associations with Sweden, Poland and Turkey than of

the Dual Alliance of the 1890s. She had to depend on a number of relatively weak and at times mutually hostile powers, instead of one supposedly strong one. Nevertheless, all these policies can be regarded as realistic--she did the best she could in the circumstances.

Her insistence on full reparations was perhaps less realistic as an act of international policy. It irritated England, whose support on the German question was in the long run more important to France than that of her eastern allies. Also it probably made impossible an eventual rapprochement between France and the Weimar Republic. But it arose from the needs for additional revenue in order to meet the cost of postwar reconstruction, to pay off France's war debts to her allies, and to satisfy the public feeling that reparations were the victor's just due.

The formation of eastern alliances meant that the eastern and western aspects of the German problem could not be treated separately. Peace must be indivisible and the treaties stand or fall together. Therefore, it was all the more serious that Stresemann and later Hitler refused to agree to an Eastern Locarno and that Great Britain also held aloof, for France was thus given warning that she would stand alone in the defence of her eastern allies and that Germany's evident intention to keep a free hand in the East meant that she might well be involved in a war which would arise, as in 1914, from some incident in a remote part of the continent and not from an attack on her own frontier. The natural and logical conclusion was for Russia to be brought into her alliance system. Eventually this was achieved by the Franco-Soviet pact of May 1935.

But, having achieved this much, French statesmanship became increasingly handicapped by the working within France of some of those general European phenomena which have been mentioned earlier as complicating the attempts to solve the German question. Although Soviet doctrine concerning war as a political instrument and the understandable dread of the Soviets felt by their immediate neighbors (e.g., Poland and Rumania) might well have rendered such an aim beyond the power of the ablest French diplomacy to achieve, the logical diplomatic answer to the triumph of Nazism would have been for France to make every effort to turn her "system" into a grand alliance, in which the military help of Russia would be assured by a military pact and would be coordinated with that of the other allies. That French statesmen failed to make this effort appears to have been due not so much to its intrinsic difficulty as to continued British suspicions of Russia and, far more, to internal dissensions within France.

These dissensions were related to the issues involved in the rise of communism and fascism, which affected every European country in greater or lesser degree. In France this did not lead to civil war, as it did in Spain, but it produced a moral equivalent of civil war, which from 1935 onwards extended into the realm of foreign policy. The clear-cut issues which Nazi imperialism should have raised, were clouded by ideological considerations of internal politics. The patriotic roles of the French Right and Left were reversed, France was made incapable of taking a lead in foreign policy, and instead she was obliged to follow in the wake of British policy, which was muddled for other reasons.

Thus in France there was no longer agreement as to the objectives of foreign policy. For many of the French Right, the

principal objective appeared to be the thwarting of Russian communism, while for at least the communist leaders of the extreme Left, the principal objective was likewise the safeguarding of something other than a purely French national interest.

The practical consequences of these factors are to be seen in, e.g., (a) the striking failure of France to react to German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, (b) the consequent weakening of her alliance system, which began with the Belgian declaration of neutrality in October 1936, (c) the sharper cleavage of French opinion over the Spanish War, (d) the strenuous opposition to any reinforcement of the Franco-Soviet pact even after the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October 1936 had finally destroyed hopes of maintaining the Stresa front, and (e) the abandonment of Czechoslovakia.

It is perhaps wrong to ascribe this weakening of French foreign policy to the ideological quarrel alone. Other factors must be borne in mind, such as war-weariness, genuine pacifism, consciousness of the demographical and industrial inferiority of France, which may have led to a fatalistic attitude. It is possible, too, that the series of setbacks and irritations such as were manifest in the failure to obtain full reparations and to prevent German rearmament, the friction over inter-allied war debts, and disappointment with British policy (all of which seemed to show the hollowness of victory) may have contributed to a cumulative sense of frustration and undermined the self-confidence of France's political leaders. On any reckoning it must be conceded that there was a fatal lack of leadership at the most critical moment. It is hard to imagine a Poincaré accepting the Rhineland coup in 1936, when the General Staff was ready to mobilize.

3. The failure of French military leadership. It can be argued that the formation of an eastern alliance system and Germany's refusal of an Eastern Locarno made it imperative that France should have a military organization which would be capable of taking the offensive on behalf of an ally who was attacked. But a peculiarity of the French position was the growing reflection in France's military organization of the general defensive mentality. This appears to have arisen in part from the discrediting of the advocates of the offensive as a result of the costliness of the Nivelle campaign in 1914-18 war and from the legend of Verdun, which reinforced the traditional French trust in fortifications and spread the belief that it was the strength of these, together with the efficacy of the fire of the new French artillery, that had proved the turning point of the war. During the 1920s French military theory still showed considerable elasticity, but once the Maginot Line had been constructed, it tended to ossify around the conception that this was an impregnable bastion which would enable France to wage war without stirring from fixed defensive positions. France's inferiority in manpower and productive capacity may well have provided sound arguments in favor of the view that she was ill-adapted to sustain an offensive campaign. But if in spite of her commitments to her allies she was right in concentrating upon this system of defense there could be little military excuse for her not to extend it to the sea, for the disastrous subordination of tanks (in which she was quantitatively if not qualitatively as strong as Germany in 1939) to infantry requirements, for the neglect of the air force and for the inculcation of a mentality which was lacking in élan.

Thus in the military as in the political sphere, France suffered from a lack of imaginative leadership. In spite of the known facts that Germany and Russia were thinking of the next war in quite different terms, and in spite of the importance attached there and elsewhere to the air arm as a force which could operate independently, her General Staff continued to envisage the next war in terms of a modernized Verdun.

Concluding Summary

After 1918 security against a recurrence of German aggression was more than ever France's chief diplomatic and military preoccupation. Her best hope of ensuring it was disappointed at the outset by the refusal of the United States and Great Britain to provide the necessary guarantees; and her subsequent reliance upon an eastern alliance system was an inadequate substitute in view of the altered balance of power in eastern Europe and the impossibility of reconciling the interests of Russia with those of the Little Entente. France's military preoccupation with the problem of security was symbolized by the Maginot Line, but this helped to engender a purely defensive mentality inconsistent with the maintenance of a system of alliances which might logically require offensive action for the assistance of an ally who was attacked. Furthermore, in the 1930s France's capacity to take the initiative in meeting the growing German menace was handicapped by the intensification of the economic and political weaknesses mentioned in the previous sections. Her military position was also impaired by the neglect of the air force and the subordination of tanks to infantry requirements. During this inter-war period it was

- 32 -

in a sense France's misfortune to be the victim of her own victory in 1918; for this gave her an illusory appearance of strength which made England less inclined to give her effective support until the German danger once again became acute while it was the growth of this danger and France's apparent weakness in face of it which led to loss of confidence on the part of her eastern allies and to the virtual breakdown of the alliance system which had been an essential part of her endeavor to resolve the problem of security. At the same time, awareness of the deterioration of France's international position strengthened the reluctance of the ordinary Frenchman to be involved in any kind of war.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. France shared in the 1920s and 1930s in what was a general crisis of western European liberalism. What there were of unsolved problems in liberalism before 1914, what new stresses arose as a consequence of the First World War and the depression, affected France as well as other countries. Moreover, in many respects in which all of Europe encountered problems during the 1920s and 1930s, France suffered more acutely because the new problems compounded long-standing political and economic problems peculiar to France, such as a relative backwardness in the development of rationalized and modernized methods of industrial production, agriculture, and commerce, and a sharp social and political cleavage between Right and Left.

2. The French crisis in this period was a highly complex phenomenon and it is not possible to isolate any single factor--e.g., financial policy, or political instability, or economic backwardness--as being its sole or primary cause.

3. It is difficult to establish a sound comparison between France and other countries, although it is virtually inevitable to make such a comparison in order to establish some approximate measure of the magnitude of the problems which France faced and the degree of success which she attained in her attempts to solve them. In some respects it would be sounder to compare France with Spain or Italy than with Britain or Germany, because for various reasons France was at an unavoidable disadvantage compared with Britain and Germany. On the other hand, in some respects France was better off than other countries in this period: (a) France had a long-established republican

government, having known no revolution or even serious insurrection since 1871. This was not true of Spain, Portugal, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Poland, or the Balkan countries; (b) France had a stable and balanced economy. She did not depend to a critical degree upon either the importation or the exportation of agricultural or industrial products. Moreover, she did not have to cope with any rapid economic process, e.g., an increase of urbanism or decline of agriculture; (c) France was a victor in 1918. The victory was perhaps Pyrrhic, but it was probably better than a defeat such as Germany or Russia suffered; (d) France had no problem of (French) irredentism and no serious problem of national minorities, while the problem of colonial nationalism did not become serious for France, as it did for Britain, during the 1920s and 1930s.

4. That France should decline as a world power sometime after 1918 was probably inevitable. Since 1870 despite her defeat France had gained a new colonial empire and had held equal diplomatic rank with Britain, Germany and Russia. Yet without the fact being fully recognized she had been suffering a relative decline in population and the basic resources of industrial power which was closely connected (especially after 1918) with a lack of willingness to utilize to the full what resources she had. For this reason France was more than ever dependent upon external support. But in the altered balance of world power she was unable to obtain the assured assistance of the strongest states and had to make do with an alliance system which was inadequate although it conformed to a traditional pattern. Hence in a sense the historical problem was not how fast France would decline (fail to resolve its crisis) but how rapidly Germany would reemerge as the dominant force in Europe.

Memorandum of Agreement

made at Princeton, New Jersey, this 27th day of October, 1950

BETWEEN

Institute for Advanced Study of Princeton, N.J.

(hereinafter called the Proprietor and designated by the masculine singular pronoun)

AND

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, of Princeton, New Jersey (hereinafter called the Publishers)

The Proprietor is acting on behalf of and with the specific authorization of the several authors.

relating to a work now entitled

**MODERN FRANCE, edited by
Edward Mead Earle**

AUTHOR'S
GRANT

1. The Proprietor hereby grants and assigns to the Publishers the full and exclusive right during the term of copyright and renewals to publish or to cause others to publish the said work in all forms and in all languages throughout the world.

AUTHOR'S
WARRANTY

The Proprietor authorizes the Publishers to take out copyright in their name in the United States, and in other countries if they deem advisable. The Proprietor promises full and seasonable cooperation in effecting copyright renewal, which he agrees to assign to the Publishers.

2. The Proprietor represents and guarantees that he is the sole author and proprietor of the said work and that he has full power to make this agreement and grant; that the said work does not infringe the copyright or other proprietary right of any other person; and that the said work contains no libelous or other unlawful matter, and makes no improper invasion of the privacy of any other person. The Proprietor undertakes to hold harmless the Publishers from any claim, suit, or proceeding asserted or instituted on the grounds that the said work infringes such rights or contains such hurtful matter, and to indemnify the Publishers for such reasonable expenses as may be incurred in defense against such claim, suit, or proceeding.

AGREEMENT
TO PUBLISH

3. The Publishers agree to publish the said work at their own expense (unless otherwise specifically provided in this agreement) within a reasonable period in such form as they deem most suitable. ~~Provided, however, that in the case of a work in substantially incomplete form or in prospectus at the time of this agreement the Publishers' commitment to publish shall be contingent upon the decision of the Editorial Board of Princeton University Press when the complete manuscript is submitted that it is in form and content worthy of scholarly publication; it being understood that this is to be a scholarly decision without reference to commercial expediency; and it also being understood that the Editorial Board has already given general approval to the subject and plan of the work, which is to be approximately~~ words long and including

**DELIVERY
OF
MANUSCRIPT**

4. The Proprietor agrees to deliver the complete manuscript, together with all illustrations, maps, charts, drawings, or other material (except index) to be included in the work, not later than Manuscript in hand. If the Proprietor shall fail to make delivery by that date, the Publishers shall be released from all obligations under this agreement unless they have advised the Proprietor in writing of their willingness to postpone the delivery date; but the Proprietor shall not be free to cause publication of the said work elsewhere until he shall have reoffered it to the Publishers under the terms of this agreement.

**FORM OF
MANUSCRIPT**

5. The Proprietor agrees to present a legibly typed manuscript and illustrations, charts, etc., suitable for reproduction. If submitted in such form that editing (aside from routine "copy-reading" customary among publishers) is required, or that retyping of manuscript or redrawing or other processing of illustrations is necessary, such work shall be done by the Publishers and charged to the Proprietor's account. Unless a special request as to spelling, capitalization, punctuation, and typographic style shall be made by the Proprietor, and unless a manuscript consistently following such style shall be furnished, the Publishers are authorized to make the manuscript conform to the style which they believe to be most suitable for the work. Provided, however, that the Publishers shall not be free, in the process of editing, to make substantive changes in the manuscript without the express approval of the Proprietor. The Proprietor agrees that if the book is to include an index he will prepare it promptly after page proof has been submitted, or, if he fails to do this, will compensate the Publishers for their expense in preparing the index. The Proprietor agrees to pay all permission fees (if any) for the use of text or illustrations controlled by others, and upon request to furnish the Publishers with written evidence of the copyright owners' authorization to use the material.

EDITING

6. The cost of Author's Alterations (i.e. changes from the original manuscript submitted by the author, exclusive of the cost of correcting printer's errors) made by the Proprietor in type and/or plates shall be borne by the Publishers to the extent of 10% of the cost of original composition, but beyond that amount shall be charged to the Proprietor's account. The cost of Author's Alterations in illustrations, exclusive of correction of printer's or plate-maker's errors, shall be borne by the Publishers to the extent of 10% of the cost of making the original plates or negatives, as the case may be, but beyond that shall be charged to the Proprietor's account.

INDEX

7. The Publishers shall take the same care of any manuscript, illustration, or other material placed in their hands by the Author as they would of their own property, but they shall not be responsible for its loss or damage beyond the amount (if any) for which the Author requests in writing that it be insured at his expense. If, after publication, the Publishers should receive indemnification from an insurance company for the loss or destruction of bound or unbound copies of the work, such indemnification shall be treated as sales income in the calculation of royalty as provided in Paragraph 8 below, and the appropriate clause of that paragraph (depending on the rate of indemnification per copy) shall apply.

PERMISSIONS

8. Six months after first publication of the work, the Publishers shall prepare a royalty statement covering sales of the work to that date, and within 60 days thereafter shall pay the Proprietor the amount due. Thereafter the Publishers shall pay the Proprietor in the months of March and September of each year the royalty payable as of the preceding February 1 and August 1, respectively, covering sales during the preceding six months. Provided, however, that annual rather than semi-annual payments may be made if a semi-annual payment would be in an amount less than \$25.00. The amount of royalty shall be calculated as follows:

**AUTHOR'S
ALTERATIONS**

8. Six months after first publication of the work, the Publishers shall prepare a royalty statement covering sales of the work to that date, and within 60 days thereafter shall pay the Proprietor the amount due. Thereafter the Publishers shall pay the Proprietor in the months of March and September of each year the royalty payable as of the preceding February 1 and August 1, respectively, covering sales during the preceding six months. Provided, however, that annual rather than semi-annual payments may be made if a semi-annual payment would be in an amount less than \$25.00. The amount of royalty shall be calculated as follows:

INSURANCE

8. Six months after first publication of the work, the Publishers shall prepare a royalty statement covering sales of the work to that date, and within 60 days thereafter shall pay the Proprietor the amount due. Thereafter the Publishers shall pay the Proprietor in the months of March and September of each year the royalty payable as of the preceding February 1 and August 1, respectively, covering sales during the preceding six months. Provided, however, that annual rather than semi-annual payments may be made if a semi-annual payment would be in an amount less than \$25.00. The amount of royalty shall be calculated as follows:

ROYALTIES

8. Six months after first publication of the work, the Publishers shall prepare a royalty statement covering sales of the work to that date, and within 60 days thereafter shall pay the Proprietor the amount due. Thereafter the Publishers shall pay the Proprietor in the months of March and September of each year the royalty payable as of the preceding February 1 and August 1, respectively, covering sales during the preceding six months. Provided, however, that annual rather than semi-annual payments may be made if a semi-annual payment would be in an amount less than \$25.00. The amount of royalty shall be calculated as follows:

<p>REGULAR DOMESTIC SALES</p>	<p>On book sales within the continental limits of the United States (except for the special cases listed below), the following stipulated percentage of the list price:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">10% on the first 3,000 copies; 12½% on the second 3,000 copies; 15% on all copies sold after 6,000.</p>
<p>FOREIGN SALES</p>	<p>On book sales outside the continental limits of the United States, one-half the above stipulated percentage of the list price.</p>
<p>SPECIAL DISCOUNTS</p>	<p>On sales of sheet stock or on book sales at special discounts of 50% or more from the list price, or on book sales of a special edition issued by the Publishers and retailing at less than two-thirds of the list price of the regular edition: the above stipulated percentage of the net amount actually received by the Publishers.</p>
<p>ROYALTY-FREE COPIES</p>	<p>No royalty shall be paid on any copies lost or destroyed, or on damaged or overstocked copies sold at or below manufacturing cost, or given away for the purpose of aiding the sale of the work.</p>
<p>OTHER RIGHTS</p>	<p>9. The Proprietor grants and assigns to the Publishers the full, sole, and exclusive right to arrange for the sale or licensing of the following rights relating to the said work, and constitutes the Publishers his representatives and attorneys-in-fact for that purpose. If such rights are sold or licensed, the Publishers shall pay to the Proprietor, at the time of the next royalty payment after receipt of the funds, the following portion of the net amount actually received for such sale or licensing:</p> <p>(a) Translation, second serial rights, selection, abridgment, condensation, digest, adaptation, syndication, omnibus volumes, receipts from a license to another publisher to reprint in whole or in part, or from a license to a book club to manufacture its own edition for distribution to its members—50% of the net amount actually received by the Publishers.</p> <p>(b) Dramatization, public reading, radio, television, and motion picture rights (sight and sound) or the right of reproduction by other mechanical devices—85% of the net amount actually received by the Publishers.</p>
<p>AUTHOR'S COPIES</p>	<p>10. The Publishers shall give the Proprietor 10 free copies of the said work. For additional copies the Proprietor shall pay the list price less 40% discount, f.o.b. Princeton, New Jersey.</p>
<p>TERMINATION OF CONTRACT</p>	<p>11. If, after five years following the date of publication of the said work, the Publishers shall advise the Proprietor in writing that they find it necessary to discontinue publication, or if the Publishers fail to keep the work in print and neglect to reprint it within six months of the Proprietor's written request that they do so, then the Proprietor shall have the right to terminate this agreement by written notice. Upon such notice of termination the Proprietor shall have the right at his option within 30 days of such notice to purchase at 25% of the actual cost (including composition) the type and/or plates of the work, should any exist, and to purchase at actual manufacturing cost any copies and/or sheets remaining in the Publisher's hands. If the Proprietor shall fail to exercise this option within 30 days, then the Publishers shall be free to destroy or dispose of the plates, if any, and to dispose of any copies and/or sheets in any way they see fit without payment of any royalty on such copies and/or sheets. Upon termination of the agreement, the Publishers agree to assign the copyright of the said work to the Proprietor; thereupon all the then existing rights granted to the Publishers under this agreement shall revert to the Proprietor.</p>

OPTION ON
AUTHOR'S
NEXT WORK

12. The Proprietor agrees to make the Publishers the first offer of publication of his —
~~But if the Publishers fail to exercise this option by executing a publishing agreement within
60 days of receipt of the completed manuscript, then the Proprietor shall be under no fur-
ther obligation under this option, and shall be free to cause its publication elsewhere.~~

ADDITIONAL
PROVISIONS


"Separates" of individual chapters shall be supplied to the Proprietor in reasonable quantities as requested, and the cost of these shall be charged, at actual cost, to the Proprietor's royalty account.


BINDING ON
HEIRS AND
ASSIGNS

13. This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of both parties.


This agreement may be assigned by either party with the written consent of the other, which consent must be obtained in advance, and the assignee thereof shall have all the rights and remedies of the original parties insofar as the same are assignable. But this agreement shall be assigned only as a whole and not as a part, nor as to any part interest therein.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Proprietor has hereunto placed his hand and seal, and the Publishers have caused this agreement to be executed and their seal to be affixed by authority of their Board of Trustees.


.....
WITNESS TO PROPRIETOR'S SIGNATURE

 (L.S.)
.....
PROPRIETOR SIGN HERE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS


.....
WITNESS TO PUBLISHER'S SIGNATURE

by  (L.S.)

MEMORANDUM

OF

AGREEMENT

Between
Institute for Advanced
Study

AND

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PRESS

MODERN FRANCE - edited
by E.M. Earle

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE
Institute for Advanced Study
Autumn 1950

THE FRENCH CRISIS 1940-1950

(Revised)

Introduction:

The development of France during the decade 1940-1950 appears to have been less different from the general development of Western Europe than it was during the decades 1919-1939. The collapse of France and its special consequences so much merged into the World War and its aftermath, that there are few important problems of the Fourth Republic which can be said to be uniquely French.

We have, therefore, decided that it is more helpful to deal primarily with the problems of France under the Fourth Republic. We have referred to events before 1945 only in order to indicate the roots of present-day issues. We have considered comparisons with the rest of Western Europe in the course of analyzing each problem, and a balance-sheet of comparisons is drawn up at the end.

Outline of Contents

A. Internal economic and social problems of the Fourth Republic

1. Population problems
2. The desire for social welfare
3. Structural reforms
4. Tensions between various economic and social groups
5. The impact of other cultural patterns on French life

B. Political and ideological problems of the Fourth Republic

1. The issues of constitution-making
2. Changes in the ruling élite
3. Changes in the political spectrum
4. The impact of ideological movements
5. Reformism in education
6. The press
7. Changes in the attitude of the individual towards society

C. International relations of modern France

1. The doubts about France's position in the world
2. Colonial problems
3. Co-ordination of economic policies with other Powers
4. The position of France in an organized Western Europe
5. France and Eastern Europe

D. General conclusions and comparisons

A. INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

1. POPULATION PROBLEMS

I. Improvements in the demographic situation

- (i) In 1945, for the first time since 1935, there was an excess of births over deaths.
- (ii) The increase of the birth-rate will shortly have made up for the human losses sustained as a result of war and of German 'demographic' policies in France.
- (iii) France has now slightly exceeded her maximum pre-war population (41.9 millions now).

II. Continuing demographic problems

- (i) The relative demographic position of France in Europe and in the world continues, nevertheless, to decline.
- (ii) The birth-rate is still inferior to that of a great number of other European countries (Italy, Spain, Holland, Norway, Denmark, etc.).
- (iii) The gap between what has been described by some writers as the 'optimum' population for the best exploitation of France's economic resources (60 to 70 millions) and the present situation remains great and unbridgeable, even by massive immigration (see Sect. A. III below).
- (iv) The increase of the birth-rate and the decline of the death-rate have made the proportion between productive adults and the non-working population still more unfavorable (5 to 3, expected to become 5 to 4). This is a common European problem; but only in France has the total labor force declined sharply during the last two decades. (21.4 millions in 1926; 19.6 millions in 1948, though this represents 1 million more than in 1938.) Demographic difficulties are aggravated by a disproportionately high employment in 'non-essential jobs'.
- (v) The concentration of the population around Paris and a few other centers, the depopulation of entire regions and their economic and intellectual stultification, lead to the absence of a vigorous regionalism - a problem both of demography and of investment. Fluidity of movement is further hampered by the housing shortage (see Sect. A. 2 (vi)).

- (vi) Due to social conditions (housing and hygiene of lower urban and rural classes), infant mortality remains much higher than in many other countries (55 per 1000, as compared with 43 in the United Kingdom and 38 in Switzerland). Since these figures express national averages, data for the underprivileged classes would show a much higher mortality of infants. Such a situation adds to class resentment and increases feelings that the class structure is incorrigibly rigid.

III. Immigration problems

- (i) The Monnet Plan foresaw 650,000 immigrants by 1950, which in the main could only have made up for the loss of man-power during the war.
- (ii) The Italian-French agreements planned for an almost immediate influx of 200,000.
- (iii) Actual figures have remained far below these expectations, because:
 - (a) The majority of immigrants are now illiterate or at least unskilled North Africans. While in general there has been fair success in assimilating European ethnical groups, immigrants from North Africa - both for ethnical reasons and because of their Moslem religion - have so far not been assimilated to any great extent.
 - (b) A high percentage of German prisoners-of-war stayed on. If German production effort further increases, it is not impossible that many of them will seek repatriation.
 - (c) By now the immigration of Italians (the most promising reservoir of man-power) has all but stopped because of bureaucratic and psychological difficulties on both sides. This is not a hopeful beginning for the "co-ordination of economic policies with other Powers" (see Sect. C. III below).
- (iv) On the deficit side there is an emigration of French citizens to over-seas possessions and foreign countries. While numerically this movement is not important, qualitatively the emigrants often represent much needed technical and professional skills.

The population trends here recorded make it obvious that in spite of some favorable developments, France is far from obtaining the manpower it needs for a desirable development of her economic resources and for a well balanced population. For the present France has, over such countries

as Italy and Western Germany, the advantage of not being plagued by unemployment and the ensuing social conflicts.

2. THE DESIRE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE

I. The quest for social welfare has various roots (many involving the desire for 'social justice' and 'social security').

- (i) The uncertainties and sacrifices of the period of war and occupation.
- (ii) Demographic stagnation, especially the relative and the absolute increases of the old-age groups.
- (iii) An economy in which the delaying of modernization of industry and the ensuing 'industrial lag' behind other countries of Western Europe has bred in producers, on every level and in every field, a habit of relying on the State for guaranteeing 'social welfare' by government intervention (subsidies, protective legislation, etc.).
- (iv) The strictly regulatory system of a war economy to which France was submitted after 1939, and which was relaxed only some eight years later, has further strengthened such habits.
- (v) Consequences of the post-war inflationary period: a greatly diminished national income and, immediately after the War, a proportionately greater decrease of goods available for consumption. The quest for social welfare finds expression in the desire to see the available wealth distributed in as equitable a fashion as possible through a comprehensive system of social security.
- (vi) Ideologically the capitalist system has been traditionally under two-fold attack, both sides emphasizing the need for a greater amount of social security: the Marxist criticism of the injustices and inegalitarian aspects of capitalism, and the aspirations of social Catholicism, also trying to hold out the promise of greater security for the individual.

II. Some consequences of the desire for social welfare

- (i) Because of the special demographic problems of France its present social security system puts its main emphasis on the problem of the family and of old age, while e.g. the British system is predominantly concerned with unemployment and sickness benefits. The neglect of unemployment insurance in the French system has been criticised by various groups, among others, the employers.

- (ii) The total annual investment in social security is enormous (277 billion francs in 1947) as compared with the national income (2,500 billion).
- (iii) The calculation of social-security contributions in percentages of wages and salaries (approximately a total of 36%), and the passing-on of much of the employer's share of this burden in the form of higher prices, result in increasing the tendency towards inflation.
- (iv) The extension of the scheme for social security to the entire active population, and the attempt to compel people outside the wage-earning and salary-earning groups to contribute, has not so far proved successful. A consequence of this attempt has been resentment on the part of these groups against the whole social security system.
- (v) There has been an extreme bureaucratization of the system through the Social-Security Boards administered by the trade unions. The strong hold which the Communist Party and the C.G.T. still have over the system increases further the resentment of the white-collar class, and the middle class and managerial groups, against it. It is called "The Monster", and is regarded as making a political issue out of social security. This is different from Great Britain, where the scheme in general is no longer a live political issue and initial difficulties are regarded as 'growing pains'.
- (vi) There is the special problem of housing and of the building industry in France. The desire for 'security of habitation' - i.e. guaranteed tenure of premises at virtually frozen rents - leads in the long run to the opposite of social welfare, for houses tend to fall into disrepair, etc.; there is little investment in new buildings; overcrowding for the younger generation leads to social frustration, infant mortality, etc. There are signs, however, that recent changes in the law which permit the limited increasing of rents are attracting new investment, and there is greater facility of credit for new building. Credit for housing is now made available from the Counter-part Fund, under Marshall Aid. But the nature of the new arrangements leaves it an open question what effects it will have on low-cost housing.
- (vii) In Britain, between 1947 and 1949, the investment in housing amounted to more than 1300 million. By the end of 1948, 426,000 new permanent houses were completed in Great Britain. In March, 1950, only 83,000 housing units had been completed in France. Until recently there was hardly any investment of the sort in France. This is partly because high priority had to be given to industrial building, and to the reconstruction of roads bridges, etc., in post-war France.

3. STRUCTURAL REFORMS

There has been a great deal of change, structural and otherwise, in the European economy as a result of the war. The most striking occurred, of course, in Central and Eastern Europe. But there was more than evolution in Western Europe; and France, with her better balanced economy (balanced as industry versus agriculture and as foreign trade versus domestic economy) may seem to have come out of it with fewer changes. However, the 1940-45 period was one of active and anguished self-examination. No other European Power experienced during that period a deeper moral crisis as a result of the crushing brutality of the awakening: after having been for several centuries one of the leading Powers in Europe and in the world, France found out suddenly, after the collapse of May-June 1940, that it had hardly opposed more resistance in modern military operations than many small Powers who never had such pretences. The Vichy period was one of ardent self-criticism, and many questions were raised as to the necessity of reshaping the French economic and social structure to modernize it and make it able to hold if not one of the foremost, at least a decent, rank in the present world. Changes that ensued since 1944 were greater than would appear on the surface.

- I. There was a deep distrust of the old economic system and of the ability of the old political personnel to solve economic problems. The Conseil National de la Résistance prepared, in March 1944, a program calling for deep and drastic reforms. The old system was considered socially unjust, practically weakening, politically undesirable. During the years 1945-49 the faith in the new, planned or controlled economic system, was again greatly weakened. There is today a deep distrust of both a free and a strictly planned economy, and a sort of belief in 'opportunistic planning' on a very high level only. New cadres are, however, being educated, with greater competence in economic theory and practice.

II. A number of structural reforms were carried out through new laws or Government planning.

- (i) Nationalization of many industries (main collieries, power and gas, big banks, insurance companies, main transportation companies other than railroads nationalized in 1935, some mechanical works, etc.).
- (ii) Planning of State financial and monetary policy by a central consultative assembly, specialized and endowed with some powers for direct action through regulation of credit, the Conseil National du Crédit. This new institution was established to regulate credit and organize the banking professions according to the Law of December 2, 1945. The Conseil is presided by a cabinet member, and its vice-chairman is the Governor of the Banque de France, ex officio. There are 38 members of this assembly: 10 of them, appointed by the Government, represent the Confédération générale de l'Agriculture (the farmers' union), the agricultural cooperative organization, the consumers' cooperatives, the producers' cooperatives, the chambers of commerce and the artisans' associations; seven other members are nominated by the large labor unions but four of them must represent directly the personnel of the banking profession; then there are seven representatives of the different Ministries concerned with economic policy problems, seven representatives of the banks and stock exchange, seven heads of the other official credit institutions (Crédit Foncier, Crédit Agricole, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, etc.). Thus consumers as well as managers of credit meet on this Conseil to advise the Government on credit policy.
- (iii) Expansion of the social security system which was based on the principle of re-distribution in order to make it more democratic and make everybody feel that he had a direct vested interest in the future of the nation (as his returns later from such a social security would depend on the national income of future years).
- (iv) Creation of a Haut Commissariat au Plan (de Modernization et d'Equiperment) usually known as the Monnet Plan, although the principle was adopted long before M. Monnet was put in charge of the first five year program and endeavored to develop production more rapidly than the controlling interests usually wished for.
- (v) Increased government intervention, through either rationing, licensing and priorities, or through a subsidy system, into a greater number of economic activities.
- (vi) Several attempts to create economic regions de-centralized from Paris (the political attempt of the Commissaires Régionaux in 1944-45, the Inspecteurs Généraux de l'Economie nationale in 1945-47, the new plans being discussed of an 'aménagement du territoire' in the sense of re-organizing the economic and perhaps the political administration).

III. Degree of success. The structural reforms did not always achieve their aim: regional planning as yet has rather failed to decentralize, with the possible exception, still very young, of the Lower Rhone Project; economic planning was done mostly through the Monnet Plan and weakened with the improvement of the situation in production and foreign currency (the Schuman Plan opens some new horizons). Perhaps the Conseil National du Cr dit is still the most efficient planning agency. Many nationalizations are being criticized and some of them did not work better than the private corporation. Finally, the results of these reforms have not changed much the proportion of wages and salaries in the national income from 1938 to 1948.

However, the stability of these statistics should not induce one into error. The standard of living of the farming population has certainly been improved, which is a widespread European fact, but this increase in consumption on the farms does not show much in the statistics of agricultural production and, therefore, on the total figures of national income. In addition, the commercial, retail trades did multiply. Some conservative estimates quote the figure of one million shopkeepers in 1940 and 1.5 million in 1950. In fact, all the profession of the commercial intermediaries, difficult to survey statistically, increased with the general economic evolution, and it is perhaps a modernization of the French economic system. But both the rural and the commercial sectors are those where tax-evasion is the easiest and the most frequent, and where figures of income are the most uncertain. It may therefore be argued that if the proportion of wages and salaries in the national income did not increase according to the official indices, it did drop in reality. Such a trend could only mean that in the alternation of inflationary and deflationary trends that France has known since 1944, the sacrificed part of the population was the salaried one, especially urban labor. It is noteworthy that the Socialist Party has lost most of its pre-war following among the small shopkeepers: this section of the population no longer feels much solidarity with labor, and does not wish for  tatism. Although these trends may not result from any official reform, they constitute a structural change.

IV. Changes in the distribution of economic power

- (i) There is increased importance and independence of the managerial group (popularity of Burnham's ideas).
- (ii) About 10% of the national income is redistributed through the social security channels, under control of administrative and political authorities which are little subservient to capital (see Sect. A. 2. II above).
- (iii) Increased importance of hoardings in gold and foreign currencies rather widely spread throughout the population, especially after the occupation period which made illegal dealings particularly fruitful and 'patriotic'. It may be estimated,

- 10 -

by taking a conservative estimate, that there are probably some four million hearers. This economic force can be manipulated through credit pressure. By manipulating the price of gold or even banking credit, or both at the same time, the Administration has much more impact on the national economy. A deflationary policy linked to the lowering of the price of gold (see René Mayer's administration of finances at the beginning of 1948) can bring a stabilization of most prices and the lowering of some.

In general, there are a great many changes, and there is an increased dynamism in economic matters fighting the old conservatism (e.g. belief in small units of production and in the dangers of 'bigness') and 'Malthusianism' (i.e. limitation of production and also strict control by the existing organization of producers of the domestic market).

4. TENSIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GROUPS

- I. "Since 1945 all social groups, even the most privileged, have considered themselves unfortunate (malheureux)" While it is impossible to give anything like a comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon, the following factors are considered to have played a particularly important role since liberation:
- (i) The almost complete statistical 'black-out' (e.g. of wages, prices and profits) conceals from everyone his place in the balance-sheet of national economic life. The accentuated concern for secrecy of the individual and of the group still adds to the difficulty of obtaining a general view of the social and economic picture.
 - (ii) Certain forms of social-security contributions (see Sect. A. 2.II above) and of subsidies have veiled the true situation still further.
 - (iii) The traditional French system of taxation has not been thoroughly overhauled. This lack of modernization of the tax system is but another expression of the antiquated economic system of France. Society and Government are therefore deprived of a modern technique for making measures of social justice transparent and understood. (Contrast British Economic White Paper: a comparison with Great Britain shows that in general the French Government is not particularly able in explaining its case to the public at large.)
 - (iv) Besides these relatively recent causes, there appear to be certain traits in what might be called the French "national character" which are opposed to considering prosperity a thing to boast of. A comparison with predominantly Protestant

countries suggests that Catholic traditions have established a disdain for a conspicuous show of "good luck". On the other hand also, the "pure" radical doctrine of an 'Alain' with its emphasis on equality, exercises an influence in the same direction.

- II. Group animosities and their roots. The uncertainty of every group about its position, combined with knowledge of inequities in the taxation system, raises in each group animosities against every other, and a desire for more effective organization of its own strength.
- (i) Employers versus Labor - Labor started, after liberation, with a strong disciplined organization and a big advantage over the discredited forces of employers. This induced employers to adopt a particularly rigid policy (especially as compared with employers' organizations in the Anglo-Saxon countries). As long as wages and general working conditions were exclusively State-controlled, employers and labor found themselves, to a certain extent, united against the Government. The gradual relaxation of price controls left wages, especially of the half-skilled and unskilled labor group, dangerously low. Ever since, in an effort to abandon the discredited dirigisme, collective bargaining has been restored, labor and employers have clashed head-on, with, as a consequence, a dangerous new decline in labor productivity.
- (ii) Labor versus Labor - consequence of the 'colonization' of the C.G.T.-affiliated unions by the Communists, and of the dramatic decline of the Socialists since liberation. The manifold splits are particularly a handicap for the working of the new comprehensive social legislation which was based on the assumption of unified labor representation. (See Sect. A. 2.II above.) This is an especially French phenomenon, for in Italy, the only other European country with a strong Communist labor movement, social legislation is much less important.
- (iii) Labor versus Farmer - during the post-liberation period, characterized by a continuing black market, the antagonism between urban and rural population grew. As long as Communist influence was particularly strong among the farmers, the Party, by its propaganda, was in a position somewhat to instigate the worker-farmer resentment. (See also Sect. A. 2 above.)
- (iv) Submanagerial groups (e.g. higher technicians) versus Labor - After shortlived interest of the submanagerial groups in left-wing movements and programs (Resistance Council Program of 1944), conflict arose in many concerns and over many problems. Attempts to establish a strong C.G.T. - affiliated union movement of the technicians and professional workers - failed, because of the 'colonization' of the C.G.T. and because of Communist methods. The fairly strong Confédération des Cadres is all but hostile to the workers' union movement. On the plant level, the

institution of the "Plant Committees", originally devised to weld the wage and salary earners closer together, has resulted in acerbation and recriminations.

- (v) Wage-earners versus the middle-men, merchants and farmers - There are special tensions between wage-earners and salary-earners (such as the lower civil servants), and retail traders, farmers, etc.
- (vi) Big business versus small business - Because of the peculiarities of French industry and trade, with its continuing importance of small units, conflicts between big and small interests are traditional. Conflicts have somewhat abated since the war, because of the more efficient organization which unites all French employers in the National Council of French Employers (C.N.P.F.). (See above Sect. A. II. (i).)

III. Consequences of these social tensions

- (i) Political - out of these antagonisms arises increasing political polarization (See Sect. B. 2, 3 and 4 below). All of the tensions mentioned are still deepened by the fact that in most of the groups another historical memory has not been overcome - that of resentment against anybody connected with Vichy or collaboration (cf. recent debates in the National Assembly about the amnesty).
- (ii) Civic - with every social group and class tending to be self-centered and to concentrate on its own interests and miseries, the sentiment de la chose publique declines further. The emergence of powerful interest groups, which had started long ago but is now continuously accentuated, further aggravates the situation, especially because of the weak party system. (See below, Sect. B. 2, 3.) It is characteristic that, although after liberation there was a great deal of "swearing" against the corporate State of Vichy, many features of a corporate State are present in the Fourth Republic.
- (iii) This lack of 'civisme' has become a greater problem than before the war, because:
 - (a) Frenchmen are more painfully aware of their shortcomings in this respect since the collapse of 1940, and the short-lived hopes of the Resistance days which temporarily helped to produce greater national cohesion.
 - (b) Examples of greater 'civisme' have been given by other Western European countries laboring under great economic and social difficulties (e.g. 'austerity' in Britain, and recovery of Germany).

Perhaps the unique character of the problem in France is the combination of a sense of resentment against economic inequality, with a

relatively high degree of actual economic inequality. In Italy, where the actual inequality is no doubt greater, the resentment is less, in Britain, where the actual inequality is no doubt less, there is also less resentment than in France.

5. THE IMPACT OF OTHER CULTURAL PATTERNS ON FRENCH LIFE

This is intensified as France diminishes in international importance and becomes more dependent on foreign powers.

I. Technological. Here the United States, and to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union and Germany, have made their influence felt.

- (i) American Influence. The traditional French resistance to technological change - arising from the cheapness of labor, the French pride in hand craftsmanship, and a glorification of hard physical labor ("Il ne craint pas sa peine") - was first seriously shaken by the impact of American techniques in the First World War. At this time Citroen and Renault introduced American methods of production in the manufacture of war materiel - the famous "Taylor system", damned by the French workers and accepted only reluctantly by the industrialists themselves. Subsequently, agricultural machinery (harvesters were commonly called McCormicks), linotypes, typewriters (Remingtons), trucks, bulldozers, etc., began to come into common use.

In general, these American products were received with genuine admiration. In the case of household appliances and tools used by mechanics, the preference usually went to American-made articles.

The Second World War provided another shock - in this case, a double one - first, through the realization of German technical superiority in 1940; second, with the massive arrival of American equipment beginning in 1944. The American influence has naturally proved the more permanent, with its continuation through Marshall Plan imports. By now, refrigerators, tractors, etc., have become familiar manifestations of the spread of American influence.

There is no criticism of American technological methods as such, but the statement is still often made that they reflect conditions in a rich country with a large population and a standard of living entirely different from that of France. In addition, the French are appalled by American wastefulness. But they offer real resistance to change only when it appears to threaten their way of life. More particularly, they resent

high-pressure advertising, as an infringement on the free choice of the individual; the quasi-instinctive revulsion against Coca Cola is a case in point. They feel that a minimum of change is necessary - but only a minimum. And they resent it when Americans tell them that they need to change their whole way of doing things.

- (ii) German influence. Here one finds a similar French respect for technical efficiency. The French feeling that the Germans work harder and reconstruct their cities more rapidly than they do, represents the resurgence (perhaps only since 1949) of a sentiment of German superiority that was widespread in the 1930's and had been in abeyance since the Liberation.
- (iii) Soviet influence. In the case of the U.S.S.R., French respect comes partly as a kind of ricochet effect from an original Russian copying of American methods. In addition, part of the appeal of Soviet Communism to French intellectuals is based on "technological" arguments. Finally, one can mention the change in attitude toward the Red Army - its original prestige (in 1944 and 1945) gradually changing to fear.

II. Cultural. The only decisive outside influence is American. This influence forms something of an exception to the French tradition of accepting and even welcoming foreign cultural importations (Italian in the 16th Century, Spanish in the 17th, English in the 18th, and German in the 19th). In these cases, the French felt - with justice - that they could eventually assimilate the new ideas into their own cultural tradition. In the case of the United States, however, the influence has come so rapidly and backed by so much physical power, that the effect has been somewhat frightening. (The inter-relation of technological and cultural impact is obvious.) More particularly, many French intellectual leaders have expressed their conviction that in this case - as opposed to the precedents from previous centuries - it was the lower level of culture that was changing the higher.

A glance at the manner in which American culture has reached the French since 1944 may help to explain this attitude. Most of it has come on the more popular cultural levels. Immediately after the Liberation, French people of all grades of education, feeling that they had been cut off for four years from the outside world, were eager to catch up on the foreign books and films that they had missed - more particularly those from the United States. Translations, films, even comic books were brought in indiscriminately, and what was most sensational tended to win out. While the general public lapped this sort of thing up - and continues to do so - among the more cultivated part of the population there came a vehement reaction to American influence (for example, in the moderate leftist Sartre-Camus group and among Academicians like Duhamel, Gilson and Mauriac).

As a result, the most refined products of American culture are little known in France. What even the comparatively educated reader knows are Gone with the Wind, the novel of violence (Faulkner, ...

- 15 -

Caldwell, etc.), Louis Bromfield, and The Reader's Digest. He has scarcely heard of Henry Adams, Thorstein Veblen, or Carl Becker. And, thinking that these former represent the essence of a peculiarly "American" culture, he tends to rate them more highly than similarly educated Americans would do. Thus, while the United States is ultra-familiar on the popular level, it is terra incognita in its more sophisticated aspects. American history is inadequately taught; there is no special chair of American civilization in the Sorbonne or in any of the provincial universities. In French Academies and learned societies, a disproportionately low percentage of American scholars and writers have been elected as corresponding members. Of the American intellectual élite, only the scientists are fully appreciated in France. The others - many of whom find themselves already isolated in their own country - experience difficulty in establishing contact with like-minded people in France.

In sum, the French attitude toward American culture is a curious combination of knowledge and ignorance, attraction and repulsion, varying greatly with the different educational and economic levels. The main aspects are: (1) a widespread acceptance on the lower levels of American popular culture; (2) a basic appreciation of American democratic values expressing itself in a feeling of political solidarity with the United States; (3) a resistance to American influence, on the higher cultural levels, and a reassertion of traditional French values.

It is important to remember, however, that this resistance is humanist rather than nationalist in origin. A feeling of cultural resistance frequently goes along with a pronounced pro-Americanism in politics - among Catholics, for example (the M.R.P. is perhaps the most pro-American of major French parties). Duhamel's formula of "France between two monsters" is considered too extreme by the bulk of French intellectuals.

This intellectual resistance appears to be a phenomenon peculiar to France, as opposed on the one hand to Italy and Germany, where American influence is accepted more happily, and on the other hand to Britain, whose own post-war social and cultural pattern is more thoroughly worked out and hence more impervious to outside influence.

B. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN FRANCE

1. THE ISSUES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING

- I. Although a Republic was assumed to be inevitable, there were three main schools of thought about the form it should take.
- (i) Un régime présidentiel à l'américaine - previously expressed by various reformers of Third Republic (Tardieu, Blum) and after liberation favoured by de Gaulle. But it was opposed then by the organized political parties, and by all the left who feared the continuation of de Gaulle in the power which he had wielded under Provisional Governments. Vichy, too, had been 'presidential'.
 - (ii) Unicameral gouvernement d'assemblée, on model of 1793. This idea was supported by the Communist Party, but was distrusted by the right as too Jacobin and demagogic; it was rejected in the referendum of October, 1945, and in the first draft Constitution of 1946.
 - (iii) Parliamentary régime à l'anglaise, akin to the Third Republic in form. This was favoured by the organized political parties, (and some men, such as Herriot, wanted a simple continuation of the Third Republic), and it was the pattern which emerged from the debates of the Second Constituent Assembly of 1946 as a compromise solution: it was formally 'bicameral', and with some (so far ineffective) checks on the power of the National Assembly: for example, the much-discussed power of dissolution, which has so far not been used.
- II. Prolonged debate over these issues distracted energies from the immediate tasks of economic recovery; the lukewarm reception given to the compromise solution carried forward indecision into the Governments of the Fourth Republic, as well as throwing de Gaulle and his followers into strong opposition. Demands for revision of the Constitution are still active. The electoral laws (methods of scrutin, and second ballot) remain a subject of recurrent controversy.
- On the other hand, the acceptance of women's suffrage has removed one constitutional issue from the scene. The preamble with its declaration of rights of the individual is now, unlike former Declarations of the Rights of Man, given legal application and interpretation.
- III. Other Western European countries unoccupied by Germany (Britain, Sweden), and others again whose regimes remained unquestioned after the war (Holland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium at first) faced no such constitution-making problems. Their plans for economic recovery, etc. were correspondingly less impeded than the French. There is closer analogy with Italy and Germany (Bonn Constitution).

These problems did not, however, greatly affect French foreign policy, because there has been general agreement among all parties except the Communists; and Bidault and Schuman (both of the M.R.P.) have between them controlled the Quai d'Orsay since liberation in 1944, except for the very short interlude under Blum in 1946-7.

2. CHANGES IN THE RULING ELITE

The European élite has been shattered, to different degrees: evolution in the West, revolution in the East. The French case is one of evolution and a more rapid one than might show on the surface. However, on this score, as on others, France displayed amazing stability, and change happened only by slow and cautious evolution. At the time of liberation people expected much more change.

- I. Changes in personnel. They were substantial as the resistance brought to power a number of people who would have had very little chance of arriving in power otherwise, in normal conditions of the 1930's. It is sometimes difficult to determine with any accuracy whether the momentous events changed the nature of certain careers or only accelerated them. It may be indicated, nonetheless, that acceleration was in many cases so great that it brought about actual changes in the nature of careers, which would never have gone so far if the old-time tempo had been maintained.

Most of these changes brought in people from the resistance groups. A number of "resistants" belonged already to the influential circles or professions, or would have arrived to such levels; but many were rocketed high up. The "résistance de l'Intérieur" brought into the political personnel some new people, mostly former intellectuals such as Bidault, de Menthon, etc., formerly teachers who might anyhow have become members of parliament, but found themselves now in outstanding cabinet posts. Several of them remained politicians of the ministrable level. The "résistance de l'extérieur" brought an even larger contingent of intellectuals (like Maurice Schuman, Jacques Soustelle) or of businessmen (like Pleven) to the first rank of the political scene. General de Gaulle is another such addition not to be neglected.

More substantial and important perhaps are infiltrations of newcomers into the higher administrative personnel: people arising out of the resistance gained entry to the "Grands Corps de l'État" (Conseil d'État, Inspection des Finances, Carrière diplomatique, etc.). It may be noteworthy that the two most politically important embassies of France, those of Washington and Moscow, are headed by Ambassadors who are not regular career-diplomats nor professional politicians, but again are academic men who had some contact with the Administration before, Henri Bonnet and Yves Chataigneau. The Conseil d'État has been

- 18 -

twice purged, by Vichy in 1940 and then after liberation. Its new head (the vice-president) René Cassin came from the external *résistance*. The Inspection des Finances was not purged at any time, but some acceleration came from the fact that some of its members went into big jobs, often diplomatic, in the external *résistance* (thus Hervé Alphand, Couve de Murville, both influential in the Quai d'Orsay in 1945-49 and now ambassadors), and the cadres of the treasury seem younger too.

The newcomers or the "accelerated men" are mostly young people: they represent intellectual opposition groups of the 1930's or business groups; some were in the administration but chiefly in side-tracked posts. Considerable rejuvenation happened in the Armed Forces. The changes here were not as great as may have seemed right after 1944. Few of the chiefs of the *maquis* kept their rank in the Army after V-E day. But many high-ranking officers were purged, some by Vichy, most of them after liberation. Some other changes are bound to come in the long run as a result of the reform of administrative recruitment through the nationalization of the School of Political Science, now the Institut d'Études Politiques, and the new École Nationale d'Administration. The new system allows situations in which a man who was a highway patrolman in a remote corner of France three years ago will reach high administrative functions in a few years after 1950. Such evolutions were practically unthinkable in the 1930's.

The importance of these changes in personnel, and the kind of evolution in the attitude of mind they show, can be seen by a rapid glance at the morrow of World War I. A whole crop of new, mostly young, talents had arisen as a result of World War I and showed itself brilliantly at the Peace Conference. Among those men we could mention such names as Jean Monnet, Paul Mantoux, Fernand Maurette, Yves Chataigneau, and on a higher political and age level, Albert Thomas. Practically all of them were sent to relatively good posts outside the country, not on straight diplomatic missions but rather to international organizations (League of Nations, I.L.O., etc.). None of them was able during the 1920's to come back to Paris and secure an important position. They were systematically kept out. Thomas and Maurette stayed with the I.L.O.; Mantoux returned to academic life, more at the University of Geneva than in Paris; Monnet went into international private business; Chataigneau stayed in secondary positions until 1936, when he was "accelerated" by the Popular Front for a while, but like Monnet it may be said for both of them that they "missed the bus" after the first World War, were side-tracked, but reached political power fully after World War II, although both did not go for election and ministerial careers. The important point is that many people were not side-tracked after 1945 as after 1919. In as strongly organized and hierarchical a society as the French, this means deep change.

- II. Changes in the "cadres économiques": young technicians gaining control of important enterprises through the nationalization of basic industries. These managers are more dynamic and less hesitant to use public funds than were the old entrepreneurs of the 200 families with their private

assets. Increased power of these technicians on economic decisions, through their participation ex-officio in boards governing the banking systems and the social-security funds.

Trade-union leadership showed itself, as usual, particularly conservative and resistant to change. However, some new men like Louis Saillant appeared in the forefront, while others, who collaborated with Vichy, like Belin, were eliminated. Some new men emerged among the leaders of farmers' interests, such as the Secretary-General of the C.G.A., Philippe Lamour, formerly a Paris lawyer. The part of the representatives of labour was also substantially increased in the administration of the national economy as a result of the greater participation of labor nominees on the governing boards of the Social Security System or on the Conseil National du Cr dit. (See also Sect. A. 3.)

- III. The bulk of the personnel in the ruling  lite is still the same or comes from the same circles as before the war. The "old crowd" has not given up. Although it has less direct means of action, and has to share more of the power with young managers or newcomers, it applies age-old techniques to take over the new elements in the big body of the  lite. The bright young men of the old families take administrative jobs and the bright young managers of modest extraction marry daughters in the old families. The difference from the pre-war situation is that the younger generation wants more change to happen: they see much more the necessity of it because they do not want to live for a re-edition of 1940. That element is a powerful psychological lever which weakens the impact of the old crowd. This is felt even in politics: old "wise men" who came back like Vincent Auriol, Paul Reynaud, Herriot, Daladier, etc., have been given honor or may claim some following. None of them are really looked up to, as they used to be, as possible "solutions" in case of acute crisis. The same can be felt, although it is more difficult to demonstrate, in administrative and economic circles. The time of the "notables" is over.
- IV. The increased role and influence of intellectual groups: it may be partly responsible for creating this "anti-notables" state of mind. One has to refer again to the appeal of political plays of the Sartre-Camus-Anouilh group (*L'Etat de Si ge*, *Les Mains Sales*), also in the Catholic circles of the leftist group or the magazine *Esprit* (Thierry Maulnier, etc.) and in a more conservative line of the review * tudes*. One could compare with the early New Deal period in Washington or early Labour period in London, when intellectuals were close to power again. But even the self-examination of the American  lite after the depression is probably less dramatic a period of self-analysis than the aftermath of the 1940's in France.
- V. Some changes in the personnel of the ruling  lite are still on their way. Some of them reflect the slow development of the trends indicated above; others result from a different process: there has been some colonization by Communists and "fellow travellers" of higher-administration, armed forces, even big industry. It came about

mainly owing to the political power of the Communist Party in 1944-47. Some de-colonization has been conducted and is still being pursued. However, losing important official functions does not mean that the men concerned are excluded thereby from a position of influence in the French élite (an eminent scientist like Joliot-Curie, for instance, certainly remains important in the high academic circles even after his dismissal from administrative responsibilities).

3. CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM

- I. Eclipse of the old Right. The anti-parliamentary right went down with Vichy. The parliamentary right (Republicans, etc.) were discredited by the failures of the Third Republic, and were at first disorganized.
- II. Temporary withdrawal of the old Centre. The old centre parliamentary parties (especially Radicals and Radical-Socialists) were also, at first, discredited by the defeat of 1940, and lay low in the early stages after liberation.
- III. Reinforcement of the Left. Influence of resistance movements ('Resistance Charter' of 1944) was in general leftist; growth of Social Catholicism (M.R.P. - Bidault had been President of C.N.R.); recovery of Socialist Party (Gouin, Blum, Auriol, Ramadier - Rion and concentration camps had done much to reinstate the reputation of men such as Blum); new power of Communists (active in resistance since 1941, best organized party, and so quick to gain grasp on some resistance movements and on C.G.T. even before liberation): all these facts reinforced greatly the power of the left after liberation. The Communists, especially, were successful in posing as the ultra-patriots and the 'true Jacobins'. They appealed more strongly than before to those peasant proprietors ready to vote for the most dynamic party. Such support had gone to the Radicals before the 1920's, to the Socialists in the 1930's, and now went to the Communists in the 1940's. This phenomenon is peculiarly French.

Until 1947, M.R.P., Socialists and Communists formed the 'big three' parties of government. De Gaulle was anxious to get national unity, and was willing to work with all three at once.

- IV. Since 1946-47, various factors conspired to bring about a new political spectrum
 - (i) Communists kept out of ministerial office after April, 1947; breach between Russia and the West helped to rob them of the role of super-patriots (Cominform, September 1947; visit of Thorez to U.S.S.R.). They relied more on their extra-parliamentary power over the C.G.T. Great strikes, etc.
 - (ii) Socialists and M.R.P. weakened by constant need to save their working-class supporters shedding away to left, and others from shedding away to reviving Radical parties or to the R.P.F.

- (iii) Revival of Radicals as party of peasants and middle classes (Ministries led by Marie and Queuille, 1948-49) strengthened the segment of the spectrum of the Right-Centre.
- (iv) In 1948, movement for creation of 'Third Force'.
- (v) Since 1947, emergence of R.P.F. opposed to both Communism and parliamentary parties - new element on the extreme right.

V. Comparisons. The post-war phenomena of strong Communist movements, of governmental Socialist parties, and of Social-Catholic movements, are common to other countries (e.g. Belgium, Holland, Italy, Germany). It may be, however, that M.R.P. leaders are more positively leftist than their Social Catholic counterparts in these other countries. It is the grouping of these three parties which has shifted in France: their fluidity has produced greater instability than elsewhere; and the R.P.F. is a unique French product. As in Italy and Belgium, for example, continued multiplicity of parties has made a system of coalition ministries, and so of collapsible cabinets, a prominent feature of the Fourth French Republic, as it was of the Third. The strength of Communism raises problems for national defence, for international relations of France, and for economic recovery at home. The enigma of Gaullism breeds uncertainty about even the near future (general elections must, constitutionally, take place in 1951 at latest). But the ingredients of French politics are not in general different from those of other continental countries (apart from the R.P.F.), though they are still very different from those of Britain or the United States (see also Sects. A.5, B.4).

4. THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS

A restless search for something to believe in characterizes not only French youth but all age groups. With the weakening of the traditional ideologies of moderate Socialism and Radicalism, Marxism (usually in its Communist form) and Catholicism are the two answers most generally offered.

I. Communism. Besides the elements mentioned under 3, above, the clearer recognition (even among Communists and Communisants) of the police-state features of Soviet society has resulted in an emphasis on the mystique, the irrational elements of Communism. One can find manifestations of this in the current "crusade" for peace (see C.1 and 4); in the appeal of Communism as an undefined protest movement to non-proletarian strata of society; in the importance within French Communism of artists and writers (Aragon, Picasso, etc.) and the consequent danger of Titoism and other heresies; in the somewhat different importance to the movement of scientists, who combine rationalism in science with irrationalism in politics. Of other Western countries, Italy alone offers a comparison with France on this score. In Italy, however, owing to the divisions and consequent weakness of

organized Socialism, the ideological polarization is even more more complete than in France. And the low educational level of the Communist rank-and-file gives the Italian Communist intellectuals an even more important position.

- II. Catholicism. The resurgence of Catholicism as a national ideology finds its expression particularly in the articles of such writers as Gilson and Mauriac. A similar Catholic revival can be noted in Western Germany and Italy, where its political importance is even more pronounced (see below).
- III. Gaullism. Among the diverse ideological elements in the movement one may note: the "mystique" of the Resistance; the "presidential" program in the Fourth Republic constitution-making; the plebiscitary tradition of Bonapartism and Boulangism; the counter-revolutionary tradition of former Pétainists; and the illusions (if one can call them such) of a liberal-democratic wing of former Radicals, civil servants, etc. Significant also are the vagueness in the boundaries of the movement and its tendency to expand and contract as events seem to favor or hinder a Gaullist solution (more recently one can detect a broader sentiment favoring something resembling Gaullism without de Gaulle). This phenomenon appears to be peculiar to France. In other Western countries conservative forces tend to group themselves around Christian Democratic parties.
- IV. Miscellaneous. The search for a cultural or spiritual faith has also found expression in the popularity of the Sartre-Camus group, the transitory vogue of Garry Davis ("first citizen of the world"), and other movements (see Sect. A. 5).

5. REFORMISM IN EDUCATION

- I. Certain characteristics of the French educational system have been accused of contributing to the 'French Crisis'.
 - (i) The system whereby the 'bachot' ensures to a group that is drawn from the intelligentsia of all classes of the population a high level of formal education: but because of its formality it has been termed by French educational reformists "the savage rites of French bourgeois snobbism".
 - (ii) The system of competitive examinations, especially at the grandes écoles, gives the successful candidate an assured future ('social security' in a high measure); to such an extent that the leading personnel at the level of higher education lack energy and dynamism, both in teaching and in research; and it robs some of the élite (see Sect. B. 2 above) of incentive and enterprise. There is a premium on conformity amongst the successful, a sense of bitter frustration amongst the rejects, in competitive examinations.

- (iii) The traditional educational system has less of a class character than the German or British, but leads to a strong 'caste' system. Democratic selection (by arithmetical devices) tends to lead to a "Mandarinate".
 - (iv) Too much emphasis on classical learning and on the remote past with an ensuing neglect of preparation for the needed technological élite; too little attention to modern and contemporary studies (current affairs, civics, etc.)
 - (v) Too much emphasis on the forming of the intellect, and too little on physical education.
 - (vi) Rigidity of the system leads to frustration of many of even the ablest of its products.
- II. Educational reform before, and especially since, liberation has set out to correct the above weaknesses by proposing, and in part pushing through, reforms in all the directions indicated: e.g. more emphasis on physical and on civic education; an attempt at student self-government at the sixième level; less segregation of the sexes at the highest lycée level in Paris.
- III. Some of the reforms have already stranded, others are still pursued. Because of their necessarily long-range character, it is not yet possible to gauge their effectiveness. In general, the virtues and faults of the French system still go together.
- IV. The Vichy interlude and the emergence of a liberal-catholic party as a member of all republican coalition governments, have not let the old issue of Catholic schools die down. The issue has lost some of its acuity in public opinion, but is still an additional obstacle to the emergence of a homogeneous middle group in politics.

6. THE PRESS

- I. Since 1944 the problem of the press throughout Europe has been chiefly the reshaping of it in order to eliminate the papers or the controlling interests that collaborated with Nazi Germany, and to integrate in the regular press system the papers, born in the underground, which came out in the open during the liberation days, asking for their share in public opinion.
- II. The French press of the 1930's had been a corrupt and not very well informed one. During the Vichy régime they were either closed down or they collaborated. New leaflets appeared in the maquis bearing the names of the resistance groups (Combat, Franc-Tireur, Libération, etc.) This was true of Paris as well as of the provincial towns. However, the resistance papers had a country-wide circulation and the "press regionalism", already weak, kept breaking down further. This trend towards centralization has continued (see Sect. A. 1 above). The general behavior of the press made it a matter of public concern and controversy after liberation.

- III. The liberation period brought about a general clean-up. Many printing presses were taken over by resistance groups and new papers were launched, utilizing the old channels of circulation. There were too many papers. There were at least ten new ones in Paris, most of them published just on two to four pages of a reduced format, because of the paper shortage and rationing. Little by little a selection worked itself out. Some papers survived, becoming the post-war version of a pre-war one, and were backed by pretty much the same, or similar, interests (i.e. France-Soir instead of Paris-Soir, backed by the textile and some paper-mill interests). Others survived and developed because of party backing, such as L'Humanité, Le Populaire (in bad financial shape, reflecting the disorganization of the Socialist Party and needing at times subsidies from the British Labour or the Belgian Socialist Parties), Le Figaro (which became the organ of the Rightist Catholic circles), L'Aurore (R.P.F.). There is a clear-cut distribution of the readers along political lines, L'Humanité and Le Figaro being the main beneficiaries of the new evolution.
- IV. A new, more independent, type of paper appeared, closer to the center, better informed, cleaner than the Third Republic papers had ever been: the outstanding case is that of Le Monde, much better than Le Temps, more lively, more independent of both the Quai d'Orsay and of big industry, this being achieved partly as a result of the fact that its circulation reaches 170,000 instead of the 50,000 of Le Temps, and also by a change of personnel. Another attempt at a similar experiment with a morning paper, Combat, partly failed. It could not get to a circulation of more than 40,000, and could not subsist as the organ of cultivated moderate left-wing opinion. It needed subsidies, lost its most valuable contributors (Camus, Aron, etc.). An independent extreme-leftist paper, published by a small but talented group of young people, Franc-Tireur, went on, sometimes influential but not widely read.
- V. As a whole the press is cleaner but more political. The type of so-called "objective" paper (journal de grande information) such as Le Petit Parisien, Le Journal, etc., seems to have disappeared. The French reader takes sides much more, especially insofar as his morning paper is concerned. He gets informed in the evening by Le Monde or France-Soir. This seems to be true also in the provinces.
- VI. To be also noted: an increase in the circulation of weekly and monthly magazines, including the old ones (France-Illustration), new ones (Réalités) and the foreign ones (chiefly American such as the French version of the Reader's Digest, Life, etc.); the existence of a single government-controlled news-agency, and of a governmental monopoly of radio as a disseminator of news.

7. CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIVIDUAL TOWARDS SOCIETY

- I. Importance of morale (sense of group solidarity and of individual responsibility to society and to the State) as a factor in the strength, health and social cohesion of a nation. In a democracy there is a need for a balance between the forces of cohesion and the forces of individualism.

- II. Some Frenchmen and some foreign observers see low morale, or incivisme, as the most poignant aspect of the French crisis: not only worse than in other countries, but worse than in pre-war France (e.g. tax-evasion, anti-military sentiment, corruption, apathy, escapism, general demoralization).
- III. Possible sources of generalized incivisme are:
- (i) National character or mores (e.g. much more inclined towards anarchy than towards discipline; put responsibility to the family higher than responsibility to the State; appeal of Voltairean outlook). The ideology of doctrinaire individualism, long dominant in France, continues to act as a strong conditioning factor.
 - (ii) Present sense of injustice in most segments of society.
 - (iii) Cumulative effect of recurrent failure of reform through liberal methods.
 - (iv) Demoralizing effects of events since 1940: collapse, dual loyalties of Vichy era, habits of systeme D, dissipation of resistance mystique, injustices of the purge, examples of the virtuous suffering and the cynical triumphant, inadequacies of post-liberation governments, lack of a powerful myth to inspire honest republicans. But the search for "a creed" is perhaps more positive now than it was in the 1930's. The issue of incivisme, whether or not the disease is actually as bad as some Frenchmen believe, contributes to social tension within the nation. The ruling élite is inclined to blame mass incivisme for France's troubles: the mass, on the other hand, concentrates on evidences of inefficiency, corruption and of self-seeking political deals among the élite. The former sentiment strengthens authoritarian tendencies; the latter sentiment reinforces both Communism and Gaullism (especially the former) as simple methods for "cleaning the rascals out".
 - (v) The whole problem involves treacherous questions of social and political psychology. It also raises the question whether the failings of institutions or of men are most responsible for France's crisis.

C. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MODERN FRANCE

1. THE DOUBTS ABOUT FRANCE'S POSITION IN THE WORLD

- I. To some degree, doubts about France's international position go back of 1940 and even back of 1914; but they have become acute and deeply meaningful only since 1940. The post-war French attitude appears to be a varying blend of dispassionate realism, injured pride, and defeatist resignation.
- (i) France's geographical position between two super-powers has special significance; it produces a sense of impotence either to prevent war or to survive it. Although Britain's geographical position is almost as exposed (except for her "tank-ditch"), the psychological impact of the geographical factor is far greater in France - partly because she has actually known invasion so often and so recently.
 - (ii) Demoralizing effect of declining confidence and growing self-criticism concerning France's primacy and prestige in the technical and cultural spheres. Voltaire's phrase "France is the whipped cream of Europe" gone somewhat sour?
- II. Varying proportions of the blend noted in (I.) above produce conflicting views about the proper role of France in the world.
- (i) France must regain great-power status at almost any cost (Gaullism).
 - (ii) France cannot regain great-power status; or, at best, the effort not worth the cost (defeatism, neutralism).
 - (iii) France can regain a position of notable influence by utilizing those advantages which she does still possess (e.g., geographical location, diplomatic skill and experience, cultural influence, overseas territories that are large and strategically located).
 - (a) Some Frenchmen in this middle category believe that with luck and skill, France can be restored to what might be called marginal great-power status.
 - (b) Others feel that the solution is to merge France into a type of Western European entity in which France would play a leading role: that only in such a fashion can her hopes of international influence be attained.
- III. The issue of France's position in the world (or power-status) appears to be a more critical and divisive issue than in any other western country except perhaps Germany. It also appears to be more critical and divisive than it was in pre-war France; although the issue was foreshadowed in the 1930's by the disputes of that era over France's proper foreign policy (n.b., the de Brinon faction on the right and

the Belin-Dumoulin faction on the left). But doubts as to France's great-power status are unquestionably more widespread and deeper than they used to be, with consequent serious effects on national morale.

In theory, these doubts might benefit France to the extent that they destroy certain pre-war illusions and complacency about France's inherent and inalienable claim to be a great power. However, no such spirit of healthy realism seems to have become dominant in French public opinion. Efforts to foster such a spirit run the risk of producing further demoralization instead, and of driving many Frenchmen toward the certainties offered by Communism.

2. OVERSEAS PROBLEMS

- I. To the surprise of many Frenchmen, France emerged from the war and the collapse with its overseas possessions largely intact (except Syria-Lebanon). Possibly her failure to make adequate post-war plans derived in part from France's wartime uncertainty as to the fate of the empire? At any rate, the Fourth Republic sought to meet some problems (e.g. Indo-China) by improvising policy after it was almost too late to find any solution at all.
- II. Basic conflict after 1944 between pressure of intensified native nationalism (and of idealistic French reform current) versus considerations of national prestige and power. Complicating factors: Communist influence overseas; division in France over cost of holding empire.
- III. Structural problems involved in creating a French Union which can reconcile the foregoing basic conflict: e.g. degree of federal and local authority; problem of preparing natives for citizenship; anomalous role of large overseas delegation in French parliament.
- IV. Critical importance of the deadlock in Indo-China, which has placed a severe burden on French budget, manpower and morale. Widespread unpopularity of the war even among those who have no sympathy for Ho Chi-Minh; balanced in part by considerations of prestige, and even more by sentiment that the Indo-China fight is part of the general struggle against the expansion of international Communism under Soviet direction. Growing uncertainties about France's ability to become militarily strong at home so long as most of the army is involved in Indo-China; growing danger that the officer corps will be totally decimated there. Demoralizing effects of allegations that certain French financial interests are instrumental in keeping the war going.
- V. Problem of economic and social development of overseas areas: cost; shortage of technicians; issue of foreign investment. Question of priority to French or to native interests in planning, investment, trade policy.

VI. New significance of North Africa in the immediate future.

- (i) Rapid development of Morocco since the war; flow of population and capital from France, Algeria, Tunisia to Morocco.
- (ii) Prospect that North Africa may become France's redoubt in case of general war.

3. COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES WITH OTHER POWERS

The chief feature is the discrepancy between the large number of formal engagements and international organizations created for the coordination of economic policies, and the relatively small degree of substantial agreement so far. This is broadly true for post-war international relations in general, but there are certain reasons why it is true for France.

I. Formal engagements include:

- (i) Anglo-French Treaty of Alliance (March 1947): Art. IV - "by constant consultations in matters affecting their economic relations with each other (to) take all possible steps to promote the prosperity and economic security of both countries."
- (ii) O.E.E.C. deriving from E.R.P. and Marshall Aid. The 16 States concerned have been driven to concert economic policies to some extent, for receipt of Marshall Aid, e.g., oil-refinery plans, Intra-European Payments Union, and Hoffmann's conception of "a single market of 275 million consumers".
- (iii) Brussels Treaty Committees (since 1948), especially involving France and Benelux (e.g. negotiations for customs agreements).
- (iv) Deriving from all these, moves to make "Western Union" a more comprehensive system of cooperation.
- (v) Economic Commission for Europe under U.N. at Geneva, especially important for East-West trade, coal and coke, iron and steel in 1947-48, railways and rolling stock, timber, etc.
- (vi) Series of bilateral agreements - e.g. with Spain under Schuman leadership; with Italy over trade and customs, etc.; with Great Britain and Belgium over colonial development. (E.C.A. in July, 1950, made 4 million dollars available for colonial development of the Western Powers, and largest single share went to France.)

II. The above, and similar agreements, have led to some solid cooperation economically, but there has been also a series of instances of how France and Britain have failed to coordinate economic policies, or failed to do so in time to avoid friction.

- (i) René Mayer's currency plans in 1948 startled Britain.
- (ii) British devaluation of pound in September 1949 alarmed France; and the steepness of the devaluation came as a shock to many people.
- (iii) Cool British reception of Schuman Plan in 1950.
- (iv) Little progress made in joint colonial development, partly because of different traditions and principles of colonial administration.

III. Special factors in the French position

- (i) French economic policy is, broadly, dominated by the same two aims as that of Britain, but with opposite emphasis: i.e., both need (a) to 'close their dollar gap' (French gap was 857 million dollars in 1949); and (b) to check inflation.

But (a) matters less to France than to Britain, partly because she is less dependent than Britain on imports of food and other necessities, partly because (b) is politically a more clamorous problem in France than in Britain. In both, the dollar-gap has, in 1950, been largely bridged by U.S. war purchases in France and Britain. There is a certain struggle between the conservatism of vested interests in France, resisting closer linking of French economy with that of other countries, and the more daring proposals put forward by some of the present 'ruling élite' (see Sect. B. 2 above).

- (ii) French concentration on 'the Continental problem' leads her to feel that relations with her neighbors to the East and the South are more important than those to the West - Britain and U.S.A. To tackle this 'Continental problem', some of her leaders are ready to make very daring and imaginative proposals - e.g., Schuman Plan and the 'Pleven Plan' for a European army. The small degree of substantial achievements in other fields may even make the arguments for a more drastic 'pooling' of coal and steel seem all the more plausible.
- (iii) Traditional factors such as the relatively well-balanced nature of French national economy, and her traditional protectionism, militate against close coordination of economic life and policy with those of other Powers. The E.C.A. has tended to yield contradictory tendencies - e.g. on one hand, pressure for more free trade; but on the other, pressure to develop local production which strengthens existing interests against foreign competition, and so to keep a balanced economy still balanced. United States economic policy has also been in some respects inconsistent - especially as regards agriculture and shipping.

- (iv) Internal forces react strongly against such international agreements - e.g. Italian industrialists and French trade unionists both react against Franco-Italian agreements. There has also been some criticism from French business interests (agriculturalists and industrialists alike).
- (v) The British Government showed more courage than the French in imposing 'austerity' at the critical stage in 1945; but the French were then faced with greater material difficulties in physical reconstruction. After 1945, France needed 'austerity' less as regards foodstuffs. But the fluctuations of French policy between policies of "free economy" and "dirigisme" have made concerted policy difficult.

4. THE POSITION OF FRANCE IN AN ORGANIZED WESTERN EUROPE

- I. The widespread conviction that France must play a leading role, both in a political union and in a Western army, faces the following limitations:
 - (i) France's own weakness - both a political weakness, arising out of the instability already discussed, and a military inadequacy, ascribable to post-war economies in the armed forces, the drain imposed by the Indo-China war, problems of morale (Communism, scepticism, etc.), and a problem of leadership (varying wartime records and political allegiances of high-ranking officers, the Revers-Mast affair, etc.).
 - (ii) Special difficulties with other powers - in the case of Germany, a reluctance to let Germany rearm, combined with a growing conviction of its eventual necessity; in the case of Britain, dissensions over the Schuman Plan, the extent and methods of Western European integration, etc.; in the case of Belgium, a jealousy of Belgian wealth and absence of war damage expressing itself in accusations of "materialism" directed at Belgium (this on the popular rather than the diplomatic level); in the case of Spain, the maintenance of the international quarantine as a concession to Socialist and other moderate leftist opinion.
- II. On the other hand, such forces as the following are leading France into participation in an organized Western Europe:
 - (i) The dollar problem (see Sect. C. 3 above).
 - (ii) France's position between the two super-powers, with its threat of a repetition of invasion and liberation (physically nearer to the Soviet Union, but economically, politically, and ideologically more closely linked to the United States).
 - (iii) A sense that Europe as a whole has declined in importance. (The fact that the French realize this more clearly than others

impels them to take the lead in schemes for Western organization, in the hope that in the future key international decisions will be made on the Continent rather than in Washington.)

- (iv) Political affinities of French groups with corresponding parties in other countries - more particularly of the M.R.P. (which, except for one short interval, has held the Foreign Ministry ever since 1944) with the Christian Democratic governments of Italy and Western Germany. (The Socialists have closer affinities with Great Britain, reinforced by their financial support from the British Labor Party.) At the same time, the movement for European unity cuts across party lines; Paul Reynaud and André Philip, for example, are both strong advocates of unity.

5. FRANCE AND EASTERN EUROPE

Among Western European Powers, France has probably the most complicated position with regard to traditional relations with Eastern Europe - France has always had a big investment, financially, politically and culturally, in the area now beyond the iron curtain.

- I. The economic interests are those of the assets in the eastern countries and of the trade with them.
- (i) The assets were great before 1917 in Russia, Rumania, the Balkans, etc. Wiped out by the Communist regime in Russia, they expanded through more investment in the Little Entente countries and Poland in the 1920's and 1930's. The 1940's ruined almost all that fortune. But many French families have not yet given up hope.
- (ii) The trade with these countries had always been of some importance. Eastern Europe was in several respects economically complementary to France. Active commercial relations were started again, especially with Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., in 1945-48, but deteriorated greatly recently. Coal has come from Poland and the Donetz basin, and trade relations are at present greater than cultural relations.
- II. Politically, the alliance with the East against the threat of the Central Powers has been for centuries a fundamental axiom of French security: with the Sultan against the Maison d'Autriche, with Russia against Germany, with the Little Entente against Germany after 1919. De Gaulle's treaty with Moscow in 1945 was in the same line. Now the break with the East is complete, but regretted by many people for considerations of the European balance of power.

- 32 -

III. The French feel that Eastern Europe was in many respects culturally under their influence, since the Middle Ages. They wanted to maintain it for the present and for the future, even when economically and politically they felt ousted. Here is a field in which they hope to be able to hold some ground, despite the sweeping impact of Russian culture and interest in the Anglo-Saxon one.

These three reasons make it difficult for the French to accept the opacity of the iron curtain; and it even plays a part in their hesitation about choosing sides in the present conflict.

D. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARISONS

In all the problems discussed, some elements of the situation in France have close parallels or analogies in the problems which confront her neighbours. The problems created by the World War and its aftermath have modified or overlaid all separate national problems in Europe. On the other hand, every problem in modern France acquires a particular French context or colouring: France's geographical and historical position in Europe, and her experience since 1939, are sufficiently distinctive to provide such differentiation. The most impressive over-all feature of modern French problems is, therefore, their equivocal character, reflecting the somewhat equivocal position of France in the modern world.

If, in conclusion, one goes behind this conspectus of modern French problems to inquire (I) why they have this characteristic, and (II) whether this characteristic can be defined more closely, the following considerations arise.

I. The reasons for the equivocal position of France.

These may be approached by at least two modes of analysis: one predominantly geographical and economic, the other predominantly historical and political.

1. Geographical.

(a) Until recent times, a fairly sharp distinction could be drawn between "continental" Powers and "maritime" Powers, the States of eastern and central Europe being mainly the former, the States of the western seaboard being mainly the latter. This distinction still has some significance for an analysis of the present-day States of Europe, but its significance has been much blunted by such developments as

- 34 -

the growth of internal communications, canals, air transport, industrialization, etc.

- (b) Almost along this same line of geographical distinction, fell a division between those States which did not have a numerous and powerful bourgeoisie, and those which had. The "maritime" States, which included France, fostered the growth of such a bourgeoisie. Those "continental" Powers which had not a numerous and powerful bourgeoisie tended to receive an influx of capital and of technical assistance from the more "maritime" States. Nationalist feeling in these countries tended, at times, to resent such intervention.
- (c) BUT these divisions of Europe have been considerably blurred, and their significance changed, by World War II. A common experience of prolonged German occupation or domination, and of an extremely efficient continental blockade, has "thrown" the States of Europe more together. (The Kremlin in the 1930's described Nazi policy as "the ice-breaker for Communism.") Various forces of "proletarianization", of State control over economic life, have helped to diminish the power of the bourgeoisie in the western States.
- (d) The position of France in this changing Europe is the result partly of concessions to these tendencies, but partly also of resistance to them. She preserves a relatively rigid social structure, but has accepted various 'structural reforms' (see Sect. A. 3 above); she has powerfully individualistic traditions and instincts, but has accepted greater industrial rationalization, more dirigisme, more nationalization. Although she moves with the times, there is a strong backwash towards the conditions and social ideals which made her a great Power in the past. Her very geographical position (part-

continental, part-maritime; half-Mediterranean, half-Atlantic) makes her a half-way house between the old and the new. This position is essential to any explanation of her present-day problems. Other comparable geographical distinctions (e.g. between Western, Mediterranean, Central and Eastern European Powers) show France in a similar criss-cross position.

2. Historical.

(a) It is, of course, possible to analyze historical growth by means of many different antitheses: individualism vs. collectivism, liberty vs. equality, and so on, and to illuminate it by such analyses. But in Europe, since at least 1870, two of the most dynamic forces of historical change have been Nationalism and Socialism. The process of their interaction (at times conflict, at others mutual penetration and reinforcement) underlies the growth of the modern so-called 'Welfare State'. Great Wars and their consequences have helped to promote both: so have industrialization, urbanization, the recurrence of economic crises, and the spread of western civilization overseas. So, too, has the growth of Democracy: (i.e. of universal suffrage, representative institutions, popular education, etc.). Democracy has, on the one hand, helped to enlist the interest and interests of all sections of the national community in what is done by the national State, and has promoted national cohesion and solidarity: it has, on the other hand, also bred Socialism, as the industrial working classes became increasingly persuaded that their political rights and powers could, and should, be used to improve their material welfare.

(b) A more detailed examination of the interaction of these two forces may provide some more objective 'differential' by which to distinguish between uniquely French problems and those which, since 1870, have been common to other European countries: and so offers further explanation for the present equivocal position of France. The process of their interaction may be broken down into three main categories:

- (i) conflict between them;
- (ii) the socializing of Nationalism;
- (iii) the nationalizing of Socialism.

(c) Conflict between Nationalism and Socialism.

(i) Paris Commune, 1871. 'Communards' were confused with 'Communists' (as were 'capitulards' with 'capitalists'), and insofar as the Commune stood for a Proudhonian break-up of France into a federation of small, self-governing units, it conflicted directly with liberal Nationalism as represented by Thiers, as well as with the Monarchist ideas of 1871, and with the 'integral nationalism', later, of Barrès, etc. The legend of the Commune carried forward this conflict, in modified forms, into the Third Republic.

(ii) The activities of the Internationals. The Marxist appeal, "workers of the world unite", inevitably bred conflict with all other Socialist movements which tended to look to national State action, through liberal-democratic means, for improvement of the lot of the working classes. Examples of this are very familiar. The conflict had two outcomes: in 1914, the Second International virtually broke up; and the Third International became increasingly an instrument of the national policy of the USSR. In either case, Nationalism triumphed over Socialism.

(iii) The Spanish Civil War assumed this character, though it also became an arena for the clash between Stalinism and Fascism.

(N.B. French adherence to 'non-intervention' was a highly characteristic reaction, in face of such conflict.)

(d) The socializing of Nationalism.

(i) The great nationalists of the 19th century contrived to promote national cohesion by adopting some socialistic measures - often only to 'steal the thunder' of the Socialist or Liberal oppositions. Bismarck's legislation after 1871, Disraeli's support for social reforms, are the stock examples. The extension of the suffrage encouraged this tendency in most countries.

(ii) The two World Wars, whilst strengthening chauvinistic nationalism in many ways, also precipitated a clamorous demand for policies which were essentially socialistic (see Sect. A. 2 above). This derived in part from war-time promises made to rally national effort ('Homes fit for Heroes') but much more from the social and economic dislocations of war, which required extensive State action to deal with them after the war. The world economic crisis of 1929-31, with its mass unemployment, is mainly a long-range example of this effect. (See below.)

(iii) The adoption by all major political parties of the ideas of 'social security' in Great Britain, France, etc., during the decade 1940-1950, whilst all of them (including the Communists) also claim to represent national (and even nationalist) interests, is the latest and greatest example of how far this process has already gone. The result is the 'Welfare State'.

(e) The nationalizing of Socialism.

- (i) The growth of non-revolutionary, parliamentary Socialist or Labour Parties in most western European countries, ready to assume responsibilities of ministerial office and renouncing the policy of the 'Internationals' whenever they conflict with these aims.
- (ii) The Stalinist victory over Trotskyism in U.S.S.R., and the consequent development of 'Socialism in a single country'. The Five-Year Plans, and indeed the whole concept of 'national socialistic planning' elsewhere, shows a nationalizing of Socialism.
- (iii) The triumph of the 'National' over the 'Socialist' wing of the Nazi Party from 1934 onwards. The Nazi program had contrived, on paper, to wed Nationalism and Socialism: but as soon as tension between them bred a wing of 'Second revolutionaries', they were purged. Even so, the Party kept its ostensibly 'socialistic' policy - national planning for autarky, etc.; denunciation of 'pluto-democracy'.
- (iv) A similar split had appeared within the Italian Fascist Party in 1923-5, when the Right wing won a victory over the Left; when traces of it reappeared in 1934-5, they were smothered by the Italo-Abyssinian War. (The coincidence in time of the tensions within the single-party States in 1934-5, including the Moscow purges, and the rise of such things as the 'National Government' in Britain, the 'New Deal' in U.S.A., the Spanish Civil War, the period of tension between 1934 and 1936 in France, is in itself significant: was it a variety of national reactions to the effects of the world economic crisis, mass-unemployment, and the challenge of Socialism?)

(f) The position of France.

In general, it can be said that before 1940 Nationalism in France had been less socialized - and Socialism had been less nationalized - than in most of her neighbours: with the result that the open conflict between Nationalism and Socialism remained stronger and more unresolved in France than elsewhere when World War II began.

Various factors which had precluded, or minimized, the inter-penetration of these two forces in France include the following:

- (i) The distinction between Radicals and Socialists, which had looked like being blurred before 1908, was kept sharp and clear (cf. the great debate between Clemenceau and Jaurès on June 18, 1906). The Radical-Socialists merged with the Radicals and not with the Socialists. The efforts to strengthen and unify the Socialist Party were only temporarily successful.
- (ii) The growth, from 1934 on, of a vigorous Communist Party which - while claiming as much as the Socialists to stand in the authentic Jacobin and French Revolutionary tradition, and so to be nationalistic - adhered to the policies of the Comintern. Its refusal to join the Radicals and Socialists in the 'Popular Front Government', 1936, to some extent illustrates this divergence.
- (iii) the growth and persistence of anti-militarist and pacifist sentiments on the Left, especially amongst the Socialists, were regarded by the Right as conclusive proof that in France Socialism had not been 'nationalized' at all.
- (iv) The French Right-wing parties, partly because of their extreme anxieties about French national security, of the power of big business and industry in their ranks, of their intense fear of

- 40 -

Communism, remained correspondingly immune to 'socializing'. The consistent blockage of any serious measures of social reform and 'social security' between the two Wars, until 1936, are a result of this: though the lethargic and conservative character of the whole constitutional system, and the power in politics of the peasant proprietors, are additional reasons.

- (v) The absence in France between the wars of mass unemployment on the scale which prevailed in many of her neighbours (or in the United States) helps to explain why French nationalism was less socialized than elsewhere, and why the drive for the "Welfare State" was less urgent and dynamic in France.
- (vi) As the first Task Force indicated, the crisis of 1934-6 shook the Republic to its base. Seen in the above perspective, it was (a) an open battle between the irreconciled forces of Nationalism and Socialism, in 1934; (b) an attempt, through the Blum experiment, to find a modus vivendi between the two forces: indeed the first serious and concerted effort of modern France to do so. It was inconclusive, partly because it came so late, the Communists did not back it, the trade unions harassed it with stay-in strikes, it alarmed the nervous Right, and it ran into the deep waters of international crisis, following German reoccupation of the Rhine. It bred the slogan 'Better Hitler than Blum', which became poignant in 1940.
- (vii) This irreconciled conflict is perpetuated in the Fourth Republic by the great power of the Communist Party and the present weakness of the Socialist Party; and by the rise of the R.P.F. on the Right, so far much more nationalistic than socialistic. But it is softened

by the growth of the M.R.P. as a bridge between Catholicism and Socialism in politics, and by acceptance (by the Centre parties) of the measures of nationalization and 'social security' passed since 1944.

II. Closer definition of the equivocal position of France.

The European Powers can, of course, be classified into many different groups, according to geographical, religious, economic or historical criteria, e.g. distinctions between:

1. 'Continental' and 'maritime' - as above - puts the States of eastern and central Europe mainly in the former, and the States of western Europe mainly in the latter category, with France overlapping both categories (like Italy).
2. 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' puts the countries of southern and eastern Europe mainly in the former, the countries of northern and north-western Europe mainly in the latter, with France bridging the two (like Germany).
3. Countries which have known a large and powerful bourgeoisie, as distinguished from those which have not, puts the north-western maritime States in the former category, and those of eastern and southern Europe mainly in the latter, with France somewhere between the two (like Germany), in the sense that she has middle classes more closely linked to the soil than, e.g. Great Britain, but stronger and more powerful than, e.g. Italy.
4. Countries where nationalism and socialism have interpenetrated, and countries where they have not, (as above) also puts France in an intermediate position.

- 42 -

Although no single classification of this kind is in itself satisfactory or adequate, there is clearly considerable coincidence of pattern when all such over-sharp distinctions are superimposed: and the country where there is least tidy identification is France. She straddles different patterns, in a cross-bench position. e.g. Countries such as Great Britain, Holland and Scandinavia have maritime traditions, are Protestant, have a strong middle class and no important Communist Party, and through the machinery of the 'welfare State' have gone far to harmonising nationalism and socialism. Countries of central and eastern Europe tend to have continental traditions, such are Catholic (N.B. Western Germany is more strongly Catholic than pre-war Germany which included the largely Protestant east), have weak middle classes and strong Communist Parties, and have not gone far in reconciling nationalism with socialism.

Immediately after liberation, France drew closer to the former pattern. She fostered the 'welfare State', offset the strength of conservative Catholicism on one side by the power of the M.R.P., and of Communism on the other by the strength of the Socialist Party, and through the durable facts of peasant proprietorship and a reconstructed industry preserved a strong middle class. She aligned diplomatically with Britain and the U.S.A. There appeared no solidly organized Catholic bloc in France, as there is in Germany and in Italy; and one factor which prevented it was the split between General de Gaulle and the M.R.P., and the subsequent emergence of the R.P.F.*

*The use of the term 'Catholic' in this Memorandum, as applied to a political party, should not be considered as implying that any official label of this kind has been attached to the group. It seems that no party in France wanted any confessional label to be officially attached to it. Although M. Bidault suggested introducing the term "Christian" or "Catholic" when the M.R.P. was christened, this was held to be undesirable by the more experienced members of the Party.

- 43 -

But with the tightening grip of Communism on organized labor, the weakening of the Socialist Party, and the growth of the R.P.F., France subsequently drew closer to the second pattern. Under the Fourth Republic she thus edged back on to a delicate equipoise, which keeps her somewhat distinct from either pattern. At almost every point, she belongs simultaneously to two different patterns of development. Is not this the underlying dilemma of the crisis in France? And is not this a good reason for studying France in particular? As France goes, so may tip the balance of western Europe.

Finally, a degree of caution should be maintained in considering the problem of modern France as if France were "the sick man of Europe". Her population is increasing. Her economic recovery, in relation to the dislocation and devastation of five years ago, is remarkably solid. Her constitutional and political difficulties, intractable though they appear at present, have a realistic correlation with her equivocal place in Europe and the world. Her political system even now permits complete freedom of thought, speech and press, and the vivacious interplay of a great variety of opinions and ideas; no other country permits more. She still sets a high value on personal freedom. She enjoys some of the benefits of her weaknesses. She may still be in process of finding a new role to play in the modern world. But her morale is worse than the situation warrants. The psychological results of her equivocal position are great. Her citizens feel a sense of frustration because change is so difficult to accomplish; they feel unable to get to grips with urgent problems: they have a feeling of insecurity and of uncertainty as to which community they belong to. Here, perhaps, are some roots of that "incivisme" so commonly observed and lamented as one of the chronic problems of modern France.

FRENCH CATHOLIC GROUPS*

The attitudes adopted by the various groups of French Catholics toward the impact on French life of other cultures, especially American, reflect the philosophy, especially spiritual, and the political and social programs of those groups. It is difficult to obtain reliable information concerning recent developments among French Catholics, but a few definite generalizations can be made: first, the practising Catholics in France constitute a minority of the total French population, and their numbers and influence have generally been overrated by both politicians and historians; second, the French Catholics are as deeply divided into a variety of schools and groups as other Frenchmen. Although French Catholics share a common moral philosophy, there is no French Catholic unity; there is no clear French Catholic agreement on any political or social subject.

One should use as great care in defining the French Catholics and their policies as in describing Trotskyites or Federalists. Not all French Catholics are conservative; most French conservatives are not Catholic; most French reactionaries are not Catholic. French conservatives often pose as Catholics, just as American politicians often pose as practising Christians, because in the past in some areas and among some classes such postures have proved politically profitable. Similarly, French radicals of various varieties have often posed as anti-clericals, but that has not prevented them when in office from using various institutions and facilities of the Church to fulfill their programs and to strengthen their political position both at home and abroad. In the same way, the Communists have used the Orthodox Church throughout eastern Europe; this hardly means that the Communists have become Orthodox Christians.

The divisions among the French Catholics are not new; they derive at least from the ancient Gallican-Ultramontane disagreement. The French Revolution temporarily united most of the French Catholics in opposition, but the history of these Catholics in the nineteenth century is one of increasing discord and division. The splitting of the ever-smaller number of Catholics was completed by the establishment of the conservative Third Republic, the issue concerning the policy which Catholics should adopt toward that Republic, and the increasing seriousness of the social problem as France became more industrialized. The sharp divisions among the Catholics constitute one of the major weaknesses of the Catholic Church in France today and one of the principal reasons the Church has not been able to profit from the present ideological vacuum in France.

The extreme conservative Catholics are very nationalistic, but they are divided in their allegiances and in the policies which they believe should be followed to retain the purity of French culture and to aid France to regain her position as a world power. Most of the other Catholics, it should be noted, are not so deeply concerned with this purity and power. Many of these extreme conservatives supported Vichy from 1940 through 1944, in part because of the attitude of the Vichy government toward the Church's role in education; many of them still presumably believe the Vichy program alone can restore France - above all, a France which again shall be truly the elder daughter of the Church. Many of the church hierarchy were leaders in the support of Vichy, just as

* Submitted to the Seminar on Modern France by Robert F. Byrnes, Jean-Jacques Chevallier, and Canon A. L. Gabriel.

were many leaders of other hierarchies - the army, the administration, business. Although many Church leaders supported Vichy and although Vichy sought to use the Catholic Church as a bulwark, it is clear that some Catholic bishops criticized this stand and that most of the Catholic clergy and apparently most of the Catholic laity as well opposed Vichy.

The extreme conservative Catholics are extreme nationalists. They seek, first of all, to reestablish France as a great power. They wish to make France independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and they wish to restore French political leadership to the continent. With "a plague on both your houses" attitude, they seek to resist all foreign influence in France. Although they are willing on occasion to borrow a political technique or to base their political system on a foreign model, they oppose the introduction into France of American ideas, food, social customs, and institutions. With their emphasis upon the land, the village, the Church, the patriarchal family - the family above all - and the old established ways, they view the United States as the source of modern industrial techniques and modern social dis-solvents. They resent and resist things American because the United States to them means forces operating for further social and political change in France.

As long ago as the 1890's, the extreme conservative Catholics, especially those among the clergy, bitterly resisted a program known then as "Américanisme." This was an attempt by some democratic French priests, influenced by the Paullists, Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop Ireland, and other progressive American Catholic leaders, to convert French Catholic leaders to the recognition that the Catholic Church in America had profited enormously from the American Catholics' general acceptance of American political ideals and that the Catholic Church in France could benefit enormously by adopting attitudes and ideas from the American Catholics. (The conservative Catholics during the 1890's had resisted this bitterly and successfully.)

This issue has not been so clear during most recent years, but it should be noted that on this front the extreme conservative Catholics have yielded. The Catholic Church in France has borrowed very heavily from the Catholic Church in the United States since the First World War. Many French priests have been sent to the United States to acquire further training in American universities and seminaries and to see at first hand how the Church has been able to thrive in a democratic Republic which is predominantly Protestant. Moreover, the reorganization of some French seminaries and, above all, the changes in the curricula within those seminaries have been accomplished with the benefit of heavy borrowing from American practice. This change, which has been urged by democratic and progressive Catholics for a half-century, could have been adopted only by the bishops themselves, who in the past have constituted one of the extreme conservative Catholic strongholds. This struggle is by no means ended, however, and the current controversy over the cassock is a symbol of the continuing resistance.

The moderate Catholics are far more difficult to define. Many of these are members of the CFTC, many were supporters of the Démocrates Populaires and the Jeune République in the 1930's, many grew up in the Catholic Action groups, many left more conservative but weaker groups at the end of the Second World War to use the MRP as their conservative bulwark. Compared with the extreme

conservative Catholics, this group is not looking backward to the same degree and is apparently not so seriously interested in the purity of French culture or in whether France is still or can become again a great power. It seeks to strengthen France and to regain prestige for France via French leadership of a more unified continental West. It has advocated basic social reforms for France, though less and less vigorously as time has passed since 1944.

The varied elements which compose this general group are much less nationalistic than the extreme conservative Catholics. They have accepted the social changes which are implicit in the adoption of new equipment and industrial techniques from America, and they have borrowed ideas quite freely. They are, however, quite critical of American culture. They are especially critical of the low standards of American movies and literature; they condemn American irresponsibility and American ignorance of other peoples and of their cultures; they resist the American emphasis on production, on quantity instead of quality, on power instead of other values; they criticize the standardization and even mechanization of American culture. While willing to adopt that which will strengthen and improve France, they have a lively fear that American ideas and attitudes will overwhelm the traditional French values.

The critique of American culture and its influence in France is best expressed by the radical Catholics, most notably by Esprit and some Catholic organs, which are also critical of the MRP and which are even more violently opposed to those forces further on the Right. This Catholic Left, which has often in the past six years been more radical than the French Communist Party, has a Christian humanist philosophy. Emphasizing a rational and critical attitude - a deep belief in the dignity of every man, the need for true equality and a real brotherhood of man, and, as Mounier described it, personalism - this group has displayed since 1932 an independent critical attitude toward all developments in France and toward the American impact on France. This group is more interested in people, in the development of individuals, than most of the others. Its rooted opposition to the established order has led to its great understanding of and sympathy for the French Communists, who these Catholics believe alone have demonstrated the revolutionary social drive which France needs and who are alone close to the workers and the vital sources of life.

The Catholic Left has ruthlessly criticized the United States, American culture, and American influence. While the Communists err in not tolerating a "Communist anti-clericalism", the Americans smother and destroy all thought and vitality by their emphasis on money, production, power, technology, and middle-class morality. Moreover, the Catholic Left in particular has pointed out large gaps in American democratic thought and practice; perhaps the best illustration of this is the bitter indictment by Témoignage Chrétien of those Paris hotels which in the summer of 1950 refused to allow Negroes because many of their American customers insisted on bringing the color line into France with them.

This group thus believes that the new humanism is at least as greatly endangered by American standards and values as it is by Communist ones, while the Communists have the merit of being closely associated with the workers, the one lively source of vigor and hope. The Communists' revolutionary zeal and their willingness to devote their lives to their cause has deeply impressed

- 4 -

the Catholic Left, and the Catholic "workers' missions" reflect these Catholics' understanding of the principal means by which the future of France must be wrested from the Communists.

Although French Catholics are now far better informed concerning the United States than they were a generation or two ago, there is still a considerable amount of ignorance of America among them. For the moderates and Left, for example, the Readers' Digest represents American culture. Mounier apparently never realized that his critique of the selfish individualism of capitalism was a common one in the United States. Similarly, neither the Catholic Left nor the other Catholic groups is aware of the role of the family or of community spirit in the United States.

THE FRENCH PEASANTRY 1918-1939

Perhaps the only non-controversial statement which can be made about the French peasantry between wars is that every aspect of the peasants' role is controversial; and the only valid generalization is that no generalization fits the peasantry as a whole. While textbooks commonly speak of the rural domination of politics, tax favoritism, the inherent backwardness of small farming, the evils of the rural exodus, and the virtues of the peasantry as a stabilizing social force, all of these generalizations have been (and are still) disputed in certain quarters in France. Even the agricultural statistics concerning land distribution, farm production, prices, buying power, and relative tax burden are sharply debated. As for the general role of the peasantry in society and in the state, opinions vary widely. Georges Gurvitch has described the farmer as "the greatest supporter of the French republic and of democracy"; Louis Chevalier contends that during the Third Republic "the deputies and senators of peasant origin did much more for the city populations and for the working class than did the representatives of the large urban centers." But Alfred Cobban calls the peasantry a reactionary element whose "unintelligent clinging to customary abuses makes [it] the ideal agent for exploitation by the most sinister forces....The continuing influence of the peasantry [Cobban adds] is the chief reason why the so-called Fourth Republic cannot escape from the Third, and remains petrified in the past."

The question of the peasants' role since 1918 bears on the work of this seminar in a number of respects. They represented between one-fourth and one-third of the total active population (and, of course, of the voters). So large a group, if properly organized, could weigh

- 2 -

heavily upon political and economic decisions. More important still was the relative status of the peasantry with respect to other social groups. Discontent among the farmers, together with hostility of the city groups toward the farmers, could seriously weaken the social fabric of France. Perhaps the most basic question for purposes of this seminar is whether these stresses or tensions were greater in 1939 than they had been twenty years earlier; whether the peasantry had come to be a factor for social stability, stagnation, or disruption.

None of the foregoing issues can be examined realistically so long as the whole rural population is lumped together en masse. The basic distinction is not between owners and non-owners (even though the latter element makes up about one-third of the total farm population), but rather between (a) prosperous operators of either large-scale or small specialized farms on the one hand, and (b) marginal operators of relatively small and backward farms on the other. In the latter category are many smallowners, a majority of the tenants, and almost all of the métayers; taken together, they constitute a clear majority of the farm population. Economically and psychologically, they might almost be called precapitalist; they produce little for the market and live pretty much on a subsistence level. Yet they bulk so large numerically that they, rather than the modernized capitalist farmers, are usually thought of as "the peasantry". Here, as in so many other respects, France finds herself in an equivocal position between two major European patterns: neither completely precapitalist like the eastern European countries, nor completely evolved like the maritime lands of northwest Europe.

Among those Frenchmen who concerned themselves with peasant problems between the wars, there were several rival currents of thought.

- 3 -

One group regarded the combination of precapitalist and capitalist agriculture as an ideal balance which ought to be preserved. It stressed the virtues of the small peasantry as a social stabilizer and a reservoir of all the best French values; it favored a variety of measures (cooperatives, state aid, etc.) to assist the small farmer and to check the rural exodus which this group deplored. Another group, which might in a sense be called neo-physiocratic, preached a drastic conversion of French agriculture to capitalistic methods with a view to increasing production and exports and cutting food costs. Between these two extremes were moderate reformers of various sorts who generally argued that small farm units were not only socially preferable but were economically advantageous as well, and who often looked to the Danish example as a model. Complicating the debate was the Catholic church's concern for a social order which would keep the family together and would keep it in the church. (The Marxian doctrine of collective farming had a purely theoretical interest in these years, since it was regarded by the Marxian parties as a long-term goal to be played down in propaganda).

Few of the farmers themselves took much interest in such broad and general questions as the proper structure of French agriculture and its role in the state. Even the prosperous capitalist minority did not push to expand its power at the expense of the small peasant--at least not in any organized way. It preferred rather to recruit the support of the precapitalist mass through a simple program which would appeal to both major agrarian categories: low taxes, no wars, and the highest possible agricultural prices. Its most effective form of organization was the so-called "specialized association"--federations of milk producers, wheat producers, wine growers, etc. These bodies,

- 4 -

controlled by the agrarian capitalist element, operated as effective pressure groups. The same elements also dominated the principal agricultural unions (which, however, were relatively small and ineffective because the mass of precapitalist peasants had no interest in joining them). From time to time efforts were made to organize a peasant party, entente, or front; but all of them remained anemic. For one thing, it was impossible to find a positive political program which would fuse together the heterogeneous rural elements. For another, the bulk of the peasantry was allergic to being organized in any fashion. And still further, the more influential elements in agriculture needed no separate party so long as they could steadily influence the choice of deputies and senators in rural areas (notably through the Radical-Socialist committees). The scrutin d'arrondissement was pretty effective insurance against the growth of a peasant party of the "green socialist" type; for it produced a kind of farm bloc in parliament without formal organization or label.

In a general way, the attitude of the agrarian capitalist element resembled that of the large industrial and commercial interests in France. Both were essentially malthusian in their desire to produce little for an assured and high-priced market; both were interested (consciously or unconsciously) in preserving a large number of small producers or traders as a kind of screen to disguise their quasi-monopoly and their high profits, and to serve as a propaganda weapon for keeping prices and tariffs high. Throughout the interwar decades the agrarian leaders complained that agricultural tariff rates were lagging behind industrial tariff rates (which was true, when based on the 1913 levels¹), that total farm buying power lagged steadily below the 1913 level

(which appears to have been generally true²), and that the "price scissors" constantly favored industry over agriculture (which, again, seems to have been the case except in the early 1930s³). They could point to the primitive living standard of the bulk of the peasants, and to the mounting flight from the farms to the cities which they described as a daily plebiscite of the rural population against its conditions of existence.⁴ What they said was in large part true; what they did not say was that the profit margin for efficient farmers was unreasonably high, or that the bulk of production for the market was furnished by a minority of producers.

Whether the preservation of a mass of precapitalist peasants contributed to France's social equilibrium is a matter of opinion-- perhaps even of faith, beyond the power of rational analysis to determine. That it contributed to increased social stress does seem possible to prove. This mass of peasants was neither prosperous nor essentially happy. Perhaps it had never been either prosperous or happy; but it was growing steadily more conscious of its handicaps as the twentieth century moved on. In part this awareness of the peasant's hard lot resulted from improved communication and transportation; in part, from social improvements in the cities; and in part as well from the propaganda spread by their more prosperous agrarian brethren. At the same time, urban resentment against the farmers increased in periods of inflation or unemployment, when the impact of high food costs persuaded the city classes that the farmers were profiteering.

The depression decade doubtless increased the tension between farm and city. The urban workers resented the fact that the peasant was eating and drinking well while they themselves went hungry. The small peasants, on the other hand, failed to recognize or appreciate the relative advantage which the depression gave them temporarily; they felt

- 6 -

the pinch of declining markets, which cut off the tiny cash income needed to pay taxes or to buy their few luxuries. For a peasant on a marginal living standard, the smallest cut was painful. Even the capitalist farmers were hit hard for the first time in years, despite the protection of their domestic market through the quota system. The resulting discontent was reflected in a variety of ways: by the growth of Communist influence in many rural districts, by the rural disorders (a rare phenomenon in modern French history) stirred up by such agitators as Dorgères, by the creation of a small but permanent peasant party, and by the vogue for corporatism which surged through the upper levels of most of the agricultural organizations.

A further contribution to the city-country tension was the Popular Front victory of 1936. Agrarian leaders feared that their influence in politics might now be overshadowed by that of organized labor; they complained that Popular Front legislation benefitted the worker at the farmer's expense. Even the Wheat Office did not please them entirely (although much higher prices at once accompanied its creation); agrarian leaders of the capitalist category would have preferred out-and-out corporative control of prices and marketing. It is probably true that 1936 cut back agrarian influence in politics somewhat. One bit of evidence was parliament's decision in 1939 to abandon the scrutin d'arrondissement for R. P. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the agrarian leaders had been shifting to the support of the more Leftist parties well before 1936 (n.b., the election of Blum at Narbonne and of other Socialists in the south), and that these leaders may have been shrewd enough to adapt themselves as political power moved Left. Certainly there is no evidence that the Popular Front aimed at basic

- 7 -

structural reforms in agriculture; Minister of Agriculture Georges Monnet was full of pious phrases about the virtues of the small peasantry and the need to preserve it, as well as about the need to "revalorize" farm prices.

By 1939 the peak of peasant discontent had undoubtedly passed. Yet one can fairly conclude that the causes of urban-rural friction remained intact and that this friction may have become somewhat worse during the interwar period. Agricultural prices remained simultaneously too high and too low: too high to permit exports or a cut in urban food costs, too low to get the mass of peasants up off the floor of subsistence. The peasant grew increasingly resentful at his hard life compared to the 40-hour week and the paid vacations of the city worker; the worker in turn resented peasant complaints about social reforms, and peasant failure to pay a full share of governmental expenses.⁵ As each group concentrated on its own grievances, civic spirit slipped another notch. It is true that just beneath the surface, changes were occurring which overshadowed the coming of a new kind of French agriculture. The rural exodus, speeded up once more after 1936, was slowly tending to wipe out the lowest category of precapitalist farms. The poorest land was going out of production; the better bits were being absorbed into middle farms of actual or potential efficiency. Certain social reforms of the Popular Front, too, gave promise of lessening the gulf in living standards between urban and rural workers. Through a slow evolutionary process, given several decades to operate, the precapitalist sector might disappear, and France might emerge with a healthier structure like that of the Danes or the Dutch. Whether there was time for this evolution to work itself out without a vigorous push

- 8 -

or two from the government, however, was open to some question. Certainly there was no sign before 1939 that any government might consider such intervention--or that any government could have survived politically if it had tried to do so. The problem was passed on to the Fourth Republic, which has likewise found it wiser to let evolution do the job.

Footnotes

1. According to Prault's figures, French duties amounted to the following percentages of the value of imports:

	Agric. products	Indust. products
Average 1901-1910	8.56	8.23
Average 1921-1930	4.55	10.75
1933	10.57	17.19

2. Dessirier's figures (1939) on peasant purchasing power for representative years:

1913	100
1920	63.4
1925	86.5
1929	100.5
1930	89.3
1935	69.7

In fact, the decline in total purchasing power was partly offset by the decline in total farm population.

3. According to Bettelheim's price indexes, agricultural prices were well below industrial prices (base 1914) in every interwar year except 1923, 1931-34 inclusive, and 1936.

4. Census figures on total active agricultural populations:

1921	8,951,000
1926	8,130,000
1931	7,637,000
1936	7,142,000

5. René Froment of the Planning Commission (1950) estimates at roughly 1 to 4 the pre-war advantage enjoyed by the peasantry in direct taxes (i.e., proportion of income paid in direct taxes). He estimates the post-war advantage, incidentally, at 2 to 3. It can be argued, of course, that the bulk of the precapitalist peasants could not afford a fully equivalent burden; that their return on capital and labor invested was extremely low.

THE FRENCH MIDDLE CLASS, 1919-1939

An Outline for Discussion

by

John B. Christopher, University of Rochester

- I. Who compose the French middle class?
- a. Terms "middle class" and "bourgeoisie" may be used interchangeably for the sake of convenience although connotations of "bourgeois" in French are varied and subtle.
 - b. Middle-class outlook characteristic not simply of small minority of Frenchmen but rather of a large number -- probably a majority. Bourgeois spirit everywhere latent (André Siegfried). Petit-rentier and petit-fonctionnaire attitudes seep down through the social strata from the haute bourgeoisie (Beau de Loménie). Marc Bloch complains of petit bourgeois attitude of most big labor unions, 1940.
 - c. Points for debate and discussion:
 1. Impossibility of arriving at precise definition of French middle class by strict economic or social classifications (income brackets, occupation, residence in town or in countryside).
 2. Workable (though not precise) definition may be reached by considering bourgeoisie -- if the cliché may be allowed -- as a state of mind. Bourgeois outlook then characteristic not only of men of property but also of would-be men of property -- businessmen, professional men, civil servants, rentiers, land-owning farmers and even some proletarians.
 3. Though important differences remain between haute and petite bourgeoisie, and though intensity of bourgeois attitude is not equal in all groups listed in (2) above, nevertheless most important fact is that a common denominator of middle-class spirit underlay them all.
- II. What is the evidence that something was amiss among the French middle class, 1919-1939?
- a. General -- the thesis that the defeat of 1940 reflected the moral bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie.

for: testimony of many observers (for example -- Pierre Cot, Léon Blum, Albert Guérard, Pertinax) that defeat resulted from a protracted and disastrous failure in bourgeois leadership.

against: defeat of 1940 pre-eminently military, and only incidentally political or social or moral.

- b. Political -- the existence of a widespread crise de confiance among the bourgeoisie with respect to the democratic republic, especially during the 1930's.

for: tendency toward political polarization, especially toward the Right (the *ruée vers l'ordre*) -- growth of fascist leagues, of appeasement mentality, of hysterical fear of Communism; Stavisky riots; Doumergue program for strengthening the executive; willingness of so many parliamentarians to commit political suicide, July, 1940.

against: results of the national elections reveal no overwhelming swing toward political authoritarianism; contention (see Albert Guérard, David Thomson) that while the machinery of the Third Republic became increasingly unpopular, the basic principle of democracy still claimed wide allegiance; general acceptance of Third Republic institutions by Fourth Republic.

- c. Economic -- unsettling effects of inflation; growth of "incivisme".

for: tax evasion, repeated flights from the franc, failure to modernize tax system.

against: ? ? ?
(the "for" evidence seems overwhelming to me, but doubtless others will disagree)

- d. Technological -- relative slowness of the twentieth-century agricultural and industrial revolutions in France as compared to Britain, Germany, the United States

for: apathy with respect to investment in technological improvements, both in agriculture and in industry; failure to maintain during the 30's the plant modernizations made as result of post-World War I reconstruction; skeptical attitude toward technology picturesquely illustrated by popularity of attacks on American mechanization and materialism.

against: a financial crisis at root of problem, more than any lack of technological interest or aptitude; significance of anti-American attitude exaggerated.

III. If we may assume that the evidence in the "for" columns in (II) above outweighs that in the "against" columns, then who and what were responsible for the plight of the middle class?

- a. Forces sometimes asserted to be beyond the control of the middle class. For example -- (i) the accidents of geography, notably the coal deficiency, hampering industrial development; (ii) the impulse given to polarization, politically speaking, by the Bolshevik and Nazi revolutions; (iii) World War I and its aftermath -- the severe drain imposed by war casualties, damage and reconstruction; failure to obtain expected reparations from Germany and consequent aggravation of inflation.

- 3 -

- b. Were all these forces, however, altogether beyond control by the middle class? Examples: (i) Geography -- failure to exploit full industrial potential of iron and bauxite deposits; (ii) inflation -- resulting in part from centuries-old fiscal tradition and from short-sighted tax and borrowing policies during World War I.
- c. Points for debate and discussion:
 1. Is it not correct to conclude that World War I, while aggravating greatly the plight of the middle class, did not originally cause it?
 2. How valid is the explanation advanced by André Siegfried -- namely: that middle-class difficulties result from long-standing French traditions (individualism, lack of community feeling, emphasis on the conservation of wealth rather than the creation of additional wealth)?
 3. How valid is the explanation advanced by David Thomson, Albert Guérard, Léon Blum and still others -- that the bourgeoisie was 'using up its sap', was unable to deal with the social and economic complexities and problems which came to the fore in France during the decade before 1914?

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Princeton, New Jersey

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

A meeting of the European members of the Seminar on Modern France was held in Paris Saturday and Sunday, 20th and 21st May 1950, to formulate a program or agenda for the sessions to be conducted at Princeton during the autumn term, September to December 1950. Those in attendance at the meeting, which was held at the Institut d'Études Politiques, were:

Professor Edward Mead Earle
M. Raymond Aron
Mr. J. P. T. Bury
Professor Jean-Jacques Chevallier
M. Francois Goguel*
Dr. Jean Gottmann
Dr. David Thomson
M. Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres*
Professor E. L. Woodward
Mr. Joseph Kraft, Secretary

It was unanimously agreed, after lengthy discussion of various possibilities, that the Seminar might most profitably concern itself with the nature, the origins, and the probable consequences to France and to Europe of the present-day crisis in France. It was realized that the crisis--which has been acute since, say, 1934--is deeply rooted in French history. But Messrs. Gottmann, Goguel, and de Vabres--representing a relatively younger generation in France--strongly emphasized that in many, perhaps all essential, respects the crisis is to be understood less in terms of ideologies and other historical factors than in terms of external pressures and of the dynamic character of the modern world. There was no disagreement, however, concerning the extent to which military security, centralization of government and administration, geographical diversification, and similar phenomena were centuries-old in their origins and implications. But it was pointed out that, to some Frenchmen at least, social security has seemed of more immediate moment than military security.

It was generally agreed, too, that the current crisis in France should be analyzed with special regard to:

1. The political and ideological crisis, which intensified old antagonisms and which rendered difficult or virtually impossible the operation of those parliamentary and social forces which operated as a "Third Force" as between the extremes of left and right. Leninism and Stalinism, on the one hand, and Fascism, on the other, had cut across the usual political alignments--to cite but a single example.

* M. Goguel and M. de Vabres are not members of the Seminar and were present by invitation.

- 2 -

2. The economic crisis--partly the result of the Great Depression and partly the result of other and longer-range forces--from which France never quite recovered before she was overrun by Germany in 1940.

3. The radical change which occurred in the French view concerning the mission of France as a European and a world power; also the change of opinion which occurred in the non-French world concerning the function and status of France as a Great Power. The weakened position of France in world affairs was partly the result of outside pressures and partly the result of such internal forces as the decline of the French élan vital.

Messrs. Aron, Chevallier, and Gottmann--with the advice and cooperation of Messrs. Goguel and de Vabres--agreed to draft memoranda on points 1 and 2, which would provide the basis of discussion for the first four or five sessions of the Seminar in the autumn. The younger American members of the Seminar are to be asked to prepare a memorandum or memoranda on the 3rd point, for consideration in the later phases of the discussion. All members were enjoined to give as much thought as possible to the program, to submit their comments thereon before the opening of the term in mid-September, and otherwise to make whatever special preparation may be necessary to assure that the work in the autumn shall get off to a flying start.

There was considerable discussion of emphasis and procedure. It was strongly urged, for example, by everyone present that the Seminar should keep constantly before it the necessity of viewing France in its larger European and world setting. For example, the question should constantly be asked: To what extent are French politics and French political behavior peculiarly and uniquely French, and to what extent are they a phase or a reflection of forces which operate on Europe and the Western World as a whole. Messrs. Woodward, Thomson, and Bury, in particular, agreed to assist in putting the French story into its larger European setting.

It was generally agreed that the work of the Seminar should be pointed to the preparation of a brief book, although it was likewise felt that the discussions should not be held to too rigid a plan or too formal an agenda. The Seminar itself would not be so much a research project as it would be a critique of individual research projects and an elaboration and clarification of the viewpoints and interests of its members. What the Seminar can best contribute to academic publications on French affairs would be a critical study representing the best conclusions of current research and current criticism and interpretation. If the Seminar is directed continuously toward the preparation of a manuscript for publication its discussions are more likely to be unified and coherent.

A survey of the resources of the Princeton libraries as regards French studies is being undertaken by Professor William Ebenstein of Princeton University.

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK
GRANT OF \$55,000, 20 MARCH 1947
EXPENDITURES TO DECEMBER 31, 1950

TOTAL RECEIPTS \$55,000.00

DISBURSEMENTS:

Stipends	\$6,787.50
Secretarial Salaries	5,222.00
Travel & Conferences	6,608.66*
Books & Scholastic Supplies	208.95
Office Supplies	75.20
Telephone, Telegraph & Postage	756.11
Research Assistants & Research Expenses	<u>1,879.74</u>

TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS 21,538.16

BALANCE DECEMBER 31, 1950 \$33,461.84

* Includes expenditures in connection with Conference on Modern France, February 1950.

SEMINAR ON MODERN FRANCE

Expenditures June to December 1950

	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Carnegie Corp. Grant</u>
Stipends	\$23,250.00	\$3,300.00
Expenses of special conferences and visiting participants	489.43	683.20
Research assistants and research expenses	3,000.00	1,250.00
Secretarial and mimeographing salaries and expense	800.00	972.00
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$28,539.43	\$6,205.20
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Overhead expenses such as telephone, telegraph, postage, stationery, library, office supplies, and the like have been defrayed almost entirely by the Institute for Advanced Study.