

SEP

January 13, 1945

Professor Earle has been ~~principally concerned with the continua-~~^{continued}
~~tion of~~ his studies of American foreign relations, with a view to ~~the pub-~~^{publishing}
~~lication of~~ a volume on the changing conditions of American security. His
seminar on military affairs had to be interrupted in the spring of 1942
because of the entry of all of its members into the Armed Forces or other
branches of Government service. Professor Earle himself has devoted part
of his time to studies for the Office of Strategic Services, the War Depart-
ment General Staff, and the Headquarters of the Army Air Forces. As a
member of a small committee which ~~made~~^{conducted} certain studies for General H. H.
Arnold, he made a brief trip overseas during the spring and summer of 1944.
[~~to the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. He has also been attached for brief~~
~~periods to the Second and Twentieth Air Forces.~~] He hopes at an early date
to publish a short book on the impact of air power upon world politics.

Professor Earle, the members of his seminar, and a number of
scholars from other institutions collaborated in the publication in
October 1943 of a volume Makers of Modern Strategy, which was a study of
military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Professor Earle edited the
volume with the collaboration of Dr. Felix Gilbert of the Institute and
Professor Gordon A. Craig of Princeton University, and also wrote four

chapters. Members of the seminar who ^{contributed to} ~~wrote chapters for~~ the volume were
^{Messrs}
~~Dr.~~ Gilbert, ~~Dr.~~ Mantoux, ~~Dr.~~ Possony, ~~Dr.~~ DeWeerd, and ~~Dr.~~ Gottmann.

Makers of Modern Strategy was intended primarily to be a study in history
and political theory rather than a technical commentary on ^{the conduct of} ~~military~~ ^{operations} ~~strategy~~.

In September 1942 the members of Professor Earle's seminar, in collaboration with the Office of Population Research and the School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University, conducted a ~~scholarly~~ conference on Military Man Power and American Policy for the War Department General Staff. ~~The proceedings of this conference were subsequently made available in the form of a mimeographed book with statistical charts, which was distributed to high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces, to officials of the Department of State, and at the request of Mr. Alexander Loveday, to a selected list of recipients of special publications of the Economic, Financial and Transit Section of the League of Nations.~~

Professor Earle published an article "Power Politics and American World Policy" in the Political Science Quarterly for March 1943, discussing the effect of the world balance of power upon the security of the United States, as well as a number of ^{less} ~~two~~ important articles to other journals.

NO 44

It is hoped that in the autumn of 1945 Professor Earle may be able to resume his seminar and to continue his own studies in American foreign relations, and also in the impact of changing military technology, especially air power, upon the policies of the United States.

Dr. Felix Gilbert, before going overseas for the Office of Strategic Services, completed the manuscript of his book on The Roots of American Foreign Policy. The first chapter of this volume was published in the William and Mary Quarterly for April 1944 under the title "The English Background of American Isolationism in the Eighteenth Century."

The French air force,
Dr. Étienne Mantoux, before joining ~~General De Gaulle's Armed Forces~~, completed a manuscript on the Reparations Problem of 1918-1920.

This manuscript, now in the possession of the Institute, will be published as soon as possible after the termination of the present war.

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~~Dr. Jean Gottmann came to the Institute in March 1942 and has been one of our most productive scholars. His volume Les Relations Commerciales de la France was published in Montreal at the end of 1942. Dr. Gottman has published a number of *on subjects connected with the* also ~~written the following~~ articles; "The Background of Geopolitics" published in the winter 1942 issue of Military Affairs; "Laterization in Africa"; Scaetta's work on its cause and cure," Geographical Review, April 1942;~~

SEP

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Princeton, N. J.

School of Historical Studies

Members of Seminar on Modern France, 1950

- Raymond Aron
Lecturer in the Institut d'Études Politiques and in the École Nationale d'Administration, University of Paris. Docteur ès Lettres, Paris 1938.
- J. P. T. Bury
Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. B.A. Cambridge, 1930; M.A. 1933.
- Robert F. Byrnes
Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers University. B.A. Amherst 1939; M.A. Harvard 1940; Ph.D. 1947.
- Richard D. Challener
Instructor in History, Princeton University. A.B. Princeton 1943; A.M. Columbia 1948.
- Jean-Jacques Chevallier
Professor in the Faculty of Law and in the Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris. Docteur en Droit sciences politiques, University of Paris 1924; Docteur en Droit sciences juridiques 1925.
- Gilbert Chinard
Meredith Howland Pyne Professor of French Literature (emeritus), Princeton University. B.L. Poitiers 1899; Licencié ès lettres 1902; LL.D. St. John's College 1934.
- Laing Gray Cowan
Assistant Professor of Government, and Administrative Assistant to the Director of the School of International Affairs, Columbia University. A.B. Toronto 1943; A.M. Columbia 1944; Ph.D. 1950.
- Edward Mead Earle
Professor in the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study. B.S. Columbia 1917; Ph.D. 1923; LL.D. Princeton 1947.

William Ebenstein	Professor of Politics, Princeton University. LL.B. Vienna 1934; Ph.D. Wisconsin 1938.
Henry W. Ehrmann	Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado. LL.B. Berlin; Dr. Juris. Freiburg.
Paul Farmer	Associate Professor of History, University of Wisconsin. A.B. Amherst 1939; M.A. Columbia 1940; Ph.D. 1942.
Edward W. Fox	Associate Professor of History, Cornell University. A.B. Harvard 1935; Ph.D. 1942.
*Edgar S. Furniss	Assistant Professor of Politics, and John Witherspoon Preceptor, Princeton University. B.A. Yale 1940; M.A. 1945; Ph.D. 1947.
Jean Gottmann	Maitre de Conferences, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Paris, and Chargé de Recherches, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique. Litt. Lic. Paris 1936.
H. Stuart Hughes	Assistant Professor of History, Harvard University. A.B. Amherst 1937; Ph.D. Harvard 1940.
Joseph Kraft	Assistant, Institute for Advanced Study. A.B. Columbia 1947; M.A. Princeton 1949.
*Daniel Marx, Jr.	Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College. A.B. Dartmouth 1929; Ph.D. California 1946.
*Robert R. Palmer	Professor of History, Princeton University. Ph.B. Chicago 1931; Ph.D. Cornell 1934.
David Thomson	Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. B.A. Cambridge 1934; Ph.D. 1938.

* Auditor

E. L. Woodward

Fellow of Worcester College, and
Professor of Modern History,
University of Oxford. A.B. Oxford
1913; Litt. D. Princeton 1946.

Gordon Wright

Associate Professor of History,
University of Oregon. A.B. Whitman
College 1923; A.M. Stanford 1936;
Ph.D. 1939.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
School of Historical Studies
Princeton, New Jersey

European Members of Seminar on Modern France
Autumn Term, 1950-1951

*Raymond Aron, Lecturer in the Institut d'Études Politiques and in the École National d'Administration, University of Paris. Born in Paris in 1905, M. Aron was educated at the École Normale Supérieure and at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Paris, from which he received the degree of Docteur ès Lettres in 1938. He has taught at the lycée at Le Havre, at the French academy in Berlin, and at the universities of Toulouse, Cologne, and Paris. During the War he joined General DeGaulle's Free French movement and became editor of La France Libre, published in London. After Liberation he became a member of the editorial staff of Combat and, later, of Figaro, for which he has written principally on international affairs. His principal publications are: La sociologie allemande contemporaine (1935); Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire (1938); L'âge des empires et l'avenir de la France (1946); Le grand schisme (1948).

J. P. T. Bury, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. Now 42 years old, Mr. Bury was educated at Marlborough College and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. During the War, he served in the Ministry of Supply for about five years and in 1945 became chief of the French section of the Research Department of the Foreign Office. He has been secretary of the British Committee of the International Historical Congress and is librarian of Corpus Christi College. Now engaged in editing Volume X of the new Cambridge Modern History, his principal publications are: Gambetta and the National Defence (1936) and France, 1814-1940 (1949); he has contributed chapters to Studies in Anglo-French History, edited by Alfred Coville and H. W. V. Temperley, and to The Opening of an Era, 1848, edited by F. Petjo. Mr. Bury is a nephew of J. B. Bury, historian of ancient Greece. He is married and will be joined in Princeton by Mrs. Bury later in the term.

Jean-Jacques Chevallier, professor in the Institut d'Études politiques and in the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris. In 1921, at the age of 21, he received his Licence en Droit at the University of Paris; subsequently he was awarded doctoral degrees in law and in political science at the same university. Since his original appointment to the faculty of law at the University of Paris in 1925, Professor Chevallier has taught at the universities of Grenoble and Belgrade. During the war he was captain of Alpine infantry, 1939-1940, and later, in 1945, was a battalion commander in the Sixth [American-French]

* For part of the term only.

Army Group commanded by General Jacob Devers: for these war services he received the Croix de Guerre. Professor Chevallier's principal interest is the history of political ideas. His publications include: L'évolution de l'empire britannique (1930); Mirabeau: un grand destin manqué (1947); Les grandes oeuvres politiques de Machiavel à nos jours (1949). He is now completing a work on the history of political ideas from Plato to our time. Professor Chevallier is married, but his wife has not accompanied him to America.

Jean Gottmann, Maître de Conférences, Institut d'Études Politiques, University of Paris, and Chargé de Recherches, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Although only 35 years old, Dr. Gottmann is generally recognized as one of the world's leading political geographers. Trained at the Institute of Geography at the Sorbonne, Dr. Gottmann has made extensive studies in economic and political geography in Europe, North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caribbean. Before the war he was active in the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, in Paris. He left Vichy France in 1942 and was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, 1942-1944. Dr. Gottmann rendered wartime services to the Board of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Economic Administration. During the years 1944-1948 he was assistant professor and associate professor of geography at the Johns Hopkins University. For a time during 1946-1947 he was director of studies and research, Department of Social Affairs, United Nations, Lake Success. He also has lectured at Princeton and Columbia universities in the United States and at the universities of Brussels and Geneva abroad. During the autumn of 1949 he was again a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Dr. Gottmann is the author of Les Relations Commerciales de la France (1942); La Fédération Française (1943); L'Amérique (1945); A Geography of Europe (1950). His essay "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare" (Chapter X of Makers of Modern Strategy) is a valuable contribution to recent military history.

David Thomson, fellow of Sidney Sussex College, and University Lecturer in History, Cambridge University. Mr. Thomson obtained his baccalaureate degree from Cambridge in 1934--when he was 22 years old--and his Ph.D. degree in 1938. Although he teaches general courses in European history, his special interest has been France. His book Democracy in France: The Third Republic (1946) was immediately recognized as one of the very best books in its field. On a somewhat similar theme was his The Democratic Ideal in France and Britain (1940). His latest work England in the Nineteenth Century will be published in the very near future. Dr. Thomson is the editor

of Volume XII of the new Cambridge Modern History, dealing with the period since 1900. Dr. Thomson is married and is accompanied by his wife.

E. L. Woodward, Professor of Modern History and fellow of Worcester College, University of Oxford. Now 60 years old, Professor Woodward is one of the deans of British historians. He was educated at the Merchant Taylor's School and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. After service in the British Expeditionary Forces during the First World War, he returned to Oxford and has remained there for the past thirty years. In 1944 Mr. Woodward was named as the first Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford. He resigned in 1947 to accept a newly-created professorship of modern history. Professor Woodward was a member of the Institute for Advanced Study during the first term of the academic year 1946-1947; during his residence at the Institute he participated in the bicentennial conferences of Princeton University and received from the University an honorary degree of Doctor of Letters. He is now engaged in editing the British Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of the Second World War, several volumes of which already have been published. He is a member of the British Academy and of the American Philosophical Society. In addition to his volumes of diplomatic documents, Professor Woodward has published: Three Studies in European Conservatism; War and Peace in Europe, 1815-1870; Great Britain and the German Navy; The Age of Reform (Volume XIII of the Oxford History of England), and other historical works, as well as Short Journey, an autobiography. Mrs. Woodward will accompany her husband to the United States.

J.F.D.
April 7, 1943

Memorandum for Dr. Aydelotte:

The following is a brief report of the research done by members of my seminar during the academic year 1942-1943.

Aside from the activities of individuals, the work of the group has centered in the preparation of a volume on the Development of Modern Military Thought, an outline of which is hereto attached. You will note that chapters have been contributed by Dr. Gilbert, Dr. Gottmann, Captain DeWeerd, Dr. Mantoux, and Dr. Possony. In addition, Professor Robert R. Palmer of Princeton University has written a chapter, and Dr. Silberner and Dr. Kann have assisted in various ways. The manuscripts for this volume are almost entirely in hand and it is expected that the book will go to press during the summer and be available for autumn publication.

In addition to editing the aforementioned volume on Military Thought, my work has been principally concerned with the continuation of my research in American foreign relations with a view to the publication of a volume on the Changing Conditions of American Security. Some of the work which I have done during the past year for the War Department General Staff and the Headquarters of the Army Air Forces is related to this major project because, as you know, changing military technology has a very significant bearing upon the relations of the United States with other powers. In this connection, I contributed to the Political Science Quarterly for March 1943 an article "Power Politics and American World Policy". I am now in the process of completing an essay, to be included in the volume on Military Thought, on Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friederich List, as exponents of the idea that economic strength constitutes the foundation of military power and hence of national security.

In September 1942 the members of the seminar, in collaboration with the Office of Population Research and the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, conducted a scholarly conference on "Military Man Power and American Policy" for the War Department General Staff. The conference was attended by high ranking officers of the Army, the Army Air Forces, the Navy, the United States Military Academy, by members of the Department of State, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Board of Economic Warfare, as well as by scholars from Princeton University, the Institute, and other institutions. The proceedings of this conference were subsequently made available in a one hundred page mimeographed book with statistical charts. This little volume has been distributed to ranking officers of the Armed Forces, to certain officials of the Department of State, to a number of scholars, and also, at the request of Mr. Alexander Loveday, to a selected list of recipients of special publications of the Economic, Financial and Transit Section of the League of Nations.

There follows a brief summary of the activities of the individual members of the seminar:

Dr. Felix Gilbert

Ph.D. University of Berlin: magna cum laude 1930; Research Assistant to the editors of the German Pre-war Documents Grosse Politik, 1925-1927; Editor of J. G. Droysen, Politische Schriften, under the auspices of the Prussian Academy 1930-1932; Research work in Florence and Rome 1932-1933; Research done under the auspices of the Faculty of History, Cambridge, England 1934-1936; Member, Institute for Advanced Study 1939-1943.

Dr. Gilbert continued his work in the field of Renaissance history, which has heretofore been his primary scholarly interest. His contribution to the collaborative volume on the Development of Modern Military Thought was an essay on "Machiavelli's Renaissance of the Art of War". In conse-

quence of a new edition of Sir John Fortescue's "De laudibus legum Angliae", Dr. Gilbert took up a study of "Fortescue's concept 'dominium regale et politicum'", which is to be published in Medievalie et Humanistica during the summer or autumn.

For the past four years Dr. Gilbert has also been interested in the eighteenth century origins of American foreign policy. Preparatory to his entering the Government service sometime in the near future, Dr. Gilbert will complete the manuscript of his book "The Roots of American Foreign Policy". In the field of American history he has also published "Letters of Francis Kinloch to Thomas Boone", Journal of Southern History, volume VIII, pp. 87-105.

Dr. Étienne Mantoux

Docteur en Droit, University of Lyon 1941; Research student, London School of Economics and Political Science 1935-1936; Lecturer in Economics, British Institute in Paris 1939; author of L'Épargne Forcée Monétaire, Lyon 1941.

During his year at the Institute, Dr. Mantoux has completed a volume dealing with the reparations problem which faced the Paris Peace Conference from 1918-1920, with special reference to its present-day significance. For the present, this volume is not to be published, although the manuscript is deposited with the Institute until such time as publication seems appropriate. For the collaborative volume on Military Thought, Dr. Mantoux has written an exceedingly able re-interpretation of Marshal Foch. Early in April Dr. Mantoux left America to join the Fighting French Forces in England.

Dr. Jean Gottmann

Bachelier ès Lettres 1932; Licencié ès Lettres 1936; Diplômé d'Études Supérieures d'Histoire et Géographie 1934; awarded Laureate of the "Concours General des Lycées at Colleges de France et Colonies" in Geography, 1931 (the subject of the competition being "Geography of Tunisia").

Dr. Gottmann came to the Institute in March 1942, and in the subsequent year has been one of our most productive scholars. His volume Les Relations Commerciales de la France was published in Montreal at the end of 1942. Dr. Gottmann has also written the following articles: "The Background of Geopolitics" published in the winter 1942 issue of Military Affairs; "Laterization in Africa: Scaetta's work on its cause and cure", Geographical Review, April 1942; "New Facts and Some Reflections on the Sahara", Geographical Review, October 1942; "Nature and Men in North Africa", Yale Review, spring 1943; "Economic Problems in French North Africa", Geographical Review, April 1943. Dr. Gottmann is now at work on a volume on the Historical and Political Geography of the Mediterranean Region, to be published by Farrar and Rinehart.

Dr. Gottmann has also written during the past year a number of scholarly memoranda on French North Africa for the War Department General Staff and the Western European Division of the Department of State. These memoranda, prepared during the spring and summer of 1942, were placed in the hands of Generals Lee, Strong, and Eisenhower and were of significance in the preparation of the American invasion of Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis in November 1942. Since then Dr. Gottmann has prepared further memoranda, one of which was recently taken to North Africa by Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, as a guide for certain of his discussions there.

Effective April 1, Dr. Gottmann has been appointed part-time instructor in Princeton University and part-time instructor in Johns Hopkins University in connection with the Language and Area Schools of the Army Specialized Training Program. On July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944, he will be part-time instructor in Princeton University and part-time member of the Institute for Advanced Study under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Effective July 1, 1944, Dr. Gottmann will be on permanent appointment as instructor or assistant professor of Geography at the Johns Hopkins University.

Dr. Stefan T. Possony


Ph.D. University of Vienna, 1935; Author of Die Wehrwirtschaft des totalen Krieges, Vienna 1938, translated into English, French, Italian and Japanese. The English edition was published in 1939 under the title Tomorrow's War.

During the past year Dr. Possony has been with the Institute for Advanced Study on part time, the remainder of his activities being centered in the Columbia Broadcasting System, the Office of War Information, and the Office of Strategic Services. He has finished a volume "Extended Strategy" which will be published by the Oxford University Press, and which will deal with certain aspects of total war. In association with Lieutenant Daniel Vilfroy of the French Military Mission to the United States, he has translated into English two volumes by high ranking German officers: Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb's Defense and Lieutenant General Erfurth's Surprise in War. He has also written a number of articles as follows: "Defeatism" in the Review of Politics, January 1942, and "The Limits of Post-War Planning" in the Review of Politics, January 1943. Dr. Possony is now with the Office of Strategic Services in Washington work^{ing}/on problems of psychological warfare.

Dr. Edmund Silberner

Université de Genève (Switzerland) 1932-1935; "Docteur ès sciences économiques" 1935; Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, 1936-1939; "Diplomé de l'Institut", 1939; author of La Guerre dans la Pensée Economique du XVI au XVIII siècle.

Dr. Silberner came to the Institute for Advanced Study in December 1942 to continue his important work on war in economic thought. His previous volume covered the period 1500 to 1800 and he is now devoting himself to the discussion of war in the economic literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He has made substantial progress, although it seems probable that the continuance of his work will be interrupted by military service.



Edward Mead Earle

Professor Harvey A. DeWeerd

Captain, General Staff Corps, Army of the United States; Associate Editor of the Infantry Journal; Ph.D. University of Michigan, 1937; Associate Professor of History at Denison University; Former editor of Military Affairs, the journal of the American Military Institute; has written a monograph on "Production Lag in the American Ordnance Program 1917-1918" which has been used by the War Production Board; author of Great Soldiers of Two World Wars (1941), a collection of military biographies. ↗

Professor DeWeerd was in residence at the Institute throughout the summer and during the early autumn of 1942, when he resigned his membership to accept a commission in the United States Army. He has collaborated actively in the editorial work connected with the volume on Military Thought and has written for it a chapter on the "Emergence of the Civilian" (dealing principally with Lloyd George and Churchill). It is hoped that Professor DeWeerd will return to the Institute at the conclusion of his military service.

Dr. Bernard Brodie

Ph.D. University of Chicago, 1940

↙ Upon leaving the Institute in the spring of 1941, Dr. Brodie was appointed instructor in Political Science at Dartmouth College for the purpose of giving a course on military affairs. His book Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton University Press 1941) is generally accepted as being the standard work on the development of naval technology and its influence on world politics. ↙ During the summer of 1942, Dr. Brodie published A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy, which has met widespread approval not merely among students of naval affairs but also among a wider reading public -- about 22,000 copies of the book having been sold up to this time. It is a text in all Naval R.O.T.C. units in the United States. In January 1943,

Dr. Brodie was commissioned a lieutenant, senior grade, in the United States Navy and appointed Historian of the Bureau of Ordnance, charged with the task of writing the history of technological developments in naval warfare during the present struggle.

Dr. Robert A. Kann

Doctor of Laws, University of Vienna 1930; graduate of the Columbia School of Library Service 1940; graduate student in history, Columbia University 1941-1942.

During the past year, Dr. Kann has been bibliographical and research assistant to the seminar and, in addition, has prepared an essay on "The Formulation of the Laws of War" which is being considered for inclusion in the volume on Military Thought. At the present time, Dr. Kann is pursuing independent research in "Federalism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire". It is hoped that this work will be sponsored by Professor Sidney B. Fay of Harvard University, and it is believed that it would be exceedingly useful not merely as an historical study but also as a guide to the solution of some of the problems of the Danubian area after the conclusion of the war.

Edward Mead Earle

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MILITARY THOUGHT

Editor - Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton, New Jersey

Section I: The Origins of Modern War: From the 16th to the 18th Century

- Chapter 1. Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War
(Dr. Felix Gilbert, Institute for Advanced Study)
- Chapter 2. Vauban: Symbol of Science in War
(Dr. H. E. Guerlac, University of Wisconsin)
- Chapter 3. Frederick the Great, Guibert, Buelow: From the Professional
to the National Army
(Prof. R. R. Palmer, Princeton University)

Section II: The Classics of the 19th Century: Interpreters of Napoleon

- Chapter 4. Jomini
(Prof. Crane Brinton, Harvard University)
- Chapter 5. Clausewitz
(Prof. H. Rothfels, Brown University)

Section III: From the 19th Century to the First World War

- Chapter 6. Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friederich List: The
Economic Foundations of Military Power
(Prof. Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Study)
- Chapter 7. Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School
(Prof. Hajo Holborn, Yale University)
- Chapter 8. DuPicq and Foch: The French School
(Dr. Stefan Possony and Dr. Étienne Mantoux, Institute
for Advanced Study)
- Chapter 9. Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French
Colonial Warfare
(Dr. Jean Gottmann, Institute for Advanced Study)
- Chapter 10. Delbrueck: The Military Historian
(Dr. Gordon Craig, Princeton University)
- Chapter 11. Marx, Engels, Sorel: Military Concepts and Revolution
(Prof. Sigmund Neumann, Wesleyan University)

Section IV: From the First to the Second World War

- Chapter 12. Churchill and Lloyd George: The Contribution of the Civilian
(Captain Harvey A. DeWeerd, Associate Editor, Infantry Journal)
- Chapter 13. Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War
(Prof. Hans Speier, New School of Social Research)
- Chapter 14. Dragomiriv, Tuchachevski, Shaposnikov: Soviet Concepts of
Total War
(Michael Berchin, New York City)
- Chapter 15. Maginot, Liddell Hart: The Doctrine of Defense
(Prof. A. Kovacs, St. John's University)
- Chapter 16. National Factor in Military Thought
(Dr. Herbert Rosinski, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy)

Section V: Problems of the Present War

- Chapter 17. Modern Naval Thought
1. Mahan: His Followers and Opponents
(Dr. Theodore Ropp, Duke University)
 2. Japanese Naval Thought
(Alexander Kiralfy, New York City)
- Chapter 18. Douhet, Seversky, Mitchell: The Development of the
Theory of Air Warfare
(Dr. Edward Warner, Civil Aeronautics Board)

Early SEP
The 1939

57 Cleveland Lane
Princeton
23 December 1939

My dear Mr. Aydelotte

Last Thursday, at the request of Miss Walker, I spent the afternoon at the Rockefeller Foundation to advise them on some projects in international relations to which they had been asked to contribute funds. As I explained to you last week, this is a fairly frequent occurrence and may build up for us a useful good-will.

Miss Walker told me that Mr. Willetts undoubtedly has in mind a fairly considerable gift to the Institute on behalf of the work in economics, not only because of his confidence in our group but because of his intimate friendship with them and, even more, his high regard and affection for you. Miss Walker has urged Mr. Willetts to make the gift, when and if, to the School of Economics and Politics as a whole because she believes this to be sound procedure and because she thinks it will be more agreeable to Mr. Fosdick, who, as you know, has a deep interest in international relations as well as in the social sciences as a whole. Miss Walker suggested that it might be wise for me to pass this suggestion on to you on the ground that your wishes were very likely to be controlling. She said, quite incidentally, that a recent conference which Mr. Willetts had had with our economists had left an unfavorable impression because they had indicated no willingness whatsoever to indicate any definitive work they had in mind but wished complete freedom of action and a roving commission; as she put it, they indicated that they wished to be endowed on the basis of their record.


Mr. Willetts also asked to see me and spoke of great enthusiasm of you. He asked a number of questions about the Institute and some of which I suggested he might more appropriately ask you. I emphasized to him the lack of departmentalization in our work and intimated that the best results would be obtained from cross-fertilization of minds, hoping that he would draw from this the conclusion that our School should be considered as an integral group. No question was raised of finances to be considered by the Foundation, of course.

You will understand, of course, that all of this is in the strictest confidence, particularly insofar as Miss Walker is concerned. She is a loyal friend of ours and simply wants us to get the most possible in the best possible way.

None of us would wish to jeopardize the success of the proposed negotiations; therefore, if in your judgment, it is better to concentrate on economics, by all means do so. Miss Walker thinks that the opposite might be the case, but you are the better judge. As you know, I myself am quite content to proceed as is until circumstances permit further consideration of my work.

Aside from the business involved, this letter brings to you and Mrs. Aydelotte our every sincere wish for a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. We are all looking forward to that happy time when you can be with us without the distraction of commuting to Swarthmore.

Always sincerely



Dr. Frank Aydelotte
Lake Wales Florida.

I find that I have only one sheet of this paper and am therefore reduced to writing on both sides of the paper. Will you forgive me? And may I thank you for your note about the housing? My colleagues are enthusiastic at your prompt response. And I am hoping we can interest Morse also. It will mean a great deal to all of us.

My man Thomas A. Bailey, of Stanford, has arrived and has already gone to work.

I shall be at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, December 27-30, attending the meeting of the American Historical Association; here at Princeton January 2-5; away on a cruise on the Kungsholm, January 6-18. This in case you need me for any reason. But please do not trouble to acknowledge this.

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PW1 23 NT=PRINCETON NJ 3

DR FRANK AYDELOTTE=

HIGHLAND PARK FLORIDA CLUB=

BEARD COMING 25TH AND 26TH. HOPE YOU AND MRS AYDELOTTE WILL DINE WITH HIM AND US THURSDAY EVENING 25TH. SMOKER FOLLOWING EVENING. WRITING=

EARLE.

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

SEP

STUDIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AN OBLIGATION OF SCHOLARSHIP

A memorandum submitted

by

Edward Mead Earle
The Institute for Advanced Study

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Princeton, New Jersey

October, 1940

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

October 30, 1940

The contents of this memorandum on "Studies of National Defense and Obligation of Scholarship" were submitted orally for comment and criticism at a small dinner held in New York on Friday evening, October 18, which was attended by the following persons:

Hanson W. Baldwin, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy and now military critic of the New York Times.

James P. Baxter, President of Williams College, and a student of naval history and naval affairs.

Lt. Col. Herman Beukema, Head of the Department of History, Government and Politics, U. S. Military Academy.

Allen Cook, formerly naval officer, now professor of English and History, U. S. Naval Academy.

Tyler Dennett, specialist in the international politics of the Far East.

A. Whitney Griswold, Associate Professor of International Relations, Yale University, author of "Far Eastern Policy of the United States."

Major General Frank R. McCoy (retired), President of the Foreign Policy Association.

David H. Popper, defense expert in the Research Department of the Foreign Policy Association

Elihu Root, Attorney

Major T. H. Thomas, of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Formerly lecturer at Columbia University and now engaged in free-lance military studies.

Harold Tobin, Professor of Politics, Dartmouth College. Author of "Mobilizing Civilian America."

Frederick P. Todd, Secretary of the American Military Institute.

Edward P. Warner, Civil Aeronautics Authority.

In a discussion following the presentation of the contents of this memorandum, there was helpful comment, practically all of it enthusiastically in favor of the proposed studies. The Committee is now in possession of letters from several members of the group confirming the original judgments; but as the text of the memorandum has not yet been circulated among them for comment and criticism, it has seemed wiser not to circularize these letters at this time but to make them available later, together with any supplementary remarks.

Edward Mead Earle

STUDIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AN OBLIGATION
OF SCHOLARSHIP

It is a striking paradox that, ~~whereas~~ although ^{military} defense has been a perennial problem of the American people since the first colonists landed on this continent, there has been no conscious, integrated, and continuous study of military security as a fundamental problem of government and society. It is another paradox that, although we live in a warlike world and have ourselves been participants in large-scale wars, there has been almost no systematic consideration by American scholars of the role of war in human affairs - this despite the transparent truth, however deplorable, that war is a recurrent phenomenon which from time to time transcends all other human activity and assumes command of our lives, our fortunes, and our destiny.¹ Even in time of peace the shadow of war falls upon the world in the form of naval and military establishments which determine in large measure how we shall spend our energies and our substance. In fact, in the present stage of world affairs, military organization absorbs an ever-increasing part of the productive capacity of mankind, tends to determine the character of our social structure, and threatens in various ways to revolutionize some of our most cherished institutions and ways of life.

Quite aside from their inherent interest, the problems of national defense have a claim upon the political and social sciences. The need of security against aggression is, as Hamilton said, "the most powerful dictator of national conduct". It involves one of the most delicate of political problems - the reconciliation of liberty and authority, the provision of the maximum degree of security with the highest degree of freedom.

1. As democracy is based upon belief in the power of public opinion and other moral sanctions, we have understandably given great weight to the problem of collective security. It is now necessary that we restore a balance as between the factors of national power and international cooperation.

It is, indeed, intimately related with all the other objectives of organized society and, in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, the "common defense" is significantly enough linked with the establishment of justice, the insurance of domestic tranquillity, the promotion of the general welfare, and the preservation of "the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity". In short, national defense is a basic function of government in a world of competitive national states; the world being as it is, perhaps/ ^{it is} the basic function. As one American student of government has put it: "By general consent this is the supreme consideration of every government. At all events, no other appeal commands such widespread popular support, receives such undivided allegiance. Those who resist it are loaded with the heaviest social opprobrium and those who betray it are stamped with the highest of crimes, treason."

Nor is the organization of defense the problem of the soldier alone. Under parliamentary and representative government, particularly as exemplified by Great Britain and the United States, the control of military affairs by civilian authority has been one of the foundation stones of the arch of freedom. This does not necessarily imply that there is any inherent conflict between two mutually antagonistic forces, civil and military. The size, organization, and objectives of the armed forces having been defined, it is essential that there be effective collaboration between the civilian, ^{and} military/ naval authorities in the interest of maximum efficiency and, of coordinate importance, that there be adequate and intelligent military implementation of national policies.

There is ample evidence that civilians and soldiers alike have come to recognize that it is vital both to military efficiency and to national integrity that war and the costly and elaborate preparation for war shall

not be reserved either to technicians alone or to civilians alone. The organization of security and, in the event of war, the organization of victory require that there be sympathetic, intelligent, and unreserved collaboration between the several groups which contribute to the total military effort. A blunt civilian Clemenceau said: "War is much too important a business to be left to the soldiers." A distinguished British officer, Sir Frederick Maurice, agreed that as war requires the employment of the whole resources and the maximum power of the nation, it is "clearly not a matter to be left to soldiers or sailors, nor would any responsible soldier desire it to be so left." The mere mention of the names Rathenau, Lloyd George, and Baruch will suggest what civilian influence meant in the last war. Even in the realm of military technology, one can point to innumerable instances in which civilian contributions concerning even the employment of weapons of war - as well as their invention, development and supply - were outstanding and sometimes controlling: this was notably true in questions involving tanks, convoys, artillery fire, machine guns, and submarine detection.

What was true in the war of 1914-18 is likely to be even more true in the present struggle. No modern war can be waged without the national effort going far beyond the boundaries of technical military efficiency into almost every realm of civilian activity. The British and American officer of today is encouraged to widen his horizons of knowledge to include an understanding of social and economic questions. There is no reason, in turn, why the civilian should not bring military affairs, which so vitally affect the nation at large and even himself as an individual, into his purview. After all, military problems do not dwell in the realm of the occult, the supra-temporal, or the recondite, for "secrecy" is largely

confined to matters of material. Military problems are susceptible of analysis, criticism and practical contributions by informed laymen, and factual data upon which to base sound scholarship are generally accessible. Indeed, it is imperative that laymen, especially scholars, concern themselves with the problem of national defense, for failure to do so may be disastrous to the success of rearmament or of the war effort. Germany has become the foremost military power on the Continent of Europe not only because of the technical efficiency of German armed forces, but also because of acute realization of the role which theoretical studies of a non-technical character may play in modern war. Such studies existed in Imperial Germany but have been extended and intensified under the Nazis, with the result that Germany entered the present war well prepared in the non-military as well as the military phases of warfare. In fact, the "bloodless victories" which have distinguished the Hitler regime were the outgrowth of a long-range strategy which took into account all the known factors of economics, psychology, domestic politics, class prejudice, inertia, and the like. A covert war has been waged against Western Europe since 1933, with its victims seemingly unaware even that the struggle was going on. Comprehension of the true state of affairs was a civilian rather than a military responsibility.

As against German preparedness, in which civilians in general and the universities in particular played an influential part, British, French, and even existing American efforts seem feeble. The result is not merely attributable to palsied leadership in London and Paris but also to a fundamental failure to comprehend intimate interrelationships of politics, economics, and military strategy.¹ There has been a lamentable paucity of

1. It is appropriate at this point to explain that the term "military" is intended throughout this manuscript to include not merely the army but the navy and air forces as well.

civilian discussion of geographic and demographic factors in international politics. There has been a good deal of muddle-headedness concerning elements of military power; potential strength was complacently confused with existing strength, the latter, unlike the former, being available to initiate or to resist sudden and overwhelming attack. There has been woeful disregard of the strategic implications for Britain and France of the war in Spain. Whereas Count Ciano was quoted as saying that "There are no longer frontiers; there are only geographical and strategic positions", statesmen of the democratic powers were proceeding to judge the situation by nineteenth century concepts of politics. There has been virtually no informal liaison between civilians and soldiers; one of the foremost British political leaders, a potential Prime Minister, and now a member of the Inner Cabinet, told the writer of this memorandum in 1938 that he had no acquaintance with any British army or navy officer and had no means of knowing the views of the armed services on Spain and other vital questions. Mutual suspicion between civilians and professional officers - which has been typical of Anglo-Saxon society, and which can only be broken down by continuous collaborative efforts in time of "peace" as well as in time of war - has prevented an over-all view of the situation, growing out of intelligent, widespread, and frank discussion.

In the absence of a general scholarly interest in the political and social aspects of national defense, the field was largely left to publicists of the Liddell Hart school whose writings contributed to the general collapse by preaching the doctrines, unwarranted by experience or reason, of limited liability, superiority of the defense (psychological and moral as well as tactical), and the alleged inability of either side to "win" a war. It will never be possible, of course, to eliminate popularizers of a special thesis. But if the Liddell Harts had been balanced by, say, two-score scholars who had

been trained in the fundamental disciplines, who understood the role of military force in statecraft, and who constituted a body of genuinely informed civilian experts in the larger phases of warfare - to say nothing of the elementary facts of history - the discussion of military affairs in Britain would have been on an entirely different level and might have had entirely different results.

And what is true of Britain was likewise true of France. Furthermore in France the conservatism of the General Staff operated to prevent acceptance of even more advanced military, as well as civilian, thought.

The truth of the matter is that, in a democratic society, it is imperative that we have the widest possible discussion of military problems, conducted on the highest possible plane. In the absence of such discussion, we cannot formulate intelligent and practicable foreign policies or, for that matter, domestic policies. Few military decisions (such, for example, as the acquisition and fortification of bases or the choice of types of ships and aircraft) are without widespread political repercussions. Likewise, political decisions - hemispheric defense, the Monroe Doctrine, the balance of power, alliances, aid to Britain and China - must be susceptible of military and, as well, economic implementation unless they are to be largely devoid of result. There must be an understanding of the impact of a vast armament program - what amounts in fact to national mobilization before M-day - upon the normal activities of a peaceful people: economics, education, psychology and morale, the standard of living, the social services. It must be clearly comprehended that in and of itself the financing of the military effort will have portentous effects upon capitalism and democracy. It must be kept in mind that vested economic interests within the nation do not always coincide with the national interest vis-a-vis foreign powers and that such conflicts of interest must be frankly faced and intelligently and fairly resolved. (For example, independence for the Philippines

was legislated not primarily with reference to the political and strategic position of the United States/in the Pacific area, but because of the persistent pressure of the beet and cane sugar interests and other lobbies at Washington). In short, there must be effective coordination of military with foreign and domestic policies, so that there may emerge a grand strategy which will assure that the will and the arms of the nation shall be so integrated that war shall be prevented or, failing this, that the nation shall enter war with the maximum chances of victory. Strategy is not merely a concept of war-time but an inseparable element in statecraft at all times; as such it is a legitimate and, indeed, an unavoidable concern of the social scientist. Only a narrowly restricted terminology would define strategy as the science and art of military command. If this be true, as it seems to be, then the scholar and the soldier have indispensable and mutually complementary tasks to perform. The mere appropriation of vast sums for armaments will not give assurance of effective defense.

These arms must be supplemented by and related to a comprehensive national policy. And the formulation of such policy is a function of the executive and legislative branches of the government. If they are to arrive at the desired goal, they must have clearly before them the facts upon which alternatives may be weighed and decisions arrived at. It is the function of scholarship to make the facts available and, over a period of years, to provide by education a trained personnel which will understand the essential place of military affairs in the science and operation of government.

It must be admitted that political and social scientists have not heretofore undertaken adequate systematic inquiry into the problems of defense and strategy. An examination of contemporary textbooks on politics, economics, and international relations reveals that military affairs are a conspicuous lacuna or, at best, have been treated as incidental and peripheral in character. This

is not surprising, for although writers on politics, since the days of Aristotle and Plato, have given some attention to military subjects, and although Machiavelli, Sir Francis Bacon, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin, among others, have shown an acute understanding of the role of strategy in statecraft, the treatment of military affairs throughout the nineteenth century and until recently in the twentieth has been left to soldiers writing for soldiers rather than civilians writing for civilians.

The truth seems to be that liberalism and democracy, being predicated upon the ideals of peace and progress and a brotherhood of man, have viewed with repugnance an international society based upon armed, competitive nation-states. Liberals and democrats likewise were suspicious (at times with justification) that defense was inextricably connected with imperialism, aggression, vested armament interests, political conservatism, and a potential militarized society. Scholars shared these suspicions and therefore avoided the problem altogether. But by abandoning the field to others, they solved none of the problems and resolved none of their fears. It is therefore essential that we return to an earlier tradition, which treated military problems as an inherent factor in the science of government and politics and, in view of the integrat^{ed}/character of the modern world, one of the most important concerns of economics and social psychology as well.

The most successful professional writing on military and naval affairs in the United States has been done by men like Mahan and Upton, who were popularizers and propagandists as well as technicians. The curricula of American colleges and universities have with only rare exceptions been destitute of a discussion of the many-sided problems of defense. Even in military history we have been negligent. For example, it is foreigners rather than Americans who have had the fullest realization of the great significance

to strategy and tactics of the Civil War and, until recently, it was Englishmen rather than Americans who contributed the outstanding biographies of certain of our military leaders. Few civilian societies have actively interested themselves in national defense, except for purposes of propaganda; some have had primarily antiquarian interests. It is only recently that military criticism has become a feature of American journalism; military critics are few in number, and not all of them possess an adequate knowledge of history, economics, psychology and politics, nor should they be expected to possess such knowledge in a position where different skills are called for. But the avidity with which military journalism is read is an indication of the potentialities which exist for more adequate treatises on defense, written in accordance with the canons of scholarship. The influences of the writer on military affairs may be widespread, far transcending the bounds of the casual reader and reaching into high places - of this truth Mahan affords an outstanding example. What is essential to the national interest is that the writing be above the transitory and the superficial.

Within the Government itself there has, as a rule, been insufficient thought on questions of defense and insufficient attention to the formulation of military policy. The committees of the House and Senate which deal with military and naval affairs (including the committees on appropriations) have not always risen above partisan considerations and frequently have shown a tendency to treat national defense as a "local issue" (as in the location of arsenals, army posts and naval stations). An occasional chairman of unusual competence lifts a committee above the average, but in the large Congress has been remiss in making appropriations with a view to long-range policies, rather than ad hoc considerations. And the same is true of the Executive arm. The

President of the United States is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but the exigencies of his office rarely give him time for critical thought on defense subjects, except in periods of impending war and only to a limited degree even then.¹ His immediate subordinates, the Secretaries of War and of the Navy have not generally been men of high calibre; and as compared with Secretaries of State they have been distinctly mediocre. When a really capable statesman like Calhoun, Jefferson Davis, Root, Baker, or Whitney holds the War or Navy portfolio it is an unusual rather than a frequent occurrence. There is no Council of National Defense, similar to the Committee of Imperial Defense in Great Britain, charged with continuous and non-partisan study of military affairs. It is no exaggeration to say, furthermore, that Presidential messages and quadrennial party platforms have contributed little more than a collection of platitudes.

All this is understandable in view of the peculiar geographical position of the United States, its absorption for a century and a half with domestic affairs, the deep-rooted suspicion of what the Fathers called "swollen military establishments", and the protection which was offered us by the balance of power in Europe. But this state of things has always been deplorable in this respect: it has prevented us from assessing clearly the extent of our potentialities and the nature of our shortcomings. As a French minister wrote to his government about a century ago, "one would say that there is something providential in the success that crowns the enterprises of the young republic, for it seems to act more by the instinct of its destiny than by serious reflection on its power."

Whatever may have been the role of instinct and Providence, heretofore, the American people is now aware that something more is needed. We live in an

1. Professor Lindsay Rogers has recently pointed out that Hitler's frequent periods of contemplation at Berchtesgaden may be an important factor in the formulation and execution of German strategy. Foreign Affairs, Volume XIX, pp. 5-6 (October 1940).

age of stark military power and have just had the experience, unique in our history, of seeing a military alliance directed against us. The new coalition may not be a "nightmare" to us (to borrow a phrase from Bismarck) but it certainly is not a sedative. We now know that conventional military standards and time-honored concepts of defense are no longer relevant to our security. Confident reliance upon the militia and the citizen soldier - of which our political literature of two hundred years is redolent - has given way to a grim determination to recruit an army of maximum efficiency by means of Selective Service. Facing the possible destruction of an Anglo-American hegemony of the seas, we are determined if necessary and if possible to substitute a primacy of our own. We are keenly aware that bold strokes are required in the political field as well; hence the trade of destroyers for bases, which ranks with the Louisiana Purchase and the Monroe Doctrine as a broadly conceived measure of defensive strategy. We are slowly gaining consciousness that Total War can be met only by planning for Total Defense and are therefore entering upon an era which will bring radical alterations in our attitudes as regards military and naval power. This is not of our choice, nor, judging by contemporary evidence, is it likely to be transitory phase in the history of the world.

The study of military affairs is not an emergency matter, although the emergency gives it added importance and, indeed, a character of importunity. If we now had on hand a reserve of trained scholars who had devoted any considerable portion of their lives to problems of strategy, they could be of inestimable service to the nation. Staff officers have been transferred to service with troops, and the Army War College has been closed because of the shortage of commissioned personnel in the higher ranks. There is now no group of trained personnel engaged in theoretical studies - a deficiency which expert scholars might overcome were they available in any number. In general,

however, what is involved is not temporary measures to meet an emergency but a long-term program of research and, ultimately, of teaching which will enable the United States in times of peace as well as in times of crisis and war to build up a body of knowledge and a corps of scholarly experts who can help in the formulation of public policy and who can contribute to an understanding of the military problems and the military power of the nation.

It is not, of course, suggested that there should be any competition with the permanent personnel of the armed forces. The effort here proposed would be complementary thereto and would attempt to open up entirely new fields of investigation and research. Lest inquiries be conducted in water-tight compartments, there should, indeed, be cordial cooperation. The social scientist can keep constantly to the fore the political, psychological, and economic factors which are of ever increasing importance in national defense. He can deal with the dynamics of foreign and military policy. He can explain the role which attempts to provide for military security have played in the history of the world in general and of the United States in particular. Indeed there are phases of human society and political organization--mercantilism, Anglo-American constitutional history, autarchy, imperialism, totalitarianism, for example--which cannot altogether be understood without reference to the role which military considerations have played. Our failure to keep in mind the hold on statesmanship and on the popular mind of military security accounts in part for some of the eclectic interpretations of American history from 1914 to 1917 and of the course of European politics between 1919 and 1939.

There are certain subjects which the civilian can take within his purview *but* which the professional officer can deal with not at all or only with the greatest reserve. Every commissioned officer is subject to severe restrictions, explicit or

implied, in dealing with questions which border on the political. In time of crisis, as at present, official orders make it difficult for officers to write or speak on anything but the purely technical, military aspects of international relations and national policy. This is probably as it should be. But it would seem to be in the public interest that competent persons be free to speak with authority at all times, and particularly in times of an emergency, and that they speak as individuals without official fear, favor, or bias. This the scholar can do.

Questions of strategy fall into three general categories: first, those which are primarily or predominantly political, even though they be of prime importance to military policy (such, for example, as the fortification of a position like Guam, or the future retention of bases in the Philippine Islands, or the acquisition of leases on strategically important areas in Latin America or the Pacific); second, those which are predominantly military, even though they have political implications (such as the type of naval vessel and military plane to be constructed); third, those which are in a kind of "twilight zone" between the political and military. In the first and third, the scholar can speak with authority and without reserve, and he may have something to contribute even in the second; the second is preeminently the field of the armed forces, although officers may appropriately express opinions on the others, subject to the limitations imposed upon them by official order or by the traditions of the services and the usual practice of democracies, which is that policy shall primarily be the responsibility of the civilian rather than the military branch of the government.

The professional officer, too, suffers from some disqualifications which would not afflict the civilian working in the field. The strength of tradition, precedent, and "regulations" operates on even the most competent of officers. Although the method of selection for the Military and Naval Academies is the most democratic conceivable (in marked contrast to the situation in Europe as a whole),

the cadets and midshipmen come from what seems to be a fairly uniform social and intellectual background, and it is by no means certain that at present the academies are attracting to the service their fair share of the outstanding young men of the nation. The educational methods of the academies, furthermore, tend to encourage esprit de corps and a degree of uniformity which, although desirable and indeed essential, does not always develop independence of judgment or conspicuous initiative. And in the technical services, such as engineering and naval architecture, there might well be further utilization of what lay education could offer. (Parenthetically it might be pointed out that some layman might appropriately undertake a study of military and naval education in the United States similar to the study of Abraham Flexner on medical education, which revolutionized the methods used in the training of physicians).

The hierarchical organization of the services (which is unavoidable, of course) has notable disadvantages. This is the more true where, as in ordinary circumstances in the United States, promotion is necessarily slow and seniority frequently weighs more heavily in the scales than conspicuous ability and independence of judgment. It is too much to ask an officer to jeopardize his career by furthering principles contrary to those which are more generally accepted. Furthermore, the pressing demand for officers with troops and with the fleet, together with the assignment of commissioned personnel to administrative posts, makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for the best brains of the services to be devoted to theoretical studies and to the formulation of policy. The civilian suffers from none of these disadvantages and, in addition, his voice is likely to carry more weight because he is independent and is presumed to have no interest to serve other than the cause of scholarship and the welfare of the nation.

This brings up another point of almost equal importance to the discussion. A study of the defense policies of the United States, especially of appropriation bills, would demonstrate that there is a sort of "fever chart" of public and official

interest. In times of acute crisis, of fear ~~of~~^{or} panic, the people will demand and Congress will enact legislation enlarging the Army and Navy without regard to rational considerations and certainly without regard to long-term policy. War scares are a kind of intoxication. They secure the adoption of measures which otherwise would be deferred or rejected. But like all forms of intoxication and profligacy, such scares are followed by periods of apathy, in which the ordinary demands of prudence are ignored and the national defense is allowed to fall into a state of desuetude. In short, the military history of the United States is marked by alternate periods of feast and famine. What seems to govern the degree of preparedness is a kind of abnormal psychology, rather than any reasoned and systematic consideration to national defense as one of the coordinate functions of government. Fear and recurrent panic are no basis for a public policy, but it must be admitted that fear on the one hand and indifference on the other have frequently been the determining factors in military and naval appropriation bills in most democracies, including the United States. It goes without saying that abrupt peaks and depressions in the chart of such appropriations are bad for the armed services. But they are also an unhealthy, febrile condition for the whole body politic and have, in particular, unfortunate consequences to the national economy. Means must be found to build up a healthy defense system which will not receive shots-in-the-arm in periods of alarm and powerful soporifics in periods of comparative calm.

This healthy state of affairs cannot be brought about, it may confidently be predicted, unless there be an entirely new approach to the problem of national defense. The professional officer is powerless to deal with the phenomenon, because, in the public eye and in the Congressional mind, he is associated with a vested interest. In times of apathy he is regarded with suspicion, in time of alarm with undue reverence. Only the scholar is capable of maintaining a continuous, objective, and documented study of the problem. Experience shows that comparable results cannot

be expected from the public, the politician, the government, or even the armed services. Furthermore, only the scholar can create a vast reservoir of competence in the field. The people whom he teaches and for whom he writes today will be the voters, teachers, reserve officers, and statesmen of tomorrow. No such reservoir of competence now exists, but it requires no great imagination to see, did it exist, what it would mean to the national morale, the national economy, and the national security in the existing crisis. Studies now undertaken will have some influence, of course, before the present emergency is passed. But their greatest importance will be in laying sound and broad foundations for a national military policy in the longer future which will be concerned not merely with a passing crisis--however menacing and prolonged--but will be intimately related to our political ideals, geographical position, industrial resources, governmental institutions, standard of living, and long-run national objectives.

In the past our apparent invulnerability, combined with the balance of political and economic forces in Europe and the Far East, made a coherent military policy, however desirable, discretionary rather than imperative. Such is no longer the case, for the tragic fact seems to be that for some time to come the world will be ruled by power politics in which the United States already has taken a conspicuous role. The American Way appears destined to receive an armor-plating and a streamlining. The militarization of America, however, would be a tragedy of the first magnitude. But there can be no militarism where there is a nice balance and an effective cooperation between professional and civilian interest in and control over political and military strategy. Unless, therefore, the social scientist takes a conspicuous and far-sighted position of leadership in the process of planning the national defense, we shall lose some of the values which it is essential that we retain and we shall, in the end, be the less rather than the more secure.

SEP

THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

Our Problem, Our Potential, Our Policy

A Memorandum by

Edward Mead Earle
The Institute for Advanced Study

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Princeton, New Jersey

October, 1940

THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

Our Problem, Our Potential, Our Policy

In an earlier memorandum, "Studies of National Defense an Obligation of Scholarship," I raised the following questions: Are military affairs a legitimate and, indeed, a vital concern of the political and social scientist? If so, what can he contribute in point of view, in method, and in content which cannot be or ordinarily is not contributed by the professional army or navy officer? There remains a third question: What topics, in particular, might profitably engage the attention of the scholar not only in the near future but over a longer period of study and research? Over a long period of time it will be desirable and even necessary to undertake basic research in military problems and in war as a fundamental social phenomenon. For the present it is the part of wisdom to concentrate attention upon the immediate military problems, the military potential, and the military policy of the United States, keeping in mind, however, their relationship to world-wide conditions.

The following specific topics are suggested, without reference to relative immediacy and importance and without contention that the list is more than an illustration of possibilities once the field as a whole is given the attention which it deserves.

The Role of the Military Services in a Democracy

There is no adequate history of the military policy of the United States, similar to the as yet incompleted work of Harold and Margaret Sprout on the Navy (The Rise of American Naval Power, 1939, and Toward a New Order of Sea Power, 1940). This would seem to be the proper time to initiate such a study, which should be something more than history, valuable as history itself would be. It would require an analysis of the theories or assumptions upon which American armies heretofore have been recruited and trained, in time of peace and in time of war, and an examina-

tion of the adequacy of those theories to present conditions. It would take due account of the role which maintenance of a professional army (including in the case of England, a mercenary army) as contrasted with a militia and citizen soldiery, has played in British and American constitutional history and in the development of republican government in the United States. It would recount our previous experiences with conscription (as in the Civil War, both North and South, and in the Land Grant colleges) and with Selective Service in 1917-1918. It would discuss the theoretical question of the obligation of military service in organized society.

Such a study would, likewise, require an appraisal of the experience of others. Most pertinent is the theory and practice of universal military service in France, particularly in the Third French Republic, where the institution of conscription was intimately associated with the ideas of the Revolution and the system of liberalism and democracy which the Revolution implied. "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" all had their application to the French military system. In Germany, on the other hand, there was an altogether different conception of the role of the army; and aside from theoretical considerations, the army was in fact a bulwark of political conservatism and reaction--until the Third Reich, when an entirely different order of things supervened. In Great Britain the practice was still different and, incidentally, more in accord with our own ideals and our practices, except that in the recruitment of the officer class there was a marked favoritism for certain social groups which had consequences of its own, good, bad, or indifferent. During the past two years the experiences of England with compulsory service have been rich with suggestions for the United States. There have also been important changes in the Swiss military system which warrant our attention. And it cannot be too strongly emphasized that we need, and need very soon, an intensive study of the processes by which Nazi Germany has produced its powerful military machine. In any such studies, there should constantly be kept to the fore not so much questions

of tactics but problems of morale, physical training, education (military, vocational, and other), collaboration of military and civilian authority, the relations between the several branches of the service, and finally the return of the ~~soldier~~ to civilian life, including the question of service in an organized reserve. There is a great fund of interest and human affection invested in our New Army. Its success or failure will involve the utmost we can give in way of intelligent consideration of problems of morale and of the place which the Army is to play in promoting greater national unity as well as in our efforts to acquire an effective defense.

Closely associated with these questions are others: is the maintenance of a national army and a greatly enlarged professional navy consistent with the continuance of a liberal democracy? What has been the extent to which the military establishments of other powers (Russia, Japan, Germany, France, Britain) have been able to prejudice larger questions of national policy, both foreign and domestic? What effect will rearmament have upon health, the standard of living, freedom of thought and discussion, and the national psychology? Experience abroad seems to indicate there will be diversified answers to inquiries of this sort. And although the experience of others is important for an understanding of our own problems, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the road which we are to take will of necessity be charted with primary reference to American conditions. There is a task here not merely for the historian but for the political scientist, the economist, and the psychologist as well.

The Military Potential of the United States

There have been many discussions, particularly at the Geneva disarmament conferences, of the meaning of "military potential" or "war" potential. Taken as a whole, they have been less than satisfactory--however useful as a

point of departure--because of the dominance of political as distinct from scholarly motives. There has, however, been little study of the manifold factors which enter into the military power of the United States. We have had surveys of our national resources and of industrial capacity in relation to the demands of national defense. But the military potential demands more than these: it involves consideration of geographical position in the light of the new technologies of war and, especially, civil and military transportation; man power (including, in addition to mere numbers, education, intelligence, mechanical ability, loyalty, organization, adaptability, health, occupational skills, and the like); immigrant populations and the influence they may have upon the national military effort or upon industrial efficiency; vulnerability of war industries to attack or to transportation breakdowns by reason of concentration in the northeast; the character of political and military leadership (including the organization of the high command), and the like. There is no absolute military potential; there is a relative military potential which is available at a given time and operates with reference to given situations. As was pointed out in an earlier memorandum, there must be kept to the fore the difference between the potential strength of a nation and its existing strength.

A study of the military potential of the United States would in and of itself be of enormous importance to the body of knowledge available to social scientists and to the responsible officers of the government. In addition, however, it would have relevance to the fundamental questions of national policy which we are going to have to face as a people. It is useless to have a diplomatic frontier which lies far beyond the boundaries of any military frontier we can hope to defend; in other words, we should not, as a rule, formulate policies to which in the last analysis we cannot give effect should they be challenged by armed force. This is not to say that we have been underestimating the ultimate military potentialities of the United States; on the contrary, it is probable that we have failed to appreciate

the immediate striking power of the United States in defense of many of the policies which we have enunciated vis-a-vis Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. But however this may be, it is impossible to formulate, either for academic or for practical purposes, any clear-cut picture of the place of the United States in international politics unless we understand the weight and extent of our actual and potential military strength.

What is more, we need to know how the power we possess (particularly our economic power) can be used, in time of peace as well as in time of war, in the furtherance of national policy--so that we shall not increase the strength of potential enemies or weaken ourselves or the powers whose interests most nearly coincide with those of the United States. The fact is: we have been drawn into a power-competition much against our hopes and we have to measure, as far as possible, the factors of our strength and of our weaknesses as well as to speculate on the ~~un~~ponderables.

The military potential of the United States has not heretofore been the result of conscious and purposeful forces but has been an incidental development in a social and economic system which has been concerned with "welfare" rather than with "military" objectives. Whether the future will change this fundamental fact remains to be seen. We must at least understand, however, the fundamental relationships between guns and butter.

The Concept of Hemispheric Defense

At present, as a result of a long series of developments since the original enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States stands officially committed to the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere--not only against military invasion but against any attempt on the part of European or Asiatic powers to "extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent" or to control the

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"destiny" of any Latin-American state "in any manner." It can hardly be doubted that the existence of this policy over the past century and a quarter has been a contributing factor in world stability. But it can be questioned whether the Monroe Doctrine has not been enforced more by moral sanctions and by the existence of a balance of power in the Atlantic and Pacific areas than by any effective military support which the United States has given it or is now prepared to give it in the event of a showdown. As the balance of power in the world is now upset and may, indeed, be destroyed for some time to come, and as moral forces seem to have less weight than heretofore in the world as now constituted, it may well be that the United States must reconcile itself to maintaining an establishment on land, at sea, and in the air capable of giving effect to the Monroe Doctrine (as supplemented by certain acts of Pan American Conferences) by military force and, perhaps in addition, by military alliances. At the moment it seems as if the opinion of the American people, formulated with the help of such data as they now have at their disposal, is in accord with the official policy of maintaining the integrity of the Hemisphere by all necessary means.

But the wish is not necessarily father to the deed. As has previously been said in this memorandum, we should not have a policy which is incapable of military implementation; we should not have a diplomatic frontier which does not approximate a defensible military frontier. Sooner or later we must face the question whether we can in fact, whatever our wish, maintain forces capable of resisting both armed invasion and ideological penetration of the twenty republics to the south of our own border. And if we could maintain such forces, what would be the cost, social as well as financial, of so doing? Or is it conceivable that the political and military objectives of our Latin American policy might not be as well or better served by a narrower delimitation of our diplomatic and military frontiers? If the present policy is to be continued, how shall we construct for it a solid founda-

tion in those elements of power which can resist the assaults of the totalitarian powers?

As military power now involves a vast complex of forces--economic, political, psychological, ideological, racial, religious, geographic, and the like--it is doubtful if an answer to any of these questions can be given in terms of strategic positions and weight of armaments alone. The writer of this memorandum does not pretend to know the answers. But he does know that the problem of cooperation between the United States (and Canada) with the Latin American republics is a complicated and not a simple problem which will not be solved by political pronouncements, however well intended or however honored by past observance. He also knows that there are a good many ~~anti-stabilizing~~ ^{centrifugal} forces at work in Central and South America and that situations may well arise which will be made to order for the sinister methods and purposes of the totalitarian states. It will be universally agreed that it would be a serious threat to the security of the United States, as well as a tragedy of the first magnitude for Latin America itself, if our neighbor republics were to become the stakes of European diplomacy or were to be Balkanized by competitive trade and armament policies devised and fostered by outside influences. To prevent all of this is a task of the first magnitude. It is a problem in military strategy in the first instance. But it is also an economic problem. And it has emotional and psychological factors of far-reaching influence. It will require as much concentrated intelligence, sympathetically applied, as it can be given. It deserves all the effort we can spare. But it also requires cold-blooded, scholarly analysis and appraisal of all the facts in the case, with only such consideration to precedent as seems to be warranted by experience.

Out of such research might come one or more conclusions. It might be found that the concept of hemispheric solidarity has real substance, in which case hemispheric defense may be a less difficult task than appears on the surface. On

the other hand, it might be concluded that hemispheric solidarity does not now exist but that effective measures must be taken to make it a reality in a measurable future. Or it might seem to be the part of wisdom to recommend serious consideration of an alternative policy which would--to pick such an alternative policy at random--limit our diplomatic and strategic commitments to an area in the Caribbean and South America which would assure the defense of the Canal Zone and the approaches to this Hemisphere from the west coast of Africa. But whatever the conclusions (which certainly should set forth at some length all the conceivable alternatives available to us), there can be little doubt of the great utility, as well as the inherent scholarly interest, of a project of this kind. That it would cut across the boundaries of several academic disciplines goes without saying.

The Strategic Position of the United States
in the Far East

This would not attempt to usurp the duties of the professional officer in appraising what is admittedly a complicated and delicate problem. It would rather concern itself with some of the fundamental data, an understanding of which is essential to intelligent discussion and conclusions. It would seek to indicate the difference between causes of conflict in the Pacific which are transitory and those which are likely to endure for some time to come. As in the case of the study of hemispheric defense, it would require a thorough-going, rational examination of the policies which we have heretofore pursued and should we decide upon their continuance, would seek to determine whether they are capable of effective implementation, both economic and military. In the event that our historic policies require modification, in what respect?

Introspective rather than retrospective scholarship of this kind would seem to be particularly imperative in the case of the Far East because of the entirely new situation created by the formation of the Triple Axis. As Sir Robert Peel once said

in another connection, "We walk, if not in danger, at least in darkness." Although there may be some question of the wisdom of isolating a geographical area for examination without reference to our military problem as a whole, it would seem to be justified in the case of the Pacific region as well as in the case of Latin America. And it would, of course, be hoped that the research conducted in Far Eastern affairs would not be hermetically sealed against appropriate reference to world conditions.

The crux of our Far Eastern problem is, of course, the military and imperialistic resurgence of Japan, accompanied by the rapid decline throughout Asia of the prestige and power of the West. To what extent does the Japanese program of a "New Order" menace vital interests of the United States? If we are determined to resist Japanese expansion, what are the means at our disposal? Is it possible for us to maintain, at a cost which we are willing to pay, a military and naval establishment capable of meeting her in her own sphere with reasonable chances of success? Should China and perhaps Russia be made actual if not nominal allies in such a program? To what extent would an economic blockade of Japan (supplemented, if necessary, by long-range naval activity) bring her to terms? What would be the effect upon our internal economy of economic sanctions against Japan? In the circumstances, should we reconsider the Tydings-McDuffie Act which sets the Philippines free in 1946? If not, should we go further than the Act in reserving military, naval, and commercial aviation bases in the Islands? Should we fortify Guam? Should we acquire the use of Singapore or should we even consider its virtual acquisition from Great Britain? What should be the political and military relationships between the United States and Australia and New Zealand in the event of a British defeat by Germany? What should we do, if anything, in the way of denunciation of the Washington Treaties insofar as they still restrict our freedom of action? Or should we continue to observe them because they have heretofore been a concrete expression of our hopes and aspirations?

What part do the Dutch and British East Indies occupy in our economy, particularly with reference to such strategic commodities as rubber, tin, and quinine? How far could we locate and encourage other sources of supply (here there would be a tie-up with the Hemispheric defense study) or depend upon synthetic substitutes? To what extent would Japanese occupation of these territories be prejudicial to our interests in times less critical than the present? Or would Japanese dependence upon the American market for disposal of East Indian products outweigh our dependence upon them?

Quite aside from such economic and strategic considerations, can the United States stand by and witness the deterioration of international society which would be inherent in a tripartite plundering of the Far East by Germany, Italy, and Japan?

If it be objected that these questions are political rather than military, it must be pointed out that in the Far East (as in certain other regions like the Mediterranean) it is virtually impossible to isolate political factors from military factors. It was the basic premise of the Washington Conference, for example, that there could be no strategic settlement which was not inseparably tied with a political settlement and that there was no possibility of a political and economic realignment unless it were accompanied by compensatory measures of a military and naval character. It was because the Washington Treaties were at first believed to offer an all-round sense of security in the entire Pacific area that they were of genuine significance to international politics and had a marked influence for a time in easing political tension the world over.

Civilian Control of Military Policy

This is a subject to which Professors Lindsay Rogers, of Columbia, and Pendelton Herring, of Harvard, have given some attention. Professor Rogers has published two noteworthy articles in Foreign Affairs, and Professor Herring has recently brought out an extensive bibliography of the available materials. It is

understood, however, that neither of them proposes to carry his research much further at this time, except that Professor Herring is conducting a seminar on some phases of the subject at the Littauer School.

There is still much to be done on this subject, however, which will require amplification at a later date.

Military Policy as a Problem of Legislation and Administration

The formulation and enactment of legislation dealing with military and naval affairs has heretofore been affected by the character of the American system of government and politics. It is not suggested that the system itself need necessarily be changed. But it is believed that a study of the processes by which legislation is framed and administered would throw a good deal of light on some of our problems of national defense. In the formulation of defense policies, the Executive, the armed forces, private groups, several committees of the House and Senate, and ultimately the Congress as a whole have special roles to fill. The President's relations with his secretaries of War and of the Navy and with the commissioned officers of the services; the relations between the War and Navy departments, with special reference to the critical question of air power; the planning functions of the Army General Staff, the Office of Naval Operations, the Navy General Board, and other professional bodies; the process of framing estimates within the War and Navy Departments; the attitude of the armed services toward civilian cooperation and advice; the relation of these services with Congress in general and with Congressional committees in particular; the activities of private pressure groups in relation to military legislation; the character of Congressional hearings and debates; the influence of sectional rivalries and special economic interests--factual studies of these factors (some of which admittedly would be difficult of documentation) would throw a flood-light upon some of the shortcomings which heretofore have marked our

defense system. Such studies, also, would keep in mind the marked influence which war scares, on the one hand, and periods of public apathy, on the other, have had on the processes of legislation. In the political campaign of 1940 all sorts of charges were bandied about by representatives of both parties without cognizance of the patent fact that many of our difficulties grow out of the system by which military appropriations are determined and are subsequently given effect.

The process of military preparedness begins with planning and legislation but ends with administration. The best planned armament program will fall short of its objectives unless it is intelligently carried into execution. It is an open secret that in the United States the administration of military affairs leaves something to be desired. Some of our shortcomings have been indicated in a former memorandum: the lack of distinction of our secretaries of War and the Navy in the past, for example, and the inability of the President, in view of all the pressing demands upon his time, to give adequate time to what has heretofore been regarded as a matter which somehow or other would take care of itself. There are other factors which require examination: the recruitment and education of officers; methods of promotion within the commissioned personnel; the organization of the War and Navy departments; the relations between the services, as well as between the several branches of each of the services. Studies of this character would have to be critical of the existing system but not hostile to it; they should be scholarly and not political in character.

Closely connected with all of this is the universally acknowledged necessity of more careful and more far-sighted planning of the national defense in all of its various aspects. Whether we require a Council of National Defense, with a permanent secretariat, or whether a different device would serve our purpose can only be decided after a thorough study has been made of the experiences of other countries-- France and Great Britain and, above all, Nazi Germany. For whatever we may think of the Nazi system as a whole, it has demonstrated the importance to military success of a complete integration of national policies, as well as effective collaboration

between all branches of the armed establishment.

Conclusion

The topics given above by no means constitute a syllabus of the subject as a whole. There are others which might be mentioned en passant and for each of which a detailed prospectus might easily be drafted:

European Lessons for American Preparedness
American Economic Power as a Weapon of Defense
Social Implications of a Military Economy
Technological Changes in Warfare and Their Influence on
World Politics
Changing Concepts of Peace and War
Psychological and Emotional Weapons of War: the Crucial
Problem of Morale

It is not deemed necessary in this memorandum, however, to indicate more than the possibilities of the field as a whole. There is, indeed, more to be done than any research program could hope to do in several years. And the results of any single project will suggest new approaches and new subjects for investigation.

Perhaps one final question needs to be raised. Is it possible for the scholar to study war and preparedness for war and still maintain his scholarly objectivity? Admittedly, military affairs are closely bound up with powerful emotions, and it is not always easy to view them without patriotic or nationalistic bias. And even if one could, it might not be altogether desirable to do so. Heretofore scholars have largely abandoned the field to others. But ignoring a problem or running away from it is no approach to its solution. National defense has always been a powerful motive in American history. It is more so now than ever. And, if contemporary affairs are any indication of the future, it will continue to be so for some time to come. There is no danger that intelligence will be degraded to the mentality of an old-fashioned drill sergeant just because it concerns itself with military affairs. In fact, militarism occurs only when civilian influence is superseded by the military to such an extent that the latter takes command of national policy. One of the surest

ways to avoid the militarization of our world is, within the United States at least, to maintain a considerable body of civilian interest and competence in what is one of the basic problems of all government and, therefore, of self-government: the common defense. In creating and sustaining civilian interest in military affairs the scholar has a special place of responsibility. In discharging an obligation to the nation he can, at the same time, make a valuable contribution to the several branches of the social sciences which, whether they will or no, have found that rearmament has been crowding into their purview with increasing insistence for almost three decades. Surely it is no reflection upon scientific inquiry if, in addition to being worth while of and for itself, it serve the cause of the nation and of democracy in this great human crisis and help to guard against the recurrence of similar crises.

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